Marriage of Gawlik

25CA0643 Marriage of Gawlik 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0643
Douglas County District Court No. 23DR30129
Honorable Andrew Baum, Judge

In re the Marriage of

David Gawlik,

Appellant,

and

Courtney Payne,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Harris and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

The Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Hulse Law Firm, PC, Claira A. Rolfson, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving David Gawlik

(father) and Courtney Payne (mother), father appeals the district

court’s permanent orders regarding the allocation of parental

responsibilities, the calculation of his income, and retroactive

maintenance and child support. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After approximately three and a half years of marriage, father

filed a petition for dissolution. The parties entered into a stipulated

temporary order that allocated parenting time and decision-making

responsibility for their two children. Under this agreement, mother

retained majority parenting time while father exercised regular

overnights with their then-two-year-old son and day visits with their

then-five-month-old daughter. A few months later, mother notified

the court and father of her intent to relocate to Florida.

¶3 Following a permanent orders hearing to address the

allocation of parental responsibilities, child support, and

maintenance, the district court issued two written orders. The first

order allocated mother majority parenting time and authorized the

children to move with her to Florida. The second order required

father to pay ongoing child support, retroactive child support, and

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retroactive temporary maintenance after it calculated that father’s

gross monthly income (GMI) was $20,000.

¶4 Father filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to

C.R.C.P. 59. Father requested the court “reconsider its findings

and orders regarding the parties’ incomes and the resulting

maintenance order, including the orders regarding retroactive

support.” The court denied this motion after finding that father was

merely restating arguments that he had made at the hearing and

that the court had already rejected in its permanent orders.

II. Parental Responsibilities

¶5 Father argues that the district court erred when it issued

parenting time orders that allowed the minor children to reside in

Florida. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 We review a district court’s allocation of parental

responsibilities for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Collins,

2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies

the law or its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. Id. “The district court has broad discretion over the

allocation of parenting time, and we exercise every presumption in

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favor of upholding its decision.” Id. “When a [district] court’s order

is supported by competent evidence, it should not be disturbed on

review.” In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.

2007).

¶7 The district court allocates parenting time based on the child’s

best interests as determined by applying the factors enumerated in

section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. See In re Marriage of

Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. App. 2004). And “in the initial

determination of parental responsibilities, the plain language of

[]section 14-10-124(1.5) indicates that a [district] court must accept

the location in which each party intends to live, and allocate

parental responsibilities, including parenting time, accordingly.”

Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 164 (Colo. 2005).

B. Additional Background

¶8 The court appointed a child and family investigator (CFI) to

make recommendations regarding the allocation of parenting time

and to address the proposed relocation. In a written report, the CFI

opined that “[m]other is a fit and proper parent and there are no

concerns about her ability to take care for and provide for the

children.” The CFI also observed that “[f]ather’s strengths [include]

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being involved in the children’s lives,” but that he “lack[ed] child

development knowledge,” had a “superior attitude towards

[m]other,” and showed a “hesitancy to get involved with [daughter].”

The CFI recommended that mother remain the majority parent and

that the children relocate with her to Florida.

¶9 The court appointed a parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE)

on father’s motion. In a written report, the PRE noted that while

mother “is an excellent primary caregiver, and the children are

bonded affectionately and strongly to her,” she also presented with

some concerning behaviors including “personality disorder traits,”

“significant episodic anxiety,” and “ang[ry] and erratic behavior.”

Regarding father, the PRE reported that the children “are strongly

and affectionately bonded to him” and “[b]oth children look up to

[father] and desire ongoing and frequent contact with him,” but that

father’s weaknesses include a “lack of emotional availability” and

certain “personality problems.” The PRE presented a parenting time

plan wherein mother, father, and the children all remained in

Colorado. The PRE did not offer an alternative parenting plan that

accounted for mother living in Florida and, in fact, testified that the

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court should require both parties to remain in the state —

notwithstanding the fact that the court could not legally do so.

