Rivers v. Taylor

25CA0900 Rivers v Taylor 06-11-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0900
Weld County District Court No. 21CV7
Honorable Judith L. LaBuda, Judge

Bernard Kenneth Rivers, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Todd Taylor, Dana Nichols, Jeffrey Romero, Troy Hause, James Hartmann,
State of Colorado, Michael Rourke,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDERS AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 11, 2026

Bernard Kenneth Rivers, Jr., Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Michelle Hickerson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Todd Taylor, Dana
Nichols, Jeffrey Romero, Troy Hause, James Hartmann, and State of Colorado

Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Matthew J. Hegarty, David Belsheim, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellee Michael Rourke
¶1 Plaintiff, Bernard Kenneth Rivers, Jr., appeals the district

court’s orders denying his motions for postjudgment relief after the

district court dismissed his amended complaint against defendants,

Todd Taylor, Dana Nichols, Jeffrey Romero, Troy Hause, James

Hartmann, and the State of Colorado (State defendants) and

Michael Rourke and Kenneth Barker. We affirm and remand the

case to the district court for a determination of appellate attorney

fees and costs.

I. Background

¶2 This is the third time that Rivers has sought appellate review

in this case. See Rivers v. Taylor, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0966, Oct. 6,

2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Rivers I); Rivers v.

Taylor, (Colo. App. No. 23CA1443, Apr. 18, 2024) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Rivers II). The case arises primarily from

Rivers’ 2017 arrest for traffic violations. A jury found him guilty in

2019 of multiple offenses, including disobeying a police officer.

¶3 Unsatisfied with that result, Rivers filed this civil lawsuit in

January 2021 against the State defendants, Rourke, and Barker.

Each defendant was either a judge or an attorney who participated

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in the traffic case or one of Rivers’ prior cases.1 In his amended

complaint, Rivers asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in his earlier

court cases.

¶4 The State defendants and Rourke moved to dismiss Rivers’

claims. The district court granted both motions and dismissed

Rivers’ amended complaint. A division of this court affirmed the

dismissal but denied the State defendants’ and Rourke’s requests

for appellate attorney fees. See Rivers I, ¶¶ 1, 26.

¶5 Still, Rivers continued filing motions for postjudgment relief.

The district court denied relief, and Rivers appealed the court’s

orders denying his eighth, ninth, and tenth motions for

postjudgment relief. Again, a division of this court affirmed. See

Rivers II, ¶ 31. This time, though, the division found that Rivers

should have known that his appeal was “substantially frivolous”

1 Taylor, Nichols, Romeo, Hause, and Hartmann were state court

judges and Rourke was the Weld County District Attorney at the
time relevant to this appeal. Barker represented Rivers for parts of
his traffic case but was never properly served as a defendant in this
case. See Rivers v. Taylor, slip op. at ¶ 1 n.1 (Colo. App. No.
21CA0966, Oct. 6, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
Accordingly, Barker isn’t a party to this appeal.

2
and awarded the State defendants and Rourke their appellate

attorney fees and double costs. Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.

¶6 Undeterred, Rivers continued filing motions in the district

court for postjudgment relief. As relevant to this appeal, Rivers filed

(1) an “objection” to the district court’s August 5, 2024, order that

awarded attorney fees to the State defendants and Rourke as well

as costs to Rourke; and (2) a twelfth motion for postjudgment relief.

The district court construed the filings as motions under

C.R.C.P. 60(b) and denied both. The court also imposed filing

restrictions on Rivers under Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910 (Colo.

2002), finding that his prior motions were “filled with immaterial,

pointless and extraneous information and [were] clearly meant to

harass [the] [d]efendants.”

¶7 For the third time, Rivers appeals. In addition to the two

orders denying Rivers’ objection and motion discussed in the

preceding paragraph, Rivers also purports to appeal orders entered

by the district court on May 3, 2025; August 5, 2024; and July 13,

2023. After issuing an order to show cause to which Rivers replied,

a motions division of this court permitted Rivers to appeal only the

two orders discussed in the prior paragraph, which were issued on

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April 15 (time-stamped 11:18 a.m.) and April 22, 2025, concluding

that the other orders either weren’t final orders or weren’t timely

appealed. Although we aren’t bound by the motions division’s

determination, see Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13, we agree

with its conclusions and proceed to review only the April 15 and

April 22 orders.

