Marriage of Janousek

24CA1408 Marriage of Janousek 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1408
Boulder County District Court No. 23DR30210
Honorable Andrew Hartman, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Michael Richard Janousek,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

and

Tamara Reynolds Janousek,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 14, 2026

Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellee and Cross-Appellant

Colorado Divorce Law Group, Brandi M. Petterson, Littleton, Colorado, for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee
¶1 This appeal arises from a dissolution of marriage action

between Michael Richard Janousek and Tamara Reynolds

Janousek.1 The district court entered permanent orders addressing

the division of property, maintenance, and waste of the marital

estate. The parties contest different parts of the permanent orders

in their appeal and cross-appeal.

¶2 We affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. Background

¶3 Michael and Tamara married in 1995. They have three adult

children. The couple separated in 2021 and filed for divorce in May

2023.

¶4 At the initial status conference, Tamara requested emergency

temporary orders, claiming that Michael had severely restricted her

financial access to the marital estate. The court denied her request

for emergency relief but set a temporary orders hearing within a

month.

¶5 The district court entered temporary orders in July 2023. The

following spring, after a three-day contested permanent orders

1 Because the parties share a last name, for clarity we refer to both

by their first names. We intend no disrespect by doing so.

1
hearing, the district court entered the permanent orders that are

the subject of this appeal and cross-appeal.

II. Discussion

¶6 The parties’ contentions on appeal are largely divided into

three categories. First, Tamara challenges the district court’s ruling

concerning their son’s 529 account. Second, both parties challenge

the district court’s calculation of Michael’s income and the resulting

maintenance award to Tamara. Relatedly, Michael argues that the

district court erred by requiring him to obtain life insurance as

security for the maintenance award. Finally, Tamara contends the

district court erred by finding that she committed economic waste

and allocating certain assets to Tamara, along with the associated

debt.

¶7 We address these contentions in turn.

A. 529 Account for Son’s Education

1. Additional Facts

¶8 About a week before he filed for divorce, Michael placed

$100,000 into a 529 account, for use in funding their son’s

education-related expenses. Tamara testified that she did not know

about the transfer of funds and would not have agreed to it.

2
¶9 Michael testified that he and Tamara had agreed to fund their

children’s college educations. More specifically, Michael stated that

he and Tamara agreed to pay for the children’s living expenses in

college, any expenses that weren’t covered by the children’s student

loans, and one-half of the student loans used to pay tuition.

Michael was the sole guarantor of the children’s student loans.

Michael also testified that the couple’s middle daughter stopped

paying on her student loan when he filed for divorce, requiring him

to make the full loan payments.

¶ 10 Michael stated that he deposited $100,000 in the son’s 529

account to ensure that the parties could comply with their past

agreements regarding funding of their son’s education. Tamara

objected to the transfer because it was made without her

knowledge, and she believed Michael would retain access to the

funds in the account. Tamara also argued that their middle

daughter’s student loan debt was not part of the marital estate and

instead was their daughter’s obligation.

¶ 11 At the end of the permanent orders hearing, the district court

found that the parties agreed to pay half of the children’s loans as

they accrued, but that Michael’s $100,000 lump sum deposit in the

3
529 account was contrary to the parties’ agreement. Still, it

reasoned that it would be inequitable for Michael alone “to be

saddled with that debt.” In light of these findings, the district court

ordered that only $50,000 of the $100,000 deposit would remain in

the account for use to fund the parties’ share of their son’s

education.

¶ 12 In addressing the remaining $50,000 in the account, the court

first determined that the middle daughter had defaulted on her

student loan. The balance of that loan was $35,369.77. The court

found that even though the parties had agreed that the children

would pay for half of their student loans, in practice, they had

funded the portion of the children’s share that the children either

could not or did not pay. Given these historical practices, the court

determined that $35,369.77 from the 529 account would be used to

satisfy the balance of the middle daughter’s student loan.2 After

paying the middle daughter’s outstanding loan balance, the court

2 Tamara’s opening brief cites the district court’s statements made

at the conclusion of the permanent orders hearing, which vary
slightly from the written orders it later entered. In resolving any
inconsistencies, we treat the court’s written orders as controlling.
See In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 41 (“[I]n the event
of a conflict, the written order prevails over the oral order.”).

