Peo v. Rivers

21CA0814 Peo v Rivers 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0814
El Paso County District Court No. 18CR2300
Honorable Frances Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Nashid Rayon Rivers,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Harris and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark G. Walta, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Nashid Rayon Rivers, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of numerous

felonies arising out of a double homicide. We affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand to the district court to correct the mittimus.

I. Background

¶2 On April 21, 2018, police responded to a 911 call from the

residence that Rivers shared with his mother, stepfather, and

brother concerning an alleged home invasion. Rivers’ mother

invited the responding officers inside, and the officers found Rivers

with burns on his hands and legs. Rivers’ mother also alerted the

officers to a nine millimeter handgun she found in a laundry

basket. The firearm smelled of gasoline. Family members reported

that Rivers had said “he killed two people and set them on fire.”

The officers interviewed Rivers for two hours before transporting

him to the hospital to receive treatment for his burns.

¶3 Later that day, police responded to reports of a suspicious

vehicle idling in a secluded cul-de-sac in Colorado Springs. The

responding officers observed blood dripping from the driver’s side

door onto the ground, but the vehicle’s windows were darkly tinted

and covered in soot, so the officers could not see inside. The

1
officers opened the driver’s side door and observed a female in the

driver’s seat and a male in the passenger seat. Both occupants

appeared to be deceased, had bullet wounds in their heads, were

stained with blood, and had singed hair.

¶4 The officers also smelled the odor of gasoline emanating from

the car and observed that the inside of the vehicle had been burned.

Outside the vehicle, officers discovered a lighter, a burnt bandana,

and a phone charger. A silver Apple iPhone was later discovered a

short distance from where the vehicle had been parked. The iPhone

and the phone charger both contained evidence that connected the

items to Rivers.

¶5 The victims were identified as Serena Garcia and Marcus

Denton. Autopsies confirmed that both victims suffered multiple

nine-millimeter gunshot wounds to the backs and sides of their

heads. Ballistics testing confirmed that the handgun discovered at

Rivers’ residence was likely used in the shootings, and traces of

Denton’s blood were found on the weapon.

¶6 During the ensuing investigation, police received information

that Marquis Hazard and his girlfriend, Shailynn Ryles, may have

played a role in the murders. Specifically, text messages and

2
Snapchat records revealed that Rivers and Hazard planned to carry

out “a deal” to procure and sell marijuana on April 21. Police

officers contacted Hazard and Ryles and searched their vehicle. The

officers observed that the driver’s side rear passenger seat appeared

to be burned.

¶7 Ryles, who was charged with being an accessory to the

murders, agreed with the prosecution that she would cooperate

with the police investigation and provide truthful testimony in

exchange for sentencing concessions. At Rivers’ trial, she testified

as follows:

• On the morning of April 21, Hazard received a call from

someone named “Trench,” later identified as Rivers, and

then directed Ryles to drive with Hazard to the west side of

Colorado Springs.

• The two parked their car in a cul-de-sac. Eventually, a

brown car pulled up and sat idling in the cul-de-sac for a

few minutes.

• Although Ryles testified inconsistently about the sequence

of events, at some point Ryles received a phone call from

Rivers, but all she could hear over the phone was “loud

3
music” playing. And at some point Ryles heard two “loud

noises” come from outside the vehicle, but she could not

identify precisely the source of the noises.

• A few minutes later, Ryles saw Rivers emerge from the back

seat of the idling car and run toward her car. Rivers was on

fire. When Rivers jumped into the back seat, Ryles doused

him with water to extinguish the flames. Ryles observed

that Rivers was carrying a gun and a bottle of gasoline or

lighter fluid. Rivers instructed Ryles and Hazard to drive

away quickly.

• Ryles, Hazard, and Rivers proceeded to a nearby apartment

to dispose of Rivers’ clothes. While they were driving, Rivers

said that he “domed” the victims in the idling vehicle.1

• Following the murders, and after Ryles and Hazard brought

Rivers to his home, Rivers told Ryles and Hazard that they

could have “whatever [was] in the [idling] vehicle.”

1 Ryles was unfamiliar with what “domed” meant at the time Rivers

said this, but testimony at trial revealed that the term is slang for
when one shoots another in the head.

