Peo in Interest of IC

25CA2235 Peo in Interest of IC 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2235
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 25JV30395
Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of I.C., Z.C., D.C., T.C., M.C., E.C., and N.C., Children,

and Concerning A.A. f/k/a M.M.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 14, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for I.C.

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem, for Z.C., D.C., T.C., M.C., E.C., and N.C.

Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency or neglect action, the children’s parent,

A.A. (formerly known as M.M.C.), appeals the judgment entered on

a jury’s verdict adjudicating I.C., Z.C., D.C., T.C., M.C., E.C., and

N.C. (the children) dependent or neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in

dependency or neglect based on concerns that the children were

living in a van with A.A. and the children’s other parent, R.H.

(mother); that the older children were not enrolled in or attending

school; and that the children were dirty and hungry. The seven

children ranged in age from eighteen months to twelve years old.

¶3 A.A. denied the allegations and requested an adjudicatory jury

trial. After a six-day trial, the jury returned special verdicts finding

that all seven children were dependent or neglected under section

19-3-102(1)(b)-(d), C.R.S. 2025. The jury unanimously determined

that (1) all seven children lacked proper parental care as a result of

A.A.’s acts or failures to act; (2) the children’s environment was

injurious to their welfare; and (3) A.A. failed or refused to provide

the children with proper or necessary subsistence, education,

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medical care, or any other care necessary for the children’s health,

guidance, or well-being.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶4 A.A. contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an

adjudication of dependency or neglect, we review the record in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we draw every

inference “fairly deducible” from the evidence in favor of the jury’s

decision. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App.

2009); People in Interest of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App.

2005).

¶6 We will not reverse the jury’s verdict even if reasonable people

might arrive at different conclusions based on the same facts.

S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

¶7 The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine the

child’s status as dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102

and whether that status warrants governmental intervention.

People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 39; see also K.D. v.

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People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the adjudication

is not made as to the parents but relates only to the child’s status).

¶8 As relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected when

(1) the child lacks proper parental care through the actions or

omissions of the parent; (2) the child’s environment is injurious to

their welfare; and (3) a parent fails or refuses to provide the child

with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or

any other care necessary for their health, guidance, or well-being.

§ 19-3-102(1)(b)-(d). An adjudication may be based on current,

past, or prospective harm. People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA

183, ¶ 15. Section 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for

an adjudication. People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29 (a

department need only prevail on one adjudicatory element), aff’d on

other grounds sub nom. People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO

31.

¶9 An adjudication may not enter without proof, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the child is dependent or

neglected. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶¶ 15, 53. The

preponderance standard allows for some uncertainty in the

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determination of dispositive facts. People in Interest of A.M.D., 648

P.2d 625, 634 (Colo. 1982).

¶ 10 The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the purview of the

jury. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The evidence at the adjudicatory trial centered on the family’s

homelessness and the children’s lack of education and medical

care. Taken together, that evidence supports the jury’s verdicts

that the children lacked proper parental care, would be in an

injurious environment if returned to A.A.’s care, and that A.A. failed

to provide the children with proper or necessary education or

medical care.

¶ 12 First, an intake caseworker testified about “the family’s

struggle with homelessness,” including that the parents and seven

children had “liv[ed] out of their van for around two years.” A police

officer testified that the van was “cramped or cluttered,” smelled like

urine, and that “[t]here was some rotten fruit.” The Department

presented evidence that the children’s clothes were dirty, wet, and

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smelled like urine. The jury also heard that the children had

chronic lice infections, and an intake caseworker testified that the

infections were “hard to eradicate due to the living conditions.” And

A.A. testified that the five youngest children were “stateless,” that

they had “no birth certificate[s], no social security number[s],” and

that “there [was] no record of their existence anywhere on earth.”

¶ 13 An intake caseworker testified that when the Department first

became involved the parents accepted help and “appeared to want

to cooperate,” but then “communication stopped and referrals

continued to come in about the concerns and conditions of the

[children].” Another intake caseworker testified that the parents

“actively tr[ied] to flee” the Department and were found in Kansas

by law enforcement after the juvenile court issued bench warrants.

