Gottorff v. Fuhuere

25CA0258 Gottorff v Fuhuere 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0258
Garfield County District Court No. 24CV21
Honorable Denise Lynch, Judge

David J. Gottorff,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Patrick Fuhuere, Warden of the Correctional Center; Anthony Johnson, Major
of the Rifle Correctional Center; Lee Terraz, Case Manager for the Rifle
Correctional Center; and Felicia Cobrado, Case Manager for the Rifle
Correctional Center,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Welling and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 28, 2026

David J. Gottorff, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Christopher B. Synsvoll, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1 Plaintiff, David Gottorff, appeals the dismissal of his

C.R.C.P. 106 complaint against defendants, Patrick Fuhuere,

Anthony Johnson, Lee Terraz, and Felicia Cobrado — the warden

and other employees of Rifle Correctional Center (RCC).1 We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Gottorff is an inmate in the custody of the Colorado

Department of Corrections (CDOC). In 2023, he was convicted of

several charges and sentenced to eight years in prison. A year

earlier, he had been acquitted of a separate charge. Gottorff claims

that during his first trial — the one that resulted in an acquittal —

he witnessed jury tampering and reported it to law enforcement.

¶3 Gottorff was housed at RCC from May 14 to July 9, 2024.

While there, he filed multiple grievances, alleging that his detention

was unlawful because his convictions were the result of jury

tampering. He also alleged that he had not been given reasonable

access to the law library. Each grievance was denied.

1 It appears from the record that the correct surnames for the

defendants identified in the case caption as Terraz and Cobrado are
“Terrazas” and “Colorado.”

1
¶4 On July 3, an RCC case manager recommended an increase in

Gottorff’s custody classification, explaining that Gottorff was “[n]o

longer appropriate for a level I facility” because he was “pending

investigation and non-program compliant.” A committee approved

the recommendation, and on July 9, Gottorff was transferred from

RCC — a level I facility — to the Buena Vista Minimum Center

(BVMC) — a level II facility. In advance of that move, on July 2,

Gottorff was placed in the restrictive housing unit (RHU) at RCC.

¶5 Gottorff appealed his reclassification and also challenged his

placement in the RHU. A CDOC officer upheld the reclassification,

stating, “You were removed from population per [DOC Admin.

Reg.] 650-03. All CDOC regulations were adhered to in this case.”

¶6 Gottorff then initiated this action under C.R.C.P. 106. In his

complaint, he alleged that he had been placed in the RHU without

justification, that his custody reclassification was “falsified,” and

that his placement in a level II facility was improper. He alleged

that these actions were witness intimidation, done in retaliation for

his report of witness tampering in connection with his criminal

case. Gottorff asked the court to (1) order defendants to report the

2
alleged criminal conduct; (2) fine defendants for placing him in the

RHU; and (3) order that he be placed in a level I facility.2

¶7 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued that

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review

Gottorff’s classification and placement in the RHU because those

actions were not judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. They also

argued that, to the extent Gottorff sought to compel defendants to

transfer him to another facility or report his criminal allegations,

his claims failed because defendants had no duty to do so.

¶8 The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It agreed

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review Gottorff’s

placement in the RHU, his custody reclassification, and his transfer

of facilities because those were administrative decisions. And it

rejected Gottorff’s other claims because (1) the transfer of prisoners

is discretionary; (2) Gottorff had other remedies available for the

2 Gottorff also requested additional access to the law library. That
claim is not at issue in this appeal.

3
alleged unlawful detention; and (3) CDOC employees had no duty to

report the alleged jury tampering during Gottorff’s first trial.3

¶9 Gottorff had also filed a motion to compel Moses Stancil, the

Executive Director of the CDOC, to “comply with” the Victim Rights

Act (VRA), §§ 24-4.1-300.1 to -305, C.R.S. 2025, by releasing

Gottorff. After granting the motion to dismiss, the court denied

Gottorff’s motion as moot because the case had been dismissed.

¶ 10 Gottorff then filed a “Notice of Intent to Petition to Require

Prosecution” of defendants under section 16-5-209, C.R.S. 2025,

along with a motion indicating that he had been prevented from

filing the petition due to a lack of access to legal resources. He filed

the petition the same day he filed his notice of appeal in this case,

asserting that defendants should be prosecuted for kidnapping and

other crimes for, among other things, placing him in “administrative

segregation” and transferring him to a higher security facility. The

district court denied the motion, concluding that it had no

jurisdiction to order the requested prosecution.

