Marriage of Noteware

25CA0915 Marriage of Noteware 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0915
Eagle County District Court No. 24DR3
Honorable Russell H. Granger, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Christine L. Noteware n/k/a Christine L. Cordaro,

Appellee,

and

Jonathan Ryan Noteware,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Lipinsky and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 28, 2026

Daniel Barron, Attorney & Mediation Services, Inc., Leigh A. Rosser, Edwards,
Colorado, for Appellee

Brown Carrington, PLLC, Dorothy Walsh Ripka, Kirsten Etre, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this marital dissolution case involving Jonathan Ryan

Noteware (husband) and Christine L. Noteware, now known as

Christine L. Cordaro (wife), husband appeals the portion of the

district court’s judgment concerning division of the marital estate,

including the court’s allocation of property and debt. We affirm the

judgment.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 In 2004, wife purchased a home in Eagle using an

approximately $76,0001 down payment that her father gifted to her,

and she took sole title to the home. Husband moved into the home

in 2006, before the parties were married, and wife remained the sole

owner for the next seven years. The parties married in 2010 and

had two children together. In 2013, wife executed a quitclaim deed,

transferring ownership of the home to herself and husband, jointly.

¶3 Husband made significant improvements to the home while he

lived there, including building a deck, insulating and drywalling the

garage, installing flooring and cabinets, plumbing the basement,

1 At various times, the parties refer to the down payment amount as

$78,000; however, because neither party contests the court’s
finding that the down payment was $76,000, we use that figure.

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and landscaping the property. During the marriage, both parties

deposited their entire paychecks into a joint account, which they

used to pay household expenses, including the mortgage. The

parties earned comparable salaries. Wife managed the family

finances.

¶4 In January 2024, wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. At

the temporary orders hearing, wife initially argued that she had a

separate property interest in the home valued at around $200,000.

However, at the permanent orders hearing, wife conceded she was

aware that the home became marital property when she gifted it to

the marriage through the quitclaim deed. Nevertheless, wife argued

that her initial down payment warranted her receiving a greater

share of the home’s equity than husband.

¶5 The matter was set for a contested permanent orders hearing

to address the allocation of the marital debt and the equity in the

home. At the hearing, the court found as follows:

[F]irst, we’ll go through some of . . . the law. It
sounds like [wife] used separate funds to pay
for the down payment — excuse me, and the
earnest money. And then the [home] was
deeded to [wife and husband] jointly, which
under the law creates a presumption of a
marital gift. And so it removes that from kind

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of a clear-cut decision and puts it into an
equitable division.

What I found compelling in the testimony was
really just a sentence that [wife] stated, and
she said, I think the question — well, between
the question and the answer, the testimony,
the evidence was that, but [for] that money,
which was her separate property, they never
would’ve bought the [home]. And if they never
would’ve bought the [home], they never
would’ve had the appreciation of the past
[eighteen] years in the [home].

The appreciation is clearly marital property
divided from the two of them. And so
[husband] has benefited equally during those
[eighteen] years of that appreciation and never
would’ve gotten that appreciation but for her
contribution to enable her to buy the [home] in
the first place. So, the court will find that in
an equitable division, that that $76,000 should
in equity be transferred to [wife].

Also, part of the court’s thought in that
although [husband] may not like that, there is
a [lost] opportunity cost during the last
[eighteen] years of that $76,000, there is a lost
interest on that $76,000. I’m not awarding
any interest for that time period. It’s just flat
dollars in flat dollars out. So, any interest or
opportunity cost is realized through the
purchase of the [home] and the appreciation of
the [home].

(Emphases added).

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¶6 The court’s written permanent orders required the parties to

sell the home, with the proceeds first allocated to pay off the marital

debt and then distributed as follows:

• $84,621 to wife, which included $76,000 for her down

payment and a $7,921 equalization payment to offset

marital property awarded to husband;

• $700 in attorney fees to wife resulting from husband’s

failure to attend mediation; and

• the balance divided equally between the parties.

II. Separate Property Issues

¶7 Husband argues that the district court erred by awarding wife

$76,000 because the court failed to make the necessary findings to

support the award. We are unpersuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 “The classification of property as marital or separate is a legal

determination that is dependent on the resolution of factual

disputes.” In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 521 (Colo. App.

2010). We therefore review the court’s findings for an abuse of

discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

based on a misapplication of the law or is manifestly unreasonable,

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arbitrary, or unfair. In re Marriage of Carey, 2026 COA 3, ¶ 32. “In

assessing whether a [district] court’s decision is manifestly

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we ask not whether we would

have reached a different result but, rather, whether the [district]

court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” Id.

(quoting E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227,

230-31 (Colo. App. 2006)).

