People in Interest of C.N.T.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
June 4, 2026

2026 COA 47

No. 25CA1563, People in Interest of C.N.T. — Juvenile Court —
Dependency and Neglect — Termination of the Parent-Child
Legal Relationship — Guardian ad Litem — Standing

In this dependency and neglect appeal, a division of the court

of appeals considers whether a guardian ad litem (GAL) has

standing to file a motion to terminate parental rights. The division

concludes that a GAL has standing because (1) People in Interest of

R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, applies only to the first, or adjudicatory, phase

of a dependency or neglect proceeding and not to the second, or

dispositional, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding; and (2)

the GAL is acting under their independent statutory charge to

advocate for the child’s best interests.

The division further rejects the parents’ contentions that the

juvenile court erred by (1) terminating their parental rights;

(2) finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate them and to reunite them with the child; (3) finding that

the father was unfit and that the mother couldn’t become fit within

a reasonable time; and (4) finding there was no less drastic

alternative to termination.

Likewise, the division is unpersuaded by the father’s

additional claims that (1) his treatment plan was inappropriate;

(2) he substantially complied with his treatment plan; and (3) his

counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The division affirms the juvenile court’s judgment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 47

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1563
Chaffee County District Court No. 23JV30009
Honorable Dayna Vise, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.N.T., a Child,

and Concerning W.C.T. and N.L.D.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Lum, J., concurs
J. Jones, J., concurs dubitante

Announced June 4, 2026

Mannina & Associates, Julie Thomerson, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant W.C.T.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant N.L.D.
¶1 W.C.T. (father) and N.L.D. (mother) appeal the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with

C.N.T. (the child). The parents contend, in part, that under People

in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, ¶ 33, which held that the State is

the exclusive party to prosecute a dependency or neglect

proceeding, the guardian ad litem (GAL) lacked standing to file a

motion to terminate their parental rights. Thus, they argue, the

juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate their

parental rights. We disagree and conclude that R.M.P. doesn’t apply

for two reasons: (1) R.M.P. applies to only the adjudicatory (first)

phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding — and the motion to

terminate was filed in the dispositional (second) phase of the

proceeding — and (2) the GAL was acting under section 19-3-

203(5), C.R.S. 2025, which charges a GAL to represent the child’s

best interests. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2023, the Chaffee County Department of Human

Services received a report that mother had been involved in a

domestic violence incident and that she was too intoxicated to care

for the child. A caseworker responded to the scene and spoke with

1
mother, who explained that father had custody of the child but that

he was currently incarcerated in the county jail. The Department

removed the child and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

¶3 The parents admitted that the child was in an injurious

environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected. After a dispositional hearing, the court

adopted treatment plans for the parents that required them to

address substance use and domestic violence, improve their

parenting skills, attend family time, and provide a safe and stable

home.

¶4 In February 2025, the GAL moved to terminate the parents’

parental rights; the Department didn’t object. The juvenile court

held an evidentiary hearing in June 2025; the GAL and the

Department participated. After considering the evidence, the court

granted the GAL’s motion and terminated mother’s and father’s

parent-child legal relationships with the child.

II. Standing

¶5 The parents assert that the juvenile court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to terminate their parental rights because the

GAL didn’t have standing to move for termination. We disagree.

2
¶6 Whether a party has standing is a legal question that we

review de novo. R.M.P., ¶ 18. In R.M.P., ¶ 33, the supreme court

determined that, under the State’s parens patriae authority,1 only

the State has standing to bring an action in dependency or neglect

and to prosecute a petition in dependency or neglect. In doing so,

the supreme court overruled People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d

1032 (Colo. App. 1986), which allowed a juvenile court to maintain

a dependency or neglect case over the department’s request to

dismiss the petition before an adjudicatory hearing had occurred

when the GAL objected to dismissal.

¶7 The parents maintain that, in light of the supreme court’s

holding in R.M.P., a GAL lacks standing to file a motion for

termination and is therefore no longer permitted to do so. We

disagree and conclude that R.M.P. doesn’t lead to the conclusion

that a GAL lacks standing to move for termination.

¶8 To begin, we recognize that in R.M.P. the supreme court used

the word “proceeding” on a few occasions when describing the

1 Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing

to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, [especially] on behalf of
someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (12th ed. 2024).
3
State’s role in prosecuting a dependency or neglect petition. R.M.P.,

¶¶ 4, 24, 33. But we disagree with the parents that these few

references to a “proceeding” evidence the supreme court’s intent to

prohibit a GAL from filing a motion to terminate. There is no doubt

that termination is part of an overall dependency or neglect

proceeding in a general sense. See People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021

CO 38, ¶ 39 n.3 (noting that a motion to terminate parental rights

is “not the start of a second proceeding”). Yet for the reasons set

forth below, we aren’t convinced that the supreme court intended

for R.M.P. to apply so broadly that a GAL could never ask for any

relief during a dependency or neglect proceeding.