II. Discussion

¶8 Rivers raises multiple contentions alleging that the district

court erred by denying his postjudgment motions. None has merit.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 The district court construed Rivers’ filings as motions for

postjudgment relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), (3), and (5). Those

provisions permit a party to seek relief from a final judgment or

order based on the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of

an adverse party; the judgment being void; or any other reason

justifying the relief. See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2)-(3), (5). We generally

review a district court’s denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for an

abuse of discretion, although we review de novo whether a

judgment is void under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Goodman Assocs., LLC v.

WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 314 (Colo. 2010). A court

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abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. Salazar v.

Kubic, 2015 COA 148, ¶ 6.

¶ 10 Our review requires us to interpret statutes and procedural

rules, which are questions of law that we review de novo. See

Defend Colo. v. Polis, 2021 COA 8, ¶ 47. In doing so, we give words

and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Elder v. Williams,

2020 CO 88, ¶ 18.

B. Judge Glowinsky

¶ 11 Rivers raises multiple contentions related to Judge Carol

Glowinsky, a retired senior judge who was assigned to preside over

portions of this case. We address and reject each in turn.

¶ 12 Rivers first contends that the district court erred because it

incorrectly said that the Rivers I division had resolved his claim that

Judge Glowinsky had been improperly appointed. But that

contention is contradicted by the record. The division in Rivers I

stated: “[W]e discern no error in the fact that Judge Glowinsky

presided over portions of this civil matter.” Rivers I, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 Even so, Rivers argues that the Rivers I division didn’t address

whether Judge Glowinsky’s appointment was improper under

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section 24-51-1105(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, and that this omission

somehow rendered the district court’s subsequent reliance on

Rivers I improper. But the Rivers I division did consider section 24-

51-1105(1)(a) and concluded that “nothing in the record [supported]

the proposition that Judge Glowinsky was not properly appointed

by the chief justice to act as a senior judge in this matter.” Rivers I,

¶ 22. Rivers fails to explain why Judge Glowinsky’s appointment

nonetheless didn’t comply with section 24-51-1105(1)(b). See

Holley v. Huang, 284 P.3d 81, 87 (declining to address “bald

assertions of error that lack any meaningful explanation”).

¶ 14 Rivers does, however, assert that “[n]ewly discovered evidence

obtained via [the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA)]2 on July 25,

2025, confirmed [Judge] Glowinsky’s statutory disqualification.”

But in the filings relevant to this appeal, Rivers never argued to the

district court that the newly discovered evidence obtained through

his open records requests supported his claims. We therefore don’t

2 The Public Access to Administrative Records Rules, not CORA,

govern requests for administrative records from the Judicial
Department. See Archuleta v. Roane, 2024 CO 74, ¶ 47 n.2
(Márquez, C.J., concurring). Nonetheless, the record reveals that
the department responded to Rivers’ open records requests.

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consider this unpreserved contention. See Parks v. Edward Dale

Parrish LLC, 2019 COA 19, ¶ 17 n.5 (“We don’t consider arguments

that a party failed to make in the district court.”).

¶ 15 Rivers similarly didn’t preserve his argument that he was

denied due process when he “was never served notice of [Judge]

Glowinsky’s appointment.” See id. Even if he had preserved the

argument, he cites no authority to support his proposition that the

court was required to notify him of Judge Glowinsky’s appointment.

See Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, ¶ 18

(“We generally decline to address arguments presented to us in a

conclusory manner that are lacking citations to any supporting

authority.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 39.

¶ 16 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err by denying Rivers’

postjudgment motions challenging Judge Glowinsky’s appointment.

C. Case Management Order

¶ 17 Rivers raises similar contentions related to the initial case

management order (CMO) that was issued in February 2021. We

detect no error.

¶ 18 Rivers first contends that the district court erred by denying

his postjudgment motions because, according to Rivers, the court

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incorrectly said that the Rivers I division had resolved the issue of

“the unlawful participation of recused judges.” Again, the record

refutes Rivers’ contention. The division in Rivers I held that “the

district court did not err by issuing the Initial CMO.” Rivers I, ¶ 11.

To the extent Rivers invites us to revisit the division’s conclusion in

Rivers I, we decline.

¶ 19 Rivers also contends that newly discovered evidence confirmed

“that recused judges did issue [an initial case management order on

February 9, 2021,] post-recusal.” But again, he never raised this

argument with the district court in the filings relevant to this

appeal. See Parks, ¶ 17 n.5.

