Marriage of Hass

25CA1591 Marriage of Hass 06-11-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1591
Elbert County District Court No. 22DR30009
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Ashlynn Hass,

Appellee,

and

Zachary Hass,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 11, 2026

Griffiths Law, PC, Duncan Griffiths, Kimberly Newton, Lone Tree, Colorado, for
Appellee

Todd Collins & Associates, LLC, Todd Collins, Marc B. Tull, Elizabeth,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Zachary Hass (husband) appeals various portions of the

district court’s permanent orders entered in the dissolution of his

marriage to Ashlynn Hass (wife). We reverse the court’s property

division and retroactive child support order and remand for the

district court to reconsider both. In all other respects, we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Husband and wife were married in August 2017 and had a

child together about four years later. Husband’s family owns a

ranch where both parties lived and worked throughout the

marriage. Before the marriage, and as relevant here, husband

acquired fractional interests in multiple parcels of real property that

were part of the ranch. The parties separated in January 2022, and

wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage shortly thereafter.

¶3 A couple months after wife filed the petition, the parties filed a

joint motion asking the court to determine temporary parenting

time, maintenance, and child support. The court held a hearing

where it discussed with the parties that under the maintenance and

child support guidelines, husband should pay wife $2,026 for

maintenance and $410 for child support per month. After learning

that wife had transferred over $60,000 from a joint account to an

1
individual account before filing for dissolution, the court said that it

would allow wife to maintain access to those marital funds but

wouldn’t order husband to pay wife maintenance. The court thus

ordered wife to make the marital funds in her individual account

accessible to husband.

¶4 After asking each party how much they believed they needed

for monthly expenses and discussing with the parties the estimated

monthly costs for their child’s ongoing healthcare needs,1 the court

authorized both parties to spend $2,200 a month in “discretionary

spending” from their marital funds. That amount didn’t include the

child’s healthcare expenses.

¶5 More than two years later, the court held a permanent orders

hearing over the course of three days. The court heard testimony

from the parties, husband’s family, and the parties’ respective

experts regarding the interests in and value of the parties’ property,

which included three parcels of real property — referred to as A, C,

and D. Wife’s counsel offered her appraiser — Carissa Marler — as

1 The child was born with several serious and complicated medical

conditions, which have required ongoing surgeries and specialized
medical care.

2
an expert witness in the area of residential and rural appraisals.

Husband’s counsel didn’t object, and the court accepted Marler as a

real estate appraisal expert.

¶6 Husband acquired a 50% interest in Property A during the

marriage, after husband’s father deeded the property to husband

and his sister in 2019. The court found that the parties agreed that

husband’s interest in Property A was marital, its marital value was

$142,500, and its value should be allocated to husband.

¶7 For Property C, the court found that “[t]he parties seem to

agree that [husband] has a 25% interest in this property.” The

court found that Property C’s value at the date of marriage was

$265,000, and, at the time of the permanent orders hearing, the

value was $450,000. The increased value between the date of

marriage and the hearing was thus $185,000. The court then

found that husband’s “combined (separate and marital) interest

value” was $112,500, with $66,250 as husband’s separate property

and $46,250 as marital property.

¶8 The parties lived on Property D throughout their marriage and

considered it their marital home. Husband and his father

purchased this property in 2012 and both, along with husband’s

3
stepmother, are listed as borrowers on the mortgage. The court

found that Property D’s value at the date of the marriage in 2017

was $849,938.80, the mortgage balance was $210,817, and the

equity — which was husband’s separate property — was

$639,121.80. The court found that the property’s value at the time

of the hearing was $1,255,840, the mortgage balance was

$156,655.40, and the total equity was $1,099,184.60. Using those

figures, the court subtracted the 2017 equity amount of

$639,121.80 from the total equity of $1,099,184.60 and concluded

that the marital equity totaled $460,062.80.