4
ordered the remaining balance of $14,630.23 to be equally divided

between the parties.

¶ 13 Tamara now appeals the district court’s determination that

$50,000 of the money Michael deposited in their son’s 529 account

would remain in that account to fund the son’s education and the

court’s distribution of the remaining funds.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Generally, we review a district court’s division of the marital

estate for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d

952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). We will not disturb the district court’s

factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. When

dividing a marital estate, the “division must be equitable, but not

necessarily equal.” In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. An

equitable division of the marital property is specific to the facts and

circumstances of each case. Id.

¶ 15 To the extent that the court’s property award is driven by

statutory or other legal principles, we review its legal rulings de

novo. See In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 17. If the

court’s order is also based on factual findings, we evaluate those

findings for clear error or an abuse of discretion. Id.

5
3. Analysis

¶ 16 Michael concedes that a court may not, absent an agreement

of the parties, order the use of marital assets to fund an

emancipated child’s postsecondary education. In re Marriage of

Sewell, 817 P.2d 594, 598 (Colo. App. 1991) (“[P]arents have neither

an absolute duty to pay the post-secondary educational expenses of

their minor children, nor an obligation to pay post-majority

educational expenses.” (citations omitted)); § 14-10-115(13)(a),

C.R.S. 2025 (“[U]nless a court finds that a child is otherwise

emancipated, emancipation occurs and child support terminates

without either party filing a motion when the last or only child

attains nineteen years of age [absent exceptions not applicable

here].”).

¶ 17 But Michael argues that the court may allocate marital funds

to pay postsecondary expenses if doing so is consistent with the

parties’ prior agreement or practice to pay such expenses. See Van

Orman v. Van Orman, 492 P.2d 81, 84 (Colo. App. 1971) (“[W]e do

not agree with the wife’s contention that, even in the absence of a

statutory or contractual duty to do so, a divorced husband has an

unqualified obligation and duty to pay for the college ехpenses of

6
his minor child . . . .”); id. at 85 (The court did not err by requiring

that “father pay the sum of $1,100 to [son] as a contribution to

college costs already incurred . . . [because] father concedes [the

sum] was available for [son] from the funds of an irrevocable trust

which the father had established for [son’s] benefit.”).

¶ 18 Tamara initially argues that the court should have treated the

$100,000 deposit as marital dissipation or waste. We disagree.

¶ 19 The $100,000 was still in the 529 account at the time of final

orders, and as explained more fully below, the court distributed

$86,000 from the account for the benefit of the parties’ son and

middle daughter in satisfaction of the marital debt created by the

parties’ agreement and practice of paying significant portions of the

children’s college expenses. And the court allocated the remaining

balance equally between Michael and Tamara.

¶ 20 The district court also addressed the timing of the deposit into

the 529 account. Michael filed for divorce nine days after

depositing the money. The district court acknowledged that making

such a large transfer without the other party’s consent so close to

the filing date could potentially be problematic. However, the

district court ultimately allocated the 529 funds in a manner

7
consistent with the parties’ past agreements and practices to fund

their children’s higher education, with the remaining balance split

evenly between the parties. Given the court’s findings concerning

the $100,000 deposited into the 529 account, we discern no error in

its conclusion that the $100,000 deposit was not economic waste.

¶ 21 Next, Tamara contends the district court improperly allocated

the funds to pay off their middle daughter’s debt because Michael

individually guaranteed that debt and Tamara did not. Thus,

Tamara argues that she should have received half of the $50,000

that did not remain in the 529 account — that is, $25,000. We are

unpersuaded.