¶ 20 We therefore conclude that the district court didn’t err by

denying Rivers’ challenges to the CMO.

D. Inconsistent Orders

¶ 21 Rivers next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by issuing contradictory orders. Specifically, he alleges

that the court’s August 5, 2024, order “assert[ed] resolution,” while

the court’s April 15, 2025, order “disavow[ed]” that resolution.

¶ 22 Rivers never identifies the “resolution” at the center of these

allegedly contradictory orders, which makes addressing his

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contention difficult. See Holley, 284 P.3d at 87. But our review of

the various orders reveals the following:

• The district court’s August 5 order included a statement

that the division in Rivers I resolved the issues relating to

the CMO and Judge Glowinsky’s appointment.

• The district court’s April 15 order stated that its August 5

order “contain[ed] no such statement.”

¶ 23 At first glance, these two orders appear inconsistent because,

in the April 15 order, the district court denied stating that the

Rivers I division had resolved all issues related to the CMO, even

though it had indeed said as much in its August 5 order. But

Rivers doesn’t explain how this minor inconsistency prejudiced him.

See Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass’n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d

547, 557 (Colo. 1991) (“[I]t is incumbent upon [the complaining

party] to show that the error was prejudicial.”). Nor do we perceive

any prejudice. As a result, we decline to disturb the district court’s

judgment on this ground. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court

may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial

rights of the parties.”).

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¶ 24 Moreover, the April 15 order went on to say that the Rivers I

division concluded that the district court didn’t err by entering the

CMO. The court’s orders are therefore largely consistent as to the

CMO; each order declares that the Rivers I division resolved the

CMO issues, which it did. See Rivers I, ¶¶ 6-11.

¶ 25 We therefore reject Rivers’ contention that the district court

abused its discretion by issuing contradictory orders.

E. Opposing Counsel

¶ 26 Rivers further contends that the district court erred by

rejecting his claim that two attorneys representing Rourke

committed fraud upon the court. According to Rivers, Rourke’s

attorneys knowingly served him with filings by mail using an

incorrect address. We discern no error.

1. Additional Applicable Law

¶ 27 A person commits fraud only when they knowingly

misrepresent a material fact. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.

Cache Creek Mining Tr., 854 P.2d 167, 172 (Colo. 1993). Fraud

upon the court is a serious type of fraud that “interferes with the

judicial machinery itself.” Id. at 176. It applies to extrinsic fraud,

which is fraud that “prevents the party complaining from making a

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full and fair defense.” Id. (citation omitted). Typically, “[p]erjury

and other fraud merely between the parties to the litigation” don’t

constitute fraud upon the court. In re Marriage of Gance, 36 P.3d

114, 118 (Colo. App. 2001). Rather, the fraud must impact more

than a single litigant. Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 COA

49, ¶ 33.

2. Analysis

¶ 28 Rivers doesn’t explain which filings were allegedly sent to an

incorrect address. See Holley, 284 P.3d at 87. Liberally construing

his filings, it appears Rivers contends that Rourke’s attorneys didn’t

comply with the requirements of C.R.C.P. 4(e) by personally serving

him with Rourke’s July 17, 2024, bill of costs. See Minshall v.

Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (We must “interpret pro se pleadings

and motions liberally, [but] liberal construction does not include

inventing arguments not made by the pro se party.”).

¶ 29 Contrary to Rivers’ contention, Rourke’s attorneys weren’t

required to personally serve the bill of costs on him in accordance

with C.R.C.P. 4(e). Instead, because the bill of costs was a

“pleading subsequent to the original complaint,” C.R.C.P. 5

governed service. C.R.C.P. 5(a). Under that rule, service may be

11
made by “[m]ailing a copy to the last known address of the person

served.” C.R.C.P. 5(b)(2)(B).

¶ 30 Here, Rourke’s attorneys mailed the bill of costs to an address

previously associated with Rivers, but Rivers apparently never

received it. Any mistake that the attorneys made by mailing the bill

of costs to an outdated address didn’t constitute fraud upon the

court. Indeed, the district court made no finding that the attorneys

intentionally or knowingly mailed the bill of costs to an incorrect

address. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 17

(Eid, J., concurring) (a mistake doesn’t constitute fraud because

fraud requires an intentional and knowing misrepresentation);

United States v. Gordon, 657 F. App’x 773, 779 (10th Cir. 2016)

(fraud upon the court claim failed because the plaintiff “presented

no evidence demonstrating the government’s misrepresentation was

intentional, as opposed to an innocent mistake”); cf. Hart v. Ed-Ley

Corp., 482 P.2d 421, 424 (Colo. App. 1971) (defendant’s false

statements weren’t fraudulent because they were made

inadvertently and didn’t prevent plaintiff from conducting his own

investigation).

