Peo in Interest of GJ

26CA0105 Peo in Interest of GJ 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0105
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30800
Honorable Michael A. O’Hara III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.J., a Child,

and Concerning A.M.R. and J.T.J.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Harris and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2025

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant A.M.R.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant J.T.J.
¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, J.T.J. (father) and

A.M.R. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with G.J. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The City and County of Denver Department of Human Services

filed a petition alleging that the parents, who were homeless, were

unable to provide the newborn child with safe care due to

substance use and mental health issues. Mother and father

admitted the petition, and the court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected. The child, initially placed in foster care

for a month, was moved to the care of paternal uncle for the

remainder of the case.

¶3 The court adopted treatment plans for each parent. As

relevant here, mother was required to: (1) complete a substance

abuse evaluation and follow any recommendations; (2) comply with

urinalysis testing; (3) engage in parenting classes and attend all

family time with the child; (4) maintain a working relationship with

case professionals; (5) locate and maintain safe housing for herself

and the child; and (6) seek out mental health treatment and follow

all recommendations. Seven months later, after the parents

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physically fought in front of the child during family time, the

Department added an objective that mother participate in healthy

relationships classes.

¶4 The Department filed a motion to terminate each parent’s

parental rights, asserting that neither parent had complied with

their treatment plan. The court granted the Department’s motion.

II. Father’s Argument

¶5 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating his

parental rights when an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

to paternal uncle would have been in the child’s best interests. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the juvenile court must consider and

eliminate less drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726

P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic

alternatives, a court must give primary consideration to the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

§ 19-3-604(3). The court may also consider other factors, including

whether permanent placement with a relative provides adequate

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permanence and stability for the child, People in Interest of T.E.M.,

124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005), and whether the

placement provider prefers adoption over an APR, People in Interest

of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31 (citing People in Interest of S.N-V., 300

P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011)).

¶7 Long-term or permanent placement with a family member,

short of termination, may not be a viable less drastic alternative if it

does not provide adequate permanence that adoption would provide

or it otherwise does not meet a child’s needs. People in Interest of

A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41. But a viable less drastic alternative

must do more than adequately meet a child’s needs; rather, it must

be in the child’s best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less

drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And we must affirm the juvenile

court’s decision if its findings are supported by the record. See

People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

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B. Analysis

¶8 The juvenile court found that there were no viable less drastic

alternatives to termination of parental rights in this case. And it

found that “it is in the child’s best interest to have the permanency

that only adoption [could] provide.” In reaching this conclusion, the

court explicitly gave primary consideration to the physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs of the child. It considered the

child’s young age and whether permanent placement with a relative

provided adequate stability for the child.

¶9 The court’s findings are supported by the record. Testimony

indicated that the child had spent all but the first of his fourteen

months of life in paternal uncle’s care and was well cared for. The

child had “an appropriate bond” with his paternal uncle’s partner

and children — the child’s cousins. A caseworker testified that the

child growing up with his cousins, who were close to his age, was in

the child’s best interest. And she opined that termination of

parental rights and adoption by paternal uncle was in the child’s

best interests.

¶ 10 Moreover, the record includes testimony that paternal uncle

disfavored an APR to the parents and that he and his partner

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wished to adopt the child. The record indicates that paternal uncle

and his partner did not want an APR because they worried about

being able to timely locate the parents for consent in case of a

medical emergency. They also worried about the potential

disruption that an APR would bring — specifically, having to return

to court regarding custody arrangements in the future. And they

had concerns about the volatility between the parents that they had

witnessed when they supervised family time.

¶ 11 While father asserts that his positive relationship with the

child was undisputed, the court found that the parents’ visitation

record suggested otherwise. This finding, too, has record support.

Mother and father were not fully compliant with family time. True,

their consistency had improved in the months before the

termination hearing, when family time was offered within walking

distance of where they were residing. But earlier in the case, they

sometimes did not attend or arrived “many, many hours late” to

parenting time.

¶ 12 Given this record evidence, which supports the court’s

determination regarding less drastic alternatives, we perceive no

basis for reversal. See B.H., ¶ 80.

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III. Mother’s Argument

¶ 13 Mother argues that there was a less drastic alternative in the

form of extending the case and giving her more time. We disagree

that this proposed resolution is properly characterized as a less

drastic alternative to termination. As we have already discussed,

the less drastic alternative analysis turns on whether there is a

permanent or long-term placement arrangement — such as an APR

— that would conclude the dependency or neglect proceeding

without terminating parental rights. However, rather than rejecting

mother’s argument outright, we opt to construe it as a challenge to

whether the court erred by finding that her conduct or condition

was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. See

§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(III); cf. B.H., ¶ 79 (construing father’s purported

reasonable efforts challenge as an assertion that there were less

drastic alternatives “rather than reject[ing] father’s argument

outright”).

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

under section 19-3-604 is a mixed question of fact and law. A.M.,

¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we

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review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 15 If a parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan,

the court is not required to allow the parent additional time to

comply. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 23. When

deciding whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable time,

the court may consider whether any change has occurred during

the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic or

long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. People in

Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). When, as

here, a child is under six years old, the court must consider the

expedited permanency planning provisions, which require that the

child be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Analysis

¶ 16 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit and unlikely to

become fit within a reasonable time. It found that she had a history

of substance abuse and mental health issues. She had not

complied with any substance abuse or mental health treatment,

and her “condition[] in this regard remain[ed] unchanged.”

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¶ 17 To be sure, mother experienced some success with her

treatment plan. For example, her ability to meet the child’s needs

during parenting time improved over the course of the case. Mother

also maintained a “very positive working relationship overall with

the Department.” Nevertheless, the record supports the court’s

findings regarding mother’s persistent substance abuse and mental

health issues.

¶ 18 Mother completed a substance use evaluation and an intake

appointment, but she did not engage in treatment. She only

infrequently completed urinalysis testing, and her drug tests were

positive. A caseworker testified that even after the case had been

open for more than a year, mother lacked an “understanding of how

substance use while parenting can negatively impact children.”

¶ 19 Regarding mother’s mental health, a casework supervisor

testified that, throughout the case, mother’s mood fluctuations

“cause[d] an unsafe environment.” For example, mother “punched

[father] in the face [during family time] because of an escalated

verbal argument that turned physical.” But mother did not engage

in mental health treatment or healthy relationships classes.

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¶ 20 Moreover, the court heard testimony that, given the length of

time the case had been open, mother was unlikely to reunify with

the child within a reasonable time.

¶ 21 Given the court’s reliance on the appropriate law and the

record evidence supporting its finding that mother could not

become fit within a reasonable time, we discern no error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.

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