People v. Taylor

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
June 11, 2026

2026 COA 50

No. 25CA2151, People v. Taylor — Crimes — Serious Bodily
Injury — Substantial Risk of Protracted Loss or Impairment

A division of the court of appeals concludes, as a matter of

first impression, that People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶ 33 — in which

the supreme court held that the “facts of the actual injury control

the substantial risk of death determination under section

18-1-901(3)(p)[, C.R.S. 2025, which defines serious bodily injury],

not the risk generally associated with the type of conduct or injury

in question” — extends to a trial court’s determination under a

different clause of section 18-1-901(3)(p): whether the injury

involved “a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any part or organ of the body.”
The division also concludes that the prosecution’s evidence

didn’t establish probable cause that the suffered injury amounted

to serious bodily injury.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 50

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2151
Chaffee County District Court No. 24CR170
Honorable Dayna Vise, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Monroe Taylor,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

Announced June 11, 2026

Jeffrey D. Lindsey, District Attorney, Stephanie B. Miller, Senior Deputy
District Attorney, Canon City, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Magdalena Rosa, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing

multiple charges against defendant, Monroe Taylor, after finding

that the prosecution failed to prove probable cause for the elements

of serious bodily injury (SBI) during the preliminary hearing. In

addressing the People’s appeal, we consider, as a matter of first

impression, whether People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶ 33 — in which

the supreme court held that the “facts of the actual injury control

the substantial risk of death determination under section

18-1-901(3)(p)[, C.R.S. 2025, which defines SBI], not the risk

generally associated with the type of conduct or injury in question”

— extends to a trial court’s determination of whether the injury

involved “a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any part or organ of the body,” under section

18-1-901(3)(p). We hold that it does and affirm. We remand the

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

¶2 Taylor is an inmate at a correctional facility. In June 2024,

correctional officer Valerie Cerisene went into Taylor’s cell to

confiscate a radio, which had been playing too loudly. Taylor had

been outside of his cell but followed Cerisene in after he entered the

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cell. Taylor asked what Cerisene was doing with the radio and then

started to punch Cerisene’s head and face. Taylor put Cerisene in a

chokehold, which caused Cerisene to lose consciousness “for a bit.”

Cerisene suffered injuries to his face, including a lacerated lip, and

was dazed. Cerisene went to the hospital. Dr. Kevin Merrell, the

physician who treated Cerisene, didn’t think that Cerisene suffered

SBI. A few days later, Cerisene saw Kevin Percy, a physician’s

assistant, who also opined that there was no SBI.

¶3 In August 2024, Cerisene was treated by an optometrist, Dr.

Gavin Walters. Dr. Walters completed and signed an “SBI Medical

Professional Form.”1 Dr. Walters checked a box on the form

indicating that Cerisene’s injuries fit the statutory definition of SBI

because they involved

1 An “SBI Medical Professional Form” is a standard form completed

by a medical professional to indicate the extent of a patient’s
injuries. See generally People v. Vigil, 2021 CO 46, ¶¶ 6-8.
Because neither party challenges Dr. Walters’ qualifications to
complete and sign the SBI medical professional form, we assume,
without deciding, that Dr. Walters was authorized to do so. We
express no opinion on whether an optometrist is a “medical
professional” for purposes of completing an SBI medical
professional form.

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a substantial risk of PROTRACTED LOSS or
impairment of the function of any part or
organ of the body, specifically, the left eye.

On the form, Dr. Walters described Cerisene’s injuries and Dr.

Walters’ reason for the SBI determination as follows:

The patient received trauma to the head that
resulted in traumatic iritis and had a
significant risk of retinal detachment with
flashes of light and floaters reported in the
vision. Retinal detachment, if not promptly
treated, may lead to a permanent substantial
reduction of vision.

¶4 As relevant here, the prosecution charged Taylor with one

count of first degree assault as a crime of violence, alleging SBI and

use of a deadly weapon (hands) in violation of section

18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; one count of first degree assault as a

crime of violence against a person employed in a detention facility

with a deadly weapon (hands) in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(f);

one count of second degree assault as a crime of violence against a

peace officer performing a lawful duty by causing SBI in violation of

section 18-3-203(1)(c.5), C.R.S. 2025; and one count of second

degree assault as a crime of violence, alleging that Taylor was

lawfully confined or in custody after being convicted of a crime and

unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly, and violently applied physical

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force against a person employed by a detention facility, in violation

of section 18-3-203(1)(f). The prosecution also charged Taylor with

crime of violence sentence enhancers under section

18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A)-(B), C.R.S. 2025, for each substantive assault

charge.

¶5 The district court held a preliminary hearing in October 2025.

