Marriage of Volovlek

25CA0522 Marriage of Volovlek 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0522
Pitkin County District Court No. 08DR34
Honorable Laura C. Makar, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Cristina Anderson,

Appellee,

and

Edward Allyn Volovlek,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Gomez and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 18, 2026

R&B Law, P.C., Josie L. Burt, Carbondale, Colorado, for Appellee

Edward Allyn Volovlek, Pro Se
¶1 Edward Allyn Volovlek (father) appeals the district court’s

order finding him in remedial contempt and imposing remedial

contempt sanctions against him for the failure to pay child support

to Cristina Anderson (mother). We affirm and remand the case so

the district court may determine an appropriate award of

reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs in accordance with this

opinion.

I. Background

¶2 The parties divorced in 2007 in Michigan, where an order for

child support was originally entered for the parties’ only child. The

parties registered their Michigan divorce decree in Colorado, and in

2010, via a joint stipulation that was adopted as an order of the

court, modified father’s child support obligation to $522 per month.

In June 2024, mother moved to have father held in both remedial

and punitive contempt for the failure to pay approximately $79,000

in child support and statutory interest, plus approximately $8,000

in unreimbursed medical expenses for the child.

¶3 After a hearing, the district court declined to hold father in

punitive contempt. However, the court found father to be in

remedial contempt given his longstanding failure to pay both child

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support and his share of the child’s medical expenses. In support,

the court found that it was undisputed that father was aware of the

child support order and, except for three small payments, father

had failed to pay child support since late 2015.

¶4 The district court also found that father had the ability to pay

mother the outstanding child support and medical expense

arrearages. The court cited father’s ability to earn at least

minimum wage in Michigan where he resided and the substantial

home equity that was available to him from his primary residence.

¶5 Accordingly, as a remedial sanction, the court fined father

$100 per day until he paid mother $90,888.90, which represented

his child support arrearage with statutory interest, and $7,773.24

for the medical expenses. However, the court gave father

approximately two and a half months to comply before the daily fine

would begin accruing.

¶6 The district court also awarded mother attorney fees and costs

related to the contempt proceeding in the amount of $11,474.86.

II. Remedial Contempt Finding and Sanctions

¶7 On multiple grounds, father challenges the district court’s

finding of remedial contempt and resulting sanction of a $100 per

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day fine. We conclude that many of father’s contentions are

unpreserved for appeal, and we are otherwise not persuaded that

the district court erred.

1. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶8 A court has the discretion to find a party in contempt, and we

will not reverse that decision unless the court abuses its discretion

reaching it. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23. A court

abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. In re Marriage

of Bergeson-Flanders, 2022 COA 18, ¶ 10.

¶9 One basis for a court’s contempt finding is when a party has

not complied with a lawful court order that the party knew about.

See Sheehan, ¶ 24 (citing In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 91

(Colo. App. 2008)); C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1) (defining “contempt” as

“disobedience or resistance by any person to or interference with

any lawful . . . order of the court”). Once those two factors have

been established, the burden shifts to the party to show that he or

she was unable to comply with the order. Sheehan, ¶ 24.

¶ 10 There are two types of contempt sanctions: punitive and

remedial. Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91. A court uses punitive sanctions,

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which are criminal in nature, to punish a party, and they require a

showing of willful disobedience on the part of the contemnor. Id. at

91-92. The district court in this case did not impose a punitive

sanction.

¶ 11 Rather, the district court imposed a remedial sanction.

“[R]emedial sanctions are civil in nature and are intended ‘to force

compliance with a lawful order or to compel performance of an act

within the person’s power or present ability to perform.’” Id. at 92

(citation omitted). The purpose of remedial sanctions is for the

benefit of another. See id. When the court orders a remedial

contempt sanction, it must specify the means by which the

contemnor can purge the contempt. See id.

¶ 12 To order a remedial sanction, the court must make “two

findings of present duty and ability to pay: one which supports the

contempt finding, and a second which justifies the imposition of a

remedial order.” In re Marriage of Hartt, 603 P.2d 970, 972 (Colo.

App. 1979).

2. Ability to Pay

¶ 13 As best as we can discern, father asserts that the district court

erred when it found that he had the ability to comply with the

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court’s orders by paying the arrearages owed to mother. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 14 Father first argues that the district court abused its discretion

by imputing income to him. But we conclude that any error was

harmless. It is true that, when assessing whether a party has the

ability to comply for remedial contempt purposes, the court is

generally prohibited from imputing income to the contemnor.

Sheehan, ¶¶ 37-39. This is because “a finding of a present ability to

comply based on the ability . . . to secure a better job places the

jailhouse keys in someone else’s hand.” Id. at ¶ 37.