¶9 When dividing the marital estate, the court concluded that it

was allocating marital assets of $785,025 to husband and $43,709

to wife. The court further concluded that husband’s separate and

marital property totaled approximately $2,000,000, while wife had

only $49,740. Because of this imbalance between the parties’

assets, the court ordered husband to pay wife an equalization

payment of $357,158. The court found that husband “ha[d] the

ability to pay that payment immediately” but also noted that “much

of [husband’s] assets [were] tied to other individuals.” Alternatively,

the court allowed husband to pay wife in four installments of

4
$100,000 between May 2025 and December 2025, which increased

the equalization payment total to $400,000. The court found this

fair and equitable under the circumstances because it incentivized

husband to pay wife early and mitigated losses that wife faced “by

not being able to invest property that [was] rightfully hers.”

¶ 10 The court ordered husband to pay wife $182 per month for

child support. The court concluded that “[t]here were no orders in

place regarding child support” during the pendency of the case, so

it ordered husband to pay wife $6,552 in retroactive child support.

¶ 11 Husband appeals the portions of the court’s permanent orders

related to its determination of the marital estate and its division

thereof. Husband also appeals the court’s order for retroactive

child support.

II. Applicable Legal Principles

A. Marital Estate Division

¶ 12 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a

marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See

§ 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA

42M, ¶ 28. “The key to an equitable distribution is fairness, not

5
mathematical precision.” In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55

(Colo. 1988).

¶ 13 Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine

whether an asset is marital or separate. § 14-10-113(1); In re

Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. Marital property is subject

to division and includes the appreciation of a spouse’s separate

property during the marriage. § 14-10-113(4); see In re Marriage of

Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 13. The court must value marital property as

of the date of the hearing on disposition of property.

§ 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4.

¶ 14 A court can only distribute marital property that exists at the

time of dissolution. See In re Marriage of Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264,

267 (Colo. App. 1998). And absent a finding that a spouse

dissipated property in anticipation of the dissolution or engaged in

conduct constituting economic fault, marital property disposed of

before the permanent orders hearing may not be included in the

marital estate. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA

95, ¶ 75 (defining dissipation as “when one spouse depletes the

marital estate for an improper or illegitimate purpose in

contemplation of the dissolution”). If marital assets have been

6
dissipated by one of the parties, then the assets must be valued as

of the last date they existed. Martinez v. Gutierrez-Martinez, 77 P.3d

827, 830 (Colo. App. 2003).

B. Child Support

¶ 15 “A child has a legal right to support from both parents, and

both parents have a continuing duty to provide reasonable support

for the child.” In re Marriage of Salas, 868 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Colo.

App. 1994). The district court may order a parent to pay retroactive

child support from the date of the filing of the petition for

dissolution to the month before the support obligation begins.

§ 14-10-115(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025. However, “[a] [district] court’s order

must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently

explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis

of its order and to enable the appellate court to determine the

grounds upon which it rendered its decision.” In re Marriage of

Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).

C. Standard of Review

¶ 16 “The district court’s classification of property as marital or

separate is a legal determination that is based on the court’s factual

findings.” Smith, ¶ 42. We review de novo the court’s application of

7
the law but defer to its factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. Id. The court’s valuation of property is binding on

appellate review unless those findings are clearly erroneous. In re

Marriage of Nordahl, 834 P.2d 838, 842 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 17 Absent a showing that the court abused its discretion, we

won’t disturb its equitable division of a marital estate, decision to

accept an expert witness’s testimony, or child support order. See

Medeiros, ¶ 28 (abuse of discretion standard for dividing a marital

estate); Meier v. McCoy, 119 P.3d 519, 521 (Colo. App. 2004) (abuse

of discretion standard for qualifying expert testimony); In re

Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 8 (abuse of discretion

standard for ordering child support). “A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or a misapplication of the law.” Medeiros, ¶ 28.

III. The Court Erred When It Divided the Marital Estate

¶ 18 As discussed below, we decline to consider husband’s

argument that the court erred when it accepted Marler’s appraisal

values, but we agree with him that the court made certain

calculation errors regarding the marital estate. We further conclude

8
that the court’s findings are insufficient to enable us to review

husband’s allegation that wife dissipated marital funds.

A. Marler’s Valuation Opinions

¶ 19 Husband argues that the court erred when it accepted Marler’s

valuation opinions related to the parcels in which he maintained

varying fractional interests. He argues that, under People v. Shreck,

22 P.3d 68, 70, 77 (Colo. 2001), Marler wasn’t qualified to opine on

“the impact of [his] fractional interest in her final value

calculations.”

