Schneider v. ICAO

26CA0236 Schneider v ICAO 06-25-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0236
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 20189-2025

Jill Schneider,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Cherry Creek
School District No. 5,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Schutz and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 25, 2026

Overlook Law PLLC, Craig W. Clark, Hannah M. Cowden, Denver, Colorado, for
Petitioner

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of
Colorado

Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., M. Johnathan Koonce, Denver,
Colorado, for Respondent Cherry Creek School District No 5

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, Jill Schneider appeals a

final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel)

affirming a hearing officer’s decision to disqualify her from receiving

benefits following her separation from employment with the Cherry

Creek School District (the Employer). We affirm the Panel’s final

order.

I. Background

¶2 Schneider worked as a Human Resources Assistant for the

Employer. On June 6, 2025, at 7:56 a.m., she emailed her

supervisor that she was resigning “effective July 4.” In her email,

Schneider said she “greatly valued her time working with” the

Employer, was “committed to ensuring a smooth transition” during

her remaining time, and thanked “the entire HR team for support,

guidance and collaboration” throughout her employment. She also

said she would not be in that day due to a family matter.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, Schneider’s supervisor responded that

Schneider was still required to attend a scheduled in-person

meeting at 9:00 a.m. that morning with Sydney Broders, the

Employee Relations Liaison. Schneider was aware of the meeting

because, the day before, her supervisor sent her home early and

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instructed her to meet with Broders at 9:00 a.m. the next morning,

rather than report to work her usual 7:30 a.m. time. The meeting

was apparently intended to address concerns that Schneider made

unprofessional remarks about not receiving a promotion and

requested a coworker to take her place in onboarding the new hire

selected for that promotion.

¶4 When Schneider did not arrive for the 9:00 a.m. meeting,

Broders called and left a voicemail around 9:30 a.m., requesting

that Schneider return her call. When Schneider did not respond,

Broders left another voicemail advising Schneider that she was

being placed on paid administrative leave, but if she failed to come

to the office for the meeting, the leave would be unpaid.

¶5 Schneider eventually returned Broders’s call, explaining that

she could not attend the meeting in person and requesting that it

be held by phone. Broders denied this request. Schneider then

emailed Broders, explaining that her in-person unavailability was

due to a “personal matter with my parents.” Broders replied as

follows:

You were directed to report to [work] this
morning at 9am, and you did not show up.
Then when we spoke on the phone just before

2
noon today, you were again directed to come to
[work], at which time you stated that you
would not be coming. Refusal to follow the
directive that [your supervisor] gave you
yesterday and again this morning as well as
the directive . . . to report to [work] today is
insubordination. As a result, you will not be
paid leave time for two weeks and your
separation date will be effective today, June 6,
2025. As we discussed via phone, you can
either send us your updated written
resignation with today’s date by 3:00 pm, or
your employment with [Employer] will be
terminated.

In response, Schneider emailed Broders, “I resign effective

immediately.”

¶6 Alan Lavizzo, the Human Resources Director, emailed

Schneider, “Thank you Jill. We will process the separation as a

resignation. We will also pack up any personal items that you have.

Please let me know of a date next week when you can collect the

items.”

¶7 Following her resignation, Schneider applied for

unemployment benefits. A deputy for the Colorado Division of

Unemployment Insurance determined that she was disqualified

from receiving benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), C.R.S.

2025 (quitting employment for personal reasons). Schneider then

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requested a hearing to contest the deputy’s determination. The

hearing officer affirmed the disqualification but relied on a different

provision, section 8-73-108(5)(e)(I) (quitting employment due to

dissatisfaction with standard working conditions).

¶8 Schneider appealed the hearing officer’s decision, and the

Panel affirmed. The Panel further modified the disqualifying

provision to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(II) (quitting employment because

of dissatisfaction with supervision not shown to be other than that

reasonably to be expected in the proper performance of work).

II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶9 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if (1) the Panel

acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was

procured by fraud; (3) the findings of fact do not support the

decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. §

8-74-107(6)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2025. We review de novo ultimate

conclusions of fact and ultimate legal conclusions. Harbert v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 23, ¶¶ 8-9.

