Parental Resp Conc SMA

25CA1553 Parental Resp Conc SMA 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1553
Boulder County District Court No. 24DR30032
Honorable Robert R. Gunning, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.M.A., a Child,

and Concerning Jordan Christopher Ashcraft,

Appellant,

and

Elena Irene Barrera,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 28, 2026

Jordan Christopher Ashcroft, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 Jordan Christopher Ashcraft (father) appeals the district

court’s permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities

between him and Elena Irene Barrera (mother). We affirm the

judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Father petitioned for an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) for the parties’ shared child. The district court appointed a

Child and Family Investigator (CFI) to make recommendations to

the court concerning an APR. Following a permanent orders

hearing, the court issued a detailed written ruling allocating father

a step-up parenting plan and mother all other parenting time and

sole decision-making responsibility.

¶3 Through the first phase of the plan, the court granted father

six hours per week of professionally supervised parenting time.

After three months of “consistent, safe” supervised time, the court

permitted father six hours of unsupervised parenting time each

week. After three months in that phase, the court allocated father

two overnights every other weekend.

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II. Parenting Time

¶4 Father contends that the district court abused its discretion

by (1) ordering professionally supervised parenting time without

making endangerment findings, and (2) imposing the step-up plan

without making express findings justifying its duration or structure.

We aren’t convinced.

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Principles

¶5 A district court enjoys broad discretion over parenting time

matters, and we exercise every presumption in favor of upholding

its decision. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based

on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA

141, ¶ 25. However, we review the court’s application of the law de

novo. In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 10.

¶6 A court must allocate parenting time in accordance with the

child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the child’s

safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Marriage of Pawelec,

2024 COA 107, ¶ 43. In doing so, a court considers all relevant

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factors, including those set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (the

best interests standard).

¶7 Section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, (the endangerment

standard) provides that a court can’t “restrict a parent’s parenting

time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger

the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s

emotional development.” § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). In addition to finding

endangerment, any order imposing a restriction must “enumerate

the specific factual findings supporting the restriction.” Id.; § 14-

10-124(1.5)(a).

B. Supervised Parenting Time

¶8 Father first argues that the district court improperly restricted

his parenting time through the professional supervision

requirement. Specifically, he asserts that the court was required,

but failed, to find that unsupervised parenting time would endanger

the child under the endangerment standard.

¶9 But the best interests standard governs an initial APR

determination, like the permanent orders here. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a); Pawelec, ¶ 43; cf. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158,

161 (Colo. 2005) (section 14-10-124, not section 14-10-129, applies

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to an initial parental responsibilities determination, even if

temporary parenting time orders were entered pending a final

determination). The court applied the best interests standard in

this case. And, while the court would have been required to find

endangerment if it granted father no parenting time, the court

allocated father parenting time, albeit supervised. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a) (The court “may make provisions for parenting time that

the court finds are in the best interests of the child . . . unless the

court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the party would

endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the

child’s emotional development.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 10 The endangerment standard, on the other hand, applies to a

restriction of a parent’s “parenting time rights.” See § 14-10-

129(1)(b)(I); see also In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32

(defining a restriction on a “parent’s parenting time rights” for the

purposes of the endangerment standard) (cert. granted in part July

21, 2025). But before the court entered permanent orders, it hadn’t

yet granted parenting time rights. See In re Marriage of Fickling,

100 P.3d 571, 574 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Only permanent orders grant

‘parenting time rights.’”). Thus, the APR ruling within the

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permanent orders granted father “parenting time rights” as that

phrase is used in the endangerment standard — it didn’t restrict

those rights. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163 (At the time of

dissolution, “[n]either [party] has vested parenting

rights . . . subject to restriction by the court.”); see also Fickling,

100 P.3d at 574 (“[T]he question whether a restriction has occurred

in parenting time need be answered only when permanent, not

temporary, orders are modified.”).

¶ 11 As a result, we conclude that the court wasn’t required to

apply the endangerment standard when it imposed a supervision

requirement on the first phase of father’s step-up plan.

¶ 12 In any event, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its

discretion by ordering that the first phase of father’s parenting time

be supervised under section 14-10-124(4)(e)(III).

¶ 13 When a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a

party has committed domestic violence, it must consider (1) as the

primary concern, the safety and wellbeing of the child and the

abused party; and (2) conditions on parenting time that ensure the

safety of the child and the abused party. § 14-10-124(4)(d)-(e). One

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such condition is an order that parenting time be supervised. § 14-

10-124(4)(e)(III).

¶ 14 While the court didn’t expressly find that father had

committed domestic violence, we can infer from its findings and

order that the court made such a determination. See In re Marriage

of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 41 (upholding district court’s decision

based on its implied findings, which were sufficient); In re Marriage

of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that, while

the trial court could have made more specific findings, its findings

and reference to the parenting evaluation “demonstrate that the

trial court considered” the appropriate best interests factors).