¶ 20 However, husband waived this argument because his counsel

failed to object when wife’s counsel offered, and the court accepted,

Marler as an expert in the field of residential and rural real estate

appraisal. See In re Estate of Musso, 932 P.2d 853, 857 (Colo. App.

1997) (failing to object at trial to the issue raised on appeal is

deemed a waiver and forecloses appellate review). And we reject his

assertion that raising this argument in his post-trial motion

preserved this issue. See In re Marriage of McClure, 2024 COA 70,

¶ 7 (appellate courts typically don’t consider arguments raised for

the first time in a post-trial motion). Because husband waived any

argument about Marler’s qualifications, we decline to address this

9
contention further. See In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212,

1215 (Colo. App. 2011) (an appellate court won’t address issues not

presented in the district court).

B. Calculating the Marital Estate

1. Property A

¶ 21 Husband argues that it’s undisputed that he and his sister

each acquired a 50% interest in Property A when they were minors

and that husband’s father transferred to them their respective

interests in 2019. Husband thus argues that the court should have

deducted Property A’s premarital value from its total value because

the premarital value was his separate property. However, husband

conceded in the joint trial management certificate, his sworn

financial statements, his proposed marital estate division

spreadsheet, and his trial testimony that his 50% interest in

Property A was marital. Because husband conceded that the

entirety of his interest in Property A was marital, we deem his

argument waived and decline to further consider it. See In re

Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 254 (Colo. 1992) (holding that a

spouse who submitted financial affidavits treating particular

10
property as marital couldn’t then question on appeal the district

court’s classification of the property as marital).

2. Property C

¶ 22 Husband argues, and wife concedes, that the determination of

Property C’s marital value in the court’s written order is different

than the determination of value the court included in the marital

property division spreadsheet attached to the order. While wife

argues that the error is merely clerical, husband argues it resulted

in a 9.5% overstatement of the marital value of the property.

Specifically, the written order states that Property C’s marital value

is $46,250, while the spreadsheet says its value is $118,750. Thus,

the court attributed $72,500 more to Property C’s marital value in

the spreadsheet than it did in its written order.

¶ 23 Wife argues that we should still affirm the court’s $357,158

equalization payment because any error was harmless. Wife argues

that the court’s detailed findings “reflect its true intent” because

husband received over $2,000,000 in total assets.

¶ 24 A court’s error that affects only a small percentage of the

overall marital estate may be considered harmless. In re Marriage of

Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo. 2001). Given the overall value of

11
the parties’ marital property, viewed alone, an error of $72,500

could be considered harmless. However, when we consider the

court’s miscalculation of the value of Property C, along with its

other miscalculations — including its miscalculation of the value of

Property D, which we discuss next — we can’t conclude this error

was harmless.2 See id. (“[I]f the [district] court’s errors in a

particular case, viewed in the aggregate, affect a large percentage of

the marital estate, a remand of the case to the [district] court to

correct such errors is required.”).

3. Property D

¶ 25 Husband argues that the court erred when, in calculating the

value of his separate and marital property interests in Property D, it

failed to subtract his father’s 50% ownership interest (1) from the

property’s total value before deducting the mortgage from

2 The court’s written order repeatedly referenced the spreadsheet to

determine the value of husband’s marital property and total assets.
But despite making written findings that husband was entitled to
certain marital property and responsible for certain marital debts,
the court didn’t include all the values of those assets and debts in
its written calculation of the total value of his marital property. Put
differently, there are additional discrepancies between the court’s
written calculations and its valuation of those assets on the
spreadsheet attached to the order. We are unable to discern the
basis for the discrepancies.

12
husband’s remaining 50% interest, (2) after it determined the

property’s total equity. We disagree with his first contention but

agree with his second.

¶ 26 Husband provides no authority to support his first contention,

which contravenes how courts ordinarily calculate equity in real

property. See In re Marriage of Hiner, 710 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo.

1985) (calculating equity by subtracting the outstanding mortgage

from the appraised value). Accordingly, we reject his assertion that

the court’s method of calculating husband’s premarital equity in

Property D was erroneous.

