Peo in Interest of JV

25CA1846 Peo in Interest of JV 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1846
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV216
Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.V., a Child,

and Concerning B.A.F.S. and W.V.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
J. Jones and Fox, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Michael J. Valentine, Deputy
County Attorney, Sylvia Geiger, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado,
for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant B.A.F.S.

Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellant W.V.
¶1 W.V. (father) and B.A.F.S. (mother) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with J.V. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In March 2022, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services (the Department) received a report that mother was using

illicit substances. Following an investigation, the Department

removed the child from mother’s care and filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. At that time, the Department couldn’t find

father, but it soon located him in Florida. Both parents made no-

fault admissions to the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated

the child dependent or neglected.

¶3 After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adopted

treatment plans for the parents. Both plans required the parents to

provide protective parenting, participate in family time, demonstrate

financial stability, abstain from criminal activity, and remain in

contact with the Department. Mother’s treatment plan also

required her to address her substance abuse and mental health

issues.

1
¶4 More than two years later, the Department planned to return

the child to mother’s care with an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) between the parents. In anticipation of that

goal, the Department completed an “address check” and discovered

that mother had been arrested a few months earlier and had an

active protection order, which she was violating; as a result, the

Department moved to restrict mother’s parenting time to supervised

visits. Over the next six months, mother’s participation waned and

father didn’t make the necessary arrangements for the child to live

with him in either Florida or Colorado.

¶5 In June 2025, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary

hearing in August 2025. After hearing the evidence, the court

terminated the parent-child legal relationships between the parents

and the child.

II. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)

¶6 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by requiring an

ICPC home study before placing the child in his care in Florida. In

the alternative, he maintains that the Department failed to make

2
reasonable efforts to rectify the ICPC denial. We aren’t persuaded

by either argument.

¶7 We review de novo whether the juvenile court properly applied

the ICPC. People in Interest of O.J.R., 2025 COA 78, ¶ 13. Whether

a department satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts is a

mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error

and review de novo its legal determination. Id.

¶8 The ICPC is an interstate agreement that facilitates the

placement and provision of services to children being placed by one

state’s child protective services agency in a home in another state.

People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 9. Under the ICPC, a

“sending state” must notify a “receiving state” of its intent to send a

child into the receiving state, and the receiving state typically

completes a home study before accepting the child for placement in

its state. § 24-60-1802, art. III(b), (d), C.R.S. 2023; see also O.J.R.,

¶ 19 (noting that, even though the General Assembly enacted a

revised version of the ICPC in 2024, the 2023 version remains in

effect until thirty-five states pass the revised version).

3
¶9 In April 2023, the Department notified child protective services

in Florida of its intent to place the child with father. The Florida

authorities initiated a home study and requested information from

father, including fingerprints from anyone living in his home, but

father didn’t follow through, so Florida denied placement. In

February 2024, the Department sent a second request; this time, a

paternal great-uncle who was staying in the home refused to submit

to fingerprinting, and placement was again denied. At the

termination hearing, father’s expert explained that the great-uncle

wouldn’t provide his fingerprints because, in his Haitian culture,

there were “certain beliefs about government.” And though father

reported to the caseworker that he was going to look for his own

apartment in Florida so that he could restart the ICPC process, he

never obtained different housing in Florida.

¶ 10 A few weeks before the termination hearing, father filed a

motion, asserting, among other things, that the ICPC doesn’t apply

to the placement of children with an out-of-state parent. In

support, father directed the juvenile court’s attention to decisions

from other jurisdictions that have decided that the ICPC doesn’t

apply to parents. See, e.g., D.L. v. S.B., 201 N.E.3d 771, 777 (N.Y.

4
2022). Notably, Florida, the state involved in this case, isn’t one of

those jurisdictions. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Benway, 745 So.

2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

¶ 11 During the pendency of the case, no Colorado appellate court

had yet decided whether the ICPC applies to placement with a

parent. See I.J.O., ¶ 11. However, shortly after the juvenile court

ordered termination, a division of this court announced O.J.R.,

which joined those jurisdictions that have determined that the ICPC

doesn’t apply to placement with parents. O.J.R., ¶ 30.

