Peo in Interest of CM

25CA2431 Peo in Interest of CM 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2431
Alamosa County District Court No. 24JV30017
Honorable Amanda C. Hopkins, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.M., a Child,

and Concerning M.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Harris and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2026

Jason T. Kelly, County Attorney, Alamosa, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, M.M. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with C.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In March 2024, the Alamosa County Department of Human

Services became involved with the family following reports of neglect

and possible sexual abuse of the then-three-year-old child, as well

as concerns about mother’s substance abuse and lack of protective

capacity. Soon after, the juvenile court granted the Department

temporary legal custody of the child, and the Department filed a

petition in dependency or neglect. The court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Eighteen months after the Department filed the petition,

and following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court

granted the motion and terminated mother’s legal relationship with

the child.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶4 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

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dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶5 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a

department of human services satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear

error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those

facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The

credibility of witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of

the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn from the

evidence are within the discretion of the juvenile court. A.M., ¶ 15.

III. Judicial Notice

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by taking

judicial notice of the prior dependency or neglect case involving

mother, the child, and the child’s father, M.C. (father). Specifically,

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mother argues that the juvenile court erred by taking notice of

pleadings that contained allegations “inherently subject to

reasonable dispute” and violated her right to due process by

depriving her of notice of the allegations against her. We conclude

that this contention is not preserved.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is

not subject to reasonable dispute and is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or (2) capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. CRE 201(b). A court

may also take judicial notice of its own records. In Interest of

C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433, 442 (Colo. App. 2009). But a court may not

take judicial notice of facts on the issue the parties are litigating.

Id. Judicial notice must be exercised “cautiously because its

purpose is to bypass the usual factfinding process.” Quintana v.

City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193, 1199 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶8 We review the juvenile court’s decision to take judicial notice

for an abuse of discretion. Id. A juvenile court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

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or unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

B. Analysis

¶9 At the termination hearing, the Department asked the juvenile

court to take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in the prior

dependency or neglect proceeding, which resulted in termination of

father’s parental rights and the child’s return to mother’s care.

Mother objected, arguing that “it would be prejudicial to [mother] to

show or make some sort of propensity argument,” and requested

that the court only “consider the facts in this case specifically.” The

juvenile court took judicial notice of “the pleadings and filings in the

previous matter” over mother’s objection.

¶ 10 The Department and the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) assert

that mother did not preserve her argument. We agree. True, as

mother asserts, she objected to the Department’s request that the

court take judicial notice of the prior proceeding. But raising an

objection on the basis of “propensity” is insufficient to preserve

mother’s contentions that the juvenile court violated her due

process rights and erred by taking judicial notice of mere

allegations, not undisputed facts. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA

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36, ¶ 37 (“An issue is unpreserved for review when . . . an objection

or request was made in the trial court, but on grounds different

from those raised on appeal . . . .” (citations omitted)). Thus, we

decline to address this issue. See Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

2023 COA 107, ¶ 25 (“In civil cases, arguments never presented to,

considered by, or ruled upon by a district court may not be raised

for the first time on appeal.”).

IV. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 11 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

her treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 12 Except in some limited circumstances not applicable here, a

juvenile court must adopt an appropriate treatment plan for a

parent following a dispositional hearing. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S.

2025; People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 15. The

treatment plan seeks to preserve the parent-child legal relationship

by assisting the parent in overcoming the problems that required

intervention with the family. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA

57M, ¶ 25. Therefore, an appropriate treatment plan is one that is

approved by the court, relates to the child’s needs, and provides

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treatment objectives that are reasonably calculated to render the

parent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a

reasonable time. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of

K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 13. A juvenile court has discretion in

formulating a treatment plan that relates to the child’s needs and is

reasonably calculated to render the parent fit within a reasonable

time. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 32.

¶ 13 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its

likelihood of success in reuniting the family, which we assess in

light of the facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the

plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.

2005). The court may modify a treatment plan when new

information or changed circumstances render a previously approved

treatment plan no longer appropriate. Z.P.S., ¶¶ 26-27. The fact

that a treatment plan is not ultimately successful does not mean

that it was inappropriate when the court approved it. People in

Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).

