Marriage of Nash

25CA0978 Marriage of Nash 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0978
Larimer County District Court No. 19DR30162
Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Anne Dixon McKay Nash n/k/a Anne Dixon McKay,

Appellee,

and

Benjamin Clarke Nash,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDER AFFIRMED,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Yun and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Rice Law Office, P.C., Jennifer L. Rice, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee

Benjamin Clarke Nash, Pro Se
¶1 Benjamin Clarke Nash (father) appeals the district court’s

orders affirming a contempt ruling entered by a district court

magistrate and awarding attorney fees to Anne Dixon Nash n/k/a

Anne Dixon McKay (mother). We dismiss the appeal in part as

untimely filed and otherwise affirm. We also award mother her

attorney fees and costs on appeal under C.A.R. 39.1 and 39(c)(1)

and remand the case to the district court for the calculation of that

award.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and father married in 2013. Mother is a former art

teacher who has not worked full-time since having the couple’s two

minor children. Father is a licensed Georgia attorney currently

pursuing a different career. Mother filed for dissolution of the

marriage in May 2019.

¶3 During the dissolution proceedings, a district court magistrate

entered temporary orders dividing the couple’s financial obligations.

Among other things, the magistrate ordered father to pay “property

taxes on all real property,” including the jointly owned marital

home.

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¶4 In June 2021, the district court entered permanent orders on

the petition for dissolution of the marriage. As relevant here, the

court (1) awarded mother the marital home; (2) ordered father to

maintain a life insurance policy with both children named as

beneficiaries and to provide mother proof of the policy within thirty

days; and (3) ordered father to pay back taxes owed to the State of

Georgia within thirty days.

¶5 Two years later, mother moved for remedial contempt

sanctions. In part, she alleged that father had failed to: (1) pay the

2020 property taxes on the marital home as had been required by

the court’s temporary orders; (2) provide proof of the life insurance

policy; and (3) pay the Georgia back taxes. In a written order

issued on March 20, 2024, a magistrate held father in contempt of

court orders based on all three of mother’s claims. The magistrate

granted mother’s request for attorney fees and costs in connection

with the contempt proceedings.

¶6 What followed was a lengthy series of motions and petitions for

review filed by father that repeatedly challenged the magistrate’s

contempt sanctions; a May 14, 2024, district court order upholding

those contempt sanctions; and various resulting awards of attorney

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fees to mother. As described in more detail below, the district court

affirmed the contempt sanctions numerous times and subsequently

affirmed or granted multiple awards of attorney fees to mother

related to each of father’s challenges.

¶7 Father now appeals, arguing the district court erred when it

upheld (1) the contempt sanctions and (2) awarded attorney fees to

mother. Before turning to the merits of father’s arguments,

however, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to

address all of father’s appellate contentions.

II. Timeliness of Appeal

¶8 In his opening brief, father challenges the merits of both the

March 20, 2024, magistrate order issuing contempt sanctions and

the subsequent May 14, 2024, district court order upholding the

magistrate order. Father also challenges three separate attorney fee

awards that stem from that contempt order: (1) $5,690.13 awarded

by the magistrate and affirmed by the district court on March 10,

2025; (2) $2,923.32 awarded by the district court on January 7,

2025; and (3) another $1,665 awarded by the district court on April

14, 2025.

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¶9 We are unable to address father’s merits claims and his

challenge to the first two attorney fee awards because father did not

timely appeal those orders.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 In civil cases, appellate jurisdiction is limited by several rules,

two of which are relevant to our analysis. First, a final judgment or

order is a prerequisite to appellate review. C.A.R. 1(a)(1); L.H.M.

Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, ¶ 14. Second, the notice of

appeal must be timely; here, the applicable rule required filing

“within 49 days after entry of the judgment, decree, or order being

appealed.” C.A.R. 4(a)(1); Stone Grp. Holdings LLC v. Ellison, 2024

COA 10, ¶ 16.

¶ 11 An order is final when it ends the action at issue and leaves

nothing further for the court pronouncing the order to do to

determine the parties’ rights. Camp Bird Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 215 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Colo. App. 2009); People in Interest

of M.R.M., 2021 COA 22, ¶ 13; see also People v. Maes, 2024 CO 15,

¶ 13 (explaining that a magistrate’s order becomes final when it

fully resolves an issue or claim).