¶9 Reading R.M.P. in context, we conclude that the opinion only

applies to the first phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding. A

dependency or neglect proceeding has two phases:

(1) In the first, or adjudicatory, phase, the State, through the

department of human services, files a petition, and the

juvenile court must “determine[] if there are grounds to

adjudicate the child dependent and neglected.” E.O. v.

People in Interest of C.O.A., 854 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo.

1993).

4
(2) If the juvenile court adjudicates a child dependent or

neglected, “the second, or dispositional, phase

commences with the hearing and adoption of a treatment

plan.” Id. During the second phase, the court may

consider a motion to terminate parental rights if the

treatment plan is unsuccessful in rehabilitating the

parent. See § 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 10 In R.M.P., the supreme court noted that the parens patriae

doctrine provides the State with standing to initially intervene in the

familial relationship. R.M.P., ¶ 20. The State exercises this

authority by filing a petition in dependency or neglect, thus

beginning the first phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding.

And because the State is the sole party that can initiate a

dependency or neglect proceeding by filing a petition, it is also the

only entity with standing to prosecute that petition. Id. at ¶ 22. In

R.M.P., the supreme court clarified that, in a dependency or neglect

proceeding, the generic term “prosecute” means to “institute” or to

“pursue” the legal proceeding. Id. at ¶ 3 n.1. Likewise, the State is

the only party that has a “legal interest in determining whether a

child should be adjudicated dependent or neglected.” Id. at ¶ 23.

5
R.M.P. therefore addresses only the State’s authority to (1) initiate a

case and (2) prosecute the petition to its conclusion — a

dependency or neglect adjudication.

¶ 11 While the stare decisis doctrine requires courts to adhere to

earlier judicial decisions from a higher court when the same issue

arises again in litigation, People v. Kembel, 2023 CO 5, ¶ 43, the

precedential value of a decision is strictly limited to the issues that

were actually raised and resolved, see Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA

79, ¶ 9 (recognizing that a prior appellate decision isn’t controlling

unless it decided the specific issue presently on appeal); Coon v.

Berger, 588 P.2d 386, 387 (Colo. App. 1978) (A “prior opinion is

only [s]tare decisis on the point decided [therein].”). Therefore,

although the supreme court referred to a dependency or neglect

“proceeding” broadly, we conclude that its holding relates to the

6
initiation of a dependency or neglect case only until a child is

adjudicated as dependent or neglected.2

¶ 12 R.M.P. says nothing about whether, after an adjudication is

entered, a GAL can file a motion to terminate. Notably, unlike a

petition in dependency or neglect, which commences the action, a

motion for termination is merely a request for a remedy within the

case. See S.A.G., ¶ 39 n.3 (“[A] motion to terminate parental rights

after a child has been adjudicated dependent and neglected is a

request for a remedy . . . .”). Indeed, the supreme court has

recognized that a GAL has authority to file a motion for termination.

See, e.g., C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 24 (“[T]he GAL may file a

motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship.”); A.M. v.

A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“Failure to comply reasonably with the

treatment plan may provide grounds for the State or the guardian

2 In People in Interest of N.K.S., the majority relied on People in

Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, ¶ 4, to hold that the GAL lacked
standing to appeal the denial of a motion to terminate parental
rights, whether acting on the State’s behalf or in the GAL’s own
right. N.K.S., 2025 COA 100, ¶ 5 (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026). To
the extent that N.K.S. can be read to suggest that a GAL can’t file
any motion of substance, such as a motion to terminate parental
rights, we disagree with the majority’s holding. See Chavez v.
Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (recognizing that one division of the
court of appeals isn’t bound by the decisions of another division).
7
ad litem to file a motion to terminate parental rights.” (emphasis

added)); People in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App.

1997) (holding that a GAL may file a motion to terminate parental

rights and that the juvenile court did not err by terminating father’s

parent-child legal relationship with his children on the GAL’s

motion).