¶ 10 In an oral ruling, the district court noted that it “generally

agree[d] and adopted the CFI’s findings” and “agree[d] . . . in part

[with] the PRE.” The court also suggested that while mother’s move

to Florida was what was best for her, the court “[did not] necessarily

agree that it is the best option for these children.” Nevertheless, the

court acknowledged that, under Spahmer, it had to “fashion a

parenting plan . . . where [mother] lives in Florida and [father] lives

in Colorado.” The court concluded that it was in the best interests

of the children that mother be the majority parent and, thus, “when

she goes to Florida, the children will go to Florida.” The court

issued a written order reflecting its findings.

C. Analysis

¶ 11 Father argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it created a parenting plan that allowed the children to move

to Florida “because it was entered after finding that the order was

not the best option for the children and therefore, was manifestly

unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable.” We disagree.

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¶ 12 First, we note that father’s argument ignores the impact of

Spahmer. As noted, that case makes clear that the court “must

accept the location in which each party intends to live, and allocate

parental responsibilities, including parenting time, accordingly.”

Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 164. Thus, notwithstanding the district

court’s apparent opinion that the children would be better served if

mother stayed in Colorado, it could not require her to do so. Thus,

the court’s correct application of Spahmer required it to determine

the best interests of the children with mother in Florida and father

in Colorado.

¶ 13 The court then explicitly considered each statutory best

interests factor, see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), in light of the unavoidable

reality of where the parties would live. And it explained which

portions of the CFI and PRE reports it relied on when doing so. The

court ultimately concluded that “given [that mother] has been a

primary caregiver for both children, and she is a very good

caregiver, [it] is in the . . . best interests of both of these children

that she remain the primary parent which means, when she goes to

Florida, the children will go to Florida.”

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¶ 14 Notably, father does not argue that the district court’s best

interests findings were incorrect. Instead, he simply asserts that

the court’s comment that the children were not necessarily being

best served by mother’s move to Florida was enough to make the

court’s parenting time allocation an abuse of discretion. But

parenting disputes involving relocation often “present agonizing

decisions for [the district] court.” In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113

P.3d 135, 147 (Colo. 2005). And after considering the reports,

testimony, and other evidence before it, the court found that the

best interests factors weighed in favor of allocating mother majority

parenting time. Because there is record support for this decision,

we will not disturb it on appeal. See Collins, ¶ 8.

¶ 15 Father additionally contends that the district court erred by

unreasonably relying on the CFI’s findings instead of the PRE’s

“because the CFI’s investigation was less extensive and in depth,

did not consider [f]ather’s work with the parenting coach, and was

concluded more than a year before the permanent orders hearing.”

But “the probative effect and weight to be given to the evidence are

matters within the province of the [district] court.” In re Marriage of

Blake, 807 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. App. 1990). Thus, we will not

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disturb the court’s decision to rely more heavily on one report over

the other.

¶ 16 Finally, father argues the district court erred when it found

that “‘gatekeeping’ is not a psychologically or psychiatrically valid

concept.” Initially, we note that the court found the term “parental

alienation” — not “gatekeeping” — to be scientifically invalid.

Indeed, the court expressly considered the PRE’s examples of

gatekeeping behavior from mother. It found that “many of the

examples the PRE cited as . . . ‘gatekeeping’ were actually [m]other

just stating her position in the normal course of a highly-contested

domestic relations case,” and that other “examples in the PRE

report were gatekeeping, but they were facilitative gatekeeping.”

The court then went on to highlight three acts by mother that did

not “support[] a continuing involvement and maintenance of a

relationship between [father] and the child[ren].”

¶ 17 Regardless of whether — given the absence of any evidence on

the subject presented at the hearing — the district court erred in its

observations regarding the scientific invalidity of the concept of

“parental alienation,” it considered the PRE’s examples of mother’s

gatekeeping behavior when issuing its order. And we may not

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reweigh the same evidence and substitute our judgment for that of

the district court. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205,

¶ 35.

¶ 18 The district court did not abuse its discretion by allocating

mother majority parenting time and allowing the children to

relocate to Florida.

