Marriage of Gillis

25CA1632 Marriage of Gillis 06-11-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1632
Larimer County District Court No. 22DR30272
Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Kathryn Gillis,

Appellee,

and

Tommy Gillis,

Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Lipinsky and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 11, 2026

The Locke Law Firm, PC, Teresa Locke, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

The Drexler Law Group, PLLC, M. Addison Freebairn, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving

Tommy Gillis (husband) and Kathryn Gillis (wife), husband appeals

the district court’s order denying his C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, which

sought relief from certain provisions of the parties’ separation

agreement. We reverse the district court’s order and remand the

case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, a district court magistrate dissolved the parties’

marriage of nearly fourteen years. The parties executed a

separation agreement that was incorporated into the decree of

dissolution and made an order of the court. To equalize the division

of marital property, the separation agreement required husband to

pay wife $500,000 annually, starting in January 2024 and ending

in 2033. The agreement also entitled wife to a salary and other

compensation from husband’s business. Additionally, husband

agreed to pay wife $15,000 per month in contractually

non-modifiable maintenance, which would terminate only upon his

death or his full payment of the equalization amount.

¶3 In May 2025, husband filed a verified motion for relief from

judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b). In support of the motion, he

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alleged that, since executing the separation agreement, his business

had seen a significant decline in revenue and was incurring

substantial losses, rendering it impossible for him to pay wife

according to the agreement’s terms. Accordingly, husband asserted

that the enforcement of the separation agreement, including the

maintenance and the property equalization payment provisions,

had become unconscionable.

¶4 Husband specifically requested relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4),

which permits relief from a judgment if, as relevant here, “it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application,” and C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), which allows relief for “any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”

¶5 The district court denied husband’s motion as untimely

without reaching its merits.

II. Timeliness of Husband’s Motion

¶6 Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his motion because, even though he sought relief under

C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (5), the court concluded that the motion had

to be filed within six months of the decree. Because we agree that

the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining

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the timeliness of husband’s motion, we conclude that further

proceedings are necessary and remand the case for that purpose.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 We review a district court’s ruling on a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion

for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Seely, 689 P.2d 1154,

1160 (Colo. App. 1984). A district court abuses its discretion when

its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. In re

Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 23. Likewise, a district court

abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of

the law. Beren v. Beren, 2015 CO 29, ¶ 12. “We review de novo the

district court’s interpretation of a rule of civil procedure.” Garcia v.

Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 7.

¶8 A district court may grant relief from a judgment “upon such

terms as are just.” C.R.C.P. 60(b); see Davidson v. McClellan, 16

P.3d 233, 237 (Colo. 2001).

¶9 A party seeking relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(2) for

mistake, excusable neglect, or fraud must file the motion “within a

reasonable time” but “not more than 182 days after the judgment.”

C.R.C.P. 60(b); see Seely, 689 P.2d at 1159 (construing prior

version of rule, which required the motion to be filed within six

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months). Failure to seek relief within this time limit bars the

motion. Seely, 689 P.2d at 1159.

¶ 10 In contrast, a party seeking relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4),

because it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have

prospective effect, or under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), for any other reason

justifying relief from the judgment, must file the motion within a

“reasonable time” without an express deadline. C.R.C.P. 60(b); see

Seely, 689 P.2d at 1160 (concluding that a motion filed eight

months after the judgment entered was filed within a reasonable

time). What constitutes a reasonable time varies depending on the

facts of any given case. See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168,

172 (Colo. 1981) (recognizing that what constitutes a reasonable

time under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) or (5) “involves factual

considerations”).

B. Analysis

¶ 11 In denying husband’s motion, the district court initially

correctly acknowledged that, although any motion under Rule 60(b)

must be made within a reasonable time, a motion under Rule

60(b)(1) or (2) must be filed within 182 days of the challenged order

or judgment. The court then found that, “[a]lthough this matter

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may be able to fit under one of the later reasons listed in Rule 60(b),

[husband’s Rule] 60(b) motion [was not] filed within a ‘reasonable

time.’” The court next elaborated that “[a] reasonable time passes

six months after judgment.” The court accordingly concluded that,

because husband’s motion was filed two and a half years after the

entry of the decree, a reasonable time had passed, meaning that the

motion was time barred.