The correctional facility investigator assigned to the case, Heather

Gaffney, was the only person who testified. Gaffney testified that

she met with Cerisene shortly after he had been assaulted and that

he seemed dazed and confused and had injuries on his face, so she

interviewed him later. Gaffney also testified that she “attempted to

get an SBI form signed” by Dr. Merrell but that he “did not believe

that there was SBI.” Similarly, Gaffney confirmed that Percy also

opined that there was no SBI.

¶6 Gaffney testified that Dr. Walters signed an SBI form, which

indicated that “there was a substantial risk of protracted loss or

impairment of the function of Cerisene’s left eye.” Gaffney testified

that she was able to obtain Cerisene’s medical records from Dr.

Merrell and Percy but that she didn’t obtain any medical records,

“like the full statement,” from Dr. Walters aside from the completed

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SBI form. Gaffney didn’t interview any of the medical staff who

treated Cerisene.

¶7 At the end of the hearing, the court raised concerns regarding

a finding of SBI based on the supreme court’s holding in Vigil, ¶ 33,

which instructs that the “facts of the actual injury control the

substantial risk of death determination under [the statute defining

SBI], not the risk generally associated with the type of conduct or

injury in question.” In relevant part, the court directed the parties

to submit briefs addressing whether Vigil “should factor in, and to

what extent that may affect the evidence” that had been presented.

¶8 After reviewing the briefs, the court issued a written order

finding that Vigil “directs that the facts of the actual injury control[]

whether the prosecution has established [SBI],” and because the

prosecution failed to “establish that the injury actually sustained by

. . . Cerisene constituted [SBI],” the court dismissed all counts

containing an SBI element and all crime of violence counts related

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to the dismissed substantive charges.2 The People appeal the

district court’s preliminary hearing order.

II. Discussion

¶9 The People first contend that Vigil doesn’t apply because the

charges against Taylor don’t involve a substantial risk of death but a

substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of

any part or organ of the body. Alternatively, even if Vigil applies, the

People argue that the prosecution established probable cause of SBI

and that the court erred by dismissing all substantive and crime of

violence charges containing SBI as an element. We disagree with

both contentions, addressing each in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

1. Serious Bodily Injury and Vigil

¶ 10 SBI is defined as

bodily injury that, either at the time of the
actual injury or at a later time, involves a
substantial risk of death; a substantial risk of
serious permanent disfigurement; a
substantial risk of protracted loss or

2 After finding probable cause existed for all elements of the lesser

included offense of second degree assault under section 18-3-
203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, the court reduced Taylor’s charge of first
degree assault to second degree assault (causing bodily injury with
a deadly weapon).

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impairment of the function of any part or
organ of the body; or breaks, fractures, a
penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot
wound, or burns of the second or third degree.

§ 18-1-901(3)(p). “Bodily injury,” on the other hand, means

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental

condition.” § 18-1-901(3)(c). The difference between bodily injury

and SBI is the degree of the injury. See Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d

680, 685 (Colo. 1982) (“The plain language of the ‘serious bodily

injury’ and ‘bodily injury’ definitions focuses on the injury the

victim actually suffered rather than the risk to the victim posed by

the defendant’s conduct.”).

¶ 11 In Vigil, the issue before the supreme court was whether the

prosecution established sufficient probable cause that the

defendant committed first degree assault — SBI with a deadly

weapon — when he stabbed the victim in the neck, but the knife

missed all vital organs and the injury resulted in the victim needing

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only stitches.3 The doctor treating the victim “believed there was a

substantial risk of death, based on the vital areas that could be

damaged” in the neck. Vigil, ¶ 8. This shifted the doctor’s analysis

from the actual injury suffered to the risk associated with what

could have been damaged following a knife wound to the neck. Id.

at ¶¶ 38, 40.

¶ 12 The supreme court reversed the trial court’s finding that there

was probable cause to bind over the first degree assault charge and

concluded that the testimony at the preliminary hearing failed to

demonstrate that the victim sustained bodily injury that “involves a

substantial risk of death.” Id. at ¶¶ 38, 48. As the court explained,

the “stab wound to the neck would involve substantial risk of death

if the knife injured certain vital structures.” Id. Relying on Stroup,4

3 When Vigil was decided, the definition of SBI was slightly different

under section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2020. As relevant to Vigil’s
circumstances, SBI was defined as “bodily injury which, either at
the time of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a
substantial risk of death.” Id. The legislature amended the
definition of SBI in 2023 — after Vigil — to include any penetrating
knife or penetrating gunshot wounds.
4 In Stroup v. People, 656 P.2d 680, 685 (Colo. 1982), the supreme

court analyzed an earlier version of the SBI statute and held that
the plain language of the statute “focuses on the injury the victim
actually suffered rather than the risk to the victim posed by the
defendant’s conduct.”

