Peo v. Jacobs

24CA1052 Peo v Jacobs 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1052
Fremont County District Court No. 23CR191
Honorable Kaitlin B. Turner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

William Jacobs,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

Jeffrey D. Lindsey, District Attorney, Wendy S. Owens, Deputy District
Attorney, Cañon City, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Julia Chamberlin, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The District Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial District appeals

the district court’s order dismissing the criminal charges brought

against defendant, William Jacobs, based on outrageous

government conduct by the elected district attorney. We reverse the

order of dismissal and remand the case to the district court for

reinstatement of the criminal complaint.

I. Background

¶2 Jacobs was charged with first degree murder, child abuse

resulting in death, and child abuse resulting in serious bodily

injury following the death of his girlfriend’s ten-month-old child.

The child allegedly sustained the fatal injuries while in Jacobs’s

care.

¶3 In July 2023, a year before the scheduled trial, the then-

elected Eleventh Judicial District Attorney, Linda Stanley, invited a

television reporter to her office for an interview. Among other

things, Stanley opined on Jacobs’s guilt, disclosed his juvenile

criminal history, and made lewd remarks about Jacobs’s

relationship with his girlfriend and her child. Stanley’s statements

were featured in two televised news stories, which aired in July and

August 2023, and were rebroadcast on multiple social media sites.

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¶4 Based on Stanley’s comments, Jacobs filed a motion to

dismiss the case for outrageous government conduct. He argued

that Stanley had knowingly violated attorney ethical standards,

including the American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice

Standards, and compromised his right to due process and a fair

trial. Specifically, he asserted that Stanley’s interview statements

“heighten[ed] public condemnation of [him], prejudic[ed] a potential

jury, influenc[ed] the outcome of the case, and undermin[ed] public

confidence in the criminal legal system.” He asked the court to

dismiss all charges.

¶5 The district court held two hearings on the motion. After

reviewing the evidence and arguments, as well as additional

briefing, the district court granted Jacobs’s motion. The court

concluded that Stanley’s conduct, which violated her ethical duties

under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct and other

standards, had a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing

[the] proceedings” and amounted to outrageous government

conduct. As for the remedy, the court declined the prosecution’s

request for a change of venue because, in its view, a change of

venue over the defendant’s objection would violate his right to a

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trial by a jury of his peers in the county where the crime was

allegedly committed. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the

charges against Jacobs.

II. Discussion

¶6 The prosecution appeals the district court’s order, arguing that

it erred by concluding that Stanley’s conduct satisfies the standard

for finding outrageous government conduct that warrants dismissal.

We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶7 Outrageous government conduct is a due process claim that,

when established, justifies the exercise of a court’s supervisory

power to dismiss a case. People v. Johnson, 987 P.2d 855, 859

(Colo. App. 1998). To successfully assert the defense, a defendant

must show that government officials’ actions violated the

defendant’s due process rights “to such a degree as to violate

fundamental fairness and shock the universal sense of justice.”

People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d 332, 336 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶8 When the defense is raised, a district court must review the

totality of the facts of the case. People in Interest of M.N., 761 P.2d

1124, 1129 (Colo. 1998). We have traditionally reviewed the court’s

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decision for an abuse of discretion. People v. Medina, 51 P.3d 1006,

1011 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Mata-Medina v. People, 71

P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling

is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable or when the court

misapplies the law. People v. Burlingame, 2019 COA 17, ¶ 10.

¶9 However, “outrageous government conduct has always been

recognized as a violation of due process,” and we review due process

claims de novo. Id. at ¶ 11; see also id. at ¶¶ 23-24, 34 (Tow, J.,

concurring) (acknowledging that divisions of this court have

reviewed decisions concerning outrageous government conduct for

an abuse of discretion but advocating for de novo review of the

ultimate conclusion because the claim is based on a constitutional

violation). We need not resolve this seeming conflict because we

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. See id. at ¶ 11.

B. The Court Erred by Dismissing the Complaint

¶ 10 The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that under

certain circumstances, the conduct of government agents may be so

outrageous as to violate a defendant’s right to due process. United

States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). Under those

circumstances, “due process principles . . . absolutely bar the

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government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction”

and the case must be dismissed. Id. The defendant effectively

receives immunity from prosecution because the government’s

conduct in bringing the case so offends due process principles that

it cannot avail itself of the judicial system. See United States v.

Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1300 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Outrageous

government conduct is . . . a claim that government conduct in

securing an indictment was so shocking to due process values that

the indictment must be dismissed.”).