¶9 In a dissolution proceeding, the court must set apart to each

spouse their separate property and equitably divide the marital

property. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; Cardona, 321 P.3d at 521.

¶ 10 Marital property is defined — in pertinent part — as “all

property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage

except . . . [p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired

prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift,

bequest, devise, or descent.” § 14-10-113(2)(b). Gifts from one

spouse to the other are presumed to be marital property.

§ 14-10-113(7)(a). A party seeking to classify certain marital

property as separate must rebut this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. Id.

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B. The Court’s Treatment of the Home

¶ 11 At the outset, the parties dispute whether the district court

treated wife’s down payment as separate property or as marital

property. Husband contends that the district court erred by

awarding wife $76,000 for two reasons: first, wife did not overcome

the presumption that she gifted the home to the marriage, see

§ 14-10-113(3), and second, even if she had, the district court

erroneously failed to calculate the value of wife’s separate interest

in the home, see § 14-10-113(4).

¶ 12 Wife counters that the district court did not err because she

did not assert a separate property interest in the home, and

therefore the court was not required to make findings regarding

separate property interest. We agree with wife.

¶ 13 As previously noted, at the temporary orders hearing, wife

argued that a portion of the home should be treated as her separate

property. But at the hearing on final orders, wife conceded that the

home was marital property and that she no longer had a separate

property interest in it. Nevertheless, wife argued that she should

receive a greater portion of the equity derived from the home than

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husband, based on the down payment she contributed from her

personal funds. The district court agreed with wife’s position.

¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, the court expressly stated

that wife’s transfer of the home to herself and husband during the

marriage created “a presumption of a marital gift. And so it

removes that from kind of a clear-cut decision and puts it into an

equitable division.”

¶ 15 The court then awarded wife $76,000 from the equity

attributed to the home after finding that her down payment, and

the resulting benefit to the marital estate, equitably justified the

allocation. The court’s finding, therefore, was not based on wife’s

separate property interest in the home, but, rather, on equitable

principles.

¶ 16 The court’s written order is consistent with these findings.

The order states that “[i]t is equitable to allocate $76,000 to wife as

credit for the down payment used to purchase the home from the

proceeds of the sale as an unequal distribution of those proceeds.”

We therefore reject husband’s assertion that the court treated wife’s

$76,000 down payment as her separate property.

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¶ 17 Relatedly, we perceive no error resulting from the court’s

decision not to proceed under section 14-10-113(4), which provides

as follows:

Subject to the provisions of subsection (7) of
this section, an asset of a spouse acquired
prior to the marriage or in accordance with
subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) of this section shall
be considered as marital property, for
purposes of this article only, to the extent that
its present value exceeds its value at the time
of the marriage or at the time of acquisition if
acquired after the marriage.

¶ 18 Because the court treated the marital home, and all its

associated equity, as marital property, it did not need to determine

the value of any separate property interest wife may have had in the

home.

III. Equitable Factors Claim

¶ 19 Husband next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to fully consider all the applicable equitable

factors in determining the division of marital property, particularly

husband’s work to improve the home. Again, we are unpersuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 Courts have broad discretion to determine an equitable

division of marital assets and debts. In re Marriage of Capparelli,

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2024 COA 103M, ¶ 7. Therefore, we review such decisions for an

abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 21 The district court is required to divide marital property in

portions that it deems just. § 14-10-113(1). Although the division

of marital property must be equitable, it need not be equal. See In

re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. “[T]he key to an equitable

distribution is fairness, not mathematical precision.” In re Marriage

of Cardona, 2014 CO 3, ¶ 34 (quoting In re Marriage of Hunt, 909

P.2d 525, 537 (Colo. 1995)).

¶ 22 To determine what constitutes a just division of marital

property, a court must consider the following factors:

(a) The contribution of each spouse to the
acquisition of the marital property, . . .;

(b) The value of the property set apart to each
spouse;

(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse
at the time the division of property is to
become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
with whom any children reside the majority of
the time; and

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(d) Any increases or decreases in the value of
the separate property of the spouse during the
marriage or the depletion of the separate
property for marital purposes.

§ 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d) (emphases added).

B. Analysis

1. The Property Allocation

¶ 23 Husband contends that the district court failed to consider the

parties’ relative economic circumstances under section

14-10-113(1)(b) and (c) when it distributed the marital estate, and

particularly, its decision to award wife a larger portion of the

proceeds of the sale of the home. He argues that the court placed

undue emphasis on wife’s $76,000 contribution, failed to consider

wife’s alleged ability to obtain financial support from her family, and

overlooked that, at the time of final orders, wife earned slightly

more money than he did.

¶ 24 Husband also takes issue with the court’s failure to give

adequate weight to his financial contributions to the household,

including depositing his entire paycheck into the parties’ joint

account and his significant home improvements.