¶ 22 Recall that in its written permanent orders the court allocated

$35,369.77 of the withdrawn funds to pay off the balance of the

parties’ middle daughter’s student loan debt and split the remaining

$14,630.23 between the two parties. In explaining its decision to

use a portion of the funds to pay off the middle daughter’s loan

balance, the court correctly determined that the middle daughter’s

student loan, which was incurred during the marriage, was marital

debt subject to division between the parties, regardless of whether

Michael alone served as the guarantor. See In re Marriage of

8
Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Colo. App. 2006) (allocation of

marital debts is in the nature of property division, and marital

liabilities include all debts incurred by a husband or wife during

their marriage); see also § 14-10-113(2), C.R.S. 2025 (subject to

exceptions not relevant here, marital property is all property

acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage). The court

also reasoned that “although this allocation deviates from the

parties’ agreement with their [middle] daughter, the parties have not

consistently required [her] to pay back her half of the loans, and, as

the guarantor, [Michael] equitably should not be entirely

responsible for the outstanding loan balance.” We perceive no error

in the court allocating $35,369.77 to pay a marital debt and then

dividing the remaining $14,630.23 evenly between the parties.

¶ 23 Finally, as to the $50,000 remaining in the 529 account, the

court designated this sum to pay that portion of their son’s

education that the parties had previously committed to pay.

Focusing on the court’s oral ruling that Michael’s transfer of funds

to the 529 account was not in accord with the parties’ agreement

regarding payment of the children’s education expenses, Tamara

argues that the court’s order improperly forces her to pay for the

9
son’s postsecondary education expenses in contravention of

Colorado law.

¶ 24 Historically, the parties had taken private loans, deposited

those funds in a 529 account, and then used the funds to pay their

50% share of their two daughters’ educations. With respect to their

son, who was a sophomore in college at the time of final orders,

they made the same commitment to pay 50% of his education, but

they did not obtain a private loan to fund that commitment.

Instead, they periodically made deposits into the 529 account and

then used those funds to pay their share of his education.

¶ 25 Thus, in allocating $50,000 of the 529 account for their son’s

education, the court was effectively treating this sum as a marital

liability the parents owed to the son based on their past agreement

and practices to fund such expenses. Under these circumstances,

we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by

earmarking $50,000 to pay their share of their son’s educational

expenses. See Van Orman, 492 P.2d at 84-85.

¶ 26 Moreover, even if the district court erred by treating the

parents’ commitment to their son as a marital debt, the net result is

that Tamara arguably should have received an additional $25,000.

10
Given that the total value of the parties’ marital estate exceeded

$2,500,000, we deem $25,000 to be de minimis and any error

therefore harmless. See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36

(Colo. 2001) (“If . . . a trial court’s error affects only a small

percentage of the overall marital estate, such an error may be

deemed to have been harmless and thus does not require

reversal.”).

B. Maintenance Award

1. Additional Facts

¶ 27 As part of its temporary orders, the district court required

Michael to pay $10,000 per month to Tamara. Michael argued at

the permanent orders hearing that his maintenance obligation

should be reduced from the $10,000 temporary amount to $4,950

per month. Tamara argued for permanent maintenance in the

amount of $12,636 for the duration of her lifetime, asserting that

she was physically unable to work full time.

¶ 28 In its permanent orders, the district court ordered Michael to

pay Tamara $8,000 per month until March 2038. The court based

its maintenance determination on its finding that Michael earned a

monthly income of $34,936, which it calculated as an average of

11
Michael’s base salary and bonuses from 2019 to 2023. The court

also found that Tamara was voluntarily underemployed and

imputed her monthly income of $6,625.

¶ 29 The district court also required Michael to obtain a $1,000,000

life insurance policy, naming Tamara as the beneficiary, for the first

five years of his maintenance obligation with a step-down of the

policy’s benefit for the remainder of the maintenance period.

