Marriage of Griffis

25CA1807 Marriage of Griffis 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1807
Mesa County District Court No. 13DR724
Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Larry Griffis,

Appellant,

and

Janette Griffis n/k/a Janette Romero,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Yun and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Cordell Law, LLP, Keri E. McCallister, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant

Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Larry E. Griffis (father) appeals the district court’s order

modifying in part and adopting in part a magistrate’s ruling on his

request to change parenting time and child support.1 We affirm the

portion of the order concerning child support. We reverse the

portion of the order concerning parenting time and remand the

issue to the district court for further proceedings.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 The court dissolved the marriage between father and Janette

Griffis, now known as Janette Romero (mother), and ordered

mother to pay child support related to their three children — Jo.G,

Ja.G, and E.G.

¶3 In 2020, the magistrate modified the child support order,

requiring mother to pay $910 per month. The magistrate found

that Ja.G. was emancipated and excluded from the child support

determination. The magistrate also determined that although

Jo.G., who lived exclusively with mother, had reached the age of

emancipation, she was disabled due to her rheumatoid arthritis and

1 The district court also adopted the magistrate’s decision to modify

decision-making responsibility. Father does not appeal that portion
of the order.

1
her parents had a continuing duty to support her. See § 14-10-

115(13)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. The magistrate included Jo.G. in the

child support determination but found that, at that time, her part-

time income alleviated father’s obligation to pay child support

related to her.

¶4 In 2023, father filed a motion to modify parenting time and

child support. He asked the court to allocate him majority

parenting time with E.G. (the remaining minor child) and to allow

mother to exercise parenting time two weekends per month. He

also argued that the court should find that Jo.G. was emancipated

for child support purposes because she was no longer disabled and

could adequately care for herself.

¶5 The magistrate denied father’s proposed parenting time

modification, finding that he had not established the “threshold

requirement of endangerment.” The magistrate also rejected

father’s argument that Jo.G. was emancipated. The magistrate

found that Jo.G.’s health had declined during the previous year and

that father had failed to demonstrate that she was no longer

physically disabled. The magistrate further determined that father’s

income had substantially increased since 2020, warranting a

2
modification of child support. The magistrate adopted father’s

proposed child support calculation and ordered mother to pay $820

per month for E.G. The magistrate did not address child support

for Jo.G.

¶6 Father and mother both petitioned for district court review of

the magistrate’s order. Father challenged the magistrate’s denial of

his request to modify parenting time, while mother argued that the

magistrate erred by not including Jo.G. when he modified child

support.

¶7 The district court adopted the portion of the magistrate’s order

concerning parenting time. However, the court found that the

magistrate erred by not including Jo.G. in the child support order.

The court modified the magistrate’s order; calculated the child

support obligation for Jo.G.; and ordered father to pay mother $767

per month for Jo.G. (which was an obligation independent from the

$820 per month mother paid for E.G.).

II. Standard of Review

¶8 Our review of a district court’s order on a petition for review of

a magistrate’s ruling is effectively a second layer of appellate review.

See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105,

3
¶ 11. We review de novo whether the magistrate and the court

applied the correct legal standard. Id. We also review de novo their

conclusions of law, and we accept the magistrate’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

III. Parenting Time Concerning E.G.

¶9 Father contends that the magistrate misapplied the law when

denying his motion to modify parenting time. He argues that the

magistrate needed to consider only the best interests of E.G. but

improperly required him to establish endangerment under section

14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025. We agree.

A. Legal Standards

¶ 10 We review a court’s order modifying parenting time for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592

(Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies

the law, or when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45.

¶ 11 Generally, a court may modify a parenting time order

whenever the modification would serve the child’s best interests.

§ 14-10-129(1)(a)(I); see also § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (best

interests factors).

4
¶ 12 However, when a parent seeks a substantial modification of

parenting time that also changes the parent with whom the child

resides a majority of the time, a heightened standard applies. § 14-

10-129(2). Under this heightened standard, the court must retain

the prior parenting time order unless, as relevant here, it finds that

the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical

health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development.