¶ 12 Father now asks us to apply O.J.R., conclude that the juvenile

court erred by requiring him to complete the ICPC process, and

reverse the termination judgment. In response, the Department

and guardian ad litem assert that we shouldn’t apply O.J.R.

because (1) the case doesn’t apply retroactively, see People in

Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 607 (Colo. 1982) (describing the

test for retroactive application of new case law); or (2) father waived

his appellate argument by participating in the ICPC process, see

People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 26 (noting that a party

may waive an appellate argument by not making a timely request

for relief).

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¶ 13 We need not decide these points because, even if O.J.R.

applies, we still discern no error. Notably, although the O.J.R.

division determined that an ICPC home study isn’t required before a

court places a child in another state, nothing in the opinion

suggests that a department is prohibited from initiating an ICPC

home study. To the contrary, the division specifically noted that its

“conclusion d[id] not excuse Colorado juvenile courts and

departments of human services from ensuring that children are safe

when placed with out-of-state parents.” O.J.R., ¶ 28. And one way

in which a court and department may ensure a child’s safety when

placing a child out-of-state is through an ICPC home study.

¶ 14 This case is also distinguishable from O.J.R. because the

record in that case established that the authorities in New York

agreed to supervise the child’s placement in that state without an

ICPC home study. See id. at ¶ 33. But here, we see nothing in the

record to suggest that the Florida authorities would have done the

same, especially considering that Florida courts have determined

that the ICPC does apply to placement with parents. See Benway,

745 So. 2d at 439.

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¶ 15 Having determined that the juvenile court didn’t err by

applying the ICPC, we now turn to father’s assertion that the

Department failed “to make reasonable efforts to help [him] rectify

the problems so that a home study [could] be passed.” See I.J.O.,

¶ 17. To that end, father maintains that the Department (1) should

have spoken with the paternal great-uncle or (2) provided resources

for housing and employment in Colorado. But we aren’t convinced

that the caseworker was required to speak with the great-uncle,

and even if she was, we can’t see how doing so would have changed

the outcome of the ICPC home study, given the circumstances

described above. And father doesn’t explain how the provision of

resources in Colorado would have assisted him with passing the

home study in Florida.

III. Equal Protection

¶ 16 Father contends that he was deprived of equal protection

under the United States and Colorado Constitutions because the

Department treated him differently from mother based on gender.

We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 17 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its

7
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. “Although the Colorado Constitution does not contain an

identical provision, the due process clause of the Colorado

Constitution implies a similar guarantee.” People v. Castillo, 2022

COA 20, ¶ 17. “We review equal protection claims de novo.”

Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶ 11.

¶ 18 An equal protection violation occurs when the government

arbitrarily treats a group of people differently from other people who

are similarly situated. Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2022

COA 13, ¶ 34. Classifications based on gender are subject to

intermediate scrutiny, which requires a showing that the

classification furthers a sufficiently important governmental

interest. People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 25 n.7.

¶ 19 Father hasn’t established that he and mother were treated

differently because of gender. He maintains that, while the

Department provided mother with “years of treatment, support, and

a managed transition of the child back to her care,” he received

“relatively little” in comparison. But he doesn’t explain how this

differential treatment had anything to do with gender. Indeed, if the

parents’ roles were reversed (i.e., if father was the custodial parent

8
and mother supported return to his care), it seems that the

Department would have provided father with the same attention

that it provided mother. In other words, to the extent the

Department treated the parents differently, nothing in the record

suggests that it did so because of gender.1

IV. Constitutional Right to Travel

¶ 20 Father argues that the juvenile court and the Department

violated his constitutional right to travel. We disagree.

¶ 21 A citizen has a constitutional right to travel between states,

which includes the right to resettle, find a new job, and start a new

life. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005).

Generally, a rule that operates to chill a parent’s exercise of the

right to travel, absent a sufficient state interest to do so, is as

impermissible as one that bans exercise of the right altogether. Id.

We review an alleged violation of a constitutional right de novo. See

People v. Janis, 2018 CO 89, ¶ 14.

¶ 22 Father asserts that he was “coerced” into moving to Colorado

in violation of his constitutional right to travel. But the record

1 At oral argument, father agreed that the analysis ends if the

record doesn’t demonstrate different treatment based on gender.