¶ 13 Moreover, “the GAL is statutorily obligated to advocate for the

best interests of the child and is expressly authorized to participate

at all steps of the legal proceedings.” C.W.B., ¶ 24. Specifically,

section 19-3-203(5) requires a GAL to “participate further in the

proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the

child.”3 While the statute doesn’t “specify[] the precise method that

should be utilized in performing the role,” People in Interest of

D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 586 (Colo. App. 2003), section (V)(D)(1)(a)(i) of

Chief Justice Directive (CJD) 04-06, Court Appointments Through

3 The General Assembly recently passed House Bill 26-1227, which

was enacted in direct response to People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025
CO 34, to clarify that as a party to the proceedings, the child has
legal standing regarding all matters related to the child’s interests
and the right to have those interests fully represented by the GAL
throughout the proceedings, including appeals. H.B. 1227, 75th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2026).
8
the Office of the Child’s Representative (amended Jan. 2023),

requires a GAL to, at a minimum, “[p]resent independent

information relevant to the child’s best interests at each hearing

through . . . motions . . . and other acceptable means consistent

with the court’s appointment orders and the GAL’s statutory

authority and ethical obligations.” See Off. of State Ct. Adm’r v.

Background Info. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 420, 431 (Colo. 1999) (“The

Chief Justice Directive represents an expression of Judicial Branch

policy, to be given full force and effect in matters of court

administration.”); see also People v. Greer, 2022 CO 5, ¶ 27 (“The

enforceability of CJDs is beyond question.”).

¶ 14 For the reasons explained, R.M.P. doesn’t apply to this matter.

The case had progressed past the adjudicatory phase of the

proceeding. And the GAL was complying with the independent and

“universally acknowledged responsibility of [a GAL] . . . ‘to represent

the best interests’ of children who are involved in litigation.” In re

J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 735 (Colo. 2007) (citation omitted).

¶ 15 Accordingly, the GAL had authority to file the motion to

terminate.

9
III. Venue

¶ 16 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to

change venue to Saguache County. Father moved for a change of

venue in the juvenile court but withdrew the motion because “he

did not want to pursue” it. Therefore, father abandoned this

argument, and we decline to address it. See In re Marriage of

Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 23 (“A litigant who abandons an argument

in the trial court likewise abandons it for the purposes of appeal.”).

IV. Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 17 The parents argue that the juvenile court erred by terminating

their parental rights. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 18 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

10
¶ 19 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves an

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 20 The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative

value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s

discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.

2010). We therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

B. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 21 Father asserts that his treatment plan was inappropriate. We

discern no error.

¶ 22 A treatment plan is appropriate if (1) it is reasonably

calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to

the child within a reasonable time, and (2) it relates to the child’s

11
needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. An appropriate treatment plan

must “address the safety concerns identified during the assessment

of the family.” People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. We

measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of

success in reuniting the family, “which must be assessed in light of

the facts existing at the time of the plan’s approval.” People in

Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 23 While the focus of a plan is to address the child’s needs and

any identified safety concerns, the plan’s requirements must also be

realistic given the existing facts. See People in Interest of B.J.D.,

626 P.2d 727, 730 (Colo. App. 1981). When the requirements of a

treatment plan are not realistic based on the existing facts, “[n]on-

compliance [is] virtually assured and lack of success [is] a foregone

conclusion.” Id.

¶ 24 The juvenile court found that father’s treatment plan was

appropriate because it “adequately addressed the safety concerns

which initiated the Department’s involvement — namely, substance

use and patterns of domestic violence.” The record supports the

court’s finding. For example, father’s treatment plan included a

substance use component that required him to complete a

12
substance use evaluation and follow any recommendations from the

provider, develop a relapse prevention plan, and participate in

random drug tests. Likewise, the treatment plan included a

domestic violence component that required father to complete a

domestic violence evaluation, identify triggers and coping

mechanisms, and learn how domestic violence impacted the child.

¶ 25 Still, father asserts that the treatment plan was inappropriate

because it didn’t consider the various barriers he had to completing

the plan, such as “transportation, employment, location, and ability

to pay for treatment.” He maintains that, because the treatment

plan was unrealistic given these facts, the plan was destined for

failure. Although the evidence shows that there were barriers to

father completing parts of his treatment plan, we aren’t convinced

that those barriers rendered the treatment plan inappropriate.

Rather, as discussed infra Part IV.D below, the Department

attempted to provide father with ways to overcome those barriers.

Had father fully engaged with available services and taken

advantage of the Department’s efforts, he could likely have

successfully completed the treatment plan. We therefore reject

father’s assertion.

13
C. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶ 26 Father also asserts that he substantially complied with his

treatment plan and that the juvenile court therefore erred by

terminating his parental rights. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 27 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), the juvenile court must find

that (1) the parent did not reasonably comply with the treatment

plan, or (2) the treatment plan was not successful. It is a parent’s

obligation to ensure compliance with and the success of a treatment

plan. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 260 (Colo. App.