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the supreme court held that “the facts of the actual injury control

the substantial risk of death determination” for SBI and not the

“risk generally associated with the type of conduct or injury in

question.” Id. at ¶ 4.

2. The Preliminary Hearing

¶ 13 “[A] preliminary hearing is not a mini-trial; rather, it is a

screening tool that seeks to weed out those cases in which

prosecution is unwarranted.” People v. Platteel, 2023 CO 18, ¶ 33.

Specifically, it is used “to determine whether probable cause exists

to support charges that an accused committed a particular crime.”

Miller v. Dist. Ct., 641 P.2d 966, 967 (Colo. 1982). To establish

probable cause at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must

present evidence sufficient to induce a person of ordinary prudence

and caution to entertain a reasonable belief that the defendant

committed the crime charged. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221

(Colo. 2000). It’s unnecessary for the prosecution to show beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, or even

the probability of the defendant’s conviction. People v. Dist. Ct., 926

P.2d 567, 570 (Colo. 1996). Instead, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all

9
reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. The prosecution is therefore

given latitude to establish probable cause that the defendant

committed the crime charged. Id.

¶ 14 Generally, we review a trial court’s finding of no probable

cause for an abuse of discretion. Hall, 999 P.2d at 221. Under the

abuse of discretion standard, our review is narrowly circumscribed,

and we can only reverse if the district court’s ruling was manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if the court misapplied the

law. See People v. Chavez, 2020 COA 80M, ¶ 8 (“A court abuses its

discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.”).

¶ 15 But we review conclusions of law de novo, and if we determine

that the district court applied an erroneous construction of law at

the preliminary hearing, we review the record and determine

whether the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, would induce a reasonably prudent and cautious

person to entertain the belief that the defendant committed the

crime charged. Hall, 999 P.2d at 221. Thus, we must first consider

whether the district court based its rulings on correct conclusions

of law. As explained below, we conclude that it did and review the

court’s decision for abuse of discretion.

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B. Vigil Applies When Evaluating Substantial Risk of Protracted
Loss or Impairment Under Section 18-1-901(3)(p)

¶ 16 The People contend that Vigil is inapplicable because it

involved a finding of a substantial risk of death arising from an

injury, Vigil, ¶¶ 30-31, while the present case concerns a

substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment. According to the

People, extending Vigil’s application to the loss or impairment

portion of the SBI definition is problematic because, while medical

professionals can typically evaluate an injury and determine almost

immediately if there’s a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk

of protracted loss or impairment is more intangible. In support,

they argue that risk can be substantial even if the chance that

harm will occur is below fifty percent. See Hall, 999 P.2d at 217.

We are unpersuaded. Moreover, we regard the People’s argument

as further proof that parameters are necessary when evaluating the

“substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment” prong of SBI

under section 18-1-901(3)(p).

¶ 17 Although Vigil considered whether a substantial risk of death

arose based on the victim’s injury, and the issue before us is

whether Cerisene’s injuries involved a substantial risk of protracted

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loss or impairment to the function of his eye, Vigil’s key principle

remains: The determination of substantial risk is controlled by the

actual injury, not by the hypothetical or commonly associated risks

of the injury. See Vigil, ¶ 38. We therefore hold that Vigil applies

when a court is asked to determine whether there is probable cause

of SBI under section 18-1-901(3)(p) based on a substantial risk of

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of

the body.

C. The Prosecution’s Evidence Didn’t Establish Probable Cause
that Cerisene’s Injury Amounted to SBI

¶ 18 The People contend that the district court’s findings

“mistakenly equated the substantial risk of retinal detachment”

with Vigil’s speculative language of “could,” “might,” and “generally

does.” Specifically, the district court found that “the evidence

showed . . . Cerisene suffered traumatic iritis and the injury could

have led [to] retinal detachment which may have led, if not properly

treated, to a permanent substantial reduction of vision. But there

was no evidence that . . . Cerisene[’s] actual injury included retinal

detachment.” This construction, the People argue, is problematic

because it focuses on whether there could have been a substantial

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risk of retinal detachment rather than on the facts of the actual

injury. But the district court’s findings were consistent with the

evidence that the prosecution presented.

¶ 19 Dr. Walters’ description of the injury on the completed SBI

form indicated that Cerisene received head trauma that resulted in

traumatic iritis and that Cerisene reported flashes of light and

floaters in his vision. Dr. Walters’ description also noted that

traumatic iritis had a significant risk of retinal detachment. And

retinal detachment, if not treated promptly, may lead to a

permanent substantial reduction of vision. These statements by Dr.