2. Parties’ Contentions

¶ 30 Tamara contends that the district court abused its discretion

by incorrectly calculating Michael’s income. Specifically, Tamara

argues that the court should have calculated Michael’s income by

using only his base salary from 2024 and then adding an average of

Michael’s bonuses from 2019-2023, rather than averaging both his

base salary and bonuses over the prior five years.3

¶ 31 Michael cross-appeals the court’s calculation of his income.

While Michael agrees it was proper for the court to average his

annual base salary between 2019 and 2023, he argues that the

3Tamara also argued in her briefs that the court should have

included a dividend Michael received in calculating his salary. But
during oral argument, Tamara’s counsel stated that she is not
pursuing this contention, so we do not address it further.

12
court abused its discretion by including his average bonuses over

that same period. Michael notes that he testified he would almost

certainly not receive a bonus in 2024, and that future bonuses were

not guaranteed. Therefore, he argues that the court should not

have included any bonuses in its calculation of his income. Michael

also contends that the court failed to make the requisite findings

under section 14-10-114(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025, to support its

maintenance order.

¶ 32 Relatedly, Michael cross-appeals the court’s order requiring

him to obtain life insurance to secure his maintenance obligation.

At times his opening brief appears to assert that Tamara failed to

preserve any request for life insurance. At other times, he argues

that Tamara failed to request an increase in the amount of life

insurance beyond the existing $500,000 policy. In addition to his

preservation contentions, Michael argues that the court failed to

make the necessary findings to require him to obtain life insurance

to secure the maintenance award.

¶ 33 We address the parties’ contentions in turn.

13
3. Standard of Review

¶ 34 We review a district court’s maintenance award for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58. And

“we review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the

law.” Id. “The court has discretion to determine the award of

maintenance that is fair and equitable to both parties based upon

the totality of the circumstances.” § 14-10-114(3)(e).

4. Analysis

a. Adequacy of Findings

¶ 35 Under section 14-10-114(3)(d), a court may only award

maintenance “if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks

sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him

or her, to provide for his or her reasonable needs and is unable to

support himself or herself through appropriate employment.” The

court shall consider several factors under section 14-10-114(3)(c) to

determine the amount and length of the award. Although the court

must consider the statutory factors, it need not make express

findings concerning each factor. See Wright, ¶ 20 (“[W]hile a district

court has no obligation to make specific factual findings on every

factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it must ‘make sufficiently

14
explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear

understanding of the basis of its order.’” (quoting In re Marriage of

Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9)).

¶ 36 We begin by addressing Michael’s contention that the district

court did not make adequate findings concerning the section 14-10-

114(3)(c) factors. We are not persuaded. The court’s permanent

orders set forth these factors verbatim, and although the court did

not make detailed findings concerning each factor, its lengthy

discussion of the maintenance issues reflected its consideration of

the statutory factors. Thus, we discern no error in the court’s

decision to award Tamara maintenance. See Marriage of Wright, ¶

20.

b. Michael’s Income

¶ 37 We turn next to the court’s calculation of Michael’s income.

When considering a maintenance award, the court must determine

the parties’ incomes. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12;

see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A). A party’s gross income generally

includes income from any source. See § 14-10-115(5)(a).

“Bonuses . . . are to be included in a determination of income.” In

re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 32; see § 14-10-

15
115(5)(a)(I)(E). The court added an average of Michael’s base salary

and the bonuses he had received between 2019 and 2023 to

determine that Michael’s monthly income was $34,936.

¶ 38 We begin by addressing Tarama’s argument that the district

court abused its discretion by averaging Michael’s base salary

between 2019 and 2023 instead of using only his 2024 base salary.

Despite this argument, Tamara contends that the court

appropriately added his average annual bonuses over the prior five

years to his base salary. Michael, by contrast, argues that the

court properly relied on his average base salary over the last five

years but improperly added his historical bonus income because he

was not guaranteed to receive bonuses in 2024 or moving forward.

We discern no error in the district court’s calculation of Michael’s

income.