§ 14-10-129(2)(d).

¶ 13 Relatedly, a court shall not restrict parenting time rights

unless it finds that parenting time endangers the child. § 14-10-

129(1)(b)(I).

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Father, relying on the recommendations of the child and

family investigator, asked the magistrate to allocate him primary

parenting time with E.G. and limit mother’s parenting time to two

weekends per month. The magistrate characterized father’s request

as seeking a “substantial modification” of the existing equal

parenting time schedule. The magistrate then determined that “the

additional requirements of [section] 14-10-129(2)” and the

requirements of In re Marriage of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1250-51

5
(Colo. App. 2004), required father to demonstrate “endangerment to

qualify for the requested modification.” The magistrate found that

father failed to establish this “threshold requirement” and denied

his motion.

¶ 15 The district court adopted the magistrate’s ruling, concluding

that the “magistrate properly analyzed whether this substantial

change [of parenting time] was appropriate under [section] 14-10-

129(2).”

¶ 16 Contrary to the magistrate’s and the district court’s

conclusion, section 14-10-129(2) does not apply to father’s motion

to modify. That section requires not only a substantial change to

the parenting time schedule but also a “change[] [to] the party with

whom the child resides a majority of the time.” Id. A modification

of an equal allocation of parenting time does not change the parent

with whom the child resides a majority of the time because under

an equal parenting time schedule, the child does not reside a

majority of time with either parent. See In re Marriage of Newell,

192 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. App. 2008); In re Marriage of Stewart, 43

P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002). Accordingly, when parents share

equal parenting responsibilities, a modification of that arrangement

6
is governed by the best interests standard, not the endangerment

standard set forth by section 14-10-129(2)(d). Stewart, 43 P.3d at

742; see also In re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 649 (Colo.

App. 2006) (acknowledging that modifying an equal allocation of

parenting time closely resembles an initial allocation of parenting

time because both decisions arise from situations in which the

parents share the legal and physical care of the child).

¶ 17 Nor do we agree that West supports application of the

endangerment standard under the circumstances here. In West, 94

P.3d at 1250, a division of this court considered whether a district

court’s order modifying parenting time amounted to a restriction

under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) and required the court to find

endangerment. The division held that when deciding whether to

apply the best interests standard or the endangerment standard, a

court “inquir[es] into both the quantitative and the qualitative

aspects of the proposed change to parenting time, as well as the

reason or reasons advanced for the change.” Id. at 1251. The

division determined that an order, which reduced the father’s

summer parenting time from eight to six weeks, was “neither a

qualitative change in the nature of father’s parenting time,” nor a

7
change based on the children’s safety. Id. It then determined that

the “purely quantitative change . . . of relatively limited magnitude”

was not a restriction and concluded that the district court correctly

applied the best interests standard. Id.

¶ 18 Here, like West, father’s proposed modification did not seek a

qualitative change to mother’s parenting time. See id. (recognizing

that a qualitative change to parenting time means a change in the

nature of a parent’s parenting time, such as supervised visitation).

Even though father raised concerns about mother’s parenting time

with E.G., he did not seek to deny or restrict her parenting time or

obstruct her relationship with E.G.

¶ 19 Father thus sought only a quantitative change to the

parenting schedule, arguing that E.G. would benefit from more time

with him. And in West, the division determined that the purely

quantitative modification was not a restriction. See id. While that

modification was “of relatively limited magnitude,” West did not say

whether a more substantial quantitative change would constitute a

restriction. Id. Rather, the division observed that most cases

concerning a parenting time restriction “involve outright denial of

visitation or require supervised visitation.” Id.

8
¶ 20 But to the extent the language in West may suggest that a

quantitative reduction to parenting time, if substantial enough,

could constitute a restriction, we are not convinced that the

magistrate properly made that determination here. The magistrate

merely made the conclusory finding that the request was a

“substantial modification” that triggered West. The magistrate gave

no explanation for why father’s proposal, which would have allowed

mother to still exercise, at least, seventy-two overnight visits per

year, rose to the level of a restriction. Moreover, the district court

determined that although the magistrate may have looked to West,

the magistrate analyzed father’s proposed modification under

section 14-10-129(2), not as a restriction under section 14-10-

129(1)(b)(I).