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¶ 12 An award of attorney fees, however, is separate from a final

order on the merits. Kennedy v. Gillam Dev. Corp., 80 P.3d 927,

929 (Colo. App. 2003); see also L.H.M. Corp., TCD, ¶ 2 (“A judgment

on the merits is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding an

unresolved issue of attorney fees.”). Moreover, where the district

court has granted attorney fees in its order on the merits but has

deferred ruling on the amount of the award, the issue related to

attorney fees is final after the award is reduced to a sum certain.

See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶¶ 10-18; Stone Grp., ¶

18 (“To be considered final, a judgment or order must address both

liability and damages and damages must be reduced to a sum

certain.” (citations omitted)).

¶ 13 We review jurisdictional questions de novo. Springer v. City &

County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000). If an appeal is

untimely, we lack jurisdiction to hear it. People in Interest of A.J.,

143 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Colo. App. 2006).

B. Father’s Untimely Contentions

¶ 14 The following timeline covers the proceedings relevant to

father’s challenge to the merits of the contempt order and the

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district court order, as well as his contention that the magistrate

erred by awarding $5,690.13 in attorney fees to mother.

(1) On March 20, 2024, the magistrate ordered contempt

sanctions against father and granted mother her

associated attorney fees.

(2) On May 14, 2024, the district court denied father’s

petition for review of the magistrate’s order and affirmed

the magistrate’s order.

(3) On February 12, 2025, the magistrate reduced its

attorney fee award to a sum certain, determining that

father owed mother $5,690.13 in attorney fees related to

the contempt sanctions.

(4) On February 14, 2025, father filed a second petition for

review that challenged, in part, the merits of the

magistrate’s order and its award of attorney fees.

(5) On March 10, 2025, the district court denied father’s

second petition for review.

(6) Father filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 2025.

¶ 15 Father’s claims concerning the merits of the March 20, 2024,

magistrate order and the May 14, 2024, district court order, along

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with the magistrate’s $5,690.13 award of attorney fees all became

final on March 10, 2025, when the district court denied father’s

second petition for review. At that point, nothing remained for the

district court to do with respect to the orders and associated

attorney fee award. See Camp Bird Colo., Inc., 215 P.3d at 1281.

Father’s deadline to file an appeal on these claims was consequently

April 28, 2025. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Because father filed his appeal a

month after that — on May 28, 2025 — his appeal is untimely and

we lack the jurisdiction to hear it.

¶ 16 The following timeline covers the proceedings relevant to

father’s challenge to the district court’s $2,923.32 attorney fee

award.

(1) On May 14, 2024, the district court denied father’s

petition for review of the magistrate’s order, affirmed the

magistrate’s order, and awarded its own associated

attorney fees to mother.

(2) On January 7, 2025, the district court reduced its award

of attorney fees granted in the May 14, 2024, order to a

sum certain, determining that father owed mother

$2,923.32.

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(3) On February 14, 2025, father filed a second petition for

review that challenged, at least implicitly, the merits of

the contempt findings that ultimately led to the

$2,923.32 fee award. (As discussed above, father’s

second petition also challenged the attorney fee award

entered by the magistrate in connection with the

contempt proceeding).

(4) On March 10, 2025, the district court denied father’s

second petition for review and, later, awarded $1,665 in

separate, associated attorney fees to mother under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025.1

1 We recognize that when attorney fees are awarded as a remedial

contempt sanction under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), the “contempt order is
not final until the attorney fees portion of the remedial sanction has
been completely resolved.” In re Marriage of January, 2019 COA 87,
¶ 16. But in this case, the district court awarded fees against
father pursuant to section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, because it
determined that father’s arguments in his petition for review and
motion for reconsideration of the order denying father’s request to
toll the appeal deadline were substantially frivolous, groundless, or
vexatious. Thus, the magistrate’s contempt order was final and
appealable on March 10, 2025, and the outstanding issue of
attorney fees awarded under section 13-17-102 did not prevent that
finality.