2007). Although absolute compliance with a treatment plan is not

required, even substantial compliance may not be sufficient to

correct or improve the parent’s conduct or condition or to render

the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo.

App. 2005).

¶ 28 The juvenile court found that father didn’t reasonably comply

with the treatment plan and that the treatment plan was

unsuccessful. The court also determined that father exhibited the

same problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement.

14
¶ 29 In support of its decision, the juvenile court relied on evidence

that father

• sporadically complied with drug tests and recently tested

positive for cocaine;

• attended fewer than half of the scheduled visits over the

few months before the termination hearing and none in

the month before the termination hearing;

• was discharged from his first domestic violence treatment

provider and only recently began treatment with a new

provider;

• hadn’t engaged with his individual therapist for several

months and did not follow through with parenting skills

training; and

• didn’t fully understand the child’s needs or believe the

child needed services.

The caseworker testified to each of these points during the

termination hearing. Therefore, the record supports the court’s

findings.

¶ 30 Still, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because the

evidence established that he “complied with the treatment plan to
15
the best of his ability.” For example, he maintains that the evidence

shows that he had employment and stable housing, engaged in

monitored sobriety, participated in individual and group therapy

and domestic violence treatment, and attended family time. To be

sure, the evidence presented at the termination hearing established

that father participated, to some extent, in these services. But the

court weighed father’s participation in the treatment plan against

other evidence of his lack of participation, and it determined that

evidence of his lack of participation in certain critical areas, as

described above, outweighed the evidence of his participation in

those services that he identifies on appeal. See In re Marriage of

Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).

What’s more, the court determined that, despite father’s

participation, the treatment plan was unsuccessful because it didn’t

render him fit. See E.S.V. v. People in Interest of C.E.M., 2016 CO

40, ¶ 20 (“[E]ven substantial compliance may not result in a

successful plan that renders the parent fit.”).

¶ 31 In sum, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

16
judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. We

therefore decline to disturb the judgment.

D. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 32 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.

¶ 33 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court must consider whether the county department of

human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent

and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the

department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides

appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-

103(114).

¶ 34 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the

department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and

individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;

(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and

(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

17
the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d

911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the

circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 33.

¶ 35 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the juvenile court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

whether the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest

of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 36 The juvenile court determined that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with

the child but that the parents didn’t use the resources provided by

the Department to become fit. The record supports the court’s

findings. As father acknowledges, the Department provided him

with numerous services, including sobriety monitoring, individual

and group therapy, the Child First program, the Circle of Security

program, and parenting classes. The record also shows that the

18
Department provided transportation to visits, and it offered to pay

for rent and car repairs. As for mother, the record shows that the

Department provided her with sobriety monitoring, therapy, family

time services, parenting classes, a domestic violence program, and

housing resources.

¶ 37 Despite this record, the parents assert, for various reasons,

that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We address

and reject those arguments below.

¶ 38 Father makes three general arguments: The Department failed

to (1) assist him with barriers; (2) focus on reunification; and

(3) expand parenting time. Under each of these general arguments,

he presents numerous specific contentions.

¶ 39 He first asserts that the Department failed to assist him with

barriers related to transportation, his distance from the offered

services, conflicts with his employment schedule, and his inability

to afford services. But the record shows that the Department

offered to assist in these areas. For example, the Department

offered to pay for car repairs if father provided an estimate and

description of what needed to be fixed, but the caseworker said that

father did not take advantage of that offer. Likewise, the

19
caseworker said that, although the Department could not pay for

father’s domestic violence treatment because it didn’t have a

contract with his provider, the Department offered to pay for

father’s rent so that he could “save that money and use that to pay

for domestic violence treatment.” The Department also transported

the child to and from father’s home for visits. As for father’s work

schedule, the caseworker said the Department offered to change the

visitation schedule to accommodate father’s work, but even when it

switched visits to his day off, father still did not attend family time.

¶ 40 Therefore, although the Department didn’t do everything

father wanted, considering the totality of the circumstances, we

can’t say that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts. Notably, father hasn’t

directed us to anything in section 19-3-208 that the Department

failed to provide. For example, section 19-3-208(2)(d)(I) states that

the Department must provide transportation to services only if

“other appropriate transportation is not available.” Apart from

noting that his vehicle may have needed repairs at some point,

father doesn’t assert that he lacked transportation for most of the

case. And although the Department is required to provide some

20
services if funds are available, such as drug and alcohol treatment

services, nothing in section 19-3-208 specifically requires the

Department to pay for domestic violence treatment.