¶ 21 In any event, In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32 (cert.

granted in part July 21, 2025), recently held that “a restriction on a

parent’s parenting time rights means an order imposing a

qualitative control over the manner, location, or environment in

which the parent engages in parenting time.” The Dale division

further concluded that “a purely quantitative reduction in a parent’s

9
parenting time is not a restriction on that parent’s parenting time

rights.” Id.

¶ 22 Mother attempts to save the denial of father’s motion by

arguing that the magistrate also made findings under the best

interests standard. However, to the extent that the magistrate

addressed E.G.’s best interests, the analysis related solely to

reducing the number of parenting time exchanges, which the

magistrate determined warranted modifying the schedule to a week-

on/week-off schedule during the school year. Nothing in the order

indicates that the magistrate considered the best interests standard

or made findings concerning the best interest factors when

analyzing father’s proposed modification.

¶ 23 The magistrate thus misapplied the law by applying the

endangerment standard to father’s motion to modify parenting time.

We therefore reverse the portion of the district court’s order

adopting the magistrate’s denial of this motion. We remand the

motion to the district court for reconsideration under the best

interests standard. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I).

On remand, the court must consider the parties’ and E.G.’s current

circumstances and provide the parties with an opportunity to

10
present evidence concerning such circumstances. In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27.

IV. Child Support Concerning Jo.G.

¶ 24 Father next argues both the magistrate’s finding regarding

Jo.G.’s disability and the district court’s inclusion of Jo.G. for child

support should be reversed. We disagree.

A. Legal Standard

¶ 25 The court may modify child support when, based on the facts

and circumstances, there is a showing of substantial and

continuing changed circumstances. § 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025;

In re Marriage of Gross, 2016 COA 36, ¶ 15. We will not disturb a

court’s child support determination absent a showing that the court

abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12.

B. The Magistrate’s Disability Finding

¶ 26 Father contends that the magistrate applied the “incorrect

legal standard” in finding that Jo.G. was disabled. He argues that

(1) the original disability finding in 2020 was based solely on Jo.G.’s

rheumatoid arthritis; (2) her rheumatoid arthritis is now in

remission; and (3) the magistrate could not rely on any other

medical condition Jo.G. developed after the age of emancipation.

11
Mother responds that father did not preserve this argument. We

agree and decline to review this unpreserved contention.

¶ 27 “Our judicial system depends upon the orderly presentation

and preservation of issues.” Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v.

Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18. To preserve

arguments for appellate review when the party appeals a district

court’s order reviewing a magistrate’s ruling, the party must present

the particular issue in a petition for review and provide the district

court with an opportunity to rule on the issue. People in Interest of

K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006); see also Valentine v.

Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1188 n.4 (Colo. App.

2011) (“We review only the specific arguments a party pursued

before the district court.”). We will not address an argument not

raised in or decided by the district court. See Melat, Pressman &

Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403.

¶ 28 In his petition for district court review, father challenged only

the denial of his motion to modify parental responsibilities. He did

not argue that the magistrate erred by finding that Jo.G. was

disabled, let alone contend that the magistrate misapplied the law

12
when doing so. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148

P.3d at 403.

¶ 29 Still, father claims that he preserved this issue by (1) generally

arguing to the magistrate that Jo.G. was not disabled, did not meet

the criteria for state or federal disability, and could support herself;

and (2) responding to mother’s petition for district court review by

asserting that Jo.G. could work and generate an income. But

father’s general arguments regarding Jo.G.’s continued disability

did not preserve all potential avenues for relief on appeal. See

Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1188 n.4. Indeed, in the district court,

father never raised the specific legal issue he now asserts in his

appellate briefing.

¶ 30 Because father failed to preserve the issue, we will not address

his argument that the magistrate misapplied the law in determining

Jo.G.’s disability. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, ¶ 18; K.L-P., 148

P.3d at 403.

