Peo in Interest of EY

25CA1461 Peo in Interest of EY 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1461
Garfield County District Court No. 24JV30009
Routt County District Court No. 25JV1
Honorable Billy-George Hertzke, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.Y., a Child,

and Concerning C.H.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Bernard*, and Ashby*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Lynaia South, County Attorney, Matthew Fredrickson, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Molly Hamsher, Assistant County Attorney, Steamboat Springs,
Colorado for Appellee

Cassandra Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem

Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs,
Colorado for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.H. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for E.Y. (the child) to W.Y. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2024, father brought the child to the Garfield County

Department of Human Services acting manic and requesting

assistance. While there, father called for an ambulance. When law

enforcement arrived with emergency services, they arrested father

for violating a protection order restraining him from having contact

with the child. The Garfield County Department then placed the

child with mother. But four days later, mother informed the

Garfield County Department that she was overwhelmed, and she

thought it was in the child’s best interests to be placed in foster

care. Following a shelter care hearing four days later, the Garfield

County Department returned the child to father’s custody, under its

protective supervision, and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

¶3 In October 2024, after law enforcement responded to a welfare

check and found father “mentally decompensating” under the

influence of alcohol and/or drugs, the Garfield County Department

sought, and the juvenile court granted, temporary custody of the

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child for placement in foster care. About six weeks later, the

Garfield County Department returned the child to father’s care

under its protective supervision.

¶4 Following mother’s admission that the child lacked proper

parental care through her acts or omissions, the juvenile court

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The juvenile court

then adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to (1) obtain

and maintain a safe and stable residence for the child; (2) cooperate

with the Garfield County Department; (3) complete a mental health

assessment and follow all recommendations; (4) participate in life

skills; and (5) maintain a positive relationship with the child by

attending all scheduled family time, completing an in-person

parenting assessment, and attending an approved parenting class.

¶5 Six months later, the juvenile court changed venue to Routt

County, father’s county of residence. Shortly thereafter, the child’s

guardian ad litem (GAL) moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to father, which the Routt County Department

of Human Services joined. Following a hearing, the juvenile court

allocated sole decision-making responsibility and primary

residential care to father and accorded mother two hours of

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parenting time, supervised by a licensed mental health professional,

per month.

II. APR Determination

¶6 Mother contends that the court erred by applying the wrong

legal standard when allocating parental responsibilities. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to

enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing

parenting time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a

dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025;

People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10.

¶8 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes

of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025. People

in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of

the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by

providing procedures to serve the child’s best interests. L.G. v.

People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Thus, the court must

allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best

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interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13. A court

may also consider the best interest factors found in section

14-10-124, C.R.S. 2025, of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act,

but the court’s focus must remain on the child’s safety and

protection and not the parent’s custodial interests. Id.

¶9 An APR is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court.

See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63,

¶ 15. A juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies

or misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,

¶ 14. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine

the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to

assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243

P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). When there is record support for

the court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding

on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct

legal standard in making its findings is a question of law that we

review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

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B. Preservation

¶ 10 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that we should

decline to address mother’s appellate claim because it is

unpreserved. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14

(explaining that, in dependency and neglect cases, appellate courts

do not address unpreserved issues). However, we need not

determine whether mother preserved her argument, or was required

to, because even if we assume she did, we discern no basis for

reversal. Cf. C.R.C.P. 52 (“Neither requests for findings nor

objections to findings rendered are necessary for purposes of

review.”); see also L & R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530,

536 (Colo. App. 2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the

outcome would not change).

C. Analysis

¶ 11 In allocating parental responsibilities, the juvenile court

considered the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, the

factors under section 14-10-124(1.5) and found that the child’s

emotional and physical wellbeing would be best served by allocating

primary physical custody to father. The court further found that

mother did not successfully complete her treatment plan, maintain

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consistent contact, or have a “stable, safe or healthy relationship

with the child.” Thus, the court found that it was in the child’s best

interests for mother’s parenting time to be supervised by a licensed

mental health professional.

¶ 12 Mother does not contest these findings. Instead, she asserts

that, because the juvenile court’s order modified a prior order

allocating parental responsibilities between the parents stemming

from their dissolution of marriage proceeding, the court erred by

considering section 14-10-124(1.5) (detailing factors for courts to

consider when initially allocating parental responsibilities) and not

section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2025 (governing modifications of

parenting time). In so arguing, mother asserts that the juvenile

court was required to make endangerment findings before

“restricting” her parenting time.