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belies this assertion. We see nothing in the record — and father

hasn’t directed us to anything — establishing that the juvenile

court or the Department required him to move to Colorado. Rather,

the record clearly shows that father volunteered, on his own, to

move to Colorado to improve his chances of reuniting with the child.

To be sure, promptly relocating to Colorado may have helped father

to succeed in this case. But he could have also completed an ICPC

home study in Florida. He did neither.

¶ 23 Because the record doesn’t establish that the juvenile court or

the Department required father to move to Colorado or attempted to

chill his right to remain in Florida, we discern no error. See

Heninger v. Charnes, 613 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo. 1980) (concluding

that the appellant’s license revocation didn’t burden his

constitutional right to travel because he was “neither locked into

nor fenced out of the state of Colorado”).

V. Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 24 The parents maintain that the juvenile court erred by

terminating their parental rights. We disagree.

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A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 25 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 26 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 27 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,

and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions

drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People

in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We

therefore can’t reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for

11
that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 29.

B. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 28 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 29 To determine fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile

court must consider whether a county department of human

services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and

reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the

department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides

services consistent with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 30 The juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

12
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. In doing so, the court may

consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in services. See

People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

2. Father

¶ 31 Father argues that the Department didn’t (1) establish “quality

contacts” with him; (2) make timely and “culturally responsive”

ICPC referrals; or (3) engage in diligent searches for relatives. We

aren’t persuaded.

¶ 32 First, father asserts that the caseworker needed to make

“quality contacts” with him each month, as described in the

Department’s own regulations. But these regulations don’t mention

anything about “quality contacts.” Rather, the relevant regulation

requires only that a caseworker make “monthly engagement” with a

parent living out of state through “telephone calls, letters, or

electronic communication.” Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.204(B)(3),

12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3. And the record shows that the

caseworker did just that. In any event, section 19-3-208 (not the

Department’s own regulations) guides our review, and nothing in

that statute requires the caseworker to do anything more to satisfy

the reasonable efforts requirement.

13
¶ 33 Next, father contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because (1) both ICPC home studies were delayed

by several months, and (2) the ICPC home studies weren’t

“culturally responsive.” As to the first point, father doesn’t explain

how any delay could have impacted the outcome of the case,

considering that he never complied with the ICPC process and

eventually abandoned that process. As to the second issue, father

doesn’t specifically explain how the process wasn’t culturally

responsive or what the Department needed to do to correct it. Nor

does he direct us to any legal authority that would require the

Department to make such efforts to satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard.

¶ 34 Finally, father maintains that the Department didn’t engage in

diligent searches for relatives. Specifically, he submits that the

Department failed to follow up with the three individuals that he

had suggested as possible placement options. But the record shows

that the Department ran background checks on all three people

father suggested: One person didn’t pass the background check,

another person lived with father, and the third person said that she

could be a “support” but not a placement. Considering that all

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three people weren’t appropriate placement options, we aren’t

convinced that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts.

¶ 35 Ultimately, father suggests that the juvenile court had no

reason to reject his expert’s testimony on these three issues. But it

isn’t our role to second-guess the court’s witness credibility

determinations. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 627-28 (Colo.

2005); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO 66, ¶ 75 n.14

(holding that a court doesn’t have to accept even unrebutted expert

testimony); Scott v. People, 444 P.2d 388, 393 (Colo. 1968) (noting

that a fact finder isn’t required to accept expert testimony). And if

the record supports the court’s findings, as they do here, we can’t

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S.,

¶ 29.

3. Mother

¶ 36 Mother contends that the Department didn’t provide her with

family time throughout the case. We discern no reversible error.

¶ 37 To satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, a department

must provide “[f]amily time services for parents with children or

youth in out-of-home placement.” § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Family time

services must be provided “as determined necessary and

15
appropriate by individual case plans.” § 19-3-208(2)(a), (b).