¶ 27 However, we agree that the court erred by not accounting for

husband’s father’s 50% interest in the property at all. Accepting

the court’s finding that the property was worth $849,938.80 at the

date of marriage and subtracting the then-existing mortgage

balance of $210,817 results in $639,121.80 in total premarital

equity. Because husband has a 50% interest in Property D, we

conclude that the court should have divided this number in half to

value husband’s separate property interest at $319,560.90.

13
¶ 28 Similarly, accepting the court’s value at the date of the hearing

as $1,255,8403 and subtracting the mortgage balance of

$156,655.40 results in $1,099,184.60 in total equity. The court

should have divided this number in half to determine husband’s

equity interest at the time of hearing, which was $549,592.30.

Subtracting the value of husband’s separate interest ($319,560.90)

from the value of his equity interest at the time of the hearing

($549,592.30) results in an appreciation of Property D’s value in the

amount of $230,031.40 as a marital asset.

¶ 29 Instead, the court neglected to account for husband’s father’s

partial interest when it concluded that husband had $639,122 in

separate interest and that the appreciation, which amounted to

$460,062.80, was marital. Additionally, the spreadsheet states that

the marital value of Property D was $303,408. Thus, in both the

written order and the spreadsheet, the court overstated husband’s

3 Husband argues that, “Without any explanation, the district court

adopted [wife’s] unsupported opinion that [Property D] was worth
$1,255,840.00. This is more than [Marler’s] opinion that its value
for permanent orders was $1,250,000.” Husband then references
Marler’s valuation report in which she opined that Property D’s
value was $1,255,840 but said she rounded the number down to
$1,250,000. Thus, Marler’s report supports wife’s offered value of
$1,255,840.

14
separate interest in Property D by $319,561.10. And the court

overstated the marital equity on the spreadsheet by $73,376.60.

¶ 30 The court thus erred when it divided the marital estate based

on the incorrect conclusion that the marital estate had

$145,876.604 in additional assets and that husband maintained

$319,561.10 in additional separate property. See Balanson, 25

P.3d at 36, 42.

C. Dissipation of Marital Assets and Equalization Payment

¶ 31 Next, husband argues that wife dissipated marital funds and

that the court erred by failing to consider such dissipation when it

divided the marital estate and calculated child support. The court

identified in the beginning of its written order that “potential

dissipation of bank accounts and marital funds” was a disputed

issue. However, the court didn’t make any findings of fact or

conclusions of law regarding dissipation.

¶ 32 Whether a spouse dissipated marital property is a factual

question. Smith, ¶ 76. A court may consider a spouse’s dissipation

of marital assets as economic fault when it divides the marital

4 This includes the $72,500 overstatement from miscalculating the

marital interest in Property C and $73,376.60 from Property D.

15
estate. In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Colo.

App. 2006); see also In re Marriage of Anderson, 811 P.2d 419,

420-21 (Colo. App. 1990) (dissipation is a proper consideration for

property division). When a spouse raises dissipation for the court’s

consideration, it is incumbent on the other spouse who spent

marital funds to establish they were used for proper expenses. See

Martinez, 77 P.3d at 830.

¶ 33 Because the court didn’t make any findings about whether

wife dissipated marital assets or whether those assets, if any, were

considered in the court’s division of the marital estate, we can’t tell

whether the property division is equitable. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at

822. The court on remand should make specific findings regarding

whether wife used marital assets for an illegitimate purpose. See In

re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996). Only if

the court finds that wife’s use of marital assets was improper

should it consider the value of those assets in its property division

orders. See id.

¶ 34 Because we are remanding the case to the district court to

reconsider its division of the marital estate due to the

miscalculations identified above and consideration of whether wife

16
dissipated assets, we need not address husband’s argument that

the court abused its discretion when it determined that he had the

immediate ability to pay wife $357,158 for an equalization

payment.5 In remanding this case to the district court, we reject

husband’s apparent assertion that the district court doesn’t have

authority to order an equalization payment. In doing so, we

specifically note that the district court has authority to effect an

equitable division of the marital estate, which includes entering “a

variety of orders to implement its decision.” In re Marriage of Payne,

897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo. App. 1995). Additionally, the court must

consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the

remand. See In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 696 (Colo.

1993); § 14-10-113(1)(c).

