Home Street v. Castle Rock Senior

24CA1008 Home Street v Castle Rock Senior 06-04-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1008
Douglas County District Court No. 22CV30760
Honorable Andrew Baum, Judge

Home Street Operations, LLC; Madison Creek Partners, LLC; Home Street
Holdings, LLC; and Madison Partners Holdings, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Castle Rock Senior Living, LLC; Solterra at Castle Rock RE, LLC; Stephen
Jorgenson; and Solterra Holdings LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 4, 2026

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Kenneth F. Rossman, IV, Kendra N.
Beckwith, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Spencer Fane LLP, Troy R. Rackham, Jacob F. Hollars, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants-Appellants
¶1 Plaintiff, Melissa Schwartz, sued two groups of defendants

over the sale of a medical care facility. A jury found parties from

both groups of defendants liable on all of Schwartz’s claims.

¶2 Defendants Home Street Operations, LLC (HSO); Home Street

Holdings, LLC (HSH); Madison Creek Partners, LLC (MCP); and

Madison Partners Holdings, LLC (MPH) (collectively, the Madison

parties) asserted cross-claims against defendants Stephen

Jorgenson; Solterra at Castle Rock RE, LLC (SCRRE); Castle Rock

Senior Living, LLC (CRSL); and Solterra Holdings LLC (collectively,

the Jorgenson parties). The Madison parties contended that the

Jorgenson parties had breached indemnity provisions in four

contracts, causing the Madison parties to incur damages in the

form of (1) attorney fees expended in defending against Schwartz’s

claims and (2) the judgments entered against two of the Madison

parties on those claims.

¶3 The Jorgenson parties appeal the district court’s judgment on

the cross-claims, which ordered them to partially indemnify the

Madison parties. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

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I. Background

¶4 Stephen Jorgenson is the owner, operator, and manager of

SCRRE, CRSL, and Solterra Holdings. CRSL operated the medical

care facility out of a building owned by SCRRE.

¶5 Because CRSL couldn’t operate the facility successfully, it

entered into an “Interim Management Agreement” with MCP under

which MCP agreed to provide operational assistance in running the

facility.

¶6 In the Interim Management Agreement, CRSL agreed to

indemnify MCP “against any and all demands, claims, causes of

action . . . losses, liabilities . . . judgments, and expenses (including,

without limitation, reasonable attorneys’ and other professionals’

fees and court costs)” stemming from the care facility.

¶7 A year later, CRSL entered into a “Consulting Agreement” with

HSO regarding the operation of the facility. In the Consulting

Agreement, CRSL agreed to indemnify HSO and its affiliates “for,

from and against any and all claims, losses, costs, damages, and

liabilities, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred, caused, or

occasioned by, in connection with or arising out of the negligent or

willful acts or omissions of [CRSL].”

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¶8 Several months later, SCRRE leased the care facility to HSO.

The parties entered into an “Operating Lease” in which SCRRE

agreed to indemnify HSO “from and against any and all claims . . .

losses, liabilities, damages,” including “attorney’s fees, costs and

expenses” resulting from a “breach by [SCRRE] in the performance

of any of its . . . obligations.”

¶9 After HSO took over the care facility’s operations, Schwartz, as

the conservator for a patient at the care facility, filed a lawsuit

against CRSL for injuries the patient sustained while being treated

there. Schwartz obtained a judgment of approximately $5 million

against CRSL (Schwartz judgment). CRSL didn’t pay the judgment.

¶ 10 Some time later, HSO and HSH engaged in discussions with

Jorgenson to purchase the care facility. At some point during the

negotiations, HSO and HSH learned of the outstanding Schwartz

judgment. The parties entered into an “Indemnification Agreement

and First Amendment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement”

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(indemnification agreement) to protect HSO and HSH if the

Jorgenson parties1 failed to satisfy the judgment.

¶ 11 The indemnification agreement states in relevant part as

follows:

• If HSO or HSH “is threatened to be made a party to, or is

otherwise involved in . . . any Proceeding relating to the

[Schwartz judgment], [HSO or HSH] shall be completely

and fully indemnified by [the Jorgenson parties] against

all Expenses and Liabilities incurred, suffered or paid by

[HSO or HSH] in connection with such Proceeding.”