Because the juvenile court must make decisions about family time,

it can’t delegate its authority to do so to other parties, such as a

department. See People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71

(Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 38 To begin, mother contends that the Department didn’t provide

her with family time for two weeks at the very beginning of the case

or expand her family time quickly enough. However, the record is

undisputed that, until the end of December 2024, the Department

provided increasing amounts of family time (in which she ultimately

had the child in her care for two weeks at a time), along with

decreasing levels of supervision, resulting in the child’s near return

home to mother. We aren’t convinced that a short delay at the

beginning of the case could have had any impact on her ability to

reunite with the child. Likewise, considering that mother had

extensive family time, we can’t see how any delays in changes to the

supervision levels resulted in a lack of reasonable efforts.

¶ 39 The heart of mother’s argument, however, is that after the

juvenile court restricted her family time at the end of December

2024, the Department failed to provide her with family time as

16
ordered by the court. In short, the record shows that the

Department moved to restrict mother’s family time to supervised

community visits, which mother agreed to, but the Department

didn’t offer her a supervised community visit until shortly before the

termination hearing. While the record supports her factual

assertion, we discern no reversible error.

¶ 40 After the juvenile court restricted mother’s family time, the

Department offered her virtual visits until it could arrange for

someone to supervise community visits. The Department initially

believed that one of its family time providers could supervise visits,

but the Department later reported that the provider wasn’t able to

do so. The Department reached out to mother in hopes of finding a

relative or other appropriate support to supervise the community

visits. Mother provided the name of a relative, but that person

didn’t pass a background check.

¶ 41 At a hearing in February 2025, mother’s counsel requested

supervised visits at the Department until community visits could be

arranged. In doing so, counsel emphasized that her request wasn’t

an agreement to a new restriction; rather, she just wanted to “get

[mother and the child] in a room together.” Notably, the

17
Department never asked to restrict mother’s family time thereafter,

and the Department didn’t offer a supervised community visit until

the foster parents agreed to supervise one in August 2025.

¶ 42 Mother maintains that the Department needed to do more to

make sure the community visits happened or, alternatively, request

that the juvenile court restrict her family time. Because the

Department didn’t do either, mother asserts that we should reverse

the judgment. We decline to do so because, although the

Department’s actions were imperfect, given mother’s disengagement

with her treatment plan, we aren’t convinced that these

shortcomings justify reversal. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court

may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial

rights of the parties.”); see also People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA

79, ¶ 27 (noting that the lack of visitation might be harmless in

light of a parent’s “noncompliance with other parts of [the]

treatment plan”).

¶ 43 As noted, the Department continued to provide mother with

family time after the restriction. But mother didn’t consistently

attend that family time. And when the Department finally offered

her a community visit, she didn’t show up for that visit. Taking all

18
this together, we can’t say that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts by failing to provide community visits when it

was providing in-person visits that mother wasn’t attending.

C. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness

¶ 44 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that he

hadn’t successfully complied with his treatment plan and was unfit.

We disagree.

¶ 45 It is the parent’s obligation to ensure compliance with and the

success of a treatment plan. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d

257, 260 (Colo. App. 2007). Although absolute compliance with a

treatment plan isn’t required, even substantial compliance may not

be sufficient to correct or improve the parent’s conduct or condition,

or to render the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d

905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 46 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

19
People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A

parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs

and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). But

if the evidence doesn’t support a finding that a parent is unfit, the

child’s “need for permanency alone [isn’t] sufficient to terminate”

the parent-child legal relationship. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 60.

¶ 47 First, father contends that he complied with all the

components in his treatment plan. The juvenile court found that,

although father had “checked the boxes on some of the treatment

plan,” he hadn’t successfully complied with the plan such that he

was fit. That finding is not without record support. Among other

things, the evidence established that father

• never demonstrated to the Department that he had safe,

stable, and suitable housing for the child in Florida;

• violated the safety plan during an unsupervised visit by

allowing mother to attend one of his visits when she

wasn’t authorized to do so;

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• didn’t fully disclose the people who would be in the home

with him and the child during one of his visits to

Colorado, and those unknown people were aggressive

with the caseworker and were smoking marijuana in the

home during the visit;

• had only limited face-to-face contact with the child, such

that they hadn’t developed a significant parent-child

relationship;

• didn’t have a job or housing lined up if he decided to

move to Colorado;

• claimed he had plenty of money (enough to purchase new

cars for himself and his father) but provided minimal

financial support to his child throughout the case; and

• had gaps in his treatment plan and had not

demonstrated that he could meet the child’s needs,

according to the caseworker.