¶ 10 A claimant’s entitlement to benefits is determined by the

reason for the separation from employment, which is a matter to be

resolved by the trier of fact. Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,

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775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989). The trier of fact must evaluate

the totality of the evidence and determine the motivating factors in

the employee’s separation. Id.

III. Analysis

¶ 11 Schneider contends that the Panel erred by disqualifying her

from receiving benefits for the following reasons: (1) her separation

qualifies as a “termination in lieu of discharge” under section

8-73-108(4)(g), C.R.S. 2025; (2) the hearing officer’s factual finding

that she “quit because she did not want to attend an in-person

meeting” is rebutted by other “hard, certain evidence”; (3) her

working conditions were objectively unsatisfactory under section

8-73-108(4)(c); and (4) alternatively, she is entitled to partial

benefits under Diringer v. Industrial Commission, 712 P.2d 1091

(Colo. App. 1985) because her notice period was shortened by the

Employer. We disagree with these contentions.

A. First Resignation

¶ 12 Schneider argues that the Panel should have applied section

8-73-108(4)(g), which permits benefits when an employee, “after

being given the choice by his employer between being terminated,

furloughed, or laid off and replacing another worker, the worker has

5
elected to accept a termination, furlough, or layoff.” But Schneider

did not cite that subsection in her brief to the Panel, and as a

general rule, we do not consider arguments not presented to the

Panel. See McClaflin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,126 P.3d 288, 289

(Colo. App. 2005) (appellate court declined to consider issue

because claimant failed to raise it before the Panel).

¶ 13 Even if we were to consider Schneider’s argument, the plain

language of section 8-73-108(4)(g) does not support her position.

The statute applies only when an employee is offered a choice

“between being terminated, furloughed, or laid off and replacing

another worker.” See Keysight Techs., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals

Off., 2020 COA 29, ¶ 11 (“If the language is clear, we apply [a

statute] as written and need not resort to other tools of statutory

interpretation.”). Nothing in the record indicates that Schneider

was offered such a choice.

¶ 14 Schneider also asserts that the hearing officer and the Panel

should have treated her job separation as a “quit in lieu of

discharge.” Citing Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d

369, 371 (Colo. App. 1994), Schneider argues that a resignation is

treated as involuntary if the “employee quits in the reasonable belief

6
that termination is imminent.” But in Goddard, the worker was

notified that his position was at risk of being eliminated and he

chose a voluntary layoff instead, circumstances not present here.

Id. at 370. Schneider had already submitted her resignation before

any termination decision was made.

¶ 15 Schneider acknowledges in her brief that the June 6 meeting

was intended to address administrative leave and a possible

investigation. Broders testified that the meeting was “not intended

to be a due process conversation because I needed to conduct an

investigation first.” She intended to present a one-page document

outlining administrative leave and expectations during that period.

¶ 16 In its initial response to the Division’s questionnaire

concerning the job separation, the Employer wrote:

[Schneider] resigned, giving two weeks notice.
However, prior to the conclusion of her final
two weeks, HR was made aware of allegations
of misconduct. In the process of attempting to
investigate the allegations, [Schneider] was
directed to meet with Employee Relations for
due process. [Schneider] refused to meet with
the office of Employee relations, and was
informed that if she refused to meet, she would
be terminated. [Schneider] elected to resign
immediately in lieu of meeting with Human
Resources.

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¶ 17 The hearing officer determined, and the Panel agreed, that “the

event that initially triggered [Schneider] to tender her resignation

effective July 4, 2025, was the requirement that she attend a

scheduled meeting in person.” The hearing officer further found,

and the Panel agreed, that “while evidence was presented that the

effective date of [her] resignation was hastened after she refused to

attend the meeting, this does not change the ultimate nature of

[her] volitional act of tendering her resignation in an attempt to

forgo attending the scheduled in-person meeting.”

¶ 18 We agree that Schneider’s first resignation was a voluntary act

that resulted in her termination. See Cunliffe v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 51 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Colo. App. 2002) (“When a

claimant’s voluntary resignation sets in motion the chain of events

that ultimately results in unemployment, we cannot say that the

claimant was unemployed through no ‘fault’ of her own.”).