¶ 14 Second, the Department presented evidence to support its

allegation of educational neglect. An intake caseworker testified

that mother reported that she had homeschooled the children and

that they had never attended a public school. But there was also

testimony that none of the school-aged children, including the

twelve-year old youth, could read or write. And the twelve-year-old

youth struggled to name or recognize numbers above ten.

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¶ 15 The ongoing caseworker worried about the children’s

educational needs because there were “many school-aged children

who [were] not able to read or write or do basic math.” The

caseworker testified that he “heard that [the children] ha[d] been

educated, but yet, [he saw] no evidence of that.” When the

caseworker scheduled a meeting with the parents to discuss the

children’s educational needs, they did not attend. And the director

of a church providing services to the unhoused testified that mother

had no interest in enrolling the children in school.

¶ 16 A.A. argues that it was “undisputed that the parents had

developed a curriculum for homeschooling and provided it to the

Department.” But the caseworker testified that the parents had “no

concrete plans, worksheets, or anything of the sort that would

identify . . . a curriculum.”

¶ 17 Third, the jury heard testimony from medical professionals

about the children’s unmet medical needs. Early in the case, the

children were assessed at a medical clinic. A physician’s assistant

(PA) from the clinic testified that she did not know of any medical

history for the children prior to the Department’s involvement.

Indeed, there was evidence that an earlier doctor’s visit — which

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also occurred after the Department became involved — was the first

time any of the children had been to a doctor’s appointment.

¶ 18 The clinic’s medical director, a doctor who was qualified as an

expert in pediatric care, testified that she had concerns about the

children’s development, nutrition, and mental health. The three

oldest children needed to be assessed to determine if they had a

“language or learning issue or a neuropsychological issue or a

developmental issue, like a learning disability, or whether that’s a

lack of exposure to [education].” The doctor opined that if the

oldest child did not receive additional resources and support, she

would not “be[] able to become an independent adolescent or adult.”

¶ 19 The doctor also testified that some of the younger children did

not exhibit “important social, emotional, developmental stages that

are really critical for development.” The doctor opined that it would

be “very important” to have a specific medical diagnosis for one of

the children to determine whether she needed medication or

whether she would qualify for services related to developmental

concerns, such as speech therapy, occupational therapy, or

learning accommodations.

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¶ 20 The PA testified that the ten-year-old child “appeared to be

delayed in her development,” and that “there was concern about

[the three-year-old child’s] speech.” And the nineteen-month-old

child did not speak at all, even though a child that age

“generally . . . can be speaking somewhere between twenty to fifty

words.” The PA opined that some of the children “potentially

medically have something that’s keeping them from meeting those

milestones or they haven’t been given the education to meet those

milestones.”

¶ 21 A.A. testified that “most of [the older children’s] issues lies [sic]

in the dyslexia.” And mother testified that she “pick[ed] up on, like

dyslexia and possibly dyscalculia” while teaching the oldest child.

A.A. testified that the children's dyslexia was “going to have to be

addressed in the lesson plans,” but that the parents did not “have

any documentation of any standardized test [or assessments] for

the children.”

¶ 22 In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that

the children’s environment was injurious to their welfare, A.A.

points to testimony describing the family shelter at which the

parents lived at the time of the adjudicatory trial. But the family

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had previously been removed from that shelter because five of the

children did not have birth certificates or social security numbers.

A homeless rights activist who had worked with the family testified

that whether the family had “overcome the barriers to housing” was

“complex” because, while the parents were “indoors,” the shelter

was “not housing.”

¶ 23 Moreover, the ongoing caseworker testified that he was

concerned that the family would not remain at the shelter if the

Department was not involved, because the parents intended to go to

California or South America. He explained that the parents “ha[d]

demonstrated a history of leaving the state during child welfare

involvement in the past and [he] worr[ied] about that pattern

continuing.” As noted above, the parents had previously fled

Colorado with the children on the day of the shelter hearing in this

case and were found by law enforcement in Kansas. And there were

records of other child protection investigations in Michigan and

Florida.

¶ 24 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that the concerns that led

to the case opening were “ongoing” and “chronic,” and the parents

were “without plan and efforts to address those issues.”

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¶ 25 From the above-described evidence, the jury could reasonably

infer that the children were each dependent or neglected under one

or more of the statutory criteria presented. See § 19-3-102(1)(b)-(d).

Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict.

III. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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