Marriage of Coward

25CA1041 Marriage of Coward 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1041
La Plata County District Court No. 19DR2064
Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Stacy Denise Cobb-Coward,

Appellant,

and

James Jason Coward,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Fox and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

Stacy Denise Cobb-Coward, Pro Se

Durango Justice Advocates, Ingrid A. Alt, Durango, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case, Stacy Denise

Cobb-Coward (mother) appeals the district court’s order allowing

Jason Coward (father) to apply for a passport for A.C-C. (the child)

without the need for mother’s signature or consent. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The court entered a decree of legal separation on September

20, 2016, which it later converted to a decree of dissolution of

marriage. Initially, mother and father shared joint legal custody

and major decision-making responsibility for the child. In 2018,

father moved to restrict mother’s parenting time, which the court

granted after a hearing. The court ordered that father would have

sole decision-making responsibility, except that he could not make

changes to the child’s school placement or therapy without an order

from the court. The court limited mother’s parenting time to two

professionally supervised visits per week and weekly phone calls,

and it ordered her to seek and obtain a psychological evaluation

and file the report with the court. The court later suspended

mother’s supervised visits.

¶3 On April 18, 2025, father filed a motion for an order

authorizing him to apply for a passport for the child. In it, father’s

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counsel certified that she had reached out to mother regarding the

relief requested but hadn’t received a response. Seventeen days

later, father’s counsel filed a notice that mother had responded and

that she opposed the motion.1

¶4 Mother didn’t file a response. Thus, on May 12, 2025, twenty-

four days after father filed the motion, the court granted the motion.

Mother then filed a “Motion for Trial on Order for Minor to Have a

Passport” on May 19, 2025, asking the court to set a hearing on the

motion for a passport. The court denied mother’s motion,

explaining that it allowed mother twenty-one days to respond to

father’s motion and, when she didn’t, it timely ruled. The court

noted that even if it “generously construed” mother’s request for a

hearing as a “motion to reconsider” its order, mother didn’t cite any

error of fact or law justifying reconsideration. Mother appeals.

1 In the answer brief, father’s counsel represents that she filed the

notice on April 24, 2025. But the record shows that she filed it on
May 5, 2025.

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II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Matters

¶5 “[P]ro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the

same extent as parties represented by attorneys.” Adams v. Sagee,

2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. Under C.A.R. 28, an appellant’s opening brief

must include, among other things, a statement on “the applicable

standard of review with citation to authority”; a statement on

“whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise

location in the record where the issue was raised and where the

court ruled”; and “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds

upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal . . . , with citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)-(B). Mother’s opening brief doesn’t

comply with C.A.R. 28. These requirements are necessary to

facilitate our appellate review, and mother’s arguments are difficult

to discern. See Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10. We

exercise our discretion to review mother’s contentions, but we are

limited by the information mother provided in her brief. See id. We

won’t develop her arguments or search the record for the relevant

facts that may support them. See id.; see also Castillo v. Koppes-

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Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that it isn’t

the appellate court’s task to locate and synthesize the relevant

facts, arguments, and legal authority).

¶6 We also won’t consider any material that mother referenced or

relied on that wasn’t included in the appellate record. See In re

Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Only

facts appearing in the record can be reviewed . . . .”); McCall v.

Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[W]e are bound by

the record presented and may consider only arguments and

assertions supported by the evidence in the record.”).

B. Due Process

¶7 Mother asserts that the district court violated her due process

rights by ruling on father’s motion without giving her twenty-one

days to respond. We aren’t persuaded.

¶8 The essence of due process is fundamental fairness. A.M. v.

A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28. It requires that a party be provided with

notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Am. Heritage

Rys., Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2025 CO 27, ¶ 48. But “due

process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

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particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972); accord A.M., ¶ 28.

¶9 We review de novo whether a party was accorded sufficient

procedural due process. See People in Interest of C.J., 2017 COA

157, ¶ 25. However, we review discretionary procedural rulings —

including decisions concerning the timing and consideration of

motions —for an abuse of discretion. Premier Members Fed. Credit

Union v. Block, 2013 COA 128, ¶ 9. A district court abuses its

discretion when its decision rests on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of the law or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 8.

¶ 10 The district court didn’t violate mother’s right to due process.

Mother had more than the allotted twenty-one days to respond to

father’s motion. She failed to file a response. The court acted well

within its discretion by ruling on the motion after the time for

mother to respond had elapsed. See Premier Members Fed. Credit

Union, ¶ 9; see also C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-15.3 (failure of a responding

party to file a responsive brief may be considered a confession of the

motion).

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¶ 11 On appeal, mother appears to assert that the twenty-one-day

deadline began to run when father’s counsel filed a notice that

mother opposed the motion. But mother provides no authority, nor

are we aware of any, supporting her assertion that father’s

supplemental notice of mother’s position somehow restarted the

deadline for her to respond to his motion.

¶ 12 In her request for a hearing, mother provided no information

about why she didn’t respond to the motion within the allotted time.

She didn’t claim she was unaware of father’s motion or that she

received it late. Nor does she do so on appeal. In sum, we can’t

agree with mother that the court denied her the chance to respond

in violation of her due process protections or that it abused its

discretion by ruling on father’s motion after the time for mother’s

response had passed.

C. Rules of Professional Responsibility

¶ 13 Mother also appears to assert that the court erred by failing to

find that father’s counsel violated certain Colorado Rules of

Professional Responsibility. Mother asserts that father’s counsel

initially told the court that his motion was unopposed, thus

violating the prohibition on making false statements of material fact

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and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation. Colo. R. P. Resp. 4.1, 8.4(c).

¶ 14 The record belies mother’s contention. Father’s counsel

reported that she had reached out to mother but hadn’t received a

response. Then, once a response was received, counsel filed a

notice with the court. Moreover, mother didn’t assert that father’s

counsel had violated any Rules of Professional Responsibility in her

motion for a hearing on the passport request and, accordingly, she

hasn’t preserved her arguments relating to counsel’s statements in

the motion. See Markus v. Brohl, 2014 COA 146, ¶ 63 (declining to

consider arguments not presented to or ruled upon by the district

court).

D. Other Contentions

¶ 15 Mother also generally asserts that the court’s ruling implicated

her Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. But she

doesn’t explain which of the court’s actions violated her

constitutional rights or describe how they did so. Accordingly, we

won’t address these arguments further. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n

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v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12, aff’d, 2021 CO

56.2

III. Disposition

¶ 16 We affirm the order.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE DUNN concur.

2 Father’s counsel’s opening brief includes several footnotes that

don’t comply with C.A.R. 32(a)(1)’s font size requirement. We
caution father’s counsel to adhere to all the rules governing briefs
filed in this court.

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