People v. Marceleno

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
May 28, 2026

2026 COA 40

No. 24CA1169, People v. Marceleno — Criminal Law —
Sentencing — Assessment of Restitution — Non-felony
Conviction Under Title 42

A division of the court of appeals examines whether section

18-1.3-603(8), C.R.S. 2025 — which limits restitution when a

victim’s loss is covered by insurance — applies to the defendant’s

convictions. The defendant contends that the district court was

obligated under subsections (8)(b) and (8)(c) to determine whether

the damaged car was covered by insurance before ordering

restitution and asserts that the court improperly shifted the burden

to the defense to present evidence on this issue.

Interpreting section 18-1.3-603(8) as a whole and giving all its

provisions consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect, the division

concludes that the limitation in subsection (8)(a) — restricting

application to non-felony convictions under title 42 — applies to all
of section 18-1.3-603(8). Accordingly, the division disagrees with

the dicta in People v. Lockett, 2025 COA 1, ¶ 18, that “subsection

(8)(a) pertains only to title 42 non-felony offenses, whereas

subsection (8)(c) pertains to all types of offenses.”

Because none of the defendant’s convictions fall under title 42,

section 18-1.3-603(8) does not apply in this case. And because the

division rejects the defendant’s remaining arguments, it affirms the

restitution order.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 40

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1169
Weld County District Court No. 22CR293
Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Danny Marceleno,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

Announced May 28, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Danny Marceleno appeals the district court’s restitution order

entered following his convictions for reckless endangerment,

vehicular eluding, and criminal mischief — offenses arising from a

high-speed chase in which he fled from police. He challenges the

restitution awarded for damage to a car and a gate sustained when

he crashed.

¶2 One of the central questions in this appeal is whether section

18-1.3-603(8), C.R.S. 2025 — which limits restitution when a

victim’s loss is covered by insurance — applies to Marceleno’s

convictions. Marceleno argues that the district court was obligated

under subsections (8)(b) and (8)(c) to determine whether the

damaged car was covered by insurance before ordering restitution

and asserts that the court improperly shifted the burden to the

defense to present evidence on this issue.

¶3 Reading section 18-1.3-603(8) as a whole and giving its

provisions consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect, we conclude

that the limitation in subsection (8)(a) — which restricts its

application to non-felony convictions under title 42 — applies to the

entirety of section 18-1.3-603(8). In so holding, we disagree with

the dicta in People v. Lockett, 2025 COA 1, ¶ 18, that “subsection

1
(8)(a) pertains only to title 42 non-felony offenses, whereas

subsection (8)(c) pertains to all types of offenses.”

¶4 Because none of Marceleno’s convictions fall under title 42,

the district court correctly determined that section 18-1.3-603(8) is

inapplicable to this case. And because we discern no other basis to

disturb the restitution order, we affirm.

I. Background

¶5 Sheriff’s deputies found Marceleno and his girlfriend asleep

inside a stolen car. When ordered to get out of the car, Marceleno

sped off, leading deputies on a chase that ended when he lost

control of the car and crashed into the gate at the entrance of

Patterson Farms, a gated community. A jury convicted him of two

counts of reckless endangerment and one count each of vehicular

eluding and criminal mischief. The district court sentenced him to

nine years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶6 The prosecution sought $26,439.99 in restitution: $6,440 to

the car owner for damage sustained in the crash; $18,999.99 to

State Farm to reimburse it for its payment to the Patterson Farms

Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for replacing the damaged gate;

and $1,000 to the HOA for its insurance deductible. Marceleno did

2
not contest the deductible but objected to the restitution sought for

the car owner and State Farm.

¶7 During the restitution hearing, the prosecution relied on

evidence presented at trial. That evidence included public records

showing the owner purchased the car for $7,998 on August 8,

2020, plus $239.94 in use tax and $247.14 in fees. The arresting

officer also testified that the car was towed from the crash site and

that he estimated its value at between $5,840 and $6,400 based on

the Kelley Blue Book. At the restitution hearing, the prosecution

confirmed — and defense counsel did not dispute — that the car

was totaled.