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¶ 17 Thus, father’s challenge to the district court’s award of

$2,923.32 in attorney fees related to its May 14, 2024, order was

final — at the latest — on March 10, 2025, when the district court

denied father’s second petition for review.2 Nothing then remained

for the district court to do. See Camp Bird Colo., Inc., 215 P.3d at

1281. Father’s deadline to file an appeal on these claims was

consequently April 28, 2025. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Because father

filed his appeal a month later — on May 28, 2025 — it is untimely

and we lack the jurisdiction to hear it.

III. Father’s Timely Contention

¶ 18 We turn next to father’s challenge to the district court’s April

14, 2025, award of attorney fees.

A. Timeline

¶ 19 The following timeline covers applicable proceedings related to

father’s challenge to the $1,665 award of attorney fees reduced to a

sum certain on April 14, 2025.

2 Mother asserts in her answer brief that the district court’s award

of $2,923.32, entered on January 7, 2025, was final and appealable
when it was entered. That is certainly possible, but we need not
address the issue further because, even if the attorney fee award
became final on March 10, 2025, father’s appeal was untimely in
any event.

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(1) On June 18, 2024, father filed a notice of appeal of the

district court’s denial of his first petition for review,

including a claim disputing awards of attorney fees. This

court dismissed the appeal because not all fee awards

had been reduced to a sum certain and therefore father’s

appeal was not final.

(2) On January 7, 2025, the district court reduced its award

of attorney fees granted in its May 14, 2024, order to a

sum certain, determining father owed mother $2,923.32.

At this point, the magistrate had not yet reduced the

award for the contempt proceeding to a sum certain.

(3) On February 3, 2025, father filed a motion in the district

court seeking to “toll the 49-day period to file a Notice of

Appeal,” noting that the magistrate had not yet

calculated a sum certain amount for the contempt fee

award and stating that he intended to challenge both the

merits and amount of that award on appeal. Tolling was

warranted, father argued, to avoid duplicative

proceedings.

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(4) On February 12, 2025, the district court, citing Farm

Deals, LLLP v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 300 P.3d 921,

923-24 (Colo. App. 2012), denied father’s tolling motion,

explaining that it “does not have authority to toll or

extend [appellate] deadlines.”

(5) That same day, the magistrate reduced its award of

attorney fees arising from the contempt proceeding to a

sum certain, ordering father to pay mother $5,690.13 in

attorney fees related to the contempt sanctions.

(6) On February 14, 2025, father filed a second petition to

review the magistrate’s award of attorney fees and a

motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order

declining to toll or extend his appellate deadline. Mother

opposed both filings and requested an award of attorney

fees as a sanction.

(7) On March 10, 2025, the district court denied father’s

second petition for review and motion for reconsideration

of the tolling order.

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(8) In a separate order issued on March 13, 2025, the court

granted mother’s request for fees under section 13-17-

102.

(9) On April 14, 2025, the district court reduced its award to

a sum certain of $1,665 in attorney fees to mother in

connection with the March 10, 2025, order.

¶ 20 Because the sum certain was not calculated until April 14,

2025, father’s deadline to appeal was June 2, 2025. See C.A.R.

4(a)(1). Father filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 2025, making it

timely. We therefore address his claim below.

B. $1,665 Award of Attorney Fees

¶ 21 Father contends that the district court erred by awarding

$1,665 in attorney fees to mother based on its March 10, 2025,

order denying father’s second petition for review and accompanying

motion to toll appellate deadlines. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 22 A district court may award “reasonable attorney fees against

any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil action,

either in whole or in part, that the court determines lacked

substantial justification.” § 13-17-102(2). A claim “lacks

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substantial justification,” as the basis for an award of attorney fees,

when it is substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. In re

Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 34. A claim is frivolous if its

proponent can present no rational argument based on evidence or

law. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Colo.

1984). It is groundless if the argument is not supported by credible

evidence. Id. And it is vexatious if it is brought or maintained in

bad faith to annoy or harass another. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate

Majority Fund, LLC, 275 P.3d 674, 686 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d,

2012 CO 12.

¶ 23 When awarding fees, the court “shall specifically set forth the

reasons for the award” and must consider a set of enumerated

factors, including “[w]hether or not the action was prosecuted or

defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith.” § 13-17-103(1)(e),

C.R.S. 2025. Bad faith may include conduct that is arbitrary,

abusive, stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of the truth. City of

Black Hawk v. Ficke, 215 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 24 We review an award of attorney fees under section 13-17-102

for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d

1163, 1165 (Colo. App. 2008). A court abuses its discretion where

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its decision rests on a misunderstanding or misapplication of the

law, Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454,

458 (Colo. App. 2003), or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230

(Colo. App. 2006).