B. Preservation

¶ 14 The parties dispute preservation. The Department and GAL

contend that mother did not adequately preserve this issue because

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she never raised her belief that the treatment plan did not

adequately address her protective capacity. Mother argues that she

could not have preserved the issue because the juvenile court “did

not inform the parties that the biggest concern was ongoing contact

between [m]other and [father]” until it issued the order terminating

mother’s parental rights. Compare People in Interest of M.S., 129

P.3d 1086, 1088 (Colo. App. 2005) (declining to review a challenge

to the appropriateness of a treatment plan when the parent failed to

object to any deficiencies in the treatment plan before the

termination hearing), with People in Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d 727,

730 (Colo. App. 1981) (concluding that a parent need not object to a

treatment plan to challenge its appropriateness on appeal). But we

need not determine whether mother was required to preserve her

argument because even if we assume she preserved it, we discern

no basis for reversal.

C. Analysis

¶ 15 The juvenile court adopted a treatment plan for mother

requiring her to (1) sign releases of information upon request of the

Department; (2) attend family time to develop and maintain a bond

with the child; (3) complete a substance abuse evaluation, engage in

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substance abuse counseling, and provide drug tests as requested

by the Department; (4) learn and maintain protective parenting

skills; (5) meet the child’s medical, physical, and emotional needs;

(6) obtain adequate employment; and (7) maintain a safe and stable

home for the child.

¶ 16 As part of the order terminating mother’s parental rights, the

juvenile court reaffirmed its prior finding that mother’s treatment

plan was appropriate. But the court found that the treatment plan

was unsuccessful because mother exhibited the same problems it

was designed to address. The court focused on mother’s

unwillingness to verify her sobriety with the Department, lack of

employment throughout the case, inconsistent family time

attendance, noncompliance with the parenting class objective, and

lack of demonstrated ability to protect the child from father.

¶ 17 Mother asserts that, even though the juvenile court focused

primarily on her lack of protective parenting capacity when

terminating her parental rights, her treatment plan did not address

this concern. Specifically, she contends that the treatment plan

should have included services for “women empowerment” and

required her to engage in therapy to increase her protective capacity

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and learn how to set appropriate boundaries with father and

paternal grandmother. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 18 Mother’s treatment plan specifically required her to “learn and

maintain parenting skills that do not put [the child] at risk for

abuse or neglect.” As part of this objective, mother was required to

attend parenting classes, “learn and discuss appropriate

supervision” of the child, and demonstrate her ability to “keep [the

child] safe from physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse,

and/or neglect.” Mother fails to articulate why this objective, as

written, was not reasonably calculated to render her fit. She

implies, without any record support, that she needed additional

assistance “to understand how to remove herself from [father].”

But, two weeks before adopting the treatment plan, the juvenile

court advised mother about its concerns regarding the child’s

contact with father and paternal grandmother. And yet mother

requested no amendments or additions to the treatment plan. See

B.C., 122 P.3d at 1071. Nor did mother request any amendments

or modifications to the treatment plan after its adoption.

¶ 19 Furthermore, considering mother’s noncompliance with the

general protective parenting objective and the caseworker’s

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testimony that she struggled to “get [mother] engaged in any

services” other than family time, it is unclear how the inclusion of

additional objectives or action steps would have changed the

outcome of the case. See C.A.R. 35(c) (we may disregard any error

not affecting a party’s substantial rights); People in Interest of R.J.,

2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error affects a substantial right if it can be

said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s

outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding).

¶ 20 We discern no reversible error in the juvenile court’s finding

that mother’s treatment plan was appropriate.

V. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶ 21 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she did not substantially comply with her treatment plan. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 22 The parent is responsible for assuring compliance with, and

the success of, the treatment plan. People in Interest of C.T.S., 140

P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006). Absolute compliance with every

provision of the treatment plan is not required. Id. at 333.

However, partial compliance, or even substantial compliance, may

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not be sufficient to render the parent fit. People in Interest of

T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 23 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a

petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions apply. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In an EPP case, the juvenile court

cannot find that a parent substantially complied with a treatment

plan when the parent (1) has not attended family time, unless good

cause can be shown for failing to attend; or (2) exhibits the same

problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I).