¶ 11 Dismissal for outrageous government conduct typically

requires a finding that the government was excessively entangled in

the creation or commission of the crime, including by inducing or

coercing the defendant into committing the crime. See, e.g., People

v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956, 958 (Colo. App. 1991) (prosecutor and

undercover agent conspired to file fake charges in a scheme

intended to induce the defendant lawyer into committing a crime);

United States v. Robinson, 993 F.3d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 2021) (To

show outrageous government conduct, “the defendant must show

either: (1) excessive government involvement in the creation of the

crime, or (2) significant governmental coercion to induce the crime.”

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(citation omitted)); State v. Hicks, 2023-Ohio-4126, ¶ 20

(Outrageous government conduct occurs “where law enforcement

agents employ[] unwarranted physical or mental coercion, where

government agents engineer and direct the criminal enterprise from

start to finish, and where the government essentially manufactures

new crimes in order to obtain the defendant’s conviction.”).

¶ 12 Instances in which courts have found outrageous government

conduct are rare. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.

1993) (“The banner of outrageous misconduct is often raised but

seldom saluted. . . . [C]ourts have rejected its application with

almost monotonous regularity.”). As a division of this court recently

recognized, Auld is the only Colorado appellate case in which the

government’s conduct was found to be outrageous, and “the

threshold for such a finding appears to be exceedingly high.”

Burlingame, ¶ 12.

¶ 13 In Auld, the district attorney “perpetrated a fraud upon [the

district] court” by filing a fictitious criminal complaint against a

fictitious person, thereby “duping” the court into participating in an

undercover operation against the defendant. Auld, 815 P.2d at 957,

958-59. The division concluded that making the court complicit in

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such deceit “must be condemned” and affirmed the district court’s

dismissal of the complaint. Id. at 959. Every other claim of

outrageous government conduct raised on appeal in Colorado has

been rejected, either because the conduct at issue was not

sufficiently outrageous or because it did not involve government

entanglement in the creation or commission of the crime. See, e.g.,

Burlingame, ¶¶ 4, 18-19 (reversing dismissal of complaint because,

although the government conduct might constitute legal error, it did

not satisfy the standard for outrageous government conduct);

Medina, 51 P.3d at 1011-12 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss

because, although the government conduct in interrogating the

defendant violated his constitutional rights, it did not implicate the

integrity of the court and the violations could be remedied by

suppressing the defendant’s statements); M.N., 761 P.2d at 1125-

26, 1128-30 (reversing dismissal of delinquency petitions because

officer’s conduct in giving juvenile drugs and encouraging him to

commit crimes did not exceed the permissible outer limits of

governmental involvement in the criminal conduct; collecting

cases). At bottom, this narrow defense “is manifestly reserved for

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only ‘the most intolerable government conduct.’” United States v.

Warren, 747 F.2d 1339, 1341 (10th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

¶ 14 We do not condone Stanley’s actions in this case. And while

her conduct might be considered “outrageous” in the ordinary

sense, we conclude that it does not satisfy the stringent standard

for finding outrageous government conduct as set forth in the case

law.

¶ 15 In this case, the government was not involved at all in the

creation or commission of the underlying crime. See People v.

Perez, 2019 COA 48, ¶ 35 (rejecting defendant’s outrageous

government conduct claim because the crime was complete when

the police arrived on scene and they did not “encourage[] or

participate[]” in the commission of the crimes for which the

defendant was prosecuted), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other

grounds, 2021 CO 5M. Before any of the conduct at issue, Jacobs

allegedly fatally injured a child and was arrested, charged, and

arraigned for the crime. In other words, Stanley’s commentary on

the case did not play any part in the filing of charges against

Jacobs. Under these circumstances, “the power to dismiss charges

based solely on government misconduct must be used sparingly.”

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United States v. Guzman, 282 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2002). In

addition, Stanley’s conduct never intruded into an attorney-client

relationship. See People v. Walker, 2022 COA 15, ¶ 17 (recognizing

a possible outrageous governmental conduct claim when the

government deliberately intrudes into an attorney-client

relationship).

¶ 16 Therefore, regardless of how improper Stanley’s public

comments were, they did not constitute the kind of outrageous

conduct that justifies the sanction of dismissal. Cf. United States v.

Walters, 910 F.3d 11, 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting an outrageous

government conduct claim because, although law enforcement’s

conduct in leaking confidential grand jury information to the press

was “highly improper,” “serious misconduct,” and “likely criminal,”

the conduct did not substantially influence, or undermine the

fairness of the process resulting in, the grand jury’s indictment).