¶ 39 True, as Tamara notes, maintenance is typically based on the

spouses’ incomes at the time permanent orders enter. But the

court recognized the uncertainty associated with Michael’s 2024

income. On the one hand, he was receiving a base salary that was

materially higher than his base salary over the prior five years, but

16
on the other hand, he had not yet received a bonus for 2024, and

he stated that he did not think he would.

¶ 40 The district court recognized that the parties’ respective

arguments served their individual interests at the cost of an

equitable result — Tamara by asking the court to maximize

Michael’s base salary by using his 2024 salary and then adding an

average bonus, and Michael by asking the court to average his base

salary over the last five years but not include any bonus, thereby

minimizing his base salary and excluding bonuses to minimize his

total income.

¶ 41 The court made clear that it found Michael’s contention that

he would not receive a bonus in 2024 to be unreliable. Based on

this factual determination, the court thoughtfully explained its

decision to average Michael’s bonuses and salary from 2019-2023.

We cannot say that the court abused its discretion by resolving the

uncertainty in Michael’s 2024 income by using his average base

salary and bonuses over the preceding five-year period.

c. Life Insurance Policy

¶ 42 Next, we address Michael’s arguments regarding the district

court’s order requiring Michael to obtain life insurance. We begin

17
by addressing Michael’s claim that Tamara failed to adequately

preserve or support her request for life insurance to secure the

maintenance award. We then turn to Michael’s argument that the

court failed to properly apply the provisions of section 14-10-114(6).

We disagree with both arguments.

¶ 43 To the extent Michael argues that Tamara completely failed to

preserve her life insurance request, the record establishes

otherwise. In the parties’ joint trial management certificate, Tamara

affirmatively stated:

[Tamara] additionally seeks life insurance to
secure [Michael’s] maintenance obligation.
[Tamara] notes that, just days before filing the
Petition for Dissolution, [Michael] removed
[Tamara] as a beneficiary on his life insurance
policy, giving 100% of the policy to the parties’
adult son as the primary beneficiary. [Michael]
must be required to provide proof that the
policy is in place and that premiums have been
paid each year.

¶ 44 Moreover, during her direct examination, Tamara testified

about Michael’s existing $500,000 policy and stated, “I need to have

guarantee that maintenance will be paid out. So I would request

that life insurance be carried on him . . . .” Thus, Tamara clearly

18
preserved this issue. See In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21

(“[N]o talismanic language is required to preserve an issue.”).

¶ 45 Michael also argues on appeal that Tamara failed to preserve a

claim that she would ask for a life insurance policy in excess of the

existing $500,000 policy. We reject this argument for multiple

reasons. First, as noted in the joint trial management certificate,

Michael had changed the beneficiary under the existing policy.

Michael does not dispute this fact. Thus, at the time of final orders

there was no existing life insurance policy naming Tamara as the

beneficiary. Moreover, as Tamara notes, it would have been

inappropriate for her to request a specific amount of insurance

because it could not be known until the court first established the

amount and term of maintenance. In any event, Michael had

previously been insured for $500,000, and the parties knew the

range of maintenance they were each seeking. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that Michael was on notice that

Tamara was requesting a life insurance policy to secure the

maintenance award and that the face value of the policy would

likely be near $1,000,000.

19
¶ 46 Next, Michael points out that section 14-10-114(6) requires

the court to make certain findings before imposing a life insurance

requirement. Specifically, the statute provides:

(a) The court may require the payor spouse to
provide reasonable security for the payment of
maintenance in the event of the payor spouse’s
death prior to the end of the maintenance
term.

(b) Reasonable security may include, but need
not be limited to, maintenance of life insurance
for the benefit of the recipient spouse. In
entering an order to maintain life insurance,
the court shall consider:

(I) The age and insurability of the payor
spouse;

(II) The cost of the life insurance;

(III) The amount and term of the maintenance;

(IV) Whether the parties carried life insurance
during the marriage;

(V) Prevailing interest rates at the time of the
order; and

(VI) Other obligations of the payor spouse.