¶8 The prosecution also presented evidence that State Farm paid

the HOA $21,300 to replace the gate. At the time of trial, the gate

had not been fully repaired or made operational, but the HOA had

already spent $11,500 on repairs, excluding labor costs not yet

billed. The HOA representative testified that the HOA would “most

likely” have little remaining from State Farm’s payment. He further

testified that State Farm required the HOA to restore the gate to its

pre-accident condition and denied that the replacement gate

differed materially from the original. He acknowledged that the

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replacement gate had “slightly different” lights and paint but stated

that the HOA did its “best to repair it . . . as close as [it] could to the

original.” The HOA also added extra supports to the replacement

gate.

¶9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court awarded

$17,940 in restitution: $6,440 to the car owner, $10,500 to State

Farm for the gate, and $1,000 to the HOA for the uncontested

deductible. In doing so, the court made two rulings relevant to this

appeal.

¶ 10 First, the district court addressed which party bore the burden

of proving the existence of insurance coverage for the damaged

vehicle. It held that the prosecution bore no such burden because

section 18-1.3-603(8) applies only to restitution orders arising from

non-felony convictions under title 42. Instead, the court treated

any insurance payment as a setoff and placed the burden of

establishing that setoff on Marceleno. With no evidence of

insurance coverage in the record, the court found it “more likely

than not” that the vehicle’s value exceeded $6,440 — it had been

purchased just one year earlier for almost $8,000, and the damage

4
was extensive, rendering it inoperable. Accordingly, the court

ordered Marceleno to pay $6,440 in restitution to the car owner.

¶ 11 Second, the district court found that Marceleno was the

proximate cause of the gate damage based on the jury’s findings

and the evidence presented at trial. Based on the HOA

representative’s trial testimony, the court further found that the

HOA had spent at least $11,500 on gate repairs, including $1,000

on the deductible. The court ordered restitution of $10,500 to State

Farm for the gate and $1,000 to the HOA for the deductible, finding

those amounts “consistent in the minimum with what the jury

found and the class of offense that was found” and with the HOA

representative’s testimony regarding the HOA’s expenditures as of

the time of trial.

II. Restitution to the Car Owner

¶ 12 Marceleno contends that the district court erred by awarding

restitution to the car owner because the court was statutorily

obligated under section 18-1.3-603(8) to consider whether the

damage to the car was covered by any insurance policy and

erroneously shifted the burden to the defense to present evidence

5
concerning this matter. Because section 18-1.3-603(8) does not

apply to Marceleno’s convictions, we disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Statute

¶ 13 We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.

People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 24. In construing a statute, we give

effect to the General Assembly’s intent, looking first to the statutory

language and “giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary

meaning.” Id. at ¶¶ 24-25 (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40,

¶ 10). We also read the statute “as a whole, giving consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts” while avoiding

constructions that “render any words or phrases superfluous or

lead to illogical or absurd results.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,

¶ 38. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we

apply it as written. People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 13.

¶ 14 The Restitution Act requires a convicted offender to financially

compensate crime victims for the harm they suffered as a result of

the offender’s conduct. §§ 18-1.3-601 to -603, C.R.S. 2025. “The

purpose of restitution is to make the victim whole, and the

Restitution Act is to be ‘liberally construed’ to accomplish that

purpose.” People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 5 (citation omitted).

6
¶ 15 Section 18-1.3-603(8) sets forth special rules when the victim’s

loss may be covered, in whole or in part, by insurance. Subsection

(8)(a) begins by stating,

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(1) of this section,1 for a non-felony conviction
under title 42, C.R.S., the court shall order
restitution concerning only the portion of the
victim’s pecuniary loss for which the victim
cannot be compensated under a policy of
insurance, self-insurance, an indemnity
agreement, or a risk management fund.

§ 18-1.3-603(8)(a). Title 42 governs the regulation of vehicles and

traffic; Marceleno was not convicted for any offenses appearing

within that title.