¶ 15 The court cited to section 14-10-124(4)(d) in its ruling, as well

as the definitions of domestic violence and coercive control within

that statute. See § 14-10-124(1.3)(a)-(b). And the court noted that

it “placed most weight on the safety and well-being of the child,”

among other factors. See § 14-10-124(4)(d). Moreover, it found

that father (1) directed inflammatory, insulting, and harassing

communications toward mother; (2) had escalated his “pattern of

verbal harassment and vitriol” toward mother during the two years

preceding permanent orders; and (3) used financial support to

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control and belittle mother. The court also found credible the CFI’s

concern that father’s behavior was “motivated by a desire to

overwhelm and exhaust” mother so that she would “give in” to his

demands.

¶ 16 Bearing this in mind, we turn to the court’s findings

concerning the child’s interrelationship with father. As relevant

here, the court made the following findings:

• While father had many of the tools that would allow him to

provide a safe environment for the child, he had “allowed his

animus against Mother to overshadow his relationship” with

the child.

• Father withheld his time, love, and affection from the child as

leverage for mother to adopt his preferred parenting plan.

• Father exercised very limited parenting time during the six

months preceding the APR determination and his “stepping

back” appeared to affect the child.

• Father’s decisions had a “direct impact” on the child’s well-

being.

¶ 17 The court ultimately determined that professional supervision

during the first phase of father’s step-up plan was in the child’s

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best interests. See § 14-10-124(4)(e)(III). The court based this on

(1) the length of time since the child had consistent parenting time

with father and (2) mother’s and the CFI’s credible concerns about

father’s “involvement of [the child] in parenting decisions.”

¶ 18 While the CFI’s concerns are apparent in the court’s ruling

and the CFI report, we can’t discern on the available record whether

the CFI testified further about these issues at the permanent orders

hearing. Nor can we tell what mother’s specific concerns were.

That is because father didn’t provide us with the transcripts from

the court’s permanent orders hearing, though he bore responsibility

to do so. See C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (“The appellant must include in the

record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and

deciding the issues on appeal.”); In re Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d

1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002). Because these transcripts aren’t in

the record, we must presume that they support the court’s

judgment. See Tagen, 62 P.3d at 1096.

¶ 19 Still, father claims that the court based the supervision order

on “generalized concerns regarding parental conflict.” We reject this

claim in light of the court’s findings discussed above. What’s more,

the court expressly determined that “[p]rofessional supervision will

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enhance objective accountability for consistency and commitment

to appropriate and health[y] contact between Father and child.”

¶ 20 For these reasons, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its

discretion by applying the best interests standard to the initial APR

determination. Nor did it abuse its discretion by ordering that the

first phase of father’s parenting time be supervised after applying

the best interests standard and considering the provisions of

section 14-10-124(4)(d)-(e).

C. Adequacy of Findings Underlying Step-Up Plan

¶ 21 Father also asserts that the district court abused its discretion

by imposing the step-up parenting plan without adequate findings

justifying its duration or structure. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 22 The court made extensive factual findings, including with

respect to certain section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) factors. It found that

father had often been unable to place the child’s interests over his

own and that his ability to encourage the sharing of affection and

contact between the child and mother was limited. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(VI), (XI). As noted, father also had very limited and

sporadic parenting time during the six-month period preceding the

court’s ruling.

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¶ 23 Further, the court specifically explained the basis for father’s

step-up parenting plan, which it determined was in the child’s best

interests. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Pawelec, ¶ 43. It concluded that

a step-up parenting plan was most likely to facilitate a “strong, safe

relationship” while giving father time to demonstrate consistency to

the child. And it determined that frequent, gradually increasing

parenting time was appropriate because of father’s struggle to place

the child’s needs before his own and his sporadic, limited parenting

time during the six months before its ruling. Moreover, the court

explained that the supervised phase of the plan was a “bridge

between very limited contact and a future consistent, healthy

unsupervised parenting time schedule.”

¶ 24 In short, the court’s thorough ruling contains findings and

conclusions sufficiently explicit that we have a clear understanding

of the basis for its decision. See In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d

815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008). Father points us to no legal authority

that persuades us that more was necessary. Thus, we reject his

contention that further findings or explanation by the court were

required.

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¶ 25 To the extent father asserts the court was required to make

express findings concerning less detrimental alternatives to its

designation of parenting time, he offers no authority in support of

this assertion. Nor are we aware of any. See In re Marriage of

Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 78 (Colo. App. 2002) (recognizing that the

concept of least detrimental alternative is subsumed within the

concept of the best interests of the child); see also In re Marriage of

Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that a court

may not “completely deny . . . parenting time under the best

interests standard without express consideration of whether doing

so is the least detrimental alternative.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 26 Finally, the court acted within its discretion when it adopted

certain recommendations by the CFI after considering the evidence

and the CFI report. See § 14-10-116.5(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (providing

that the court shall consider the entire CFI report, and any

testimony, before adopting any of the CFI’s recommendations).

Thus, we reject any suggestion to the contrary by father.

III. Disposition

¶ 27 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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