4
¶8 Rivers was charged with multiple felonies arising out of the

murders. After a ten-day trial, a jury found Rivers guilty of two

counts of first degree murder (after deliberation) — one for each

victim; two counts of felony murder predicated on “arson and/or

robbery” — one for each victim; conspiracy to commit first degree

murder; second degree arson; attempt to commit tampering with a

deceased human body; tampering with physical evidence; and ten

crime of violence sentence enhancers. The district court sentenced

Rivers to life without the possibility of parole in the custody of the

Department of Corrections.

II. Analysis

¶9 Rivers contends that the district court erred by denying his

(1) challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to the

prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory strike and (2) motion to

suppress evidence arising from an investigator’s search of his cell

phone. We disagree.

¶ 10 Rivers further contends that the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony murder based

on the predicate offense of second degree arson. Although the

People contend that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the

5
felony murder convictions, they nevertheless concede that the court

erred by entering separate convictions for first degree murder (after

deliberation) and felony murder. We agree with the People, vacate

Rivers’ convictions and sentences for felony murder, and remand

the case with instructions for the court to amend the mittimus

accordingly. Because of this disposition, we need not address

Rivers’ sufficiency challenge.

A. Batson Challenge

¶ 11 Rivers contends that the district court erred by denying his

Batson challenge to the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory

strike dismissing C.S., one of few African American2 potential

jurors. We discern no error.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

forbids a challenge to a potential juror based solely on race.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; see People v. Ojeda, 2022 CO 7, ¶ 19;

People v. Wilson, 2015 CO 54M, ¶ 10 n.4. When a party raises a

2 C.S. did not disclose his race or ethnicity, so we cannot determine

if he identified as African American or Black or with another racial
group. Both parties on appeal refer to him as African American, so
we adopt the same nomenclature.

6
Batson challenge, the trial court must engage in a three-step

analysis to assess the claim of racial discrimination. Ojeda, ¶ 21.

¶ 13 First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must make a

prima facie showing that the strike was based on race. Id. Second,

if a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the striking

party to provide a race-neutral explanation for excusing the

potential juror. Wilson, ¶ 10. Third, the trial court must decide the

ultimate question: whether the objecting party has established

purposeful discrimination. Ojeda, ¶ 27; see People v. Owens, 2024

CO 10, ¶ 78 (“A peremptory strike is purposely discriminatory” if it

is “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” (quoting

Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019))). In other words,

“[t]he inquiry at step three requires the trial court to decide whether

to believe counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory

challenge.” Wilson, ¶ 13.

¶ 14 Rivers’ appellate contentions only concern the third step of the

court’s Batson analysis. In deciding the ultimate question, the

court “must gauge the prosecutor’s credibility by evaluating [their]

demeanor, how reasonable or improbable [their] explanations are,

and whether [their] ‘proffered rationale has some basis in accepted

7
trial strategy.’” Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 339 (2003)). The court should also consider (1) “a prosecutor’s

use of peremptory strikes against Black, as compared to white,

prospective jurors”; (2) “disparate questioning and investigation of

Black and white jurors”; (3) “side-by-side comparisons of Black

prospective jurors who were struck and white prospective jurors

who were not”; and (4) “misrepresentations of the record in

defending strikes during a Batson hearing.” Owens, ¶ 78.

¶ 15 “On appeal, each step of the trial court’s Batson analysis is

subject to a separate standard of review.” Ojeda, ¶ 30 (quoting

People v. Rodriguez, 2015 CO 55, ¶ 13). We review steps one and

two de novo. Id. But step three — whether the opponent of a strike

has satisfied their burden of proving purposeful discrimination — is

a question of fact that we review for clear error. Id.; Owens, ¶ 79.

Under this standard, we reverse only “under ‘exceptional

circumstances,’” when the court’s findings have no support in the

record. People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 22 (quoting Snyder v.

Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)); see Wilson, ¶ 13 (we give

“great deference” to a court’s step-three finding (quoting Batson,

8
476 U.S. at 98 n.21)). If we conclude that a Batson violation

occurred, the remedy is automatic reversal. Wilson, ¶ 80.

2. Additional Background

¶ 16 Rivers underwent several evaluations to determine his

competency to stand trial. Although Rivers was found competent,

the resulting reports disclosed that Rivers had received disability

payments for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rivers sought

to endorse an expert on the effects of PTSD, and the prosecution

objected. The district court ruled that Rivers’ PTSD expert could

testify but that the prosecution would be permitted to provide

relevant rebuttal testimony.