12
¶ 31 In addition, even assuming the attorneys’ alleged misconduct

could constitute extrinsic fraud that might support a fraud upon

the court claim, Rivers can’t show that he was prevented “from

making a full and fair defense” — an essential element of a fraud

upon the court claim. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy, 854 P.2d at

176. After the bill of costs was returned as undeliverable, the

attorneys emailed the filing to Rivers. Moreover, the court gave

Rivers additional time to respond. But instead of challenging any of

Rourke’s claimed costs, Rivers rehashed the same arguments he’s

made throughout this litigation. We therefore conclude that Rivers’

indifference, rather than any purported fraud, deprived Rivers of

whatever defense he may have had. See id. at 177.

¶ 32 For the same reason, any error in improperly serving Rivers

with the bill of costs was harmless. See Gessler v. Smith, 2018 CO

48, ¶¶ 43-44 (insufficient notice of hearing was harmless because

party didn’t identify any issues raised at the hearing that he was

precluded from responding to); In re Estate of Kochevar, 94 P.3d

1253, 1256 (Colo. App. 2004) (defective notice was harmless

because corrected notice was sent with sufficient time to allow the

affected party to respond).

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¶ 33 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err by rejecting Rivers’

claim that Rourke’s attorneys committed fraud upon the court.

F. Precedent

¶ 34 Rivers also contends that the district court erred by failing to

apply binding precedents. We disagree.

¶ 35 Rivers argues that our precedent provides that judgments

entered without jurisdiction or in violation of constitutional rights

are void. But he develops no argument beyond those we have

already rejected to explain how the district court entered judgment

without jurisdiction or violated his constitutional rights. See

Holley, 284 P.3d at 87.

¶ 36 Rivers also argues that the district court’s April 15 order was

procured by fraud because the court “fabricated evidence

suggesting trial courts may disregard evidence.” But he doesn’t

explain what evidence the court allegedly fabricated. See id. And

while the April 15 order slightly mischaracterized the August 5

order, we have already concluded that the orders were largely

consistent with one another, they accurately described the Rivers I

division’s conclusions, and the minor mischaracterization didn’t

prejudice Rivers.

14
¶ 37 Rivers adds that the district court and State Defendants

selectively invoked precedent such as Warnick v. Court

Administration, 2025 COA 7. But he doesn’t identify where he made

this argument to the district court, see C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); Parks,

¶ 17 n.5, and the court didn’t mention Warnick in either of the two

orders we are reviewing. Nor does he explain how the court

selectively invoked Warnick or any other decision. See Holley, 284

P.3d at 87.

¶ 38 Accordingly, we reject Rivers’ precedent-based contentions.

G. Other Contentions

¶ 39 In his reply brief, Rivers contends for the first time that the

district court violated his equal protection rights by denying him,

but not his opponents, “the ability to rely on court records and

published decisions.” But we don’t address arguments raised for

the first time in a reply brief. See Hickman v Cath. Health

Initiatives, 2013 COA 129, ¶ 16 n.7.

¶ 40 Rivers also contends in his reply brief that the defendants

“misrepresented that ‘new evidence obtained via CORA’ supported

their position.” Yet Rivers doesn’t identify when the defendants

made this alleged misrepresentation. See Holley, 284 P.3d at 87.

15
And our review of the parties’ appellate briefs reveals that Rourke

never discussed evidence obtained by an open records request,

while the State Defendants did so only when summarizing Rivers’

contentions. We therefore reject this contention as well.

H. Rivers’ Supplemental Authorities and Other Filings

¶ 41 After appellate briefing concluded, Rivers filed several notices

of supplemental authority. See C.A.R. 28(i) (a party may notify the

court of “pertinent and significant new authority” that comes to a

party’s attention after appellate briefing has closed).3 The purpose

of C.A.R. 28(i) is to provide parties “with an opportunity to bring to

the attention of the court new authority, not available when briefs

were submitted.” Glover v. Innis, 252 P.3d 1204, 1212 (Colo. App.

2011). “The notice must set forth the citation and state, without

argument, the reason for the supplemental citation, referring either

to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally.” C.A.R. 28(i).