¶ 19 To avoid disqualification under section 8-73-108(5)(e) and

qualify for benefits, Schneider needed to establish that she became

“unemployed through ‘no fault’ of [her] own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App. 1998). For purposes of

the unemployment statutes, “fault” includes a “volitional act or the

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exercise of some control or choice in the circumstances leading to

the discharge from employment such that the claimant can be said

to be responsible for the termination.” Richards v. Winter Park

Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo. App. 1996). “Volition”

means the power or ability to choose and decide or to exercise some

control over the circumstances, as opposed to acting in a manner

that is “essentially involuntary” or “accidental.” Starr v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Off., 224 P.3d 1056, 1065 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 20 The hearing officer questioned Schneider about whether her

absence from the meeting was due to a family matter or her

discomfort with attending the meeting. Schneider answered, “I was

very uncomfortable going.” When asked, “Why did you tell them it

was a family matter,” Schneider responded that she was “dealing

with some things professionally and personally, and I just wanted

to reiterate that I wanted to take leave time that day.”

¶ 21 Broders testified that she offered Schneider the option to

attend the meeting later that day, but Schneider ultimately refused

to attend. Broders also testified that, as a human resources

employee, Schneider knew that such meetings required in-person

attendance.

9
¶ 22 It is the hearing officer’s responsibility to assess the credibility

of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and determine

the weight to be accorded the evidence. See Tilley v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). We may

interfere with the hearing officer’s credibility determinations only in

extreme circumstances, such as where the credited testimony is

rebutted by “hard, certain evidence,” making it error as a matter of

law to credit it. Halliburton Servs. v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571, 578

(Colo. 1986).

¶ 23 Schneider argues that Halliburton applies because, in her

view, the hearing officer’s credibility findings are rebutted by the

Employer’s form submitted to the Division, which she interprets as

classifying the job separation as “in lieu of discharge.” But this

interpretation is incorrect. The form identified the “Employer’s

reason for claimant’s separation” as “voluntary quit,” and when

asked, “What reason did the claimant give for quitting,” the

response was “in lieu of discharge.” Elsewhere in the form, the

Employer noted that Schneider “elected to resign immediately in

lieu of meeting with human resources.”

10
¶ 24 Schneider further contends that the hearing officer’s finding

overlooks Broders’ testimony that Schneider “resigned her position

in lieu of termination due to insubordination.” But as the Panel

observed, Broder also testified that Scheider submitted the first

resignation before the insubordination issue arose. We find no

error in the conclusion that Scheider’s first resignation was due to

her discomfort with attending the scheduled meeting.

¶ 25 Schneider also argues that Broders’ email, which gave her a

choice between resigning immediately or being terminated,

contradicts the finding that her initial resignation triggered the job

separation. But this argument disregards the fact that, at the time

of her initial resignation, she was not facing immediate termination.

Schneider testified that Broders’ second voicemail offered

administrative leave as an option. Schneider could have attended

the meeting to avoid immediate termination, but her choice —

refusal to attend the in-person meeting — ultimately led to her

resignation. See Cunliffe, 51 P.3d at 1090 (an employer who

accepts an employee’s unequivocal notice of resignation is entitled

to rely on it without the risk of being charged for compensation

benefits).

11
¶ 26 Upon reviewing the entire record, we reject Schneider’s

argument that the hearing officer’s findings were rebutted by hard,

certain evidence as contemplated by Halliburton.

B. Second Resignation

¶ 27 Schneider argues that the Employer’s actions amounted to a

“constructive discharge” and that “the hearing officer failed to

recognize that attempts at constructive discharge constitute a

substantial change in working conditions under section

8-73-108(4)(c).”

¶ 28 Section 8-73-108(4)(c) entitles an employee to unemployment

benefits if the job separation was due to “unsatisfactory or

hazardous working conditions.” Id. In making this determination,

the hearing officer should consider whether the working conditions

“are the same or substantially the same as the working conditions

generally prevailing among workers performing the same or similar

work.” Id.

¶ 29 Schneider points to several circumstances in support of her

claim that her working conditions were unsatisfactory. For

example, she refers to “eighteen months of broken promotion

promises and detrimental reliance,” the “requirement to fingerprint

12
and process the external candidate given the promised promotion,”

her “abrupt and unexplained removal from the workplace on

June 5,” her “past experiences of hostile treatment in Employee

Relations,” and a “coercive resign-or-be-fired ultimatum imposed

under a two-hour deadline.” She alleges that this “hostile

treatment” constituted “constructive discharge.”