¶ 41 Second, father contends that the Department failed to focus

on reunification because it didn’t involve his fiancee in the case,

only sought permanency with the foster parents, failed to observe

father’s interactions with the child, and did not provide services in

Saguache County. Again, father hasn’t directed us to anything in

section 19-3-208 requiring the Department to make these efforts.

As for father’s assertion that the Department failed to provide

services in Saguache County, the caseworker testified that, if a

parent moves to another county, the Department might reach out to

its counterpart in the other county for provider recommendations in

that county. The caseworker said that she could have done so in

this case, but father never requested it.

¶ 42 Finally, father asserts that the Department failed to expand

family time. Section 19-3-208(2)(b) only requires that the

Department provide family time services “as determined necessary

and appropriate by individual case plans.” Said another way, to

satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, the Department must

21
provide family time as ordered by the juvenile court. Father doesn’t

assert that the Department withheld any of his court-ordered family

time. The record therefore shows that the Department satisfied its

burden under section 19-3-208, and we aren’t convinced that it had

any duty to exercise its discretion to expand family time, especially

considering that father wasn’t addressing the identified concerns in

this case.

¶ 43 Mother also asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it didn’t provide her with a full domestic

violence evaluation. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 44 The domestic violence cycle component of mother’s treatment

plan required her to schedule an intake with a confidential provider

to “learn about domestic violence dynamics in a group or individual

setting.” The evidence shows that mother engaged in individual

therapy, but because she was absent for most of the case, she had

not yet begun addressing domestic violence. The caseworker said

that she had also talked with mother’s therapist about referring her

to a domestic violence survivors’ group called Seeking Safety, and

the therapist agreed that it would be appropriate for mother.

However, the therapist expressed concern that mother might be

22
overwhelmed by all the services and recommended it as a

“substitute group,” rather than an “additional therapeutic

intervention.”

¶ 45 Therefore, the record shows that the Department provided

mother with the appropriate services to support her treatment

plan — namely, individual and group therapy. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915. Contrary to mother’s argument, her treatment plan didn’t

require a comprehensive domestic violence evaluation, and

therefore the Department didn’t have an obligation to provide her

one to meet its reasonable efforts requirement, especially

considering that mother didn’t object to the plan’s domestic violence

component and never asked the Department for a referral for such

an evaluation. At any rate, mother doesn’t explain how she could

have become a fit parent in a reasonable time even if the

Department had referred her for a comprehensive domestic violence

evaluation, given that she only actively participated in the case for

the final four months. We therefore reject her argument.

E. Fitness

¶ 46 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that he

was unfit, while mother argues that the court erred by finding that

23
she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 47 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A

parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs

and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 48 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change

has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the

chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.

D.L.C., 70 P.3d at 588-89. The determination of a reasonable

period is fact specific and varies from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be

24
determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152.

¶ 49 The juvenile court found that father was unfit based, in large

part, on the same evidence it relied on to determine that he did not

successfully comply with his treatment plan as we described, supra

Part IV.C. See D.P., 181 P.3d at 408. And as already set forth

above, the record supports those findings.

¶ 50 Yet father asserts, for the following reasons, that the juvenile

court erred.

• Father contends that the court erred by finding him unfit

under section 19-3-604(2)(e) because he didn’t have a

“substance abuse addiction.” But subsection (2)(e)

doesn’t require proof of an “addiction.” Rather, it merely

allows a court to “consider” evidence of “[e]xcessive use”

of “controlled substances” that “affects the [parent’s]

ability to care and provide for the child.” Given that

father only sporadically complied with testing and tested

positive for a controlled substance, the record supports

the court’s finding.

25
• Father asserts that he didn’t “lack accountability” and

instead that the evidence showed he “supported the

child’s services” and “demonstrated safe parenting.” But

the caseworker testified to the contrary, and it was within

the juvenile court’s purview to weigh this evidence. See

A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

• Father asserts that the court “erroneously relied on

expert testimony” when it considered the caseworker’s

opinions about whether he was fit. But we decline to

address this argument because father didn’t object to the

caseworker’s expert testimony in the juvenile court. See

People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14.

¶ 51 Father also asserts, in a single sentence, that the juvenile

court erred by finding that he couldn’t become fit within a

reasonable time. Because father failed to develop this argument, we

don’t address it. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531

(Colo. App. 2004) (appellate courts don’t address arguments that

fail to “identify any supporting facts, make specific arguments, or

set forth specific authorities to support the contention”).