¶ 48 Though we might have weighed the evidence differently had it

been our call, it’s not. And because there is record support for the

court’s finding that that father didn’t fully comply with the plan’s

21
components, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 49 Second, father argues that the Department didn’t establish

that he was an unfit parent. Rather, he claims that the juvenile

court terminated his parental rights based on the child’s need for

permanency alone, which isn’t permissible. See id. But as

described above, father didn’t fully comply with his treatment plan.

See D.P., 181 P.3d at 408. The court also relied on father’s

unwillingness to comply with the ICPC process, “get his own place,”

or make the necessary arrangements to provide a stable home for

the child in Colorado. Taken together, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to establish that father was “unable or

unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care.” § 19-3-604(2).

Because the evidence satisfies the statutory criteria for unfitness,

we can’t reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment to reach a

different result. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

D. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 50 Both parents assert that the juvenile court erred by finding

that they couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We

disagree.

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¶ 51 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change

has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the

chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.

People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).

The determination of a reasonable period is fact specific and varies

from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. But a reasonable time isn’t an

indefinite time, and it must be determined by considering the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. A.J.,

143 P.3d at 1152. And when, as in this case, a child is under six

years old, the court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning provisions, which require that the child be placed in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-

102(1.6), 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 52 As for father, the juvenile court rejected his assertion that he

could become fit within a reasonable time, finding that, “[i]n three

and half years, he’s done almost nothing . . . to get his son back.”

For example, the court noted that father could have complied with

the ICPC process or ensured that he had his own place so he could

pass the ICPC home study. Considering the length of time that the

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child had already been out of the home, the court concluded that

waiting any longer for father to become a fit parent wasn’t in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 53 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As

previously described, father didn’t comply with the ICPC process in

Florida, and two different ICPC home studies were denied. Father

told the caseworker that he would look for an apartment in Florida

so that he could pass an ICPC home study, but he never did. And

after the child was removed from mother’s care in December 2024,

father claimed that he would move to Colorado so that he could be

the child’s custodial parent. More than eight months passed since

father said he would move, and he hadn’t made any progress

toward completing that task. Father testified that he’d given notice

to his employer in Florida and would move in the next few weeks

but admitted that he hadn’t made any arrangements for

employment or housing. In the caseworker’s opinion, extending the

case wasn’t in the child’s best interests, considering that father had

had multiple “opportunities” over a nearly four-year period but had

been unwilling to take advantage of them.

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¶ 54 On appeal, father asserts that he could become fit within a

reasonable time because he only needed about ninety days to move

to Colorado and get established. But the juvenile court rejected this

same argument for the reasons described above. And because the

record supports the court’s findings, we can’t substitute our

judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 55 As for mother, the juvenile court determined that she couldn’t

become fit within a reasonable time, noting that, although she was

“doing well in treatment” until December 2024, her compliance

“completely [fell] off [for] almost a year.” During 2025, mother last

saw the child in May, “stood up the child [for] the last two visits,”

and didn’t participate in any substance abuse and mental health

treatment.

¶ 56 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As already

described in detail above, the record indicates that mother was

substantially complying with the main components of her treatment

plan and was exercising increasing family time until the child was

in her care for two full weeks at a time. But the Department

discovered that mother had an undisclosed criminal case and

protection order (which she was violating by having contact with the

25
restrained person). After that, the record shows that mother

minimally attended family time, stopped engaging in substance

abuse and mental health treatment, and tested positive for illicit

substances. The caseworker acknowledged that, when mother was

“focused” and “working hard, she d[id] great,” but that “only

happen[ed] for a certain period of time” before she would regress.

Thus, the caseworker opined that, at that point, extending the case

any longer would “do more harm than good” for the child.

¶ 57 Mother now contends that she could become fit within a

reasonable time, considering her success during most of the case.

But the juvenile court considered evidence supporting mother’s

compliance during the first part of the case, weighed it against

contrary evidence of her compliance during the latter part of the

case and the needs of the child, and determined that mother

couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. Despite mother’s

success in the first part of the case, considering that she hadn’t

participated in family time or services for almost eight months at

the time of the termination hearing, we discern no error in the

court’s decision. See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132,

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1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (even “increased compliance” over the

course of a case may not justify additional time).