3 The district court also dismissed the claims against all defendants

other than the warden under C.R.C.P. 106.5(b), which provides that
“[o]nly the Executive Director of the CDOC and the warden of the
facility shall be named as Defendants” in an action under that rule.

4
II. RHU Placement

¶ 11 Gottorff first contends that the district court erred by

dismissing his claim regarding his placement in the RHU for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because such placement was a quasi-

judicial action reviewable under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) provides for relief when “any governmental

body or officer . . . exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has

exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no

plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law.” A

district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)

is limited to the review of judicial or quasi-judicial actions. See

Chellsen v. Pena, 857 P.2d 472, 475 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 13 In determining whether a government action is quasi-judicial,

“[t]he central focus . . . should be on the nature of the governmental

decision and the process by which that decision is reached.” Cherry

Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622,

627 (Colo. 1988). An action is quasi-judicial if “it involves (1) a

determination of the interests, rights, or duties of specific

5
individuals and (2) the application of current law or policy to past or

present facts.” Hushen v. Gonzales, 2025 CO 37, ¶ 7.

¶ 14 We review de novo a district court order dismissing a

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including whether

the challenged action is quasi-judicial. People v. Jones, 222 P.3d

377, 379 (Colo. App. 2009); Garcia v. Harms, 2014 COA 154, ¶ 11.

B. Analysis

¶ 15 Gottorff concedes on appeal that his custody reclassification

and facility placement are administrative decisions that are not

subject to judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). But likening his

placement in the RHU to the administrative segregation at issue in

Baldauf v. Roberts, 37 P.3d 483, 484-85 (Colo. App. 2001), he

argues that such placement was a reviewable quasi-judicial action.

¶ 16 In Baldauf, CDOC officials had placed the plaintiff in

administrative segregation pursuant to a regulation that required

notice and a hearing. Id. at 484. The applicable regulation

required that decision to be “based on the evidence presented at the

hearing and on the criteria for such classification” set forth in the

regulation. Id. Concluding that there was “no meaningful

distinction” between those procedures and CDOC disciplinary

6
procedures, the division held that “administrative segregation

actions” under that regulation were quasi-judicial actions subject to

judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Id. at 484-85; see also

Buenabenta v. Neet, 160 P.3d 290, 295 (Colo. App. 2007) (stating

that the decision to place an inmate in administrative segregation

under the same regulation as in Baldauf was quasi-judicial).

¶ 17 But Gottorff was placed in the RHU under a different

regulation. See DOC Admin. Reg. 650-03. Although Regulation

650-03 requires a hearing when an inmate is placed in the RHU as

a disciplinary measure, it also allows an inmate to be temporarily

placed in the RHU “pending reclassification and facility transfer.”

DOC Admin. Reg. 650-03(IV)(A)(2), (3)(a).4 The only procedures

required for such placement are those that govern offender

classification. See id.; DOC Admin. Reg. 600-01. Unlike the

regulation at issue in Baldauf, there is no hearing, no presentation

of evidence, and no criteria to apply. See Baldauf, 37 P.3d at 484.

4 The regulation also allows an inmate to be removed from the

general population and placed in the RHU for security or
investigative purposes. DOC Admin. Reg. 650-03(IV)(A)(1).

7
¶ 18 There is nothing to indicate that Gottorff was placed in the

RHU as a disciplinary sanction. Instead, the record indicates that

he was placed there pending his reclassification and transfer to a

new facility — which occurred one week later. See DOC Admin.

Reg. 650-03(IV)(A)(3)(a) (allowing placement in RHU pending

reclassification and transfer for up to fifteen days). Such placement

was not based on a fact-specific application of the law. See Hushen,

¶ 7. It was based on the administrative decision to transfer and

reclassify him. Thus, the placement was likewise administrative.

¶ 19 It is true that notice and a hearing are not required for an

action to be quasi-judicial. See Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 627. But

such procedures are nevertheless a “clear signal” that it is. Id. And

wholly apart from the lack of a hearing requirement, the temporary

placement of an inmate in the RHU pending a facility transfer —

with no apparent consideration of any other facts — does not “bear[]

similarities to the adjudicatory function performed by courts.”

Widder v. Durango Sch. Dist. No. 9-R, 85 P.3d 518, 527 (Colo. 2004).