• “[The Jorgenson parties] shall defend and hold harmless

[HSO or HSH] in any Proceeding related to the [Schwartz

judgment] and shall take no position — legal or

otherwise — in compromise or against this duty to defend

[HSO or HSH].”

• “[The Jorgenson parties] shall and hereby [do] indemnify

and hold harmless [HSO or HSH] against all Expenses,

1 The indemnification agreement includes “[CRSL], Steve Jorgenson,

and their directors, officers, Subsidiaries, affiliates, members,
assigns and any Entity controlled directly or indirectly by them” as
the “Debtors, Seller, or Indemnitor.”

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judgments, penalties, fines and amounts paid in

settlement actually and reasonably incurred by [HSO or

HSH] or on [their] behalf relating to the [Schwartz

judgment].”

• “In the event that any right accrues hereunder, including

enforcement of a right under this Agreement, all

Expenses . . . shall be advanced and paid by [the

Jorgenson parties] including but not limited to retainer

fees, deposit fees, attorney’s fees, and other Expenses.”

¶ 12 In addition to these indemnification obligations, the Jorgenson

parties agreed that they “shall not enter into any settlement of any

Proceeding related to [the Schwartz judgment] unless such

settlement provides for a full and final release of all claims asserted

against” HSO and HSH (the settlement provision).

¶ 13 In September 2022, the parties closed on the sale of the care

facility. The next month, Schwartz sued the Jorgenson parties and

the Madison parties over the sale. Schwartz generally alleged that

the Jorgenson parties conspired with the Madison parties to sell the

care facility so that the Jorgenson parties could avoid paying the

Schwartz judgment.

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¶ 14 As relevant here, Schwartz brought claims for (1) violation of

the Colorado Uniform Fair Trade Act (CUFTA); (2) violation of the

Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA); (3) conspiracy to

violate COCCA; and (4) civil conspiracy.

¶ 15 Just before trial, Schwartz agreed to settle the claims against

Jorgenson and Solterra Holdings for $2 million and, in exchange,

dismissed those claims with prejudice.2 As part of the settlement,

SCRRE and CRSL remained parties to the lawsuit as “nominal”

defendants, but Schwartz agreed not to enforce any judgment she

might obtain against them.

¶ 16 During trial, Schwartz voluntarily dismissed the claims

against MPH and HSH. All of Schwartz’s claims were tried against

the remaining defendants — CRSL, SCRRE, MCP, and HSO.

¶ 17 The jury returned a unanimous verdict in Schwartz’s favor. As

to MCP and HSO, the damages awards and judgments were entered

as follows:

2 Bridgewater Castle Rock ALF, LLC, another company owned and

operated by Jorgenson, also settled with Schwartz and was
dismissed from the case.

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Claim Damages Punitive Judgment Entered by
Awarded Damages District Court
by Jury Awarded
by Jury
CUFTA $4,870,000 $7,305,000 — one and one-
Violation half times the base damages
amount of $4,870,000. See
§ 38-8-108(1)(c).
COCCA $500,000 $500,000 — folded into the
Violation judgment for conspiracy to
violate COCCA because the
award represented the
jury’s “determination that
$500,000 was the
appropriate [amount of]
damages for both COCCA
related claims.”
Conspiracy $500,000 $1,500,000 — three times
to Violate the base damages amount
COCCA of $500,000. See
§ 18-17-106(7).
Civil $1,500,000 $1 — reduced to nominal
Conspiracy damages because the jury’s
award was duplicative of the
COCCA and COCCA
conspiracy damages.

¶ 18 After the jury trial, the Madison parties’ cross-claims were

tried to the court. The court ruled that (1) the Interim Management

Agreement, the Consulting Agreement, the Operating Lease, and the

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majority of the indemnification agreement,3 were valid and

enforceable contracts that the Jorgenson parties breached; (2) the

Jorgenson parties breached the settlement provision in the

indemnification agreement; (3) the indemnification provisions in all

four agreements were enforceable as to the damages awarded by the

jury for the CUFTA and COCCA violations but were unenforceable

as to the damages awarded on the conspiracy claims because such

damages were punitive; and (4) MCP and HSO had to pay the

CUFTA and COCCA judgments to Schwartz before seeking

indemnification from the Jorgenson parties. The Madison parties

also moved for attorney fees and costs under the indemnification

provisions of the various agreements.