¶ 16 Subsection (8)(b) requires courts to consider whether “the

defendant or the vehicle driven by the defendant at the time of the

offense” was covered by (1) “[a] complying policy of insurance or

1
Section 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “[e]very order of
conviction of a felony, misdemeanor, petty offense, or traffic
misdemeanor offense, except any order of conviction for a state
traffic misdemeanor offense issued by a municipal or county court
in which the prosecuting attorney is acting as a special deputy
district attorney pursuant to an agreement with the district
attorney’s office, must include consideration of restitution.” It then
requires the court to issue one of four types of restitution orders.
§ 18-1.3-603(1)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2025; Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32,
¶ 20.

7
certificate of self-insurance”; (2) “[s]elf-insurance”; or (3) “[a]ny other

insurance or indemnity agreement.” § 18-1.3-603(8)(b).

¶ 17 Subsection (8)(c)(I) provides that a court may not award

restitution to a victim if the victim received or is entitled to receive

benefits or reimbursement under a policy of insurance or other

indemnity agreement. However, a court may award restitution for a

deductible under the victim’s own insurance policy.

§ 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(II)(A).

¶ 18 The remaining provisions of section 18-1.3-603(8) discuss

(1) restitution awards for nonowner drivers or passengers; (2) an

insurance company’s lack of obligation to represent a defendant at

a restitution hearing, pay or otherwise satisfy a civil judgment, or

indemnify a defendant for an amount awarded in a restitution

order; (3) the retention of the rights and immunities provided for in

the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act; and (4) a district court’s

continued ability to order restitution reimbursement for victim

compensation funds. See § 18-1.3-603(8)(d)-(g).

B. Analysis

¶ 19 Marceleno contends that the district court erred by awarding

restitution to the car owner. Specifically, he argues that because

8
the court found subsection (8)(c)(I) inapplicable to his title 18

convictions, it improperly shifted to him the burden of proving that

the owner had received, or was entitled to receive, benefits or

reimbursement under a policy of insurance. But see People v.

Stanley, 2017 COA 121, ¶ 17 (noting that “the defendant bears the

burden of proving any setoff” in a restitution proceeding); People v.

Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029, 1035 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that the

defendant bears the burden of proving the amount of a statutory

setoff or decrease in restitution), overruled on other grounds by,

Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58.

¶ 20 In support, Marceleno relies on two statutory provisions:

subsection (8)(b)’s requirement that the court consider whether the

vehicle he drove at the time of the offense was covered by insurance

and subsection (8)(c)(I)’s limitation on the court’s ability to award

restitution if the car owner received or was eligible to receive

reimbursement from an insurance company. Taken together, he

contends, these provisions placed the burden on the prosecution to

present evidence of the car owner’s insurance coverage or lack

thereof.

9
¶ 21 Marceleno’s interpretation, however, ignores the very first

provision of this subsection — subsection (8)(a) — which expressly

limits its application to “non-felony conviction[s] under title 42.”

§ 18-1.3-603(8)(a). Because none of his convictions fall under title

42, section 18-1.3-603(8) — including subsections (8)(b) and

(8)(c) — does not apply to him.

¶ 22 We acknowledge that the limiting language of subsection (8)(a)

is not expressly repeated in the remaining subsections.

Nevertheless, reading subsection (8) as a whole and giving its parts

consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect, we conclude that the

limitation in paragraph (a) applies to the entirety of section

18-1.3-603(8). See People v. Yoder, 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17 (statutes

must be read as a whole to discern the meaning and purpose of

their language).

¶ 23 The consistent use of title 42-specific terminology throughout

the subsections — terms like “driver,” “passenger,” and “vehicle” —

signals the General Assembly’s intent to confine the entirety of

section 18-1.3-603(8) to non-felony convictions under title 42.

See § 18-1.3-603(8)(b) (instructing courts to consider whether the

defendant or the “vehicle driven by the defendant” was covered by

10
insurance); § 18-1.3-603(8)(d)(II) (addressing restitution for a

“nonowner driver or passenger in the vehicle”).