¶ 17 During jury selection, several jurors expressed concerns

related to the financial hardship of serving on a jury. Prospective

juror C.S. — an African American male and military veteran —

initially said he would be unable to afford taking time away from

work to serve on the jury, but he eventually confirmed that he

would be paid for his time and was able to serve. The prosecutor

then asked C.S. a series of questions:

PROSECUTOR: Let me, also, ask you, too,
[C.S.] — and, again, I want to put this very
delicately. I know there are not a lot of jurors

9
of color in the room, not a lot of people of color.
But I wanted to ask you very specifically,
[C.S.], is there anything about what is going on
nationally right now that we should know
about as it might impact your ability to serve
as a fair and impartial juror?

C.S.: No.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And, look, man, this
is — this is tough. I mean, you know the
George Floyd trial is going on, right?

C.S.: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And do you have any
strong opinions about the criminal justice
system in light of it?

C.S.: I just hope that the justice system does
the right thing.

....

PROSECUTOR: Let me also ask, too, you
know, especially because the defendant is a
person of color as well as you are, sir. I’m not
trying to single you out, I just want to make
sure to ask. Is there any danger at all that
there might be any bias or sympathy or
prejudice, or would you make your decisions
based on the evidence?

C.S.: Based on evidence, yes.

¶ 18 During questioning by defense counsel, C.S. volunteered that

he “suffer[s] from PTSD” after seeing “a lot of stuff in war.” Defense

counsel explained that some of the evidence presented at trial could

10
be disturbing and asked C.S. whether that could “trigger” his PTSD.

C.S. explained that he “[cannot] say because PTSD is just

something that just happens. . . . [I]t’s not controllable.” The

prosecutor did not ask C.S. any follow-up questions concerning his

military experience or the effects of his PTSD.

¶ 19 At the end of voir dire, the district court asked the parties to

approach to record their peremptory strikes, but the conference

occurred without transcription by the court reporter, and there is

no transcript of that part of the proceeding. However, in

accordance with C.A.R. 10(e), the parties stipulated to the following:

• The prosecutor used a peremptory strike for C.S., and

defense counsel immediately challenged the strike under

Batson. Defense counsel argued that C.S. was one of the

few African American jurors in the venire, that the

prosecution had no valid reason to strike C.S., and that the

strike was based on race and was therefore invalid.

• Before the court determined whether defense counsel made

a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, the

prosecutor explained that he was striking C.S. because “he

had volunteered, in the course of defense questioning

11
during voir dire, that [PTSD] from prior military service

might affect, or could ‘trigger’ him.” The prosecutor noted

C.S.’s statement that “his PTSD had a significant impact on

him . . . [and] wasn’t something he could control.” The

prosecutor was concerned that C.S.’s experience with PTSD

“would influence his ability to fairly and impartially

consider potential evidence from a defense expert” that

Rivers’ behavior following the murders may have been

impacted by his PTSD.

• Defense counsel responded that C.S. had confirmed he

could be fair and impartial and that the record did not

establish that C.S.’s experience with PTSD would impact his

ability to fairly consider the evidence.

• The parties engaged in a back-and-forth discussion, during

which the prosecutor noted that there was another African

American juror on the presumptive panel whom the

prosecution did not intend to strike. That juror ultimately

served on the jury.

• The court determined that the prosecutor’s asserted

justification for the peremptory challenge of C.S. was

12
credible and race neutral. Accordingly, the court overruled

Rivers’ Batson objection and excused C.S.

3. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Rivers’ Batson
Challenge

¶ 20 Rivers contends that the prosecution’s peremptory strike of

C.S. was plainly motivated in substantial part by discriminatory

intent and that his conviction must be reversed. He argues that

C.S. “was an ideal juror for the prosecution” — he had a long and

distinguished career in the military, he was “a rule-follower”

committed to upholding the law, and in the face of the prosecutor’s

questions concerning social and racial justice issues, C.S.

confirmed that he trusted the justice system to resolve any issues.

Against this backdrop, Rivers contends there was no reasonable

explanation for the prosecutor’s strike of C.S. “other than the fact

that he and . . . [Rivers] were both [B]lack and that the prosecution

had concerns that this shared racial identity might somehow be

problematic and potentially disqualifying.”

¶ 21 Because only the third Batson step is before us, our review is

for clear error. Ojeda, ¶ 30; Owens, ¶ 79. Thus, our only question

is whether the record contains any support for the district court’s

13
finding that the prosecutor’s asserted justification for his

peremptory challenge of C.S. was both race neutral and credible.