¶ 19 The Jorgenson parties opposed the attorney fees motion,

arguing that the Madison parties were barred from collecting

attorney fees because they didn’t present evidence of those fees as

damages in the jury trial. The Jorgenson parties also requested a

hearing on the reasonableness of the fees.

3 The district court concluded that certain sections of the

indemnification agreement were unenforceable. No party appeals
that portion of the district court’s judgment.

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¶ 20 The court ruled that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary

and issued an order awarding attorney fees of $657,487.50 to HSO,

HSH, and MCP related to work done by two law firms. The district

court denied all fees associated with work by three other law firms.

¶ 21 While this appeal was pending, the Madison parties sought a

limited remand to further amend the judgment to include amounts

that HSO and MCP had paid to Schwartz on the judgment entered

on the jury verdicts. This court ordered a limited remand. On

remand, the district court ordered the Jorgenson parties to pay

$6,010,488.67 to HSO and MCP.

¶ 22 The Jorgenson parties make three arguments on appeal.

First, they argue that the district court erred by partially enforcing

the indemnification provisions because public policy prohibits

indemnification for acts that are intentional, willful, and in bad

faith. Second, the Jorgenson parties argue that even if the court

didn’t err in that regard, it nonetheless erred by awarding attorney

fees to HSO, HSH, and MCP because those parties were required to

prove fees and costs as damages during the jury trial. Third, the

Jorgenson parties argue that even if the Madison parties weren’t

required to prove fees and costs as damages at trial, the district

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court erred by declining to hold a hearing on the reasonableness of

the fees before entering its order. We address each argument in

turn.

II. Indemnification for CUFTA and COCCA Violations

¶ 23 The Jorgenson parties contend that the district court erred by

partially enforcing the indemnification provisions because HSO’s

and MCP’s actions underlying Schwartz’s lawsuit were intentional

or willful. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶ 24 Whether a contract provision is void as against public policy is

a question of law that we review de novo. Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins.

Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1045 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 25 In Colorado, “[p]ublic policy prohibits ‘indemnifying a party for

damages resulting from intentional or willful wrongful acts.’”

Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 750 (Colo. App. 2002) (citation

omitted). “A court will not enforce a contract that violates public

policy even if the failure to do so is ‘unfair’ to one of the parties.” Id.

¶ 26 When a party commits multiple forms of misconduct, but only

some of the misconduct is intentional or willful, enforcement of a

contractual indemnification provision turns on whether the willful

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misconduct is separable from the conduct committed at a different

time or with a lesser mens rea. Cf. Bohrer v. Church Mut. Ins. Co.,

965 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Colo. 1998) (“When the covered conduct

causes injury resulting in damages, and the excluded conduct has

not occurred in close temporal and spatial relationship to the

covered conduct, coverage is not defeated by the exclusion.”).

B. CUFTA

1. Applicable Law

¶ 27 CUFTA functions to protect an unsecured creditor by voiding a

debtor’s transfer of assets to a third-party transferee when such

transfer renders the debtor insolvent or otherwise unable to pay the

creditor. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, LLC, 251 P.3d 523, 529

(Colo. App. 2010). A transfer is voidable when a debtor “actual[ly]

inten[ded]” to “hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor.

§ 38-8-105(1)-(2), C.R.S. 2025; id. at cmts. 1, 5; § 38-8-106, C.R.S.

2025; see West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1041 (Colo.

2006) (official comments to a statute are relevant to its

interpretation); CB Richard Ellis, 251 P.3d at 529 (discussing

constructive fraud under sections 38-8-105(1)(b) and -106).