¶ 12 We agree with husband that the district court erred. The

court applied the wrong legal standard when, for purposes of

husband’s motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (5), it held that a

reasonable time necessarily passes six months after judgment. Yet,

C.R.C.P. 60(b) unambiguously applies a strict time limit of 182 days

(formerly six months, see Seely, 689 P.2d at 1159) only to motions

filed under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) or (2).

¶ 13 To support its conclusion that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) or

(5) must be filed within six months to be timely, the district court

relied on several older cases. However, each of those cases

addressed motions that, under the current rule, would be governed

by C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) or (2). For instance, the district court cited

Burson v. Burson, 369 P.2d 979, 980 (Colo. 1962), in which the

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supreme court held that a motion for relief from a judgment

because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect

was untimely when filed nine months after the entry of a divorce

decree. Other cases that the district court cited similarly involved

the strict time limits for motions based on mistake under C.R.C.P.

60(b)(1). See Peercy v. Peercy, 392 P.2d 609, 611 (Colo. 1964);

Sauls v. Sauls, 577 P.2d 771, 773 (Colo. App. 1977).

¶ 14 Wife suggests that the district court made sufficient findings to

support its conclusion that husband did not file his motion within a

reasonable time. We disagree. The court’s only finding on this

point was that husband filed his motion two and a half years after

the entry of the decree. The court did not explain why this delay

was unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the court denied

husband’s motion for reasons other than it was filed more than six

months after the decree, we are unable to ascertain the basis of the

court’s order, and further findings are required. See In re Marriage

of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008) (The district court

must make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently

explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis

of its decision.).

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¶ 15 In sum, because the district court applied the wrong legal

standard when denying husband’s motion and failed to make

adequate findings explaining why the two-and-a-half-year delay was

unreasonable, we reverse the order and remand the case for further

proceedings. On remand, the district court must make sufficient

findings to determine whether husband’s motion was filed within a

reasonable time, without employing a fixed six-month cutoff.

¶ 16 However, we reject husband’s contention that the district

court is required to hold a hearing on remand. Nothing in C.R.C.P.

60 requires a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Front

Range Partners v. Hyland Hills Metro. Park & Recreation Dist., 706

P.2d 1279, 1281 (Colo. 1985) (concluding that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion when it

reviewed the trial record without an evidentiary hearing).

Accordingly, the district court has the discretion to decide whether

a hearing on remand is necessary. See C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-15(4)

(“Motions shall be determined promptly if possible [and] [t]he court

has discretion to . . . set a hearing on the motion.”); Rozzi, 190 P.3d

at 822.

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C. Wife’s Other Contentions

¶ 17 Wife asserts that the district court’s order should be affirmed

on alternative grounds regardless of the timeliness of husband’s

motion. Specifically, she argues that the district court was barred

from granting husband relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b) because the

parties’ separation agreement was non-modifiable, absent the

parties’ written consent. Wife also claims that husband’s motion

represents an improper attempt to revalue his business after the

date of the marriage, in violation of section 14-10-113(5), C.R.S.

2025.

¶ 18 We decline to exercise our discretion to affirm the district

court’s order on alternative grounds. See Hunter v. SCL Health-

Front Range, Inc., 2022 COA 41, ¶¶ 24, 30 (recognizing the decision

to affirm on alternative grounds is discretionary). Although the

district court erred by denying husband’s motion as untimely, it

remains to be determined by the district court whether, under the

correct legal standard, husband filed his request for relief within a

reasonable time and therefore, may seek relief from the judgment in

the first place. Thus, the consideration of the alternative

arguments presented by wife is currently unnecessary.

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¶ 19 Moreover, even if the district court finds on remand that

husband’s motion was filed within a reasonable time, it has not yet

addressed the merits of husband’s motion and wife’s defenses to the

same, and we do not find it appropriate to prematurely weigh in on

these issues, particularly where factual findings may be necessary.

See Hunter, ¶ 25 (recognizing the general rule favoring the

resolution of disputes on their merits); Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP

Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 319 (Colo. 2010) (discussing

the equitable nature of the relief available under C.R.C.P. 60(b)).

¶ 20 By declining to address wife’s alternative arguments, we

express no opinion on the merits of husband’s motion under

C.R.C.P. 60(b) or wife’s corresponding defenses.

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE YUN concur.

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