C. The District Court’s Authority to Address Child Support
Related to Jo.G.

¶ 31 Father also contends that the district court “exceeded its

authority in addressing issues not placed before it in the

13
[m]agistrate’s [d]ecision regarding [Jo.G.’s] support order.” He

argues that the district court “inappropriately inserted its own

findings and opinion into the order without regard to whether this

actually conflicted with the [m]agistrate’s intent.” Father explains

that the magistrate made no findings related to Jo.G. when

addressing child support and that the magistrate gave no indication

he intended to modify the portion of the prior child support order

concerning Jo.G. We are not persuaded.

¶ 32 At the hearing on father’s motion to modify child support,

mother argued that Jo.G. was not emancipated and should be

included in the child support calculation. The magistrate agreed

with mother that Jo.G. was not emancipated. However, despite

finding that father’s substantially increased income warranted

modifying the prior child support order, the magistrate did not

further address child support concerning Jo.G.

¶ 33 In her petition for review, mother argued that the magistrate

erred by failing to include Jo.G. in the child support order. The

district court agreed, explaining that the magistrate found, with

record support, that Jo.G. was not emancipated due to her

disability and that the magistrate’s failure to address Jo.G. in the

14
child support order was inconsistent with that finding. The court

recognized that, under the previous child support order, father was

not obligated to pay child support for Jo.G. because she could work

and earned a modest income. But the court went on to find that

there was no evidence that Jo.G. was presently earning an income,

and it modified the magistrate’s child support order to reflect that

circumstance.

¶ 34 A district court reviewing a magistrate’s decision shall adopt,

reject, or modify the magistrate’s order. C.R.M. 7(a)(10) (2025).2 In

deciding the proper disposition, the district court “shall consider

the petition for review on the basis of the petition and briefs filed,

together with such review of the record,” and it may conduct further

proceedings as necessary. C.R.M. 7(a)(8); In re Marriage of Matheny,

2024 COA 81, ¶ 20.

¶ 35 The district court acted within this authority to modify the

magistrate’s child support order. A parent’s obligation to support a

child continues beyond the age of emancipation if the child is

mentally and physically disabled. See § 14-10-115(13)(a)(II); Koltay

2 Since the entry of the orders on appeal, Colorado Magistrate Rule

7 was amended. See C.R.M. 7(k) (2026).

15
v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo. 1983). The court reviewed

the record and concluded that, given the magistrate’s finding that

Jo.G. was not emancipated, Jo.G. needed to be included in the

modified child support order and the magistrate erred by not doing

so. See C.R.M. 7(a)(8), (9). The court then made additional findings

based on the available record and modified the magistrate’s ruling

to correct the error. See id.; Matheny, ¶ 20.

¶ 36 We therefore reject father’s contention that the court exceeded

its authority by including Jo.G. in the child support order.3

V. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 37 Mother requests an award of attorney fees on appeal, arguing

that father’s contentions concerning child support were

3 Father does not contest the district court’s or magistrate’s

calculations on the amount of each parties’ child support obligation
or the use of two independent support orders. Nor did mother
cross-appeal the modified child support ruling. We therefore
express no opinion on the amount of the parties’ child support
obligation or the propriety of the child support calculations under
section 14-10-115(8), C.R.S. 2025. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Colorado
Sun, 2026 CO 18, ¶ 52 (recognizing that “our adversarial system of
adjudication ‘is designed around the premise’ that where, as here,
parties are represented by competent counsel, they ‘know what is
best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
argument entitling them to relief.’” (quoting United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020))).

16
substantially groundless and frivolous. See C.A.R. 38(b) (“If the

appellate court determines that an appeal . . . is frivolous, it may

award damages it deems appropriate, including attorney fees . . . .”).

We deny her request. See Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO

77, ¶ 70 (noting that an award of attorney fees for a frivolous appeal

should be reserved for “clear and unequivocal” cases involving

“egregious conduct” (citation omitted)).

VI. Disposition

¶ 38 We reverse the portion of the order denying father’s request to

modify parenting time and remand this issue to the district court

for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. We otherwise

affirm.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

17