¶ 13 However, Title 19, not Title 14, governs the juvenile court’s

allocation of parental responsibilities in a dependency and neglect

proceeding. See L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d

1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996) (“[T]he exclusive authority of a juvenile

court to determine issues of child custody arising in the course of

dependency and neglect proceedings is established by the

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[Children’s] Code.”). And endangerment findings are not required

for the entry of an APR under Title 19. See People in Interest of L.B.,

254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Because the adjudication

of [the child] as dependent and neglected provided the predicate for

the disposition entered, no finding concerning either unfitness or

endangerment was necessary.”). Moreover, proceeding, as mother

argues, with “a presumption that prior orders should remain in

effect,” would erroneously prioritize a parent’s custodial interests

over the child’s best interests. See H.K.W., ¶ 13.

¶ 14 In short, because the juvenile court focused on the overriding

purpose of the Children’s Code when allocating parental

responsibilities, we conclude that the juvenile court applied the

correct legal standard and discern no error.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 15 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by allocating

parental responsibilities without considering whether the Garfield

County and Routt County Departments made reasonable efforts to

reunite the family by providing appropriate family time and

accommodating her disability. We discern no error.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 16 A department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

parents and reunite families following the placement of abused or

neglected children out of the home. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5,

19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable efforts

“means the exercise of diligence and care . . . for children . . . who

are in [or are at imminent risk of being placed in] foster care or

out-of-home placement.” § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 17 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213, requires a public entity, such as a county

department of human services, to make reasonable

accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. Specifically, the

ADA requires that, as part of the reasonable efforts determination,

the court consider whether the department provided a parent with

reasonable accommodations. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA

36, ¶ 34.

¶ 18 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.

Before a department can be required to provide reasonable

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accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual

has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious

or because someone has informed the department of the disability.

Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate

screenings and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible

for disclosing information regarding her disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And

a parent should also identify any modifications that she believes are

necessary to accommodate her disability. Id.

¶ 19 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply

with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a department

made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should consider the

totality of the circumstances and account for all services and

resources provided to a parent, measuring them holistically rather

than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.

See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

¶ 20 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to provide reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact

and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review

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the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and review de

novo its legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether

the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Family Time

¶ 21 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by granting the

APR despite the Garfield County Department’s failure to make

reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Specifically, mother asserts

that the Garfield County Department repeatedly reduced her family

time without first requesting a hearing in violation of section

19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2025. The Routt County Department and GAL

assert that mother did not adequately preserve this contention. We

agree. See M.B., ¶ 14 (noting that appellate courts will “review only

issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court”).

¶ 22 Mother acknowledges that she did not “address the repeated

reductions [of,] and increased restrictions on [her] family time” at

the APR hearing. Even so, she argues the issue is adequately

preserved for our review because the “visitation component” of her

treatment plan was a “primary reason” why the juvenile court

allocated her two hours of supervised parenting time per month.

Although the juvenile court considered mother’s lack of consistent

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participation in family time when deciding what parenting time

schedule for mother was in the child’s best interests, we disagree

with mother that this finding sufficiently preserved for our review

her reasonable efforts argument based on a failure to hold hearings

when entering orders restricting her parenting time.

¶ 23 Neither mother nor her counsel objected to the reductions in

her family time as they occurred, argued at the APR hearing that

such reductions exemplified a lack of reasonable efforts by the

Garfield County Department, or asked the juvenile court to deny

the APR because of a lack of reasonable efforts. See Forgette v.

People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties

use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party

must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will

review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo.

2004)). As a result, the juvenile court did not make any reasonable

efforts findings before allocating parental responsibilities. Nor does

mother provide any authority supporting her argument that the

court was required to make such findings when allocating parental

responsibilities between parents. Cf. A.S.L., ¶ 20 (determining that

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the court is required to consider reasonable efforts when it enters

an APR to a nonparent).

¶ 24 Thus, because mother did not present the juvenile court with

an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of

law regarding her assertion that the Garfield County Department

improperly restricted her family time and failed to provide

reasonable efforts to reunify the family, we do not review this issue.

See M.B., ¶ 14.

C. ADA Accommodations

¶ 25 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by not

considering “the department’s failure to implement her requested

A.D.A. accommodations, before ruling that [she] had failed to

complete her treatment plan.” We disagree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 26 Four-and-a-half months before the APR hearing, mother’s

counsel filed a notice asserting that the ADA applied based on

mother’s schizophrenia diagnosis. As a result, mother requested

several accommodations including (1) medical reminders for

appointments and medicine; (2) transportation support; (3)

motivational interviewing; (4) clearly defined case standards; (5)

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written instructions, at an appropriate educational level, prior to

appointments; (6) increased structure, routines, and predictability;

(7) simplified instructions and the opportunity to repeat back

instructions to confirm understanding; (8) cognitive behavior

therapy (CBT); and (9) caseworker communication after important

meetings and court appearances. The Garfield County Department

did not object to any of mother’s requested accommodations but

emphasized that, to provide the accommodations, the Department

needed her to communicate.