26
¶ 52 We now turn to mother’s assertion that the juvenile court

erred by finding that she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable

time. The court determined that mother couldn’t become fit within

a reasonable time because, although she had recently made

progress, her engagement came too late, especially considering that

this case was an expedited permanency planning (EPP) case. See

§ 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S. 2025 (noting that the EPP provisions require

a court to ensure that a child under six years old is placed in a

permanent home as “expeditiously as possible”). The record

supports the court’s finding. The evidence established that mother

left Colorado early in the case without providing the Department

with a way to contact her. She didn’t return to start working on her

treatment plan until about four months before the termination

hearing. The caseworker opined that mother was unlikely to

become fit in a reasonable time because mother couldn’t address

the child’s “specific needs” given her “current challenges.”

¶ 53 Mother asserts that she could become fit in a reasonable time

because she had made “substantial progress by the time of the

termination hearing.” There is no doubt that the evidence showed

that mother engaged in the treatment plan during the short time

27
that she was involved in the case. But we must nevertheless reject

her assertion because it would require us to reweigh the evidence

and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we

cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29; see also People in Interest of V.W., 958

P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even “increased

compliance” over the course of a case may not justify more time).

F. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 54 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 55 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 56 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

28
termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 57 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination. In reaching its decision, the court noted

that (1) the child needed the permanency and stability that only

termination and adoption could provide, see People in Interest of

Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30; and (2) the foster parents wanted to

adopt and did not want to participate in an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR), see S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920. The record

supports the court’s findings. Specifically, the caseworker testified

that termination and adoption were in the child’s best interest

because she “need[ed] security and permanency” that couldn’t be

achieved through an APR. She also testified that the child was

doing well in her current foster home, the foster parents wanted to

adopt her, and they didn’t believe that an APR would be in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 58 Father doesn’t challenge the juvenile court’s findings, nor does

he attack any of the evidence on which the court relied. Instead, he

maintains that we should reverse the termination judgment

29
because the Department failed to make intensive, ongoing efforts to

identify placement options with relatives. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 59 To aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less

drastic alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a

reasonable number of the people identified by the parents as

placement options. D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. But the department

isn’t obligated to “independently identify and evaluate other possible

placement alternatives.” People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,

215 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 60 The caseworker testified that the Department investigated all

the relatives the parents had identified as potential placement

options, but none of those individuals could serve as a placement.

See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. In addition, the Department conducted

a diligent search for relatives but couldn’t identify any other

options. See Z.P., 167 P.3d at 215. And father failed to identify any

other relatives who were available for placement (and willing to

accept an APR) but were not investigated by the Department. For

these reasons, we discern no error.

30
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 61 Father contends that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance. We discern no basis for a remand.

¶ 62 Under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in

dependency or neglect cases, the parent must establish that

(1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance; and (2) the parent was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance — that is, a

reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the outcome would have been different. See A.R. v. D.R.,

2020 CO 10, ¶ 60. “If the parent fails to establish either prong of

this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168,

¶ 26.

¶ 63 An appellate court must remand for an evidentiary hearing if a

parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and compelling to

constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

A.R., ¶ 63. If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity,

however, the appellate court may summarily deny the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Id.

31
¶ 64 First, father asserts that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance by failing to “object to improper venue.” But father

cannot establish deficient performance because his attorney, in

fact, moved to change venue under section 19-3-201(2), C.R.S.

2025, and only withdrew the motion at father’s request. But even if

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a

change of venue under section 19-3-201(2), father hasn’t

sufficiently alleged prejudice because a party can only request a

change of venue under that section if the department filed the case

in “a county other than that of the child’s residence.” And father

doesn’t specifically allege that the child’s residence was in any

county other than Chaffee County.4

¶ 65 Second, father contends that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance by calling an expert witness who recommended a post-

adoption contract because a post-adoption contract was “in direct

opposition to [his] interests.” Even if counsel performed deficiently

4 In its answer brief, the Department responds to the allegation that

father’s counsel should have moved to change venue “earlier in the
case.” But father didn’t allege that counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to move for a change of venue sooner. We
therefore don’t address that issue.
32
in this regard, father hasn’t sufficiently alleged prejudice. He

asserts that he was prejudiced because the juvenile court “expressly

relied on his expert’s post-adoption contract recommendation.”