§ 14-10-114(6).

¶ 47 As Michael notes, the statute requires the court to consider

these enumerated factors before compelling a spouse to provide

security for a maintenance award. But neither the statute nor our

20
case law requires that the court make express findings on each of

the enumerated factors. Cf. Wright, ¶ 20.

¶ 48 Although it did not make express findings on each of the

statutory factors, the court’s order reflects its adequate

consideration of them in making its award. The court was aware of

Michael’s age and the fact that he was previously insured for

Tamara’s benefit in the amount of $500,000. No party presented

evidence suggesting that he was uninsurable or that the policy

premiums were cost prohibitive.

¶ 49 True, the court did not expressly consider how the monthly

premiums would impact Michael’s ability to pay maintenance. But

the court expressly recited this statutory consideration, so it was

mindful of it. And Michael presented no evidence below, or any

argument on appeal, that his existing income was not adequate to

pay both maintenance and the life insurance premiums.

¶ 50 Moreover, the district court carefully made the policy’s benefit

commensurate with the maintenance award and its duration. The

award of $8,000 per month over the thirteen-year maintenance

term resulted in a total maintenance obligation of approximately

$1,250,000. Thus, the court selected a rational policy amount of

21
$1,000,000. But the court also recognized that the total

maintenance obligation would decrease over time. It therefore

ordered a reduction in the policy amount to $750,000 for years six

through ten of the maintenance obligation and to $500,000 for the

final three years.

¶ 51 These findings reflect the district court’s thoughtful

consideration of the statutory factors, are supported by the record,

and fall within the district court’s discretion. We perceive no abuse

of discretion in the district court’s orders regarding life insurance.

C. Economic Waste and Personal Property Allocations

¶ 52 Next, Tamara appeals the district court’s determination that

she committed economic waste in her failure to lease the couple’s

Moab rental property. She also argues that the district court erred

by finding waste regarding her spending habits. Part of her

argument is based on a false premise. While the court did find that

Tamara’s failure to lease the parties’ vacation home between

temporary and permanent orders constituted waste, the court did

not find that her expenditures on personal property or the money

transfer to family members constituted economic waste. Rather,

22
the court simply attributed the associated personal property and

funds to Tamara.

¶ 53 We turn now to Tamara’s contentions regarding these issues.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 54 Michael and Tamara shared a large income and lived a lifestyle

commensurate with that income. Both parties appeared to

maintain that lifestyle while their divorce was pending.

¶ 55 The parties lived separately for about eighteen months before

they formally divorced. In that time, Tamara bought new furniture,

which the district court determined had a value of $36,651. During

the divorce proceedings, Tamara also bought quite a bit of clothing.

The district court ultimately determined Tamara should be awarded

that clothing and that its value equaled $21,300. Tamara also

moved money out of the marital estate and gave it to other people,

including $21,000 to her sister. The court received conflicting

testimony whether some or all of these transfers were a loan or gift.

Tamara also deposited roughly $2,600 of her earnings from a part-

time sales job into her middle daughter’s account. Michael testified

that he was not aware of the gift or loan to Tamara’s sister or of

23
Tamara’s deposit of her income into the daughter’s account. The

court found all these funds were marital property.

¶ 56 During the marriage, Michael acquired a large sports

memorabilia collection with a marital value of approximately

$105,259. He also continued to make memorabilia purchases and

spent significant amounts on sporting events while the divorce was

pending. The court treated the sports memorabilia as marital

property.

¶ 57 Michael and Tamara also owned a condo in Moab, which they

typically leased. Tamara managed the rental property. In its

temporary orders, the court ordered the parties to lease the

property to generate income, but Tamara failed to do so.