5 In his appellate briefing, husband’s counsel cites two unpublished

opinions from this court in support of his argument. Absent
exceptions inapplicable here, this court’s policy prohibits citations
to our opinions that aren’t selected for official publication. Colo.
Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of
Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2026),
https://perma.cc/ZQW2-H29D. We trust counsel will adhere to
this policy in the future.

17
IV. Retroactive Child Support

¶ 35 Husband argues that the court overlooked the May 2022

temporary orders when it found that “[t]here were no orders in place

regarding child support while this case was pending.” In the

temporary orders, the court ordered that “both parties may spend

up to $2,200 a month of marital funds” from joint accounts. But

the record sheds little light on whether this authorization was

intended to cover temporary maintenance, child support, a

combination of both, or neither. Husband argues that the court’s

failure to consider the impact of the $2,200 monthly authorization,

along with wife’s other “economic circumstances,” amounted to

clear error.

¶ 36 Because the court didn’t clarify the intent of the temporary

orders in the permanent orders, it’s unclear whether it considered

the order authorizing each party to spend $2,200 per month during

the pendency of the proceedings when it ordered retroactive child

support. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822. Thus, the court’s findings are

insufficient for us to determine whether the court erred in

determining the amount of retroactive child support.

18
¶ 37 That said, our conclusion that the court’s findings were

insufficient shouldn’t be construed as a conclusion that the $2,200

monthly amount was child support. Indeed, as we have already

noted, at the temporary orders hearing, the court didn’t make clear

the purpose of its $2,200 per month authorization. Accordingly, on

remand, the court should determine the nature of the $2,200

monthly amount before recalculating the amount of retroactive

child support owed, if any.

V. Husband’s Request for Appellate Costs, and Wife’s Request for
Attorney Fees

¶ 38 Husband requests that we award him appellate costs under

C.A.R. 39(a)(3).6 Wife requests that we award her attorney fees

under C.A.R. 38, C.A.R. 39.1, and section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

Wife argues that the “court’s findings extensively illustrate a

substantial economic disparity between the parties” and that

husband has the means to continue to pay for legal fees because of

his family’s assistance, while she is not similarly situated.

6 The header in husband’s opening brief states “COSTS AND

ATTORNEY FEES,” but he only requests costs, so we need not
consider whether to award him any attorney fees. See C.A.R. 39.1
(a party claiming attorney fees must explain the legal and factual
basis for an award).

19
¶ 39 Under C.A.R. 38(b), if we determine an appeal is frivolous, we

may award sanctions, which includes attorney fees, to the appellee.

C.A.R. 39(a)(4) taxes appellate costs “only as ordered by the

[district] court.” Under C.A.R. 39.1, it’s within our discretion to

determine a party’s “entitlement to and the amount of an award of

attorney fees” for an appeal, or we “may remand those

determinations to the lower court.” And section 14-10-119

authorizes a court to award attorney fees in dissolution proceedings

after considering the financial resources of both parties.

¶ 40 Because we affirm in part and reverse in part, we remand to

the district court the determination of husband’s appellate costs

under C.A.R. 39(a)(4) and reject wife’s assertion that his appeal was

frivolous. We thus deny wife’s request for sanctions under C.A.R.

38(b).

¶ 41 Regarding wife’s request for attorney fees under section

14-10-119, the district court is better equipped to determine

whether wife is entitled to attorney fees because it must consider

the factual issues regarding the parties’ financial resources at the

time of the remand proceedings. See In re Marriage of Boettcher,

2018 COA 34, ¶ 34 (“Section 14-10-119 empowers the [district]

20
court to apportion costs and fees equitably between parties based

on their relative ability to pay.”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

VI. Disposition

¶ 42 The portions of the judgment addressing the separate and

marital values of Properties C and D, dissipation, and retroactive

child support are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed. The court must also reevaluate maintenance and child

support based on the court’s reconsideration of the property

division and the parties’ current financial circumstances. See In re

Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 (maintenance); In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d 271, 273

(Colo. App. 2010) (child support). On remand, the court may

exercise its discretion to determine whether additional proceedings

or an evidentiary hearing is necessary. In re Marriage of Pawelec,

2024 COA 107, ¶ 85.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

21