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¶ 28 The culpability of a transferee is not essential to show that a

transfer is voidable under CUFTA. CB Richard Ellis, 251 P.3d at

532. However, a transfer is not voidable against a transferee who

took title to the transferred assets “in good faith and for a

reasonably equivalent value.” § 38-8-109(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 29 If a creditor shows that a transfer is voidable under CUFTA,

the creditor may receive “a judgment for one and one-half the value

of the asset transferred” against the debtor (exemplary damages).

§ 38-8-108(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Additionally, a “judgment for the

value of the asset transferred” may be entered against “[t]he first

transferee of the asset” regardless of the transferee’s intent.

§ 38-8-109(2)(a)(I). However, exemplary damages may not be

entered against a transferee unless the transferee also acts with

“actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud [the] creditor.” Id.;

§ 38-8-105(1)(a).

2. Analysis

¶ 30 Recall that the jury awarded Schwartz approximately $4.8

million in damages with respect to its verdict on the CUFTA

violation claim (base CUFTA damages). The court concluded that

the indemnification provision was enforceable as to the base CUFTA

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damages because they weren’t punitive in nature. We agree with

the Jorgenson parties that the court erred because (1) it focused on

the type of damages awarded rather than whether HSO’s and MCP’s

actions related to the sale of the care facility were intentional or

willful, and (2) its conclusion regarding indemnification is

inconsistent with its other findings and conclusions regarding

HSO’s and MCP’s bad faith.

¶ 31 First, the district court awarded exemplary damages against

HSO and MCP — the transferees in the sale of the care facility —

under section 38-8-108(1)(c). Such damages could be entered

against HSO and MCP only upon a finding that they acted

intentionally or in bad faith related to the facility transfer. See

§ 38-8-108(1)(c) (Exemplary damages can’t be entered against “a

person other than the debtor unless that person also acts with

wrongful intent as defined in section 38-8-105(1)(a).”);

§ 38-8-105(1)(a) (defining wrongful intent as an “actual intent to

hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor”). HSO and

MCP don’t appeal the district court’s imposition of exemplary

damages or its underlying finding.

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¶ 32 In a similar vein, the district court also imposed joint and

several liability against CRSL, HSO, and MCP with respect to the

CUFTA claim. Joint and several liability can only be imposed on

“two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately

pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.”

§ 13-21-111.5(4), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, the court necessarily found

that HSO and MCP “consciously conspire[d] and deliberately

pursue[d] a common plan or design” to violate CUFTA — in other

words, it found that the violation was intentional. See id. MCP and

HSO don’t appeal the district court’s imposition of joint and several

liability or its underlying finding.

¶ 33 In sum, although the base CUFTA damages aren’t punitive in

nature, the court found that MCP’s and HSO’s participation in the

CUFTA violation was intentional. Accordingly, the court erred by

enforcing the indemnification provisions of the agreements as to the

base CUFTA damages. See Equitex, 60 P.3d at 750 (courts won’t

enforce contracts that violate public policy).

C. COCCA

¶ 34 The jury found MCP and HSO liable for violating COCCA,

awarding Schwartz $500,000 in damages on that claim (base

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COCCA damages). The jury also found all defendants liable for

conspiracy to violate COCCA and awarded $500,000 in damages on

that claim. The district court concluded (and the parties don’t

dispute) that the COCCA and COCCA conspiracy claims involved

the same wrongful acts and that the verdict indicated the jury’s

intent to award a total of $500,000 for both COCCA claims. The

court then trebled the jury’s damages award and entered judgment

for $1,500,000. See § 18-17-106(7), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 35 As with the CUFTA claim, the district court determined that

the indemnification provision was only enforceable as to the base

COCCA damages of $500,000. The Jorgenson parties contend that

any enforcement of the indemnification provision is prohibited

because the HSO and MCP willfully violated COCCA. We agree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 36 COCCA imposes civil liability on a defendant who commits at

least two racketeering crimes in furtherance of the defendant’s

association with an enterprise. §§ 18-17-103(3), -104, -106, C.R.S.

2025. Any person injured by a COCCA violation “shall have a cause

of action for threefold the actual damages sustained.”

§ 18-17-106(7).