¶ 17 Nor are we persuaded that a violation of the Colorado Rules of

Professional Conduct is sufficient to support dismissal of a case for

outrageous government conduct. Citing People v. Antunes, 680

P.2d 1321, 1323 (Colo. App. 1984), the district court concluded that

the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Criminal

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Justice Standards could serve as a framework for determining

whether the government’s conduct was outrageous. However,

neither Antunes, nor any other case we could find, supports this

proposition. Antunes was not an outrageous government conduct

case; the question was whether prosecutorial misconduct had

impaired the defense investigation. Id. The division determined

that the prosecutor had committed no violation of the professional

rules and, therefore, there was no prosecutorial misconduct that

would warrant dismissal of the case. Id.

¶ 18 While a violation of the professional rules may be a factor in

evaluating whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, see, e.g.,

Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048-49 (Colo. 2005);

Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 264-65 (Colo. 1995), it is less clear

whether the rules bear on the due process analysis. True, in Auld,

the division noted that the district attorney’s conduct in creating a

“counterfeit prosecution” and committing perjury might have

violated ethical rules and prosecutorial standards. 815 P.2d at

958-59. But the ethical violations themselves were not the basis of

the outrageous government conduct finding; the finding was based

on the government’s conduct in fabricating a case that fraudulently

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“implicated the court in the prosecution aspect of the law

enforcement process.” Id. at 958.

¶ 19 Thus, whether Stanley engaged in conduct sufficient for

Jacobs to establish a cognizable outrageous government conduct

claim warranting the sanction of dismissal is distinct from whether

Stanley’s conduct violated ethical rules warranting disciplinary

sanctions. See Burlingame, ¶ 18 (acknowledging that “while the

government’s behavior might be considered poor judgment or even

legal error, the conduct did not rise to the level of outrageous

governmental conduct”). Violations of the professional rules should

result in an appropriate professional sanction, as they have in this

case. See People v. Stanley, 559 P.3d 697, 706 (Colo. O.P.D.J.

2024) (disbarring Stanley for her extrajudicial statements in this

case and two others), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, In re Stanley,

2025 CO 51 (affirming the disciplinary board’s recommended

sanction of disbarment). But they are not dispositive of whether the

government’s conduct was outrageous. See Colo. RCP, Scope, ¶ 20

(“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action

against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a

case that a legal duty has been breached.”).

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¶ 20 The court’s main concern was that Stanley’s statements would

prejudice the public against Jacobs, infringing on his right to an

impartial jury. But even a constitutional violation rarely warrants

dismissal for outrageous government conduct. See Medina, 51 P.3d

at 1012 (egregious violations of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment

rights did not constitute outrageous conduct); People v. Cowart, 244

P.3d 1199, 1206 (Colo. 2010) (concluding that even though the

defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, “there

was no outrageous government conduct”). And we have not found,

nor does Jacobs cite, any authority supporting the proposition that

a dismissal for outrageous government conduct is the proper

remedy when prosecutorial misconduct impinges on a defendant’s

right to an impartial jury. Rather, as discussed above, the

outrageous government conduct defense protects defendants from

enduring criminal proceedings that would not have been initiated

but for the government’s involvement in the underlying crime. See

Perez, ¶ 35.

¶ 21 In reaching our disposition, we expressly acknowledge the

district court’s concern that Jacobs’s constitutional rights may have

been impacted by Stanley’s statements. Specifically, we share the

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court’s concern that Stanley’s statements disclosed possibly

inadmissible information and may have heightened public

condemnation of Jacobs, which could potentially affect the court’s

ability to impanel an impartial jury. And as the district court

pointed out, changing the venue to remedy the government’s

improper conduct — over Jacobs’s objection — may not serve the

interests of justice.

¶ 22 But as legitimate as these concerns are, they must be

addressed at the appropriate time in the proceedings. Mechanisms

exist to mitigate or remedy the court’s concerns going forward. See

People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589, 596 (Colo. 1981) (listing six means

by which a court may ensure a defendant’s constitutional right to a

fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors in the face of pretrial

publicity), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in

People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991). And if those

mechanisms cannot adequately protect Jacobs’s right to a fair trial,

the court may consider other options at that time. Thus, should it

be the case that Stanley’s conduct has imperiled Jacobs’s

constitutional or procedural rights, the court has remedies at its

disposal on remand.

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III. Disposition

¶ 23 The order is reversed, the charges against Jacobs are

reinstated, and the case is remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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