¶ 58 Mother also argues that she could have become fit within a

reasonable time if the Department had provided her services in a

timely manner after December 2024. As for family time services, we

rejected this argument in Part V.B.2 above. And as for other

services, mother hasn’t established that the Department’s lack of

efforts, rather than her unwillingness to participate, delayed new

referrals after December 2024. See A.V., ¶ 12.

E. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 59 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. Specifically,

she asserts that an APR to the maternal great-grandmother was a

less drastic alternative to termination. We discern no reversible

error.

¶ 60 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

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give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 61 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 62 To aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less

drastic alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a

reasonable number of people the parents identify as placement

options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.

2004). But the department isn’t obligated to “independently identify

and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” People in

Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 63 In addressing whether there was a relative who could be a

placement for purposes of a less drastic alternative, the juvenile

court found:

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• Mother wasn’t “forthcoming” about her relatives and that

she didn’t give the Department much information until

three years into the case.

• The maternal great-grandmother “had no idea that the

child was in foster care” and hadn’t seen the child in a

“long time.”

• The maternal great-grandmother didn’t “speak any

English,” mother “refused to tell the caseworker what

language [great-grandmother] spoke,” and the caseworker

couldn’t get an interpreter as a result.

Based on this information, the court found that the Department

“looked at all the relatives” and didn’t identify anyone who was an

appropriate placement option.

¶ 64 The juvenile court then determined that there wasn’t a less

drastic alternative to termination, and that termination and

adoption were in the child’s best interests. Specifically, the court

found that an APR was “absolutely not appropriate given [the

child’s] age and the length of time he’[d] been in out of home

placement and foster care.”

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¶ 65 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that the Department did a diligent search for

relatives, but the search didn’t locate the great-grandmother. The

caseworker said that she found out about the great-grandmother

when mother disclosed her as a possible placement in March 2025.

The caseworker completed a background check and didn’t find

anything that would disqualify the great-grandmother as a

placement. Mother told the caseworker that the great-grandmother

would need an interpreter if she wanted to speak to her, but mother

wouldn’t tell the caseworker what language she spoke so that the

caseworker could provide an interpreter. Instead, mother said that

she would interpret, but the caseworker didn’t believe that was

appropriate.

¶ 66 In part because of these delays, the caseworker didn’t meet

with the great-grandmother until August 2025. The caseworker

said that communication with the great-grandmother was “a bit

rough” and that she could only communicate with a great-uncle,

who also lived in the home. The caseworker noted that it didn’t

appear that the great-grandmother had seen the child since he was

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removed from mother’s care and that she hadn’t come forward

because mother didn’t tell her that the child was in foster care.

¶ 67 The caseworker opined that placing the child with the great-

grandmother wouldn’t be in his best interests. Specifically, the

caseworker testified that “putting him in a home where he [didn’t]

know the language[,] [didn’t] know the people, and . . . [had] never

built a relationship with [them] . . . would be very hard on him, and

very detrimental.”

¶ 68 Despite this record, mother asserts that the juvenile court

erred for two reasons, both of which we reject.

¶ 69 First, mother asserts that the Department should have known

about the great-grandmother sooner because she mentioned her in

a meeting in April 2022. But mother doesn’t direct us to anything

in the record showing that she identified the great-grandmother as

a placement option before March 2025. And because the

Department isn’t obligated to evaluate a relative unless the parent

identifies them as a placement option, we discern no error. See id.

¶ 70 Second, mother contends that the Department violated Title VI

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it declined to place the child

with the great-grandmother because she didn’t speak English. But

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mother didn’t claim Title VI discrimination in the juvenile court.

See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14. And we decline

her request to address this unpreserved argument because she

hasn’t developed an argument in support of that request. See

D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.

¶ 71 Finally, even if the great-grandmother was an appropriate

placement option, we still reject mother’s assertion because the

juvenile court found, and the record shows, that an APR to her

wouldn’t be a less drastic alternative to termination because the

child needed permanency that could only be achieved through an

adoption. See People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30.

VI. Disposition

¶ 72 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FOX concur.

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