See Beauvais, ¶ 22. We conclude it does.

¶ 22 During voir dire, C.S. volunteered that he served two tours in

Iraq as a member of the military and that he “saw a lot of stuff in

war” and “recovered a lot of bodies” while he was deployed. C.S.

explained that, because of his military experience, he suffered from

PTSD. While C.S. could not say whether the evidence submitted at

trial would “trigger” his PTSD, he conceded that “it could” and that

PTSD is “not controllable. It just happens.” In light of Rivers’

request to present expert testimony concerning how PTSD may have

impacted his conduct, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to be

concerned with how C.S.’s experience with PTSD might influence

his ability to fairly and impartially consider the evidence.3

¶ 23 We are not persuaded otherwise by Rivers’ counterpoints.

First, Rivers argues that the prosecutor’s concerns about C.S. were

3 In a footnote, Rivers asserts that, “by this point, the prosecution

had already made a tactical decision not to introduce evidence that
would have opened the door to expert testimony that Mr. Rivers
may have been suffering from PTSD . . . at the time of the incident,”
but he cites a trial transcript from eleven days after the prosecution
struck C.S.

14
pretextual because the prosecutor made no effort to inquire into the

potential impact of C.S.’s PTSD or military experience on his role as

a juror. But the record shows that the prosecutor had no need to

inquire further into C.S.’s experience because his responses to

defense counsel’s questions provided ample evidence to support the

prosecution’s asserted race-neutral basis for the peremptory strike.

¶ 24 To the extent Rivers argues that the prosecutor’s justification

for striking C.S. was “undercut[]” by his “strident defense of a juror,

in response to a causal challenge by Mr. Rivers, who had issues

very similar to Juror C.S.,” the record belies this characterization of

events. True, the other juror expressed concerns about the graphic

nature of the evidence, calling back to decades of experience as an

emergency room nurse and indicating that she did not “want to be

unfair to anybody here.” But she expressly denied having PTSD,

which was the prosecutor’s specific concern with C.S. Moreover,

defense counsel moved to strike the other juror for cause. See

§ 16-10-103(1), C.R.S. 2025 (listing the grounds for a challenge for

cause including, as the only ground possibly relevant here, “[t]he

existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias

toward the defendant or the state”). In response, the prosecutor

15
said striking the juror for cause was “a tough choice,” reasoning

that someone with the juror’s experience could be a valuable and

careful juror. That is hardly a “strident defense” of the juror.

Ultimately, the court struck the juror for cause, not because of her

emergency room experience or hesitancy to view the evidence, but

because of a “prayer reference” — she said she had been praying all

day not to be picked for the jury — and because she “would not

know that she could be fair.”

¶ 25 Second, Rivers argues that the only questions the prosecutor

asked of C.S. centered on “issues of race” despite that topic having

“absolutely nothing to do with” Rivers’ trial. But the record does

not reflect that C.S.’s responses to those questions played any part

in the prosecutor’s decision to excuse him from the jury. And the

mere fact that the prosecutor did not ask similar questions of other

prospective jurors does not neutralize the record evidence

supporting the court’s finding that Rivers failed to establish

purposeful discrimination. See Ojeda, ¶ 27; see also Owens, ¶ 78

(identifying disparate questioning as one factor the court may

consider in resolving the Batson challenge).

16
¶ 26 Third, Rivers contends that the prosecutor offered “post hoc

justifications” for his strike of C.S. after the court had already

denied the Batson challenge, which “smacks of a guilty conscience

and was obviously a clumsy attempt to back-fill the record after

consciously committing a constitutional crime.” Frankly, we view

the record differently.

¶ 27 Immediately before the court excused all remaining

prospective jurors and announced the final jury, the prosecutor

said,

And, Your Honor, I just wanted to make one
more note for the record. The defense had
B[a]tson’d the People previously. We had
absolutely left [juror B] on . . . this jury. She is
a person of color, and [I] wanted the record to
reflect that, because I’ve seen that appellate
records sometimes in the aftermath can take
issue with decisions the People made or did
not make. We had never considered kicking
[juror B] ever, and I wanted the record to
reflect that.

It is not clear to us whether juror B served on the jury or was

struck by defense counsel. Either way, we disagree that the

prosecutor’s statement was a post hoc justification for his

peremptory strike of C.S. The prosecutor apparently felt the need to

make a record about not striking all the people of color from the

17
jury, which certainly could have been relevant to the prior Batson

challenge, but the prosecutor did not mention C.S. or give another,

different reason for striking him.