Walters on the SBI form focus on the possible risks associated with

traumatic iritis — retinal detachment; and if retinal detachment

occurs and isn’t treated promptly, it could lead to permanent

substantial reduction of vision. The hypothetical risks weren’t

supported by evidence that Cerisene’s injury, either at the time of

the actual injury or later, carried a substantial risk of protracted

loss or impairment to his eye, consistent with the definition of SBI.

Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by finding no probable cause of SBI existed because the

prosecution’s evidence focused on what might have happened if

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Cerisene suffered retinal detachment and if he failed to receive

proper treatment, when Cerisene’s actual injury was only traumatic

iritis. See Vigil, ¶ 31 (explaining the SBI definition “does not speak

of bodily injury which ‘could,’ ‘might,’ or ‘generally does’ involve

substantial risk of death”).

¶ 20 The People also contend that Cerisene’s injury met the

definition of SBI because his head trauma (the injury in question)

caused traumatic iritis (the actual injury), and he had a significant

risk of retinal detachment, which involved a substantial risk of

further loss or impairment associated with the actual injury. Thus,

they claim, the prosecution met the probable cause standard

because, as Vigil instructs, “the injury actually created by the

defendant’s actions is the crux for determining” SBI. According to

the People, Cerisene’s traumatic iritis, which resulted in symptoms

of flashes of light and floaters reported in Cerisene’s vision, met the

“impairment of the function” of the eye definition under the SBI

statute.

¶ 21 In contrast to Vigil, which considered the substantial risk of

death that a stab wound could have caused if the knife had injured

vital structures, the People claim that Dr. Walters’ completed SBI

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form isn’t about the danger of being hit in the head but about

actual injuries and impairment of function. Namely, Cerisene’s

injury was traumatic iritis that caused flashes of light and floaters

in his left eye, which met the SBI standard because the plain and

ordinary meaning of “impairment” is a “diminishment or loss of

function or ability.”

¶ 22 Although Dr. Walters noted on the SBI form that Cerisene

“received trauma to the head that resulted in traumatic iritis and

had a significant risk of retinal detachment with flashes of light and

floaters reported in the vision,” neither Cerisene nor Dr. Walters

testified — and the prosecution presented no evidence — that the

flashes of light and floaters impaired Cerisene’s vision. There was

also no evidence presented regarding how often the flashes and

floaters occurred, how long the symptoms lasted, how much they

impacted Cerisene’s daily activities, how they affected Cerisene’s eye

function, or how traumatic iritis met the definition of SBI. Indeed,

the prosecution didn’t even offer evidence explaining traumatic

iritis. Likewise, Gaffney testified that she didn’t interview Dr.

Walters or obtain a full medical report from him. Rather, the only

evidence the prosecution presented in support of SBI was Dr.

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Walters’ SBI form indicating that the injury “may” lead to

complications if left improperly treated.

¶ 23 The facts here stand in contrast to People v. Duncan, 2023

COA 122, where the victim suffered hearing loss for five months

after the defendant struck the side of her face and perforated her

eardrum. In Duncan, medical testimony established not only that

such an injury can cause hearing loss, but that the victim in fact

experienced hearing loss for a sustained period, which was an

injury that involved a substantial risk of “protracted loss or

impairment of the function” of the victim’s hearing under section

18-1-901(3)(p). Duncan, ¶¶ 20-21.

¶ 24 No comparable showing was made here. The prosecution’s

evidence didn’t establish probable cause that traumatic iritis — the

actual injury — either at the time of the injury or later, carried a

substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment to Cerisene’s eye,

consistent with the definition of SBI.

¶ 25 The People are correct that the prosecution’s burden is

relatively low at the preliminary hearing stage, but even under this

low standard, we cannot say that the district court erred by finding

that the prosecution didn’t establish probable cause that Cerisene’s

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injuries met the statutory definition of SBI. The prosecution didn’t

present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that

Cerisene’s injuries involved a “substantial risk of protracted loss or

impairment of the function of his left eye.” See People v. Tafoya,

2019 CO 13, ¶ 14 (“A preliminary hearing is designed to provide a

judicial determination as to whether probable cause exists to

believe that the charged offense was committed by the defendant.”);

Duncan, ¶¶ 20-21.

¶ 26 Because the prosecution didn’t establish probable cause that

Cerisene suffered SBI, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion

by dismissing all counts containing an SBI element and all crime of

violence counts related to the dismissed substantive charges.

III. Disposition

¶ 27 We affirm the order and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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