¶ 15 But here, although the district court imputed income to father,

it did so at a level that was less than the amount of money that

father has conceded he actually makes. Specifically, the district

court imputed father a full-time income using the minimum wage in

Michigan, which is $12.48 per hour or approximately $26,000

annually. Yet, father testified at the hearing that he was earning

approximately $36,000 per year from his self-employment, and

consistent with that testimony, father’s opening brief represents

that he presently makes “less than $37,000” per year.

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¶ 16 Father has not explained how the court’s reliance on a level of

imputed income that is less than his actual income has prejudiced

him, and we therefore conclude that any error on the part of the

district court was harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61 (instructing courts to

disregard any error which “does not affect the substantial rights of

the parties”); People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo.

App. 2007) (an alleged error, without a valid allegation of prejudice,

is not grounds for reversal).

¶ 17 Similarly, father claims that the district court overvalued his

home and the equity available to him when assessing the resources

that he had available to pay the amounts owed to mother. The

district court found that it was uncontroverted that “whether the

Court looks at that [$]500,000 or [$]700,000 number [for the

home’s value], either way the amount of equity that [father] has in

his personal residence . . . would allow him to pay the total amount

that is currently owed” to mother.

¶ 18 The district court’s findings as to father’s home equity were

supported by the record. Father suggested at the hearing that he

could use his home equity to satisfy his obligations to mother and

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“absolutely” agreed that he had “at least $180,000 of equity in the

home that [he could] pull.”

3. Nature of Sanction Imposed

¶ 19 We next consider and reject father’s contention that the

district court erred because the sanction that it imposed — a $100

per day fine until he paid the outstanding child support and

medical expenses owed to mother — was punitive in nature.

¶ 20 A remedial sanction “exists primarily to enforce obedience to a

trial court’s order,” In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d 493, 499

(Colo. 1999), and the “contemnor may purge [remedial contempt] by

complying with the court order in question,” id. at 498. Here,

contrary to father’s assertion, the daily fine imposed by the district

court was in fact a remedial sanction given that it was connected to

a specific act of compliance, namely his full payment of the

amounts owed to mother. While father complains that the sanction

was improper because it had “no termination date and no stated

purge condition other than payment in full,” we are not aware of

any legal authority placing such limits on remedial sanctions. And

the cases cited by father, to the extent that they even exist, do not

stand for such a proposition. Indeed, given that the district court

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found that father had the present ability to pay the total amount

currently owed to mother, coercing father’s full payment of the

outstanding child support and medical expenses arrearages was the

primary purpose of the remedial contempt sanction. See Nussbeck,

974 P.2d at 498-99; Hartt, 603 P.2d at 972.

4. District Court’s Award of Attorney Fees

¶ 21 Father also argues that the district court erred by awarding

mother her attorney fees arising from the contempt proceeding on

the sole ground that the court was required to equitably apportion

those fees based on the parties’ respective financial resources under

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. We disagree.

¶ 22 As a preliminary matter, because “a party is not required to

object to the trial court’s findings in the trial court to preserve a

challenge to those findings,” People in Interest of D.B., 2017 COA

139, ¶ 30, we reject mother’s assertion that father failed to preserve

this issue for our review.

¶ 23 Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded by father’s contention

because it is apparent that the district court awarded mother

attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), which provides for “[c]osts

and reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with the [remedial]

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contempt proceeding.” And an award of attorney fees under

C.R.C.P. 107(d) is distinct from other awards of attorney fees in

domestic relations proceedings. See Catron v. Catron, 577 P.2d

322, 324 (Colo. App. 1978) (recognizing that section 14-10-119

“controls the award of attorneys’ fees in a domestic relations case

except in contempt proceedings,” which fall under C.R.C.P. 107(d)).

Accordingly, section 14-10-119 did not apply, and the court did not

err by failing to consider the parties’ respective financial resources.

5. Father’s Unpreserved Contentions

¶ 24 Lastly, we decline to consider three of father’s contentions,

which he failed to preserve for our appellate review.

¶ 25 “It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower

court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.” Melat,

Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61,

¶ 18; see also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d

1182, 1188 n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“A party’s mere opposition to its

adversary’s request . . . does not preserve all potential avenues for

relief on appeal. We review only the specific arguments a party

pursued before the district court.”). And here, father failed to

present at least three of his contentions for appeal.

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¶ 26 To start, father did not preserve his allegation that the district

court violated his due process rights by admitting and considering

evidence that he never had an opportunity to review. Specifically,

father now claims that he did not receive copies of mother’s exhibits

in the mail until the day after the hearing. But even assuming that

father is correct as to when he received the exhibits, at no point did

he raise the issue of not having previously been able to review

mother’s exhibits at the hearing. Nor did he object to the admission

of any of mother’s exhibits. Thus, we decline to consider his

unpreserved contention of error. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.

DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo. 2009) (“In order to properly

preserve an objection to evidence admitted at trial, a timely and

specific objection must appear in the trial court record.”).

¶ 27 Next, while father now claims that the parties’ 2010

stipulation and resulting order concerning child support are

somehow invalid and unenforceable for lack of a definite

termination date, nowhere did father raise such an argument before

the district court. Therefore, this issue is also unpreserved. See

Melat, ¶ 18.

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¶ 28 Similarly, we conclude that father failed to preserve his

assertion that mother’s alleged noncompliance with the financial

information exchange provisions of the parties’ 2010 stipulation

somehow constituted a defense to a finding of remedial contempt.

While at the beginning of the hearing, father referenced a motion to

compel mother to comply with certain provisions of the parties’

stipulation, which he had filed a week before the hearing, he

conceded that he “got that in probably too late for consideration,”

and the court thus declined to consider any issues raised by father

in that motion. Moreover, father has not cited, nor have we been

able to locate, a place in the record where he argued that mother’s

alleged noncompliance with other provisions of the stipulation

somehow excused him from paying child support. See C.A.R.

28(a)(7)(A) (requiring the appellant to identify “the precise location

in the record where the issue was raised” in the record). Thus, this

issue is also unpreserved.

III. Mother’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 29 Mother requests an award of her appellate attorney fees and

costs on two separate grounds.

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¶ 30 First, mother asserts that, because she was awarded attorney

fees by the district court and prevailed in the contempt proceeding,

she is entitled to attorney fees and costs for defending father’s

appeal. A party seeking attorney fees must “explain the legal and

factual basis” for their request. C.A.R. 39.1. And here, whether to

award attorney fees and costs to mother is a close call given that

the legal authority she cited in support of her assertion is not

directly applicable to this proceeding. See Melssen v. Auto-Owners

Ins. Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 75 (awarding a successful appellant

attorney fees under the statutory scheme governing the

unreasonable delay or denial of insurance benefits, where the party

was also awarded attorney fees in the district court).

¶ 31 Yet, it remains apparent to us that the district court awarded

mother attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). And because costs

and attorney fees incurred in connection with an appeal of a

contempt order are costs and fees incurred “in connection with the

contempt proceedings,” mother is accordingly entitled to an award

of her appellate attorney fees and costs arising from her successful

defense of father’s appeal of the remedial contempt order. See

Madison Cap. Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 562 (Colo.

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App. 2009) (citing C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2)); In re Marriage of Dean, 2017

COA 51, ¶ 33. We therefore exercise our discretion under C.A.R.

39.1 and remand for the district court to determine an award of

mother’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs incurred in

defending against father’s appeal.

¶ 32 Because we conclude that mother is entitled to an award of

her appellate attorney fees and costs under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), we

need not decide whether she is alternatively entitled to an award of

attorney fees for having to respond to father’s opening brief, which

she alleges was substantially noncompliant with the appellate rules.

¶ 33 We do, however, pause to note that father’s brief largely failed

to follow the appellate rules. See C.A.R. 32(a) (font and formatting

requirements); C.A.R. 28(a)(5) (record citations); C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B)

(citations to legal authority). Moreover, three of the cases cited by

father — In re Marriage of Stevenson, In re Marriage of Lambert, and

In re Marriage of Rankin — do not appear to exist. This suggests to

us that portions of father’s brief may have been drafted with the use

of generative artificial intelligence (GAI). “[U]sing a GAI tool to draft

a legal document can pose serious risks if the user does not

thoroughly review the tool’s output.” Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone,

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LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 32. Self-represented litigants must be

particularly careful, as they “may not understand that a GAI tool

may confidently respond to a query regarding a legal topic,”

regardless of whether the answer contains errors and

hallucinations, which are case names and citations that a GAI tool

makes up. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 32.

¶ 34 Accordingly, father is now on notice that (1) future

noncompliance with C.A.R. 28 or other applicable appellate rules

could lead to our striking the offending brief or imposing other

appropriate sanctions, including dismissal, see C.A.R. 38(a), Bruce

v. City of Colo. Springs, 252 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo. App. 2010); and

(2) errors caused by GAI in future filings may result in sanctions.

See Al-Hamim, ¶ 41.

IV. Disposition

¶ 35 The order is affirmed. We remand the case so the district

court may determine an appropriate award of reasonable appellate

attorney fees and costs in accordance with this opinion.

¶ 36 JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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