2. Preservation

¶ 27 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that mother did

not preserve this claim for appeal. We need not decide this issue

because, even if we assume mother preserved her claim, we discern

no reversible error.

3. Analysis

¶ 28 Mother argues that once notified of her disability and need for

accommodations the Garfield and Routt County Departments did

not provide reasonable accommodations for her and therefore failed

to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. See S.K., ¶ 34

(holding that the ADA requires that, as part of the reasonable efforts

13
determination, the court consider whether the department provided

a parent with reasonable accommodations). And she correctly

asserts that the juvenile court made no specific written or oral

findings regarding ADA accommodations at the APR hearing. As

discussed in section III.B. above, the need for the court to make

findings as to reasonable efforts at the APR hearing at all is unclear

since it was ordering APR to a parent. But reading mother’s

argument to challenge the court’s general determinations that her

treatment plan was appropriate and she failed to successfully

comply with her treatment plan, we address it here.

¶ 29 We note that the court’s failure to make express findings at

the APR hearing, on its own, “does not establish a failure by the

court to ensure that the Department made reasonable efforts.”

A.S.L., ¶ 15. And, because the provision of reasonable

accommodations is a subset of a court’s reasonable efforts

determination, a court’s failure to express reasonable

accommodations findings, on its own, does not establish a failure

by the court to ensure that a department provided reasonable

accommodations. See S.K., ¶ 34 (“[A] juvenile court should consider

whether reasonable accommodations were made for the parent’s

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disability in determining whether the parent’s treatment plan was

appropriate and reasonable efforts were made to rehabilitate the

parent.”).

¶ 30 Reviewing de novo the ultimate question of whether the

Garfield and Routt County Departments satisfied their obligations,

we conclude that the record sufficiently demonstrates the

Departments’ efforts to provide reasonable accommodations for

mother’s disability during the pendency of the case.

¶ 31 The Routt County Department caseworker testified that she

reached out to mother multiple times, by phone, email, and text, to

try to assess mother’s status. But mother responded inconsistently

and primarily via text message. The caseworker acknowledged

mother’s disability and need for appointment reminders, additional

processing time, and transportation support, among other

accommodations. But, based on mother’s preference to primarily

communicate via text and her lack of consistent communication,

the Departments were limited in their ability to provide mother with

her requested accommodations.

¶ 32 Even so, mother asserts that the caseworkers failed to use

“motivational interviewing techniques” and, despite mother’s

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difficulty following complicated instructions, the Departments

offered no transportation assistance beyond the offer of bus passes.

But mother does not clarify how the Departments could have

provided motivational interviewing techniques via text message.

Nor does mother explain how more detailed instructions about the

provided bus passes would have accommodated her disability. See

id. at ¶ 21. Indeed, mother does not connect her inability to ride

the bus to her disability, stating only that she was “unable to get on

the bus for the scheduled visit.” See id. at ¶ 34 (“[W]hen a parent

involved in a dependency and neglect proceeding has a disability

under the ADA, the Department and the juvenile court must

account for and, if possible, make reasonable accommodations for

the parent’s disability when . . . providing rehabilitative services to

the parent.”) (emphasis added).

¶ 33 In sum, the record reflects that the Garfield County and Routt

County Departments endeavored to make reasonable

accommodations for mother’s disability, but ultimately mother’s

lack of engagement limited the accommodations the Departments

could provide to her. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. Thus, we

discern no basis for reversal.

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IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 34 Mother contends that she received ineffective assistance of

counsel because her counsel failed to (1) object to repeated changes

in mother’s family time or request a hearing pursuant to section

19-3-217(3); (2) discuss the Garfield County Department’s proposed

treatment plan before the juvenile court ordered it as part of its

dispositional order; (3) request ADA accommodations sooner than

four-and-a-half months before the APR hearing; (4) file a written

response to the APR motion to advocate for more parenting time for

mother; (5) refute the caseworker’s testimony that father had

completed his treatment plan; and (6) object to the GAL’s portrayal

of mother as a domestic violence offender. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 35 A parent has a statutory right to effective counsel in

dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1),

C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent can raise a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and

neglect proceeding for the first time on appeal. People in Interest of

C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App. 2007).

17
¶ 36 We employ the same Strickland test that is used in criminal

cases to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in

dependency and neglect proceedings. A.R., ¶ 60 (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under this test, to establish a

claim, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance was

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and

(2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance —

that is, there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 60. “If the parent fails to establish

either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B.,

2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

¶ 37 If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may

summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. See C.H., 166

P.3d at 291. In other words, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is

only required if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and

compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id.