III. Income Calculations

¶ 19 Father argues the district court erred when it calculated his

income. Again, we disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion. In

re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 8. And we defer to the

district court’s factual findings regarding a party’s income so long

as they are supported by the record. In re Marriage of Connerton,

260 P.3d 62, 66 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 21 To determine the amount of a child support award, the court

must consider several factors, including both parents’ financial

resources. § 14-10-115(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025. For the purposes of

child support, “‘[i]ncome’ means the actual gross income of a

parent, if employed to full capacity.” § 14-10-115(3)(c). And if a

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party is self-employed, “‘gross income’ equals gross receipts minus

ordinary and necessary expenses . . . required to produce such

income.” § 14-10-115(5)(a)(III)(A).

B. Additional Background

¶ 22 During the dissolution proceedings, father transitioned from

being an employee of a company to being a self-employed business

owner. At the permanent orders hearing, father presented his bank

statements and a summary of his income calculation based on

those statements. Each month showed transfers from father’s

business account to his personal account. Father also received a

$20,000 mobile deposit that he did not address during his

testimony. Father testified that his GMI was $8,147, which he

calculated by “look[ing] at every single transaction from [his]

business account, every invoice, and then every expense.” However,

mother testified that father’s GMI was $20,000.

¶ 23 The court found that father’s GMI was $20,000. The court

calculated this amount after stating that it did not find father’s

summary of his annual income credible. Instead, the court found

“the more accurate and reliable evidence of [f]ather’s GMI comes

from transfers of money from the business checking account to his

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personal account.” The court concluded that “[f]ather’s income is

the average of the amount of monthly deposits into his personal

account from his business account.”

C. Analysis

¶ 24 Father argues that the district court erred when it calculated

his GMI by averaging all monthly deposits from his business

account to his personal account and that the court should have

accepted his proposed GMI of $8,147.

¶ 25 The district court was entitled to reject father’s proposed GMI

based on his bank statements and testimony. See Blake, 807 P.2d

at 1213; see also In re Marriage of Bowles, 916 P.2d 615, 617 (Colo.

App. 1995) (The district court “as a finder of fact can believe all,

part, or none of a witness’[s] testimony.”). Furthermore, while

father argues that the “[t]ransfers from one account to another

could reflect depletion of an asset [or] could be funds acquired via

loan,” he did not offer evidence that his transfers fell into one of

these — or any other such — categories. When “there is a

substantial fluctuation in a parent’s income . . . the [district] court

has discretion to consider, or use an average of, past earnings.” In

re Marriage of Rice, 987 P.2d 947, 950 (Colo. App. 1999). The court

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exercised this discretion when it averaged father’s transfers from

his business account to his personal account to calculate his GMI.

We will not disturb the district court’s finding that father’s GMI was

$20,000. See Connerton, 260 P.3d at 66.

IV. Retroactive Maintenance and Child Support

¶ 26 Father argues the district court erred when it ordered him to

pay retroactive child support and maintenance. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 We review maintenance awards and child support orders for

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12

(maintenance); Garrett, ¶ 8 (child support).

¶ 28 To award maintenance, the court must first determine

whether the requesting party is entitled to it based on certain

statutory factors, including the parties’ gross incomes, the marital

property apportioned to each party, and the financial resources of

each party. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. If the court

determines the party is entitled to maintenance, it must consider

additional factors that may affect the amount and term of the

maintenance. § 14-10-114(3)(c). The maintenance guidelines state

that a court “may award a monthly amount of temporary

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maintenance.” § 14-10-114(4). And while the statute is silent as to

specifically awarding retroactive temporary maintenance, “[g]iven

the district court’s discretion over the term for an award of

temporary maintenance, we cannot conclude that the court lacked

the authority to order retroactive temporary maintenance.” In re

Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 15.

¶ 29 The child support statute, on the other hand, explicitly

authorizes district courts to order retroactive child support.

Specifically, it provides that the court “may order an amount [of

child support] determined to be reasonable under the

circumstances for a time period that occurred after the date of the

parties’ physical separation.” § 14-10-115(2).