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2. Analysis

¶ 37 Jury Instruction No. 22 informed the jury that, for Schwartz to

recover on the COCCA claim against MCP and HSO, she had to

prove that “[MCP] and/or [HSO] participated in the [care facility]

through a pattern of racketeering activity.”

¶ 38 The jury also received the following instruction for conspiracy

to violate COCCA:

For [Schwartz] to recover from [MCP] and/or
[HSO] on her claim of Conspiracy to Violate
[COCCA], you must find that all of the
following have been proved:

1. A person or entity associated with [the care
facility] engaged in a violation of the
[COCCA], as defined in [the COCCA
instruction]; and

2. Defendants, or any of them, agreed to aid
another person or entity associated with [the
care facility] in violating [COCCA]; and

3. Defendants, or any of them, engaged in an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to
violate [COCCA]; and

4. [Schwartz] was harmed as a result of any of
the Defendants’ conspiracies or endeavors
to violate [COCCA].

(Emphasis added.)

16
¶ 39 The jury’s verdict for Schwartz on the COCCA conspiracy

claim required it to conclude that MCP “and/or” HSO “agreed to aid

another person or entity associated with” the care facility in

violating COCCA. An “agreement” to pursue a common goal — in

this case, the violation of COCCA — requires intention. Thus, any

actions MCP “and/or” HSO undertook to violate COCCA (i.e.,

engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity”) must have been

intentional.

¶ 40 For this reason, the district court also erred by enforcing the

indemnity provisions as to the base COCCA damages.

III. Attorney Fees

A. Indemnification for Attorney Fees

¶ 41 In their breach of contract cross-claims, HSH, HSO, and MCP

asserted that the Jorgenson parties were required to pay the

attorney fees those entities incurred in defending against Schwartz’s

CUFTA and COCCA claims.4 HSH, HSO, and MCP contended that

these fees were due as a result of the Jorgenson parties’ breach of

4 All four Madison parties asserted cross-claims against the

Jorgenson parties. However, the court awarded attorney fees to
only HSH, HSO, and MCP because, unlike those entities, MPH
wasn’t a party to the applicable agreements.

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(1) the indemnification provisions in the Interim Management

Agreement, Consulting Agreement, Operating Lease agreement, and

indemnification agreement; and (2) the settlement provision of the

indemnification agreement.

¶ 42 As best we understand their briefing, the Jorgenson parties

argue that, because HSO’s and MCP’s conduct with respect to the

CUFTA and COCCA violations was intentional, the district court

erred by enforcing the indemnification provisions as to the attorney

fees. HSH, HSO, and MCP make three arguments in response.

¶ 43 First, HSH, HSO, and MCP argue that, regardless of the

outcome of this appeal, the attorney fees award should be affirmed

to the extent the fees were incurred by (and awarded to) HSH. We

agree. The only Madison parties found liable for the CUFTA and

COCCA violations were MCP and HSO. HSH was originally a

defendant in the Schwartz litigation, but it was voluntarily

dismissed on the sixth day of trial. As a result, the record contains

no finding that HSH violated CUFTA or COCCA, much less that it

acted intentionally in doing so. Our conclusion that the district

court erred by enforcing the indemnification provisions as to the

base CUFTA and COCCA damages was based on MCP’s and HSO’s

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intentional conduct; thus, it has no bearing on whether HSH should

receive its attorney fees incurred in defending against Schwartz’s

claims.

¶ 44 Second, HSH, HSO, and MCP argue that the indemnification

provisions aren’t the only contractual provisions that the Jorgenson

parties breached. We again agree. The district court found that the

Jorgenson parties also breached the settlement provision of the

indemnification agreement. Recall that the settlement provision

prohibited the Jorgenson parties from settling the Schwartz

litigation unless the settlement also released HSO and HSH. The

Jorgenson parties don’t cite — and we can’t find — any authority

suggesting that the settlement provision is subject to the same type

of public policy considerations as the indemnity provisions. Thus,

our conclusion about the enforceability of the indemnity provisions

has no bearing on any award of attorney fees that can be attributed

to the settlement provision.