¶ 42 Rivers’ first three notices don’t comply with C.A.R. 28(i)

because they fail to cite “new” authority that was unavailable when

3 Most of Rivers’ notices fail to mention C.A.R. 28(i) or comply with

its provisions. But we liberally construe Rivers’ pro se filings, so we
treat his notices as if they were filed under C.A.R. 28(i). See
Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21.

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briefing closed. Nevertheless, we have considered the authorities

cited in each of his notices and conclude that none changes our

analysis.

¶ 43 We also deny Rivers’ (1) motion to strike the defendants’

response to one of his notices of supplemental authority; (2) motion

to address unreasonable appellate delay; and (3) motion to remand

the case to the district court based on an allegedly void order,

statutory violations, and unanswered claims.

III. Rourke’s Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 44 Rourke requests his appellate attorney fees and double

appellate costs under C.A.R. 38(b); C.A.R. 39(a); section 13-17-102,

C.R.S. 2025; and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We grant his request.

¶ 45 C.A.R. 38(b) permits us to award attorney fees and single or

double costs if we determine that an appeal is frivolous. See also

C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against

the appellant.”). And section 13-17-102 requires us to assess

reasonable attorney fees against a party who brought an appeal

that “lacked substantial justification” or “was interposed for delay

or harassment.” § 13-17-102(2), (4). But we may assess fees

against a pro se party only if we determine that the party “clearly

17
knew or reasonably should have known that the party’s action or

defense, or any part of the action or defense, was substantially

frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”

§ 13-17-102(6).

¶ 46 Under § 1988, however, pro se parties aren’t held to a lower

standard. Rather, that statute empowers a court in its discretion to

award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a § 1983 claim. See

§ 1988(b). But case law has limited a court’s discretion to award

attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, allowing a fees award only if

the § 1983 suit “was vexatious, frivolous, or was brought to harass

or embarrass the defendant.” State v. Golden’s Concrete Co., 962

P.2d 919, 926 (Colo. 1998) (citation omitted).

¶ 47 An appeal is frivolous as filed if it raises “no legitimately

appealable issues” because the judgment below was “plainly

correct.” Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45 (quoting Castillo v.

Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)). But even if

the appeal raises legitimately appealable issues, it still may be

frivolous as argued if the appellant doesn’t make a coherent

argument or support their argument with legal authority. Id.

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¶ 48 Like the division in Rivers II, we conclude that Rivers’ appeal is

frivolous as filed and as argued. See Rivers II, ¶ 28. In his

appellate briefs, Rivers rarely supports his argument with citations

to the record or legal authority, often includes erroneous or

irrelevant citations, relies primarily on conclusory and undeveloped

arguments that are contradicted by the record, repeats arguments

that have already been rejected by prior divisions, and advances

arguments that he didn’t preserve before the district court. And

like his district court filings, Rivers has continued to flood this

court with serial, improper filings after briefing closed. What’s

more, the orders Rivers appeals were plainly correct. See Calvert,

¶ 45. Given all this, we conclude Rivers’ appeal is frivolous as filed

and as argued.

¶ 49 We also conclude, consistent with the Rivers II division, that

Rivers reasonably should have known this appeal was substantially

frivolous. See § 13-17-102(6); Rivers II, ¶ 29. In its April 15 order,

the district court noted that Rivers didn’t cite any factual or legal

basis to support his contentions. Likewise, in the April 22 order,

the court found Rivers’ twelfth motion for postjudgment relief was

another attempt to “harass [d]efendants and place an unreasonable

19
burden on precious judicial resources,” leading it to conclude that

Rivers “knew or should have reasonably known” that the motion

lacked substantial justification. Further, the court imposed filing

restrictions on Rivers before he appealed those orders, providing

him additional notice that his claims were frivolous and his conduct

was improper. Rivers’ conduct on appeal nonetheless mirrors his

vexatious conduct before the district court.

¶ 50 Accordingly, we conclude Rourke is entitled to his reasonable

attorney fees under both § 1988 and section 13-17-102. We also

award Rourke his double costs under C.A.R. 38(b). We remand the

case to the district court to determine the amount of Rourke’s

reasonable attorney fees and double costs incurred on appeal. See

C.A.R. 39.1.

IV. Disposition

¶ 51 We affirm the orders and remand the case to the district court

to determine Rourke’s reasonable attorney fees and double costs

incurred on appeal.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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