¶ 24 Moreover, by placing the title 42 limitation in the first part of

subsection (8), the General Assembly signaled that the paragraphs

to follow are similarly confined — and not, as Marceleno suggests,

applicable to convictions under other titles. Cf. People v. Campbell,

885 P.2d 327, 329 (Colo. App. 1994) (“[W]hen a statute specifies the

particular situations in which it is to apply, it should generally be

construed as excluding from its operation all other situations not

specified.”).

¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by Lockett. In that case, a

division of this court considered whether restitution could be

ordered for insurance companies under subsection (8)(a) in cases

involving non-felony convictions under title 42. Lockett, ¶¶ 2, 8. In

passing, the division observed that “subsection (8)(a) pertains only

to title 42 non-felony offenses, whereas subsection (8)(c) pertains to

all types of offenses.” Id. at ¶ 18. But the division in Lockett did

not explain why subsection (8)(c) pertained to “all types of offenses,”

nor was it tasked with addressing that question. Id. Instead, the

division’s narrow task was to interpret subsection (8)(a) and decide

11
whether the General Assembly intended to limit recovery for

insurance companies under that subsection. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 8.

Nevertheless, to the extent Lockett can be interpreted as supporting

a conclusion that subsection (8)(c) applies to all types of offenses,

we respectfully disagree for the reasons previously articulated. See

Campbell v. People, 2020 CO 49, ¶ 41 (a division of the court of

appeals is not bound by the decision of another division).

¶ 26 Nor are subsections (8)(a) and (8)(c) rendered redundant by

limiting both provisions to non-felony convictions under title 42.

Subsection (8)(a) establishes a broad rule that, for non-felony

convictions under title 42, the court may order restitution only for

losses “for which the victim cannot be compensated under a policy

of insurance, self-insurance, an indemnity agreement, or a risk

management fund.” § 18-1.3-603(8)(a). Subsection (8)(c), on the

other hand, restates a portion of this rule — for “a policy of

insurance or other indemnity agreement” — before clarifying that

this broad prohibition does not apply to a victim’s “deductible

amount under his or her policy of insurance.” § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I)-

12
(II)(A).2 Interpreting subsection (8)(c) to apply to “all types of

offenses,” as Lockett suggests, would render subsection (8)(c)(II)(A)

superfluous because section 18-1.3-603(2)(b)(II) already provides for

“[r]eimbursement for insurance deductibles, including deductibles

for . . . automobile damage or loss.” Thus, subsections (8)(a) and

(8)(c) serve distinct purposes despite their partial overlap. See

Lockett, ¶ 18 (concluding for different reasons that, “despite some

overlap, the subsections aren’t redundant”).

¶ 27 Accordingly, because we conclude that section 18-1.3-603(8)

applies only to non-felony convictions under title 42, the district

2 Before it was amended in 2004, subsection (8)(c) contained a

second exception permitting restitution for personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits “only if the court finds that the defendant
on the date of the offense did not meet state compulsory insurance
requirements.” § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(II)(B), C.R.S. 2003. When the
General Assembly repealed the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations
Act and its PIP provisions, it deleted subsection (8)(c)(II)(B) and
removed the reference to PIP benefits in subsection (8)(c)(I). Ch.
255, sec. 28, § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I), (II)(B), 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws
904. The prior PIP-specific language confirms that subsection (8)(c)
was designed with title 42 traffic offenses in mind — not criminal
convictions generally. See Murphy v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 747 P.2d
691, 694 (Colo. App. 1987) (“The Auto Reparations Act generally
requires ‘every owner of a motor vehicle,’ who operates, or who
allows the operation of, that vehicle on the public highways of this
state, to have in full force and effect an insurance policy providing
the PIP benefits described in that statute.” (citation omitted)).

13
court correctly determined that subsection (8)(c)(I) is inapplicable to

Marceleno’s convictions. And because Marceleno raises no separate

challenge to the amount of restitution ordered for damage to the

car, we affirm this portion of the restitution order.