¶ 30 But as the Panel recognized, “constructive discharge” occurs

when an employer creates intolerable or hostile working conditions

such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. See,

e.g., Krauss v. Cath. Health Initiatives Mountain Region, 66 P.3d 195

(Colo. App. 2003). The unemployment statutes do not specifically

provide for “constructive discharge”; rather, section 8-73-108(4)(c)

provides for an award when an employee quits due to

dissatisfaction with working conditions.

¶ 31 Whether working conditions are unsatisfactory is determined

by an objective standard. See Rodco Systems, Inc. v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 981 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Colo. App. 1999) (“[T]he issue is

whether a reasonable person in the claimant’s position would have

found the actual working conditions, as determined by the hearing

13
officer to have existed, to be so detrimental to that worker’s physical

or mental well-being as to warrant resignation from employment.”).

¶ 32 The hearing officer determined that the meeting Schneider was

required to attend was part of the Employer’s standard investigative

process and was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

Because in-person attendance was the standard procedure for such

meetings, the hearing officer concluded that this requirement

constituted a standard working condition generally prevailing

among similarly situated employees.

¶ 33 As for Schneider’s other complaints, we agree with the Panel

that she failed to show her working conditions were objectively

unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c). That provision

considers factors such as: (1) the degree of risk to the worker’s

health, safety, or morals; (2) the worker’s physical fitness, prior

training, experience, and prior earnings; (3) the distance of work

from the worker’s residence; and (4) the working conditions of

others performing the same or similar work in the locality. Id.

¶ 34 The Panel ultimately concluded that a reasonable person in

Schneider’s position would not have considered her working

14
conditions so unsatisfactory, as defined by statute, as to require

resignation. We discern no error in this determination.

C. Diringer Benefits

¶ 35 Schneider relies on Diringer to argue that she is entitled to

partial benefits because her notice period was shortened by the

Employer. We disagree.

¶ 36 In Diringer, the claimant — a law firm associate — told the

partners in early June that he would probably be leaving the firm in

September to move to California so his wife could pursue a

graduate degree. Diringer, 712 P.2d at 1091. A partner told him a

few days later that the firm planned to hire a replacement as soon

as possible, making his status with the firm uncertain. Id. At that

time, the claimant reiterated his desire to stay with the firm

through September. Id.

¶ 37 On June 29, the claimant was told that his last day would be

June 30 even though no replacement had been hired. Id. The firm

stated that there would have been no issue with his continued

employment had he not announced his intent to leave in

September. Id.

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¶ 38 On appeal, a division of this court held that “an employee

terminated under these circumstances is eligible for a full award of

benefits for this period.” Id. at 1092. Specifically, the division

explained that the “claimant cannot be said to have chosen to be

unemployed and unpaid during the period between [his]

termination and the effective date of [his] resignation.” Id. Thus, he

was unemployed through no fault of his own during that period. Id.

¶ 39 Unlike Diringer, however, Schneider failed to follow the

Employer’s policies during her notice period. At the hearing, the

Employer’s counsel asked Schneider a question about her first

resignation: “So during that period between June 6th and July 4th,

would you have continued to be employed?” Schneider answered,

“Yes, based on my resignation, correct.” Counsel then asked, “So

based on that, would you still be subject to directives from your

employer?” Schneider responded, “Yes.” Then, counsel asked her,

“Did you receive a directive to come into the building that day to

meet with Ms. Broders?” Schneider again answered, “Yes.” Finally,

counsel asked if she complied with that directive to which

Schneider responded, “I did not.”

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¶ 40 After considering this testimony as well as the entire record,

we discern no error in the Panel’s conclusion that Diringer does not

apply. Schneider’s desire to stay until July 4 did not obligate the

Employer to accept her proposed separation date, when she refused

to follow the Employer’s directives during the notice period. See

Cunliffe, 51 P.3d at 1089 (“Thus, we conclude that, for

unemployment compensation purposes, a voluntary resignation is

an unconditional event, the legal significance and finality of which

are not altered by the interval between the employee’s notice and

his or her departure from the job.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 41 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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