¶ 58 By the time the court entered permanent orders, the condo

was under contract for sale and was scheduled to close within a few

days. Michael requested that the lost income resulting from the

property sitting vacant be attributed to Tamara. Tamara argued

that not renting the condo was a reasonable decision because it

would have made it more difficult to sell. During this time, Tamara

also insisted on a listing price for the property that appeared to be

too high for the market. As a result, the house remained vacant

24
and on the market for several months. Based on these facts, the

district court concluded that Tamara caused $34,058.64 of waste

by not leasing the property during the pendency of these

proceedings.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 59 Section 14-10-107(4)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, imposes a “temporary

injunction” against both parties that remains in effect “until the

final decree is entered or the petition is dismissed.” The statute

reads in relevant part:

[B]oth parties [are restrained] from
transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in
any way disposing of, without the consent of
the other party or an order of the court, any
marital property, except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life and . . .
each party [is required] to notify the other
party of any proposed extraordinary
expenditures and to account to the court for
all extraordinary expenditures made after the
injunction is in effect.

§ 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A).

¶ 60 As previously stated, we do not disturb the division of a

marital estate unless the district court has abused its discretion.

Powell, 220 P.3d at 954. Whether a party has dissipated marital

funds presents a question of fact, and we uphold the district court’s

25
findings unless there is no record support for them. See Van Gundy

v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12 (“A court’s factual findings are

clearly erroneous only if there is no support for them in the

record.”).

3. Economic Waste of Moab Property

¶ 61 Tamara testified that she took over the management of the

Moab property in late 2022. She talked about repairs the property

needed before it was ready to be placed on the market, including

fire inspections, and said she was temporarily wheelchair-bound

after an accident during this period. Tamara also testified that she

thought the property would be difficult to sell while it was occupied

by renters. Michael testified that Tamara refused to rent the

property. He also presented evidence that the total loss during the

eight months between temporary and permanent orders was

$34,058.64. It is undisputed that the property sat vacant for eight

months after Michael filed the petition for divorce.

¶ 62 The district court found that Tamara had committed waste by

not renting the property. In addressing Tamara’s proffered

explanations, the court found her “justification for not seeking

rental of the property is just nonsensical. It had a rental history. It

26
was a monthly burn, which even if there is some tax benefits, it’s

still a loss. And if that could have been rented, that would have

been a marital asset.” The district court also credited Michael’s

testimony concerning the amount of the lost income.

¶ 63 Thus, because the district court’s findings are supported by

the record, we defer to them and conclude that it did not err by

determining that Tamara’s refusal to lease the Moab property

resulted in $34,058.64 of economic waste. See Jorgenson, 143 P.3d

at 1174 (noting that the district court could assign husband sole

responsibility for a lease liability because husband’s decision to

stop making lease payments constituted economic fault).

4. Tamara’s Spending

¶ 64 As previously noted, Tamara argues that the district court

found her spending on personal property to be waste as well. But

that argument misapprehends the record. The court did not

conclude that her spending constituted economic waste, but rather

that the marital debt and associated marital property obtained

through that spending should be allocated to her.

¶ 65 Tamara argues that because she bought the clothing and

furniture on a credit card and was also allocated the debt of that

27
credit card, she was forced to pay for the clothing and furniture

twice. But, as Michael points out, it is not unusual for a court to

allocate personal property as an asset and the associated debt to a

particular party. Doing so allows that party to realize the net value

of the asset. We discern no error in the court’s doing so here.

¶ 66 Tamara also argues that the amount she spent on clothing

after temporary orders was in line with what she spent during the

marriage. However, evidence admitted during the permanent orders

hearing showed that her clothing spending dramatically increased

after the court entered its temporary orders. While she spent

$3,235 between January 1 and July 10, 2023, the court received

evidence that she spent $17,866 between July 11 and December

31, 2023.