B. Additional Background

¶ 30 Based on father’s calculated GMI of $20,000, and other

relevant factors, the court concluded that mother was not entitled

to maintenance going forward but that she was entitled to

retroactive temporary maintenance. The court ordered father to pay

retroactive temporary maintenance in the amount of $37,588. And

after considering the relevant factors for child support, the court

ordered father to pay $1,669 in ongoing monthly child support. The

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court also ordered father to pay retroactive child support in the

amount of $18,851.1

C. Analysis

¶ 31 Father argues the district court erred when it calculated

retroactive support without making sufficient findings and based on

its incorrect calculation of father’s GMI.

¶ 32 Initially, father argues that the district court’s “findings as to

[f]ather’s income between February 2023 and December 2024

undermines its own findings that [f]ather earned $20,000 per

month at the time of permanent orders.” First, the court explicitly

noted in its written order that father “was earning an average of

$20,000 starting in December 2023,” which does not contradict its

finding that he was earning that amount at the time of permanent

orders. Second, prior to December 2023, father’s income changed

over the course of these proceedings when he transitioned from

being an employee to being a self-employed business owner. The

court acknowledged this change in employment in its calculations

1 In calculating the retroactive child support, the district court

appropriately accounted for the temporary maintenance it had
determined father owed mother.

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and issued different child support worksheets for different time

periods that reflected the change in father’s income.

¶ 33 Next, father argues that his “payments for the mortgage on the

property where [mother] was staying should have been considered

as a form of maintenance payment during that time and should

have offset the retroactive maintenance the Court ordered.” But at

the permanent orders hearing, father testified to making only a

single mortgage payment before the permanent orders hearing —

for September 2024.2 Notably, the court ordered father to pay

temporary maintenance through August 2024. We cannot discern

how father’s payment of the mortgage in September should offset

the temporary maintenance he owes for a prior period. Thus, we

cannot say the district court abused its discretion by not adjusting

the retroactive temporary maintenance award based on father’s

payment of the mortgage.

2 After the hearing, father attempted to supplement the information

regarding the expenses he had paid to keep the marital home out of
foreclosure, but the district court correctly declined to consider
evidence not provided at the hearing. For the same reason, we also
decline to consider it.

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¶ 34 Father similarly argues that his payments for childcare

expenses should have been credited in the calculation for

retroactive support. The court did account for childcare payments

in the order and child support worksheets.

¶ 35 Father next argues that mother presented no evidence that

she or the children needed additional support during the pendency

of the proceedings. Father’s contention is unfounded. Mother

testified that she was unemployed for approximately six months

during the proceedings. Mother also testified that she asked father

to consider selling the marital home because she was struggling to

keep up with the mortgage and bills associated with the property.

¶ 36 Next, relying on Santilli v. Santilli, 453 P.2d 606 (Colo. 1969),

father argues that the district court’s award of retroactive child

support improperly impoverished him because it “effectively

appropriated [father’s] entire half of the marital estate.” In Santilli,

the Colorado Supreme Court found that the district court’s orders

for maintenance and child support would improperly impoverish

the husband because he would have “less than $200 a month for

himself.” Id. at 609. Here, father’s total monthly payment

(including retroactive maintenance, retroactive child support, and

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current child support) is $3,229.3 And as discussed, supra Part

III.B, the district court found that father’s GMI was $20,000. Thus,

father’s total monthly payment for child support and maintenance

accounts for only sixteen percent of his monthly income and still

leaves him with a monthly income that exceeds mother’s by nearly

$10,000.

¶ 37 Finally, father points to various portions of his testimony,

mother’s testimony, and the parties’ sworn financial statements to

support his contention that the district court’s findings were

insufficient to award retroactive maintenance and child support.

Once again, the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given to

evidence are matters within the province of the district court.

Blake, 807 P.2d at 1213. The court properly considered the

testimony of both parents and the other evidence before it. It then

weighed that evidence and calculated a retroactive child support

and maintenance plan to fit the circumstances. In light of the

court’s factual findings, which have record support, we cannot say

3 This monthly payment will be reduced to $1,669 upon payment in

full of the retroactive child support and retroactive temporary
maintenance.

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it abused its discretion by awarding retroactive child support and

retroactive temporary maintenance.

V. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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