III. Restitution to State Farm

¶ 28 Marceleno contends that the district court erred by awarding

restitution to State Farm because (1) his actions were not the

proximate cause of the HOA’s upgrades to the gate, and (2) the

evidence was insufficient to support the amount of restitution

ordered. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 29 We review for clear error a district court’s proximate cause

determination for restitution. Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 3.

We “must affirm the district court’s findings unless they are without

‘support in the record.’” Id. at ¶ 34 (citation omitted).

¶ 30 “A defendant convicted of a felony offense must pay restitution

for any pecuniary loss he proximately caused his victim.” Id. at

¶ 13. Proximate cause in the restitution context means “any ‘cause

which in natural and probable sequence produced the claimed

injury.’” Id. (citation omitted). The prosecution bears the burden of

14
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

proximately caused the victim’s losses. Stone, ¶ 6.

¶ 31 Restitution encompasses “any pecuniary loss suffered by a

victim,” including but not limited to “all out-of-pocket expenses,”

“anticipated future expenses,” and “other losses or injuries

proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can be

reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Analysis

¶ 32 Marceleno contends that the evidence was insufficient to

establish that he proximately caused the HOA’s gate upgrade

expenses — specifically, the addition of extra supports. He relies on

People v. Reyes for the proposition that his conduct merely exposed

an existing structural vulnerability, and therefore the cost of its

reinforcement is not compensable in restitution. 166 P.3d 301, 304

(Colo. App. 2007), superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 318,

sec. 2, § 18-1.3-204(1), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1378, Ch. 232, sec.

1, § 16-18.5-103(1), 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1032, as recognized in,

Martinez, ¶¶ 16-17.

15
¶ 33 Reyes is distinguishable. There, a division of this court

reversed a restitution award to a burglary victim who had

purchased interior locks as a precautionary measure against future

break-ins. Id. at 304. The division concluded that the defendant’s

conduct did not create or increase the risk of future burglaries but

rather “merely exposed an existing vulnerability.” Id. Here, by

contrast, the HOA representative testified that State Farm required

the HOA to restore the gate to the “exact standards as it was before

the accident” and that the HOA did its “best to repair it . . . as close

as [it] could to the original.” He further testified that, at the time of

trial, the HOA had spent $11,500 of the $21,300 it received from

State Farm — an amount that did not yet include labor costs. With

repairs still outstanding, he did not expect there would be “much

left over from the check from State Farm.” Thus, even if the extra

supports were included in the $11,500 repair cost, the record does

not support the finding that State Farm was placed in a better

financial position than before the crime. See People v. Perez, 2017

COA 52M, ¶ 19.

¶ 34 We likewise reject Marceleno’s contention that the evidence

was insufficient to establish the $11,500 repair cost because the

16
prosecution submitted no documentation or invoices and relied

solely on the HOA representative’s trial testimony. This argument

goes to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 29 (“As the fact finder, the court

had the authority to determine the weight of the evidence[ and] the

witnesses’ credibility . . . .”). The district court considered and

rejected this argument, finding that the HOA representative’s

testimony left “no question” that the HOA had spent $11,500 of the

State Farm payment on repairs by the time of trial. Weighing the

evidence was squarely within the district court’s province, and we

will not disturb the restitution order on this basis.

¶ 35 Finally, we reject Marceleno’s contention that he did not

proximately cause State Farm’s alleged “overpayment” to the HOA.

He argues that the prosecution failed to produce the cost

breakdowns or internal analyses underlying State Farm’s payment

determination. But even assuming State Farm’s payment

constituted an overpayment, the district court did not award that

amount. Rather, the court concluded that “being conservative on

this issue [was] probably more prudent” and ordered an amount

less than half of what State Farm paid the HOA. The trial evidence

17
established that the HOA spent $11,500 repairing the gate.

Marceleno does not dispute that he destroyed the gate and

concedes responsibility for the HOA’s $1,000 deductible. We

cannot say the court clearly erred by ordering him to pay $10,500

to State Farm and $1,000 to the HOA.

¶ 36 The record supports the district court’s finding that

Marceleno’s conduct proximately caused the losses sustained by

State Farm.

IV. Disposition

¶ 37 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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