Peo in Interest of RG

25CA1875 Peo in Interest of RG 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1875
Weld County District Court No. 23JV104
Honorable Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of R.G. IV and M.G., Children,

and Concerning N.S.,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

and R.L.G. III,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

No Appearance for Petitioner

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.G. IV and M.G.

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant and Cross Appellee

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellee and Cross-Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, N.S. (mother) appeals

the judgment allocating parental responsibilities of R.G. IV and

M.G. (the youths) between mother and R.G. III (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2023, the domestic relations court ordered the Weld County

Department of Human Services to conduct an investigation into the

family “due to significant concerns of parental conflict and

emotional impact to the [youths].” The Department subsequently

filed a petition in dependency or neglect, raising concerns about

domestic violence between mother and her partner and escalating

conflict between mother and father. The juvenile court adjudicated

the youths — then ten and eleven years old — dependent or

neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents.

¶3 The youths were initially placed with mother. However, nine

months later it was discovered that mother had been violating the

protective orders by allowing her partner to be in the home with the

youths. At that point, the juvenile court granted temporary custody

of the youths to father, where they remained for the rest of the

dependency action, with mother having significant parenting time.

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¶4 Two years after the petition was filed, father moved to allocate

parental responsibilities and close the dependency or neglect action.

After a contested hearing, the juvenile court issued a detailed

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) order. As relevant here,

the APR (1) designated father as the primary custodian during the

school year; (2) granted mother unsupervised parenting time from

after school Thursdays to before school Mondays for three weeks

per month; (3) established a week-on/week-off parenting time

schedule for the summer; (4) allocated decision-making for routine

medical, dental, and eye care to mother; and (5) allocated joint

decision-making responsibility for education, major medical

decisions, and extracurricular activities that impact both parents’

parenting time.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re B.R.D., 2012 COA

63, ¶ 15. When there is record support for the juvenile court’s

findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.

Id. However, whether a court has applied the correct legal standard

presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

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¶6 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the

legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child

within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; L.A.G. v.

People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).

¶7 Although the juvenile court must allocate parental

responsibilities to best serve “the interests of the child and the

public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, the Children’s Code does not

prescribe any specific factors the juvenile court must consider in

making its decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281

(Colo. App. 2005). Still, the juvenile court must “be guided by the

purposes of the Code and resolve the issue in a manner that

furthers the best interests of the child and the public.” Id. at 1283.

III. Preservation

¶8 We begin with mother’s contention that the juvenile court

erred because it would have been in the youths’ best interests to

grant her primary custody, and her related contention that the

juvenile court was required to maintain the existing parenting order

unless the order endangered the youths’ physical health or

significantly impairing their emotional development. See § 14- 10-

129(2), C.R.s 20205; § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. Mother did not

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present these arguments in the juvenile court, instead she asserted

that she and father should be granted equal parenting time.

Because mother did not present these arguments to the juvenile

court, they are not properly before us. People in Interest of K.L-P.,

148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (arguments never presented to,

considered by, or ruled on by the trial court may not be raised for

the first time on appeal). Accordingly, we do not address the merits

of these contentions. See In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶

13.

IV. The APR Judgment

¶9 Mother generally contends that the juvenile court erred by

requiring joint decision-making for major decisions and denying her

requested parenting time schedule of one week-on/one week-off

during the school year. We read mother’s framing of these issues —

that the terms of the APR were not in the youths’ best interests —as

a contention that the court abused its discretion by adopting the

APR, rather than an attempt to assert the rights of the youths. See

C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 18 (“Except in certain limited

circumstances, ‘a litigant must assert [their] own legal rights and

interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or

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interests of third parties.’” (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.

693, 708 (2013))). However, her challenge fails because there is

record support for the findings and orders made by the juvenile

court.

¶ 10 The juvenile court found that communication between mother

and father was “not quite there to do one-week-on, one-week-off”

during the school year and ordered “what is close to a fifty-fifty

[parenting-time schedule] but primarily has the children residing

with their father during the school week.” The evidence supported

the court’s decision.

¶ 11 Mother testified that she did not believe that the youths’

academic improvements could be attributed to primarily residing

with father. But the caseworker, an expert in child protection,

testified that the children’s attendance, tardiness, and overall

academic performance improved after living primarily with father

during the school year, and opined that father was responsible for

the improvement. The caseworker also opined that, although there

were times that mother and father were able to work well together,

in other instances their communication still prevented them from

successfully co-parenting. The caseworker recommended that

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father remain the primary residential custodian during the school

year because of the youths’ academic improvements under this

schedule. Because we cannot reweigh the evidence, we must reject

mother’s assertion. People In Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 29; see also In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 56 (“It is

the trial court's responsibility to judge witness credibility, determine

the weight and probative value of the evidence, and resolve

evidentiary conflicts, and we may not disturb its findings in this

regard.”).

¶ 12 Mother also points to concerns that arose early in the two-year

case, asserts that father did not comply with portions of his

treatment plan, and alleges that father did not adequately support

the children’s relationship with her. But the record supports the

juvenile court’s findings that, by the time of the APR hearing, both

parents had “come a long way[]” to complete their respective

treatment plans and become fit parents. And while the caseworker

did testify that she had not seen father actively encouraging the

youths’ relationship with mother, father testified that he was

working to foster a relationship between mother and the youths “all

the time.” We will not reweigh this evidence. S.Z.S., ¶ 29

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¶ 13 Mother also claims that requiring her and father to agree on

some extracurricular activities effectively foreclosed the youths’

ability to participate because they would not be able to come to an

agreement. But mother did not provide any evidence at the APR

hearing that this would be the case. Instead, the caseworker

testified that father demonstrated that he valued the youths’

participation in extracurricular activities. Furthermore, father

testified in detail about the many extracurricular activities that both

youths participated in while mother and father exercised joint

decision-making as part of the dependency and neglect action.

Given the record support for the juvenile court’s conclusion that

mother and father could successfully continue to exercise joint

decision-making responsibility, we discern no basis for reversal.1

V. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

1 The youths concede mother’s argument that an equal APR would
have been in the children’s best interest. But the youth did not file
an appeal in this case and did not develop the merits of this
concession beyond mother’s argument, so we do not address it
further.

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