¶ 28 Finally, we reject Rivers’ contention that the court clearly erred

because its “rationale for finding the prosecution’s asserted

justification for striking . . . C.S. credible isn’t entirely clear.”

Typically, in the absence of a full transcript of the parties’

conference — at which they discussed, and the court ruled on, their

respective peremptory strikes — we would presume that the record

supports the court’s determination. See People v. Gandiaga, 70

P.3d 523, 527 (Colo. App. 2002) (“It is the appellant’s duty to

provide those portions of the record necessary to substantiate the

claims of error on appeal. Absent such a record, we must presume

that the trial court’s ruling was correct.”). Here, it appears that

neither party is at fault for the absence of the relevant transcript, so

we will not presume that the missing record provides greater clarity

about the court’s ruling. But we also decline to employ the reverse

presumption and assume that the court gave no explanation for its

step-three finding. The parties’ stipulations provide us with enough

of the court’s rationale to evaluate its decision.

18
¶ 29 In the end, we are tasked with deciding whether this case

presents the “exceptional circumstance[]” in which the district

court’s finding that the prosecutor’s strike of C.S. was not

motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent has “no

support in the record.” Beauvais, ¶ 22 (citation omitted); see

Owens, ¶ 78. It does not present such a circumstance.

Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not err by

denying Rivers’ Batson challenge. See Ojeda, ¶ 30.

B. General Warrant

¶ 30 Rivers contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant

that lacked sufficient particularity. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 31 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo.

Const. art. II, § 7. A search conducted pursuant to a warrant is

typically reasonable. People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 34. But

“so-called ‘general warrants,’ which permit ‘a general, exploratory

rummaging in a person’s belongings,’ are prohibited.” Id. (quoting

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)). This prohibition

19
“safeguard[s] the privacy and security of individuals against

arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Id. at ¶ 33 (quoting

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)).

¶ 32 To that end, the Fourth Amendment requires that search

warrants include a “particular description” of the thing to be seized.

Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). And the Colorado Constitution requires the

search warrant to describe the place to be searched or the thing to

be seized “as near as may be.” Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. To

determine whether the particularity requirement is met, courts

must “read warrants and the accompanying affidavits [together] in a

practical, common sense fashion.” People v. Roccaforte, 919 P.2d

799, 804 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 33 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of fact and law. People v. Morse, 2023 COA 27, ¶ 17. We

defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by

competent evidence in the record, but we review the court’s legal

conclusions de novo. Id. Evidence obtained pursuant to a search

warrant that fails the particularity requirement should be

suppressed. See Roccaforte, 919 P.2d at 802 (“The principal means

20
of effectuating the requirement is to suppress all evidence seized

pursuant to an overbroad, general warrant.”).

2. Additional Background

¶ 34 Before trial, a detective applied for a warrant to search the

contents of the silver iPhone discovered near the crime scene about

a week after the murders. The phone was found in a patch of grass

by one of the victim’s friends a few feet from where the victims’ car

had been parked. The application identified the iPhone as a silver

iPhone 6, matching a description of a silver iPhone 6 owned by

Rivers that he claimed had been stolen from him by Hazard. The

detective believed that the device could contain material evidence

related to the events on April 21.

¶ 35 The affidavit expressly incorporated two attachments.

Attachment A was an affidavit from the detective, explaining in

detail the crime under investigation, Rivers’ alleged connection to

the crime, facts leading the detective to believe that the iPhone

belonged to Rivers, and “that a search of [the] phone would provide

critical material evidence to [the] homicide investigation.”

Attachment B listed the information sought from the iPhone, which

was expressly limited to information “believed to be relevant to the

21
[h]omicide incident on 4/21/2018.”4 A magistrate reviewed and

signed the application, authorizing the search warrant.