B. Analysis

¶ 24 In determining that mother “only partially complied” with her

treatment plan, the juvenile court found that mother “exhibit[ed]

the same problems intended to be addressed by the treatment plan

without adequate improvement as set forth in [section]

19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).” The court acknowledged that mother had

“likely” obtained sobriety but found that any sobriety was “tenuous”

based on mother’s refusal to verify her sobriety to the Department.

Furthermore, the court found that mother had not shown the

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capability to maintain a stable home, maintained employment

throughout the case, demonstrated the ability to provide financially

for the child, completed a parenting class, consistently attended

family time, provided good cause for her missed family time

sessions, or shown the ability to protect the child from father.

¶ 25 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that mother had not consistently attended family time, built a bond

with the child, demonstrated an ability to meet the child’s needs, or

secured employment. At the time of the termination hearing, the

caseworker expressed concern about mother’s ongoing interactions

with father and her ability to maintain long-term sobriety. As a

result, the caseworker opined that mother had not substantially

complied with her treatment plan.

¶ 26 Nevertheless, mother asserts that because she was sober, had

housing, received financial support through Temporary Assistance

for Needy Families (TANF), cared for her younger child, and

remedied any concern about her contact with father by moving

thirty miles away from his city of residence, the juvenile court erred

by finding that she had not complied with her treatment plan. But

the court heard testimony regarding mother’s substance abuse

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treatment, sobriety, housing, TANF, and care of her younger child,

and it still found that mother was unfit for several reasons. See

T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 909. We cannot reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

¶ 27 Moreover, irrespective of all other treatment plan components,

the juvenile court found, with record support, that mother did not

attend all her scheduled family time and, for the most part, did not

provide good cause for the missed visits. The caseworker testified

that mother did not attend the majority of the family time visits

during the case and had not seen the child in the two months

preceding the termination hearing. Mother’s explanations for her

missed visits included that she needed her boss to “open the gate”

before she could leave for family time, her dogs ran away, and she

could not find a babysitter for her younger child. And several times

mother missed visits without providing any advance notice or

explanation.

¶ 28 In this EPP case, the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that mother failed to substantially comply with her

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treatment plan. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A).1 Consequently, we

discern no error.

VI. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 29 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and

reunify her with the child. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶ 30 The Department and GAL dispute preservation because

mother did not challenge the reasonableness of the Department’s

efforts before the termination hearing. Compare People in Interest of

D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355-56 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining to review a

reasonable efforts finding because the parent failed to object to

services before the termination hearing), with People in Interest of

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 914-18 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a

parent’s failure to object to services does not bar appellate review of

1 We decline to consider mother’s assertion, raised for the first time

in her reply brief, that the record did not support a conclusion that
she “had completely stopped visiting the child.” See In re Marriage
of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to address arguments
raised for the first time in the reply brief). In any event, the
evidence on this point was at best disputed, and it was the juvenile
court’s province to resolve that dispute. See People in Interest of
A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15

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a reasonable efforts finding). But we need not determine whether

mother was required to preserve her argument because even if we

assume she preserved it, we discern no basis for reversal.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 31 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite families.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114).

¶ 32 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section

19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

The services that “must be available and provided” as determined

by individual case planning include, among others, screenings,

assessments, home-based family and crisis counseling, information

and referral services to available public and private assistance

resources, family time, and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

Additional services may be required if funding is available,

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including transportation and family support services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 33 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the court should determine whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915, by “considering the totality of the circumstances and

accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33.

C. Analysis

¶ 34 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother. Underlying this

conclusion, the court found that the Department arranged family

time; offered transportation assistance; made referrals for drug

testing, parenting classes, and therapy; and assisted mother with

her housing search.

¶ 35 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that she offered to arrange virtual family time while mother engaged

in inpatient treatment, but mother declined; submitted referrals for

parenting time supervision, including therapeutic supervision;

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submitted referrals for parenting classes to two separate agencies,

but mother was discharged for noncommunication; tried multiple

times to schedule the parent-child interactional with mother;

offered bus passes and gas vouchers to mother; and resubmitted

referrals for drug testing each time mother was removed for

nonparticipation.

