Peo v. French

24CA1474 Peo v French 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1474
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR5246
Honorable Eric M. Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jazmine N. French,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 28, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert P. Borquez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jazmine N. French, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of second

degree assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts.

¶3 In September 2022, French rear-ended the victim, Cecelia

Soria, while traffic was at a standstill. After feeling her car get

bumped, Soria started recording a video on her cell phone. Soria

walked from her car to the back of French’s car, recording French’s

face, car, and license plate. After seeing this, French got out of her

car and knocked Soria’s phone out of her hand. Soria then pushed

French, prompting French to punch her in the face. As French

described at trial, the two then engaged in a “big old brawl.” A

short time later, French’s passenger, her daughter, also began

fighting with Soria.

¶4 The prosecution charged French with second degree assault

and first degree contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury

found French guilty of second degree assault but acquitted her of

contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The district court

sentenced French to three years of probation with the condition

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that she enroll in anger management and conflict resolution

classes.

¶5 French now appeals.

II. Heat of Passion Jury Instruction

¶6 French contends that the district court erred by not

instructing the jury on heat of passion, a mitigating factor for

second degree assault. She asserts that Soria’s push and her

video-recording the encounter constituted highly provoking acts

that supported French’s requested instruction. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 Second degree assault is a class 4 felony. § 18-3-203(2)(b),

C.R.S. 2025. But if the defendant commits the assault in a sudden

heat of passion, the charge is reduced to a class 6 felony.

§ 18-3-203(2)(a).

¶8 To receive a heat of passion instruction, the defendant must

provide evidence that (1) the assault was performed upon a sudden

heat of passion; (2) the assault was caused by a serious and highly

provoking act of the intended victim; (3) the provoking act was

sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person;

and (4) between the provocation and the assault, an insufficient

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amount of time passed for the voice of reason and humanity to be

heard. Id.; see People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶ 22 (citing Cassels

v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 956 (Colo. 2004)). The evidence must

“establish that an objectively reasonable person would have

similarly suffered an irresistible passion.” People v. Dooley, 944

P.2d 590, 594 (Colo. App. 1997).

¶9 The defendant must present “some credible evidence” in

support of each element to receive the instruction. People v.

Oslund, 2012 COA 62, ¶¶ 15-16 (quoting O’Shaughnessy v. People,

2012 CO 9, ¶ 11). We review de novo whether sufficient evidence

supported a requested jury instruction. O’Shaughnessy, ¶ 13.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 For two reasons, we perceive no error in the district court’s

denial of French’s requested heat of passion instruction.

¶ 11 First, Soria’s push wasn’t a serious and highly provoking act

sufficient to satisfy the second required element. See People v.

Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 94 (Colo. 2002) (the victim’s refusal of the

defendant’s marriage proposal, request that the defendant leave,

and subsequent push weren’t highly provoking acts); People v.

Holloway, 973 P.2d 721, 724 (Colo. App. 1998) (a push causing the

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defendant’s girlfriend to fall over on a couch wasn’t a highly

provoking act). Indeed, by the time Soria pushed French, French

had already instigated physical contact by knocking Soria’s phone

out of her hand. Given this, French can’t claim that Soria’s

subsequent push provoked her. Cf. People v. Valdez, 183 P.3d 720,

723 (Colo. App. 2008) (heat of passion defense inapplicable when

the “defendant intentionally put himself in the provoking

situation”).

¶ 12 Second, we disagree with French that Soria video-recording

the incident constituted a serious and highly provoking act.

Cassels, relied on by the district court when rejecting French’s

requested instruction, is instructive. 92 P.3d at 957. There, the

supreme court concluded that the victim’s acts were highly

provoking when he followed the defendant around the apartment

acting like a “wild man,” shoved and “threaten[ed] to beat [the

defendant] severely enough to require hospitalization,” “positioned

himself in front of the only exit . . . next to an iron bar that he

previously said would make a good weapon,” and insulted the

defendant repeatedly. Id. The defendant, wearing only a towel, was

in a “highly vulnerable position.” Id.

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¶ 13 In contrast to the defendant in Cassels, French had no reason

to believe Soria had a weapon or intended to hurt her. Moreover,

Soria didn’t threaten French or act in a wild manner. And French

wasn’t in a highly vulnerable position. While Soria approaching

and recording French may have been unwelcome, that doesn’t

transform her behavior into a highly provoking act that will support

a heat of passion instruction. See People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d

1002, 1005, 1007 (Colo. 2003) (victim’s “decision to appear where

he allegedly knew he was unwelcome” wasn’t a highly provoking

act).