Indeed, the court noted father’s expert’s testimony when finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. But we

aren’t convinced that, but for the expert’s testimony, the outcome of

the case would have been different. As discussed, supra Part IV.F,

father didn’t propose any less drastic alternatives to termination,

and nothing in the record suggests that a less drastic alternative

existed. In other words, the expert’s testimony had no impact on

the court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to

termination. As a result, father’s claim fails.

¶ 66 Finally, father argues, “to the extent [that an] issue is raised

concerning counsel’s failure to ensure the reasonable efforts

hearing was completed,” his attorney provided ineffective

assistance. Father’s counsel moved for a finding of lack of

reasonable efforts in November 2024, and the juvenile court held an

evidentiary hearing in December 2024, which was eventually

continued until April 2025 when father’s counsel asked the court to

hold the motion “in abeyance” because “the issues in the motion

33
[were] going to be the same issues that [were] going to be litigated in

the termination trial.” Although father doesn’t specifically say so,

he presumably argues that, if we were to conclude that if his

counsel had waived his reasonable efforts argument by failing to

pursue resolution of his motion, then his attorney provided

ineffective assistance. Because we haven’t done so, we need not

address father’s argument further.

¶ 67 In sum, we conclude that father hasn’t raised sufficiently

specific and compelling allegations to create a prima facie showing

of ineffective assistance of counsel. See A.R., ¶ 63; see also People

v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that a

claim that is too speculative will not satisfy the prejudice prong).

Thus, we decline to disturb the termination judgment.

VI. Disposition

¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM concurs.

JUDGE J. JONES concurs dubitante.

34
JUDGE J. JONES, concurring dubitante.

¶ 69 The majority holds that a guardian ad litem (GAL) may file and

prosecute a motion to terminate parental rights. In so holding, it

reads the language of People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34 — in

which the Colorado Supreme Court held that only the State may file

and prosecute a dependency or neglect petition — as applying only

to that initial phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding. I’m not

so sure. But because the majority’s conclusion is plausible and I’m

not able to conclude with sufficient certainty that the majority is

wrong, I concur in the result.1 Nevertheless, I think it appropriate

to explain why I believe R.M.P. casts doubt on the majority’s

conclusion. I begin, though, twenty-eight years before R.M.P.

¶ 70 In People in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App.

1997), a division of this court held that a GAL may file a motion to

1 “Dubitante” is a Latin word meaning “[d]oubting.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 630 (12th ed. 2024). A dubitante opinion can serve a
variety of purposes. One such purpose is to express a judge’s
doubts about a majority’s holding — albeit doubts that don’t, in the
judge’s mind, justify a dissent. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349,
355-58 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante) (concurring
because “I cannot be confident that my colleagues are wrong”); see
also People v. Carter, 2021 COA 29, ¶ 60 n.1 (J. Jones, J.,
concurring dubitante) (describing the different reasons for a
dubitante opinion).

35
terminate parental rights. At least two times since, the supreme

court has — in dictum — cited M.N. with apparent approval.

¶ 71 In A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, the court held that foster parents

who are allowed to intervene in a dependency or neglect proceeding

“may participate fully in [a] termination hearing without limitation.”

Id. at ¶ 1. In reviewing the statutory procedures in a dependency or

neglect proceeding, the court said that a parent’s “[f]ailure to

comply reasonably with [a] treatment plan may provide grounds for

the State or the guardian ad litem to file a motion to terminate

parental rights.” Id. at ¶ 14 (first citing § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.

2012; and then citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676); see also id. at ¶ 5 n.2

(“The guardian ad litem is authorized to file a motion to terminate

parental rights.” (citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676)).

¶ 72 Five years later, in C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, the court held

that foster parents who had intervened in a dependency or neglect

proceeding didn’t have standing to appeal a juvenile court’s order

denying a termination motion. Id. at ¶ 2. In the course of

“examining the relative duties and rights of the several parties to a

dependency and neglect case,” id. at ¶ 21, it observed that “the GAL

may file a motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship,”

36
id. at ¶ 24 (first citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676; and then citing A.M.,

¶ 14).

¶ 73 But then, seven years later, the court decided R.M.P., holding

that “the State, in its role as parens patriae, is the sole party that

may prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings.” R.M.P., ¶ 4.

The more specific issue in the case was whether a “counsel for

youth,” § 19-3-203(2), C.R.S. 2025, can prosecute a dependency or

neglect petition. The court held that such counsel can’t and, for

good measure, said that “[n]othing in the Children’s Code” gives any

“non-state party” — which would include a GAL — authority to do

so either. R.M.P., ¶ 24.