¶ 67 Tamara also asserts that the district court inverted numbers

in calculating her clothing expenditures. She points to an exhibit in

which some of her expenditures on clothing were quantified at

$12,300. But the court did not cite that exhibit when referring to

the clothing awarded to Tamara. And the court also received

evidence from Michael that her clothing expenditures between

temporary and final orders were proximate to the amount the court

28
awarded to Tamara. Under these circumstances, we cannot

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in setting the

value of the clothing assigned to Tamara at $21,300 and allocating

that clothing and the associated debt to her.

¶ 68 Finally, even if we were to accept Tamara’s premise that the

court transposed the numbers representing her spending on

clothing, the difference between the number she cites and the

court’s figure is less than $9,000. Given the size of this estate, that

asserted error is de minimis. See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36.

5. Tamara’s Transfers to her Sister and Daughter

¶ 69 Turning to Tamara’s transfer of money to family members, the

evidence was in conflict whether the money she gave to her sister

was a gift or a loan. The parties had previously made monetary

gifts to Tamara’s sister during the marriage. After the parties

separated but before the petition was filed, Tamara gave her sister

various sums that collectively exceeded $21,000. Tamara also

diverted approximately $2,600 into her middle daughter’s bank

account. Michael testified that Tamara made these money transfers

without his knowledge.

29
¶ 70 The district court found that the funds were marital property

that Tamara diverted without Michael’s agreement. Accordingly,

the court attributed the combined amount to Tamara. With respect

the money transferred to Tamara’s sister, the court stated that she

was entitled to collect the money from her sister, if it was indeed a

loan. In reaching these conclusions, the court found that Tamara

“was not highly credible on financial matters, . . . was evasive and

rambling, provided unsupported contradictory testimony, and often

relied on inaccurate filings and disclosures.” By contrast, the court

seems to have found Michael’s testimony credible.

¶ 71 We discern no error in the court’s finding that these transfers,

and any corresponding right to repayment, should be attributed to

Tamara. See Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2008)

(“We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and will disturb

its findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous and not

supported by the record.”).

6. Michael’s Spending

¶ 72 Tamara argues that, if the district court properly determined

that some of her spending on clothing and furniture was waste,

then it erred by not determining that Michael’s spending was also

30
waste. But this argument is also based on the noted false premise.

The court did not treat either Tamara’s expenditures on clothing or

her transfers to family members as economic waste. Therefore, we

do not further analyze her comparative spending argument, though

we note that the court allocated the sports memorabilia to Michael

as a marital asset, just as it allocated the clothing and furniture to

Tamara as a marital asset.

D. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 73 Finally, Tamara requests an award of her attorney fees and

costs incurred on appeal under C.A.R. 38(b), 39(a), and 39.1 and

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 74 C.A.R. 38(b) addresses an appellate court’s authority to award

attorney fees as sanctions against a party for a “frivolous appeal.”

Tamara does not develop any argument explaining why Michael’s

defense of Tamara’s appeal or his own cross-appeal was frivolous,

so we do not address it further. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo

Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12 (“We don’t consider

undeveloped and unsupported arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.

¶ 75 Tamara is correct that under section 14-10-119 an appellate

court, “after considering the financial resources of both parties” can

31
order one party to pay the fees and costs of the other party. § 14-

10-119. The purpose of section 14-10-119 is to ensure that

“neither party suffers undue economic hardship as a result of the

proceedings.” In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1377 (Colo.

1997). And Tamara is correct that Michael makes significantly

more money than she does. However, in rejecting Tamara’s request

for attorney fees, the district court concluded that both parties have

ample resources to pay for their own attorney fees and costs.

Neither party points to any material developments that would

impact this conclusion. Therefore, we exercise our discretion under

C.A.R. 39.1 and deny Tamara’s request for attorney fees

¶ 76 Rule 39(a)(2) provides that if a judgment is affirmed on appeal,

the appellant is entitled to an award of costs “unless the law

provides or the court orders otherwise.” This case involves both an

appeal and a cross-appeal, and neither party prevailed on their

respective appeals. Under the circumstances, we conclude that

neither party is entitled to an award of appellate costs.

III. Disposition

¶ 77 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

32