¶ 14 Even if we assumed that video-recording a person after a car

accident could constitute a highly provoking act, we conclude on

this record that it still wasn’t sufficient to excite an irresistible

passion in an objectively reasonable person. See Tardif, ¶ 22.

Absent other circumstances not present here, an objectively

reasonable person wouldn’t engage in a physical fight merely

because the victim recorded them after a fender bender. See

Sepulveda, 65 P.3d at 1007 (concluding as a matter of law that a

victim’s unwelcome presence, without more, wouldn’t excite the

passion of a reasonable person); see also Holloway, 973 P.2d at 724

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(testimony that the defendant and victim were “arguing like they

were about to fight” didn’t establish provocation sufficient to excite

an irresistible passion in a reasonable person).

¶ 15 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the district court’s

decision rejecting French’s requested heat of passion instruction.

III. Limits on Cross-Examination

¶ 16 French contends that the district court erred by limiting her

cross-examination of Soria in violation of CRE 611(b), the

Confrontation Clause, and the party presentation principle. We

aren’t persuaded.

A. Additional Background

¶ 17 At trial, the prosecution admitted a bystander’s video of the

altercation. During Soria’s testimony, the prosecution played

segments of the video and questioned her about her actions and

observations during the fight. Defense counsel cross-examined

Soria about the video — specifically, about the movements of

French’s daughter during the altercation. During this questioning,

the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then [French’s
daughter] moves from the passenger side of

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[French’s] car to the driver’s — to the driver’s
side. Right?

[SORIA]: I don’t know.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to approach
you with that video, People’s Exhibit 1, and
without any audio I’m just going to show you a
brief clip on my computer.

THE COURT: I’m sorry. You’re republishing?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. I’m just showing
Ms. Soria.

THE COURT: Counsel, what is it you think
you’re doing? She didn’t say she doesn’t
remember, so you’re not refreshing
recollection. She says she doesn’t know, so
she’s unaware exactly what happened.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She said she did not
remember, Your Honor.

THE COURT: She said, “I don’t know.” And
the exhibit speaks for itself.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, Your Honor, Ms.
French has a right to cross-examine —

THE COURT: Counsel approach.

(Discussion at the bench.)

THE COURT: Counsel, you’re not going to be
able to get into this. The reason she doesn’t
remember is because she’s gotten punched
and she’s in the middle of a fight. She did not
see this part. She said, “I don’t know.” You’re
not refreshing recollection. You’re not
impeaching. You’re having her comment on an

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exhibit which speaks for itself. The jury can
see it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, she — on
direct examination she had the opportunity to
go through this exhibit piece by piece with the
district attorney, and Ms. French should have
the opportunity to then cross-examine her
piece by piece about this exhibit that she was
questioned about on direct.

THE COURT: She said she didn’t know. Move
on.

After a recess, defense counsel questioned Soria about screenshots

from the video, showing the movements of French’s daughter during

the altercation.

B. CRE 611(b)

¶ 18 French contends that the district court erred by limiting

cross-examination, in violation of CRE 611(b), because the

prosecution questioned Soria about the video during her direct

examination.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 19 CRE 611(b) limits cross-examination to the “subject matter of

the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the

witness.” But the rule must “be liberally construed to permit

cross-examination on any matter germane to the direct

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examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to elucidate,

modify, explain, contradict, or rebut testimony given by the

witness.” People v. Sallis, 857 P.2d 572, 574 (Colo. App. 1993).

¶ 20 Nevertheless, a trial court has broad discretion to limit

cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of

the issues, repetitiveness, and relevance. People v. Conyac, 2014

COA 8M, ¶ 97. Unless the court’s restriction is so severe as to

constitute a denial of the right to cross-examine the witness, the

extent to which cross-examination should be allowed falls within

the court’s discretion. Id.

¶ 21 We review a trial court’s limits on cross-examination for an

abuse of that discretion. Id. at ¶ 91.

2. Analysis

¶ 22 We perceive no abuse of discretion under CRE 611(b) in the

district court’s limitation on French’s cross-examination of Soria.

The court restricted inquiry on only one topic — the location of

French’s daughter during the altercation. That narrow restriction

fell within the district court’s broad discretion. When Soria didn’t

know the answer to defense counsel’s question, there was nothing

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for defense counsel to impeach or refresh through the bystander’s

video recording.

¶ 23 Moreover, defense counsel did elicit testimony from Soria

about the location of French’s daughter while introducing

screenshots of the video. Thus, the court’s limit on

cross-examination wasn’t so severe as to constitute a denial of

French’s right to cross-examine Soria. See Conyac, ¶ 97.