¶ 74 The majority in this case holds that the supreme court’s

rationale in R.M.P. is limited to the “first phase of a dependency and

neglect proceeding” — the adjudicatory phase. Supra ¶¶ 9-10. Put

another way, the majority concludes that M.N. remains good law

after R.M.P. As I said above, the majority plausibly explains why,

notwithstanding R.M.P., a GAL can file and prosecute a termination

motion. But the following aspects of R.M.P. give me pause:

• As the majority recognizes, the court in R.M.P repeatedly

used the word “proceeding” when speaking about the

37
State’s “sole” authority. Though the majority says the

court could only have been referencing the first phase of

a proceeding, the supreme court previously, in People in

Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, took pains to emphasize

that the “proceeding” in this context is the whole of a

dependency or neglect case: A motion to terminate is a

remedy within the proceeding, “not the start of a second

proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 39 n.3. Given this history, to

conclude that the court in R.M.P. meant only a phase of a

proceeding when using the term “proceeding” requires

assuming that the court overlooked what it previously

said in S.A.G.

• The court’s holding in R.M.P. rested on the State’s

authority as parens patriae. R.M.P., ¶¶ 4, 19-20, 23. The

State continues to exercise that authority throughout the

case and is the only party with such authority. A GAL

“represents” the “child’s best interests,” id. at ¶ 2; see

§ 19-3-203(5), C.R.S. 2025, but a GAL doesn’t stand in a

parent’s shoes, see In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 734-35

(Colo. 2007).

38
• The court in R.M.P. said that “to allow a child (or another

non-state party, such as a family member or foster

parent) to prosecute dependency and neglect actions

risks transforming the government’s parens patriae

authority to protect children into a weaponized family

court system.” R.M.P., ¶ 24. Along the same lines, the

court said that “[a]llowing a child (or any non-state party)

to override the State’s determination that a petition [in

dependency or neglect] should be dismissed would be

analogous to allowing the victim of a crime to prevent the

district attorney from dismissing a criminal case.” Id. at

¶ 30. Though the court was speaking about a petition in

dependency or neglect, it is difficult to see why the same

concerns wouldn’t apply to the State’s determination not

to move to terminate parental rights.

• The court in R.M.P. spoke about the State’s authority to

“prosecute a dependency and neglect petition” but also

said it was using the term “prosecute” “to mean to

‘institute’ or to ‘pursue’ the legal proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 3 &

39
n.1 (emphasis added). Again, in S.A.G., ¶ 39 n.3, the

court said that the “proceeding” is the whole of the case.

• Section 19-3-203(5) provides that a GAL “shall . . .

participate further in the proceedings to the degree

necessary to adequately represent the child.”2 And yet

the court in R.M.P. held what it held, apparently of the

view that this provision doesn’t give a GAL, who may be

appointed before or after a petition in dependency or

neglect is filed, see § 19-3-205(1), authority to file or

prosecute a petition.

¶ 75 To my mind, all this could be read as broadly applying beyond

the context of filing a petition in dependency or neglect. And I’m

not alone in taking this view. In People in Interest of N.K.S., 2025

COA 100, ¶ 9 (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026), a division of this court

applied the rationale and broad language of R.M.P. to hold that a

2 In People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, the supreme court

said, “[U]nlike a guardian ad litem, who represents the child’s best
interests, a counsel for youth represents the child in the same
manner as an attorney directly representing a client.” Id. at ¶ 2
(citing § 19-2-203(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025). So it appears the court
reads “child” in the sentence from section 19-2-203(5) that I quote
above as “child’s best interests,” a reasonable construction given
the statutory context.

40
GAL lacks standing to appeal the denial of a motion to terminate

parental rights when the State has elected not to appeal.3

¶ 76 All that said, the supreme court hasn’t overruled M.N.; indeed,

it has cited it with approval at least twice, most recently in 2018.

But in light of the uncertainty R.M.P. has engendered, I would urge

the supreme court to clarify the reach of R.M.P. Perhaps it will do

so in N.K.S. But that case involves a different issue than this one

and may be resolvable based on the language in section 19-3-203(5)

giving a GAL the right to “appeal matters to the court of appeals or

the supreme court.” This case, however, squarely presents the

issue whether a GAL may file and prosecute a motion to terminate

parental rights.

3 I also note that section 19-3-602(1.5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025, provides

that a “motion for termination must . . . [i]nclude a statement
indicating what continuing inquiries the county department of
human or social services has made in determining whether the
child who is the subject of the termination proceeding is an Indian
child.” It would seem that only a department would be likely to
have that information, indicating that perhaps only a department
may file such a motion. But I may be assuming too much.

41