¶ 36 Following a search of the iPhone, Rivers filed a motion to

suppress any evidence discovered from it, arguing that the warrant

(1) “lacked particularity and effectively authorized the sort of

general, exploratory rummaging condemned by our law” and

(2) “failed to establish a nexus between the alleged criminal activity

and the thing to be searched.” The prosecution responded that the

search warrant described the property to be seized with

particularity and sought specific categories of information that

reasonably could be found on the iPhone and that related to

“significant outstanding investigative questions.” In the alternative,

the prosecution argued that the evidence should not be suppressed

under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

4 We acknowledge that Attachment B to the search warrant

requests three categories of information that are not limited by date
or crime: (1) “[g]eneral photographs of the device”; (2) “[t]race
evidence to include possible DNA and fingerprints”; and
(3) “[s]pecific details of this particular device” including
manufacturer and model. But Rivers does not seem to challenge
these categories, which are sufficiently particular without such
limitations.

22
¶ 37 The district court held a suppression hearing, during which it

heard testimony from the detectives involved in executing the

search warrant and considered the parties’ arguments. The

detective who submitted the warrant application and supporting

affidavit explained each of the categories of information in

Attachment B and why investigators believed searching the iPhone

for that information would lead to the discovery of material evidence

related to the victims’ murders. The detective also explained that

he was careful to request evidence he believed to be relevant to the

“homicide incident on 4/21/18” to clearly indicate that the

“purpose of searching [the] phone was specifically to look for

evidence pertaining to that homicide investigation.”

¶ 38 In a written order, the court denied Rivers’ motion to

suppress. The court explained that, although the categories of

information sought from the iPhone were comprehensive, “the items

to be searched [were] limited by date and crime.” The court

concluded that the warrant was not the type of general warrant

criticized in the case law cited by Rivers. The court also found that

the investigator’s “search was performed in objective reliance upon

a validly signed warrant.” Thus, even assuming the warrant was

23
overbroad, the court determined that “the good faith exception to a

general warrant applies.”

3. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Rivers’ Motion to
Suppress

¶ 39 A warrant is generally required before a suspect’s cell phone

data can be searched. People v. d’Estree, 2024 COA 106, ¶ 38.

Because cell phones have “immense storage capacities” and the

“ability to collect and store many distinct types of data in one

place,” our supreme court has acknowledged that cell phones are

“entitled to special protections from searches.” Coke, ¶ 37.

Accordingly, a warrant that authorizes “police to search a cell phone

for all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any

data showing ownership or possession violates the particularity

demanded by the Fourth Amendment.” People v. Thompson, 2021

CO 15, ¶ 19. Still, “broad searches may be sustained against

particularity challenges if they are constrained by certain limiting

principles.” People v. Rodriguez-Ortiz, 2025 COA 61, ¶ 27 (cert.

granted Feb. 9, 2026). Specifically, warrants for the search of data

on cell phones are sufficiently particularized if they include specific

limitations based on (1) “the type of alleged criminal activity”;

24
(2) “the identity of the alleged victim”; and (3) “the timeframe, if

applicable, within which the suspected crime occurred.” People v.

Stauch, 2026 COA 22, ¶ 32; see Coke, ¶ 38.

¶ 40 In Coke, ¶ 35, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search

the defendant’s cell phone for all texts, videos, pictures, contact

lists, and phone records, as well as any data showing ownership or

possession. Because the warrant “contain[ed] no particularity as to

the alleged victim or to the time period during which the assault

allegedly occurred,” the supreme court held that “such broad

authorization violates the particularity demanded by the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 38. The court concluded that the warrant

effectively “authorized a general search” of the defendant’s phone

and was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id.

¶ 41 Although Rivers cites Coke, he develops little argument that

the search warrant was overbroad, baldly claiming it “was the

epitome of a ‘general warrant.’” Instead, he focuses on the lack of

connection between himself and the iPhone that was searched.

Specifically, he argues that “[t]he questionable provenance of the

phone, coupled with the fact that there was actually very little

evidence connecting the phone to Mr. Rivers, undermine both the

25
[district] court’s conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to

justify the warrant, as well as its determination that the warrant

was narrowly tailored.” Critically though, Rivers’ contention

disregards the level of detail in the warrant and its attachments.

¶ 42 Attachment A, which was expressly incorporated into the

warrant by reference and signed by the issuing magistrate, clearly

identified the victims and explained in detail the circumstances of

the crime. See Stauch, ¶ 27 (search warrants for cell phone data

are sufficiently particularized if they identify the alleged criminal

activity and the victims that were harmed). It also offered detailed

facts supporting the detective’s belief that the iPhone belonged to

Rivers and would contain material evidence of the crime. For

example, Attachment A provided that (1) Rivers’ mother told police

that Rivers had two phones: “a grey iPhone and . . . a flip style

phone”; (2) detectives discovered the flip phone at Rivers’ residence,

but not the iPhone; (3) Rivers claimed that Hazard took his iPhone

from him on the day of the crimes, but he did not know where the

iPhone ended up; (4) Hazard’s friend said he saw Hazard with a

damaged silver or grey iPhone 6 the day of the murders; and (5) the

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iPhone was discovered in a patch of grass just feet away from where

the victims’ car had been parked.