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B. Timeliness

¶ 38 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that we should

deny mother’s claim of ineffective assistance stemming from the

dispositional hearing, as untimely. Citing A.R., they argue that,

because mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s adjudicatory

order or disclose an impediment to her ability to raise this claim in

such an appeal, her claim is untimely. However, their reliance on

A.R. is misplaced. In A.R., the parent sought relief from a juvenile

court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based, in part, on

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from

“counsel’s performance at the adjudicatory hearing.” A.R., ¶ 43.

Our supreme court held that, because the parent “was aware (or

reasonably should have been aware) of the facts giving rise to any

claim of ineffective assistance at the adjudicatory hearing” and

because “[a]n order decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent

[is] a final and appealable order after the entry of the disposition,”

her claim was untimely. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43 (quoting § 19-1-109(2)(c),

C.R.S. 2025). But here, mother asserts only that her counsel was

ineffective at the dispositional hearing, not the adjudicatory

hearing. And dispositional orders are not, by themselves, final and

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appealable orders. See People in Interest of H.T., 2019 COA 72, ¶ 1.

Therefore, because mother did not have a prior opportunity to raise

her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the dispositional

hearing, we will address it on its merits.

C. Analysis

¶ 39 Even if we assume, without deciding, that trial counsel’s

actions amounted to deficient performance, mother has failed to

show that but for counsel’s failures the result of the proceeding

would have been different. See A.R., ¶ 60.

¶ 40 Mother’s only assertions of prejudice are that, had counsel

“taken any of [the] listed actions promptly, the trajectory of the

dependency and neglect case could have changed” because mother

“could have had” (1) consistent family time; (2) CBT treatment; and

(3) increased support to facilitate family time. And with these,

mother asserts, the juvenile court’s parenting time orders “could

have been different.”

¶ 41 But, as the caseworker testified, mother did not communicate

to schedule family time or consistently attend the family time that

she did schedule. And to the best of the caseworker’s knowledge,

mother did not complete the mental health assessment required by

20
her treatment plan. Thus, even if mother’s counsel had objected to

ongoing reductions in mother’s family time, discussed the treatment

plan with mother before its adoption, or filed for ADA

accommodations earlier in the case, mother has not established

how these actions would have resolved her overall lack of

engagement. See People v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App.

2006) (holding that a speculative claim does not satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland). And, ultimately, the juvenile court

focused on mother’s lack of consistent engagement when deciding

the best parenting time schedule for the child.

¶ 42 Mother’s remaining ineffective assistance claims focus on the

evidence presented during the APR hearing. First, she asserts that

counsel erred by not requesting more parenting time for mother —

specifically, an allocation of equal parenting time or, at a minimum,

more than two hours of therapeutically supervised parenting time

per month. But mother’s counsel opposed the GAL’s proposed

parenting time schedule, advocating instead for a gradually

increasing parenting time schedule. And, considering that the

juvenile court declined to order the requested graduated parenting

time schedule, we do not see how the outcome of the proceeding

21
would have been different had mother’s counsel advocated for even

more parenting time.

¶ 43 Second, mother asserts that trial counsel failed to refute the

caseworker’s representation that father had completed his

treatment plan — noting that father had not engaged in the

treatment recommended by his mental health evaluation or signed

a release allowing the caseworker to verify his domestic violence

treatment. But father’s treatment plan did not require him to

engage in domestic violence treatment. And, before opining that

father had reasonably complied with his treatment plan, the

caseworker acknowledged that he had not participated in the

treatment recommended by his mental health evaluation as

contemplated by his treatment plan. Moreover, when allocating

parental responsibilities between the parents, a court is not

required to make findings regarding parental fitness or treatment

plan compliance to determine which APR is in the child’s best

interests. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.

¶ 44 Finally, mother asserts that her counsel “allowed” mother to

be “portrayed at the APR hearing as a domestic violence offender.”

Mother’s only basis for this assertion is one statement made by the

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GAL in her closing argument, specifically “[a]s was alluded to by

[mother], there [were] times when the parties . . . had informal

supervision between each other. That ha[d] not worked out because

of the domestic violence between them . . . .” But, as stated, the

GAL based her argument on mother’s own testimony discussing the

parties’ domestic violence history. And the juvenile court made no

findings about, or reference to, domestic violence instigated by

either party when allocating parental responsibilities.

¶ 45 For these reasons, mother’s claims do not establish a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s allegedly

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. Therefore, mother has not made a prima facie

showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and, as a result, her

claims must fail. See C.B., ¶ 26.

V. Disposition

¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE ASHBY concur.

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