C. Confrontation Clause

¶ 24 French contends that the district court’s limitation on her

cross-examination of Soria violated her constitutional right to

confront the witnesses against her.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 25 The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to

cross-examine prosecution witnesses. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo.

Const. art. II, § 16; People v. Campos, 2015 COA 47, ¶ 27. A court

may not “limit excessively a defendant’s cross-examination of a

witness regarding the witness’ credibility, especially

cross-examination concerning the witness’ bias, prejudice, or

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motive for testifying.” Campos, ¶ 27 (quoting Merritt v. People, 842

P.2d 162, 167 (Colo. 1992)).

¶ 26 “The question in determining whether a restriction on

cross-examination runs afoul of the constitutional right of

confrontation is whether a ‘reasonable jury might have received a

significantly different impression of a witness’s credibility had the

court not erroneously excluded otherwise appropriate evidence.’”

People v. Dunham, 2016 COA 73, ¶ 40 (quoting Krutsinger v. People,

219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2009)).

¶ 27 We review de novo whether a trial court violated a defendant’s

Confrontation Clause rights. People v. Carter, 2015 COA 24M-2,

¶ 28. But because French didn’t raise the constitutional right to

confront witnesses as a basis for allowing her requested

cross-examination, our review is limited to plain error. See People

v. Jaeb, 2018 COA 179, ¶¶ 8-9 (evidentiary objection insufficient to

preserve Confrontation Clause claim); Campos, ¶ 29 (defining plain

error).

2. Analysis

¶ 28 We discern no error under the federal or state Confrontation

Clauses, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s narrow limitation

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on French’s cross-examination of Soria. The court didn’t prevent

French from asking Soria about her perceptions of the movements

of French’s daughter. Soria answered the question by saying she

didn’t know, prompting the court to direct French to “[m]ove on.”

¶ 29 But even if the court had prevented French’s questions, its

restriction didn’t relate to Soria’s credibility, bias, prejudice, or

motive for testifying. See Carter, ¶ 36 (rejecting Confrontation

Clause challenge, in part, because the defense’s requested

cross-examination “had little, if any, bearing on [the witness]’s bias,

motives, or credibility as a witness”); Campos, ¶ 38 (concluding that

the court’s limit on cross-examination didn’t violate the

Confrontation Clause where the excluded questions didn’t relate to

the witness’s “bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying”). To the

contrary, defense counsel was still able to effectively cross-examine

Soria on topics bearing on her credibility, including the lack of

damage to her car and her incomplete communications with the

prosecution and law enforcement.

¶ 30 Accordingly, the court’s limit on French’s cross-examination of

Soria didn’t prevent the defense from eliciting testimony that would

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have given the jury a “significantly different impression” of Soria’s

credibility. Dunham, ¶ 40 (quoting Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at 1061).

D. Party Presentation Principle

¶ 31 French contends that the district court erred by sua sponte

limiting her cross-examination of Soria, violating the party

presentation principle.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 32 The party presentation principle requires a court to rely “on

the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts

the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.” Galvan v. People,

2020 CO 82, ¶ 45. The principle is “supple, not ironclad.” People v.

Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶ 30 (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020)). “There are no doubt circumstances in

which a modest initiating role for a court is appropriate.”

Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 376.

¶ 33 Under CRE 611(a), the trial court must “exercise reasonable

control” over the interrogation of witnesses to “(1) make the

interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the

truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect

witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”

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¶ 34 We review a trial court’s alleged deviation from the party

presentation principle for an abuse of discretion. Sineneng-Smith,

590 U.S. at 375. Because French didn’t raise the party

presentation principle before the district court, our review is again

limited to plain error. See Campos, ¶ 29.

2. Analysis

¶ 35 We perceive no error under the party presentation principle,

let alone plain error, in the district court’s limitation on French’s

cross-examination of Soria. As with French’s CRE 611(b)

argument, Soria’s answer of “I don’t know” when asked about the

movements of French’s daughter meant that there was nothing for

defense counsel to impeach or refresh through the bystander’s

video recording. When defense counsel nonetheless persisted with

the same line of questioning, the court acted within its broad

discretion under CRE 611(a) by instructing counsel to move on to a

different topic. See People v. Hendrickson, 45 P.3d 786, 788 (Colo.

App. 2001) (a trial court “must exercise its discretion to preclude

inquiries that have no probative value, are irrelevant, or are

prejudicial”).