8
¶ 20 Thus, because Gottorff’s placement in the RHU was not a

quasi-judicial action, the district court correctly dismissed Gottorff’s

C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5

III. Duty to Report Alleged Criminal Misconduct

¶ 21 Though not listed as a separate issue on appeal, Gottorff also

argues that the district court erred by not ordering defendants to

report his allegedly unlawful detention — which he claims

constitutes a “kidnapping,” among other crimes. But other than

repeating his claim that his convictions and remand were “void” and

“criminal,” he does not explain how the CDOC committed a crime

by carrying out the sentence imposed in his criminal case. Such

allegations do not establish a “clear duty” to report that custody as

a crime — particularly when Gottorff claims the inspector general

5 To the extent Gottorff asserts that his placement in the RHU

violated his constitutional rights, that argument is beyond the
scope of his C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim. See Hushen v. Gonzalez, 2025
CO 37, ¶ 28 (noting that question of due process is distinct from
whether an action is quasi-judicial); Sundheim v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 904 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Colo. App. 1995) (explaining that
C.R.C.P. 106 does not provide a damages remedy), aff’d, 926 P.2d
545 (Colo. 1996); see also Green v. Nadeau, 70 P.3d 574, 577 (Colo.
App. 2003) (holding that a prisoner does not have a protected
liberty interest in a security classification or the procedures by
which that decision is reached).

9
did investigate his allegations. See Verrier v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 77

P.3d 875, 877 (Colo. App. 2003) (“Mandamus is appropriate only

when . . . the agency has a clear duty to perform the act requested

. . . .”); § 17-1-103.8(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring the inspector

general to “investigate, detect, and prevent any crimes”).

IV. Victim Rights Act

¶ 22 Gottorff next contends that the district court erred by denying

his motion to compel Executive Director Stancil to comply with the

VRA.6 Gottorff asserts that he is a witness and victim of a crime

because, by keeping him in custody, CDOC officials are

“kidnapping” him and “intimidating” him in retaliation for reporting

the allegations of jury tampering in his criminal case.

¶ 23 The district court denied Gottorff’s motion as moot because,

having dismissed the case, there was no longer any live dispute to

which the motion could attach. Gottorff does not challenge that

basis for the district court’s ruling. See People v. Archer, 2022 COA

6 Stancil is not a party to the lawsuit or the appeal.
See Foothills
Meadow v. Myers, 832 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Colo. App. 1992) (“A court
may not adjudicate the rights of persons not before it.”).

10
71, ¶ 42 (holding that we must affirm the district court’s ruling

when the appellant does not challenge the grounds for the ruling).

¶ 24 In any event, as Gottorff appears to acknowledge, “[t]he VRA

does not give legal standing to an alleged crime victim.” People v.

Blagg, 2015 CO 2, ¶ 21 n.4; see also Puerta v. Newman, 2023 COA

100, ¶ 21 (holding that the VRA “does not grant crime victims the

right to compel a sheriff’s office to process evidence”). Only the

Attorney General has standing to file suit to “enforce compliance”

with the VRA. Newman, ¶ 23 (quoting § 24-4.1-303(17), C.R.S.

2025). Thus, even if Gottorff were a victim of the crimes he alleges,

his sole means of enforcing compliance with the VRA would be “by

notifying the crime victim services advisory board.”

§ 24-4.1-303(17). He would not be entitled to a court order. And of

course, no provision of the VRA would grant him the relief he asked

for — release from custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction.

V. Petition for Prosecution

¶ 25 Gottorff also argues that the district court erred by denying his

petition to require prosecution of defendants — for kidnapping,

accessory to jury tampering, and intimidating a witness — under

section 16-5-209. But Gottorff filed that petition the same day he

11
filed the notice of appeal. And when the district court denied the

petition nearly three months later, Gottorff did not amend his notice

of appeal or file a new one. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review

that order. See In re Estate of Anderson, 727 P.2d 867, 869-70

(Colo. App. 1986) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction over appeal

of order entered after notice of appeal).

¶ 26 We nevertheless reiterate that Gottorff has offered no

substantive factual and legal basis for his allegations that

defendants have committed any crimes. See Sandoval v. Farish,

675 P.2d 300, 303 (Colo. 1984) (“The party challenging the district

attorney’s charging decision must overcome the presumption that

the prosecutor acted in accordance with the law and prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the prosecutor’s decision was

arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse.”).

VI. Disposition

¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LUM concur.

12