¶ 45 Third, HSH, HSO, and MCP assert that the Jorgenson parties

also breached contractual provisions obligating them to

affirmatively defend HSH, HSO, and MCP in the Schwartz litigation

(as opposed to simply indemnifying them later for attorney fees they

19
incurred in supplying their own defense). And they argue that the

duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify such that it

required the Jorgenson parties to defend them against Schwartz’s

claims regardless of the ultimate findings as to intentional conduct.

The district court’s attorney fees order didn’t address this

distinction (or any potential factual disputes underlying it) because

neither party raised it below. Further, none of the parties’ appellate

arguments on this subject are particularly well developed.

¶ 46 Given our reversal of the judgment on the merits and the

attorney fees considerations noted above, we conclude that it is

appropriate to reverse the attorney fees award and remand to the

district court for reconsideration. The record isn’t sufficiently

developed for us to determine (1) the amount of attorney fees that

pertain to HSH or (2) the amount of attorney fees that stem from

the Jorgenson parties’ breach of the settlement provision. The

district court should consider arguments about those two issues on

remand. Additionally, both parties can make arguments to the

district court about whether the Jorgenson parties are required to

20
pay HSO’s and MCP’s attorney fees under any contractual duty to

defend for which the court found a breach.5

B. Failure to Present Evidence of Attorney Fees at Jury Trial

¶ 47 The Jorgenson parties next argue that the district court erred

by awarding HSH, HSO, and MCP attorney fees because they didn’t

prove the attorney fees as damages during the jury trial. We

address this issue because, if we agreed with the Jorgenson parties,

then MCP, HSO, and HSH wouldn’t be able to recover attorney fees

under any contractual provision. However, we discern no error.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 48 Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law that

we review de novo. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Stewart Title

Guar. Co., 2014 COA 1, ¶ 32; U.S. Fax L. Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein,

Inc., 205 P.3d 512, 515 (Colo. App. 2009) (reviewing de novo any

legal conclusion that provides a basis for a fees award).

5 We express no opinion about the merits of either party’s

arguments regarding the distinction, if any, between the duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify.

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2. Analysis

¶ 49 “An agreement to indemnify another is an agreement by one

party to hold another harmless from such loss or damage as may be

specified in their contract.” Constable v. Northglenn, LLC, 248 P.3d

714, 716 (Colo. 2011). In this case, the indemnity provisions

contemplate that such losses or damages include the attorney fees

that HSH, HSO, and MCP incurred defending against Schwartz’s

claims.

¶ 50 If the Madison parties had brought a separate breach of

contract action against the Jorgenson parties after the completion

of the Schwartz litigation, the attorney fees would be assessed as

damages and would need to be considered and assessed by the fact

finder in the breach of contract proceeding. See Chartier v.

Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Colo. App. 2001)

(“Attorney fees that are part of the substance of a lawsuit, that is,

the legitimate consequences of the tort or breach of contract sued

upon, are classified as damages and are decided by the trier of fact

during the damages phase of the trial.”). However, fees “incurred in

the litigation in which they are to be assessed, which relate to

services rendered during the course of that litigation . . . may be

22
awarded as costs.” Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 885 P.2d 265,

272-73 (Colo. App. 1994), aff’d, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996). Thus,

a “determination of the propriety of an award of [attorney] fees need

not be made until that litigation is completed and the result is

known.” Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826, 829 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶ 51 The fees at issue related to services rendered to the Madison

parties during the jury trial phase of the proceedings. Thus, they

weren’t required to present evidence of their fees to the jury, and

the court could award the fees after trial. See id. (“[U]ntil the

litigation is completed, it may be impracticable to calculate the

proper amount of fees to be awarded, either because the extent of

the remaining services to be rendered cannot be ascertained until

the dispute is settled or because the result achieved may, itself,

impact upon the proper amount of fees to be awarded.”).

IV. Hearing on Attorney Fees

¶ 52 The Jorgenson parties contend that the district court erred by

awarding attorney fees without conducting a hearing on the

reasonableness of the fees. Because we reverse and remand the

attorney fees award for the reasons described in Part III.B.2 above,

we need not address this contention.

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V. Disposition

¶ 53 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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