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¶ 25 Wife counters that the district court’s orders have record

support, and the court properly considered both parties’ economic

and noneconomic contributions to the marital estate to arrive at an

equitable division. We agree with wife.

¶ 26 In its oral findings, the court acknowledged that both parties

contributed to increasing the value of the marital property and

noted that, “even if one party may have done more work, one party

did less work, one party may have paid more, that all went into the

marital estate.” As the court noted:

Both parties — I mean there’s been — sounds
like there’s been some hard times and one
party may have worked more, contributed
more parts during the marriage. But that’s,
that’s kind of what happens in a marriage is
like a partnership. That’s kind of what
happens in life. So, I still see it as a — that
the fairest thing to do is to try and get it as
close to 50 percent as I can.

¶ 27 The district court also considered both parties’ current and

anticipated future economic circumstances. For instance, it applied

a significant portion of the home equity to pay off all marital debt,

with the stated intention of allowing each party to walk away from

the marriage debt-free.

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¶ 28 Recall that a court is not required to divide marital property

equally but must determine what is equitable under the

circumstances. Wright, ¶ 3. We discern no error in the court’s

finding that wife should receive a slightly larger share of the marital

estate in recognition of the fact that she used her personal funds —

the $76,000 — to purchase the home and later gifted it to the

marital estate. As a result, both parties benefitted from the

substantial equity that had accrued in the home since its purchase.

And the court conservatively limited wife’s greater share to only the

$76,000, without any interest or additional equity attributable to

that sum.

¶ 29 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to

equitably adjust the distribution of the home equity in recognition

of wife’s contribution of her separate property to the “acquisition of

the [home].” § 14-10-113(1)(a), (d).

2. The Debt Allocation

¶ 30 Husband also argues that the court inequitably allocated the

parties’ marital debt because wife “depleted the overall financial

resources of the marriage by unilaterally incurring significant

debts.” As best we understand his contention, husband asserts

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that he should not be equally responsible for the credit card debt

accumulated by wife during the marriage because she did so

without his consent or knowledge.

¶ 31 Wife counters that the district court’s findings on the equal

division of the marital liabilities comports with evidence that the

credit card debt was incurred for expenses benefiting the entire

household.

¶ 32 At the permanent orders hearing, wife presented evidence that

she incurred the credit card debt to pay family medical expenses,

including the children’s travel and activities, and the family’s home

furnishings, appliances, and other expenses. Husband testified

that wife managed the household’s finances throughout their

marriage.

¶ 33 Husband did not present any evidence to support his

contention that some unstated portion of the credit card debt was

attributable to wife’s use of the credit cards for purely personal

purposes. And on appeal, husband does not challenge any of wife’s

specific expenditures but, instead, broadly argues that she made

credit card charges without his knowledge or consent.

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¶ 34 In view of the parties’ testimony, and in the absence of any

record citation supporting husband’s contention that wife’s

expenditures were for nonmarital purposes, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s allocation of the parties’ marital

debt.

¶ 35 Finally, we reject husband’s contention that the court erred by

failing to make specific findings regarding whether some of wife’s

post-filing expenditures were for personal expenses. The court

stated at the end of the final orders hearing that it lacked detailed

information about the parties’ post-filing expenditures and asked

counsel whether they could resolve these issues themselves.

Counsel assured the court that they could resolve any such

disputes, and the court did not further address the issue.

¶ 36 Under these circumstances, we conclude that husband either

invited or waived any error attributable to the court’s lack of

consideration of specific post-filing expenditures. We therefore do

not address the issue further. See Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA

106, ¶ 11 (“The doctrine of invited error prevents a party from

complaining on appeal of an error that he or she has invited or

injected into the case.”); Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243,

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247 (Colo. 1984) (“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a

known right or privilege.”).

IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 37 Wife requests an award of appellate attorney fees, arguing that

husband’s appellate contentions were frivolous and groundless.

Section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, provides that a court shall award

attorney fees against any party who has brought or defended a civil

action, in whole or in part, that lacked substantial justification.

§ 13-17-102(2).

¶ 38 As used in the statute, the phrase ‘“lacked substantial

justification’ means substantially frivolous, substantially

groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-101.5, C.R.S.

2025. Awards of appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102

are only appropriate in “clear and unequivocal cases where no

rational argument is presented and, thus, the appeal is frivolous.”

In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34.

¶ 39 Although ultimately unsuccessful, husband’s appellate

contentions were presented in a rational and good faith manner.

Therefore, we conclude that his arguments were not substantially

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frivolous or groundless. Accordingly, we deny wife’s request for

attorney fees.

V. Disposition

¶ 40 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE YUN concur.

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