¶ 43 Further, Attachment B, which was expressly incorporated into

the warrant by reference, detailed the iPhone to be searched and

the categories of data to be collected. The warrant restricted the

investigators to collecting only data “believed to be relevant to the

Homicide incident on 4/21/18.” See id. (search warrants for cell

phone data are sufficiently particularized if they identify the

timeframe within which the suspected crime occurred).

¶ 44 Taken together, the search warrant and its attachments

included specific limitations as to the crime under investigation, the

date upon which the crime occurred, and the identities of the

victims involved, and it authorized a search for data related to only

those specifics. See id. The search warrant did not permit a

general rummaging of the iPhone but instead targeted information

related to Rivers’ involvement with the victims’ murders. Thus, the

search warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity

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requirement, and we discern no error in the district court’s denial of

the motion to suppress.5 See id. at ¶ 41.

C. Felony Murder Convictions

¶ 45 Rivers was charged with and convicted of two counts of first

degree murder (after deliberation) (counts one and seventeen) and

two counts of felony murder based on the predicate offenses of

“arson and/or robbery” (counts seven and twenty-three). Charges

one and seven related to victim Garcia, and charges seventeen and

twenty-three related to victim Denton. The district court entered

convictions and sentenced Rivers on all four murder counts.

¶ 46 Rivers contends that his felony murder convictions rest on

insufficient evidence that he caused the victims’ deaths in the

course of or in furtherance of the predicate offense of arson. See

§ 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018. Although the People disagree and

alternatively argue that Rivers’ felony murder convictions were also

predicated on robbery, they concede that the felony murder

5 In light of our disposition, we need not reach the People’s

alternative argument, not raised in the district court, that Rivers
lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation because he
was not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone
that he abandoned at a crime scene.

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convictions must be vacated because the district court violated

Rivers’ double jeopardy rights by entering separate convictions for

first degree murder (after deliberation) and felony murder for each

victim. See People v. Wood, 2019 CO 7, ¶ 27 (a defendant may not

stand convicted of both first degree murder (after deliberation) and

felony murder for the killing of a single victim).

¶ 47 Nonetheless, Rivers urges us to address his sufficiency

argument, arguing that the proper remedy for the admitted double

jeopardy defect is to merge the felony murder convictions into the

first degree murder (after deliberation) convictions, rather than to

vacate the felony murder convictions, which would allow him to

challenge both convictions on appeal.6 See Candelaria v. People,

148 P.3d 178, 183-84 (Colo. 2006) (because the defendant was

convicted of both deliberate murder and extreme indifference

murder for killing the same victim, the division ordered that the

convictions be merged into “a single, generic judgment of conviction

6 We note that Rivers did not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions for first degree murder (after
deliberation).

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for first degree murder”). But Rivers attempts to draw a distinction

without a difference.

¶ 48 When a defendant is convicted of both first degree murder

(after deliberation) and felony murder based on the killing of the

same victim, merging the felony murder conviction into the first

degree murder (after deliberation) conviction has the same effect as

vacating the felony murder conviction. Wood, ¶ 29 (merger has the

same effect as vacating one of the multiplicitous murder

convictions); accord People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 17. Even so,

our supreme court has clarified that, where multiplicitous

convictions exist, the appropriate remedy is “to vacate . . . the

underlying [conviction] as well as the . . . sentence based upon it.”

Wood, ¶ 28 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1095

(10th Cir. 2007)).

¶ 49 Because Rivers was convicted of both first degree murder

(after deliberation) and felony murder for killing the same two

victims, his convictions and sentences for felony murder must be

vacated. Id. And because we conclude that the felony murder

convictions must be vacated, his contention that the evidence was

30
insufficient to sustain those convictions is moot. See People v.

Fuentes, 258 P.3d 320, 326 (Colo. App. 2011).

III. Disposition

¶ 50 We vacate Rivers’ convictions and sentences for felony murder

(counts seven and twenty-three) and remand this matter to the

district court with instructions to correct the mittimus accordingly.

We otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.

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