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¶ 36 French doesn’t point us to any authority suggesting that the

party presentation principle overrode the court’s responsibility

under CRE 611(a) to exercise reasonable control over the

presentation of evidence. And since the party presentation principle

isn’t “ironclad,” Lulei, ¶ 30 (quoting Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at

376), we decline to apply it in a manner that would inhibit the court

from exercising its considerable discretion to secure the effective

interrogation of witnesses and avoid the needless consumption of

time. See CRE 611(a); cf. Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 (the

party presentation principle doesn’t “prevent a court from properly

characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a

party”).

¶ 37 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err under the party

presentation principle by limiting French’s cross-examination of

Soria.

IV. Authentication

¶ 38 French contends that the district court erred by admitting a

video of the altercation that wasn’t properly authenticated. We

disagree.

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A. Additional Background

¶ 39 Before trial, French moved in limine to exclude a video of the

altercation that the prosecution planned to introduce through a

bystander, N.H. French argued that N.H. couldn’t authenticate the

video because he witnessed the altercation from a different angle

than the person who recorded the video. Although French

stipulated to the video being introduced through another witness,

she didn’t want the prosecution to introduce the video through N.H.

The district court denied French’s motion.

¶ 40 At trial, N.H. testified that he was driving in the opposite

direction as Soria and French when he witnessed their altercation.

N.H. explained that he witnessed “all” of the interaction, except “the

initial contact between the two cars.” After the altercation ended

and French drove away, N.H. pulled his car over to the side of the

road and ran over to see if Soria needed medical attention. Another

witness who stayed on scene, a truck driver, had recorded the

incident. N.H. asked the truck driver for a copy of the video. The

prosecution moved to admit the video into evidence during N.H.’s

testimony.

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¶ 41 After voir dire, defense counsel reraised her pretrial objection

to N.H.’s authentication of the video. The court overruled the

objection and admitted the video. The prosecution played the video

but didn’t question N.H. about it.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 42 The proponent of physical evidence must authenticate the

evidence to admit it at trial. See CRE 901(a). Authentication

requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims.” Id. The burden of

authentication is “minimal — all that’s required is a prima facie

showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims.” Gonzales

v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 42. Evidence is admissible under

CRE 901(a) if “the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation

from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is

authentic.” Gonzales, ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16,

¶ 13). Once the proponent meets this prima facie burden,

authenticity is a question for the jury. Id. at ¶ 6; see People v.

Brown, 313 P.3d 608, 614 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Any question as to

the authenticity of evidence is properly decided by the jury.”).

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¶ 43 CRE 901 doesn’t prescribe an exclusive method for

authenticating evidence. Gonzales, ¶ 30. Rather, it contemplates a

“flexible, fact-specific inquiry,” id. at ¶ 5, and “vests trial courts with

broad discretion to consider a variety of foundational circumstances

depending on the nature of the proffered evidence,” id. at ¶ 30. “To

authenticate a video recording, the proponent needs to establish

that the recording is an accurate reproduction of a scene with

which the witness is familiar.” People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA

163, ¶ 51, overruled in part on other grounds by, People in Interest of

E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42.

¶ 44 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence

for an abuse of discretion. Gonzales, ¶ 25. “A trial court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21).

C. Analysis

¶ 45 The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in overruling

French’s objection to N.H.’s authentication of the video. N.H.’s

testimony that the recording accurately captured the scene he

witnessed was sufficient foundation for the court to admit the

recording into evidence. See M.V., ¶ 51.

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¶ 46 French’s argument that N.H. couldn’t authenticate the video

because he viewed the altercation from a different angle doesn’t

convince us otherwise. After the prosecution met its prima facie

burden, any question about the video’s authenticity — either

because N.H. observed the altercation from a different angle than

the truck driver who recorded it, or for any other reason — became

an issue for the jury to decide. See Brown, 313 P.3d at 614; see

also People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16 (once a proponent of

evidence meets its prima facie burden, questions about authenticity

“go to the weight of evidence and not its admissibility”). In addition,

defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined N.H. regarding his

viewing angle, inconsistencies in his recollection, and the

differences between his version of events and what the video

depicted.

¶ 47 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s admission of the video.

V. Cumulative Error

¶ 48 French contends that, even if none of her contentions of error

individually warrants reversal, their cumulative effect does. To

warrant reversal under the cumulative error doctrine, a reviewing

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court must identify multiple errors that collectively prejudiced the

defendant’s substantial rights. Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO

69, ¶ 25. Because we haven’t identified any errors, the cumulative

error doctrine isn’t implicated. People v. Jones, 2025 COA 43, ¶ 56

(cert. granted Jan. 20, 2026).

VI. Disposition

¶ 49 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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