¶ 36 Nevertheless, crediting her own testimony, mother contends

that the Department failed to assist her with transportation,

housing, or substance abuse treatment. But the court considered

the conflicting testimony from the caseworker and mother regarding

these issues before finding the caseworker more credible. And it

was for the juvenile court to consider and weigh the evidence,

resolve any evidentiary conflicts, and make credibility findings. See

A.M., ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250

(Colo. 2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court,

particularly when it hears contradictory testimony on material

issues . . . .”).

¶ 37 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts because the

Department did not provide reunification or family therapy. True,

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the caseworker acknowledged that she did not make referrals for

family therapy. But she testified that, based on the child’s

outbursts and lack of a bond with mother, it was not “appropriate”

for the child to be in therapy with mother. The Department

ensured that the child was engaged in play therapy and tried to

discuss individual therapy, as well as the child’s traumas and

triggers, with mother “to try to get [their] relationship back on

track.” But mother did not believe there was an issue. Ultimately,

the caseworker opined that mother was not “engaging in services”

or “working on her end” to improve her relationship with the child.

See C.T.S., 140 P.3d at 335.

¶ 38 In light of the juvenile court’s findings, which enjoy record

support, we discern no error in its conclusion that the Department

made reasonable efforts. See My.K.M., ¶ 33.

VII. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 39 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination and that

termination was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 40 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In

considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,

¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other things,

(1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be

beneficial to the child, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA

195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see

People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009);

and (3) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, see

T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910-11.

¶ 41 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination. Id.

at ¶ 32.

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¶ 42 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are

bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its

findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 43 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination that would serve the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional needs. In particular, the court found that

the child needed the permanency that only adoption could provide.

In so finding, the court considered the foster parents’ preference for

adoption, the length of the child’s out-of-home placement, the

child’s reactions to family time, and the length of the EPP case.

¶ 44 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that the child exhibited concerning

behaviors — including nightmares, hitting, kicking, spitting, and

biting — following family time sessions. The caseworker also

described the lack of a bond between mother and the child. The

caseworker opined that the child needed a stable and permanent

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home that could only be assured through termination and adoption

and, thus, that termination best served the child’s physical, mental,

and emotional needs and conditions. See A.M., ¶ 32; see also

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011)

(“Permanent placement is not a viable less drastic alternative to

termination if the children need a stable, permanent home that can

only be assured by adoption.”).

¶ 45 Even so, relying on People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86,

mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

termination was in the child’s best interests because the court

recognized the value of preserving the child’s relationship with

mother. To be sure, in its oral ruling, the juvenile court said that

mother and the child had a relationship and acknowledged the

“value specifically to the child . . . in preserving” that relationship.

But the juvenile court did not formally adopt those findings in its

written order. See People in Interest of O.J.S., 844 P.2d 1230, 1233

(Colo. App. 1992) (“[T]he court has the authority to supplement and

modify the opinions it expressed in its oral remarks until the date

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judgment formally enters.”).2 And any benefit to the child of

maintaining a relationship with a parent is just one factor, among

many, for the court to consider when analyzing whether any less

drastic alternatives are in the child’s best interests. See A.R., ¶ 38.

The court ultimately found that, considering all relevant factors,

termination and adoption was in the child’s best interests,

notwithstanding the relationship between mother and the child.

¶ 46 Moreover, mother’s reliance on H.L.B. is misplaced. In H.L.B.,

a division of this court upheld a juvenile court’s judgment denying a

department’s motion to terminate a parent’s parental rights because

the record supported the juvenile court’s finding that an APR was in

the child’s best interests, even though a specific individual willing to

accept an APR had not been identified. H.L.B., ¶¶ 21, 25. In

contrast, here, irrespective of the availability of an individual willing

to accept an APR, the juvenile court found that termination and

adoption was in the child’s best interests. See A.M., ¶ 32; see also

2 Mother argues that the juvenile court’s less drastic alternative

finding is inconsistent with its order that mother continue to have
parenting time following termination and during the pendency of
this appeal, but the court rescinded its post-termination visitation
order in its final written order.

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H.L.B., ¶ 23 (“[W]hether a less drastic alternative is available is a

distinct consideration from a court’s later finding of whether that

alternative is in the child’s best interests.”). And because the record

supports the juvenile court’s finding, we must accept its

determination. See B.H., ¶ 80.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 47 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.

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