2. Analysis

¶ 25 From what we can discern, father claims the court’s $1,665

award is unmerited because his arguments were supported by some

legal authority and therefore were not substantially frivolous or

groundless.

¶ 26 We conclude that the district court’s award of fees was an

appropriate exercise of its discretion. First and foremost, in the

district court, father pointed to no legitimate authority for his

repeated claims that the district court could toll appellate

deadlines. Father did not cite any law in his first such request but

instead simply asserted that “good faith” and “judicial economy”

merited the extension. In its first order denying the tolling request,

the court explained it lacked the “authority to toll or extend

deadlines for the Colorado Court of Appeals” pursuant to C.A.R. 4(a)

and directed father to binding appellate precedent supporting that

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proposition. See Farm Deals, 300 P.3d at 924 (holding that there is

no mechanism for a trial court to extend a deadline for the

certification of an interlocutory appeal specified under the Colorado

Appellate Rules). In his motion for reconsideration, father

countered that C.A.R. 4(a)(4) “explicitly allows the [d]istrict [c]ourt to

extend the notice of appeal deadline upon a showing of excusable

neglect.” However, the rule actually states that “[u]pon a showing of

excusable neglect, the appellate court may extend the time to file the

notice of appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). And regardless, as the

district court explained in its first order denying father’s tolling

request, even if it did have the authority to toll the appellate

deadline, father “would have [had] to make a showing of excusable

neglect[,] . . . something he . . . also failed to do.”

¶ 27 The rest of father’s arguments regarding tolling were an

attempt to distinguish the holding in Farm Deals. But even here,

father’s analysis failed to show that the district court had authority

to toll appellate deadlines. Indeed, he cited additional cases that,

as the district court noted, “either [did] not exist, [did] not conclude

what [father] states, or [were] not relevant to the issue regarding

whether a [d]istrict [c]ourt can toll an appellate deadline.” Having

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reviewed father’s motion to reconsider and the cases cited therein,

we agree that that even those citations that were legitimate3 were

not remotely supportive of his legal arguments.

¶ 28 As for father’s request that the district court reconsider its

earlier decision affirming the magistrate’s contempt order, his

second petition reiterated the arguments in his first petition nearly

verbatim. Because he presented no new arguments in his second

petition, we agree that the district court had already “addressed and

resolved” the issue and that there was no need to revisit it.

¶ 29 Given this context, combined with the history of the case, we

concur with the district court’s conclusion that father’s motions

“lacked substantial justification” and appeared to be part of a

vexatious “pattern of behavior where [father] asks for

reconsideration of any decision he does not agree with, despite legal

precedent.” We therefore affirm the district court’s April 14, 2025,

award of attorney fees against father in the amount of $1,665.

3 Although there is perhaps another explanation for father’s

citations of nonexistent cases, we observe that they bear many of
the hallmarks of “hallucinations” that are a well-publicized problem
associated with generative artificial intelligence large language
models. See, e.g., Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA
128, ¶¶ 25-35.

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IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 30 Mother requests attorney fees on appeal. Because she

successfully defended the fee awards, we grant her request. See

Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 390 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“When a party is awarded attorney fees for a prior stage of the

proceedings, it may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs for

successfully defending the appeal.”); see also 1046 Munras Props.,

L.P. v. Kabod Coffee, 2025 COA 71, ¶ 39. We remand this matter to

the district court to determine and award mother her reasonable

appellate attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 39.1 and C.A.R.

39(c)(1).

V. Disposition

¶ 31 We dismiss as untimely the portion of this appeal related to

the magistrate’s and district court’s orders issued on and before

March 10, 2025. We affirm the district court’s April 14, 2025,

award of $1,665 in attorney fees against father. We remand the

case for the district court to further calculate and award mother her

attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 39.1 and 39(c)(1).

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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