Peo in Interest of JC

25CA1997 Peo in Interest of JC 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1997
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV289
Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Je.C. and Ja.C., Children,

and Concerning T.W. and L.C.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE ASHBY*
Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora,
Colorado for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for Je.C. and Ja.C.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for
Appellant T.W.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Appellant L.C.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, L.C. (father) and

T.W. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with Je.C. and Ja.C. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services (the Department) received a referral that father had

dementia, believed that mother and the children were strangers

holding him against his will, and physically harmed the children

when they tried to stop him from leaving the home. As a result, the

Department provided ongoing support to the family. During a

meeting with the caseworker in August 2023, the children reported

concerns about mother’s substance use, anger, and physical

aggression. After receiving a report that mother had threatened the

children’s lives, the Department filed a petition in dependency or

neglect and sought temporary custody of the children. The juvenile

court granted temporary custody to the Department, who placed the

children with maternal grandmother. But three weeks later, based

on concerns about grandmother’s substance use, the Department

transferred the children to foster care where they remained.

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¶3 The juvenile court then adjudicated the children dependent

and neglected and adopted treatment plans for mother and father.

In December 2024, the Department moved to terminate both

parents’ parental rights. Following a multi-day hearing spanning

several months, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated mother’s and father’s legal relationships with the

children.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶4 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has

not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶5 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a

department of human services satisfied its obligation to make

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reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear

error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those

facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the

children when the Department failed to make reasonable

accommodations for his disability. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶7 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite families.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section

19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

The services that “must be available and provided” as determined

by individual case planning include, among others, screenings,

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assessments, home-based family and crisis counseling, information

and referral services to available assistance resources, family time,

and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶9 Additionally, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, requires a public entity, such as

a county department of human services, to make reasonable

accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. Thus,

departments and juvenile courts must account for and, if possible,

make reasonable accommodations for a parent’s disability when

providing rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K., 2019

COA 36, ¶ 34. And, a juvenile court must consider whether a

department made reasonable accommodations under the ADA in

determining if it made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent.

Id.

¶ 10 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA is a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21. Before

a department can be required to provide reasonable

accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual

has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious

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or because someone has informed the department of the disability.

Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate

screenings and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible

for disclosing information regarding his disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And

a parent should also identify any modifications that he believes are

necessary to accommodate his disability. Id.

¶ 11 A parent is ultimately responsible for utilizing the services

provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply

with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d

1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a

department made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should

consider the totality of the circumstances and account for all

services and resources provided to a parent, measuring them

holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific

treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v.

V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

B. Additional Background

¶ 12 In October 2023, father filed a notice asserting that the ADA

applied based on his diagnoses of vascular dementia and multiple

myeloma cancer. At that time, father did not request any specific

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accommodations, stating only “[s]hould [he] require any

accommodations or modifications, [his] counsel [would] confer . . .

and motion the [c]ourt.” Two months later, father moved to a

nursing home facility where he stayed for the remainder of the case.

¶ 13 In March 2024, the Department moved the juvenile court for a

finding that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for

father, asserting that “[d]ue to [father’s] diagnosis and inability to

care for himself and the minor children, [the Department did] not

believe that an appropriate treatment plan [could] be [de]vised to

address [his] unfitness as a parent.” In response, father’s counsel

moved for a finding that the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts to develop a treatment plan and explore reasonable

accommodations for his disability.

¶ 14 The court set a contested hearing to resolve the motions.

Father’s witness, qualified as an expert in treatment planning and

accommodations for individuals with disabilities, testified that, even

though father would not be able to become a custodial parent

because of his medical conditions, he could participate in services

at his nursing home, attend family time, and maintain an ongoing

relationship with the caseworker through continued monthly

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contact. The court found it undisputed that a treatment plan could

not be devised to rehabilitate father and render him a primary

parent. But the court found that there could be a treatment plan

which allowed father continued contact with the children while the

case proceeded. Thus, the court adopted a treatment plan for

father requiring him to (1) maintain caseworker contact; (2) attend

family time and interact with the children in a nurturing and

affectionate manner; (3) sign releases of information pertaining to

his medical care; and (4) participate in physical therapy as

recommended by his nursing home facility. Father’s counsel did

not request any modifications to the treatment plan or any specific

accommodations for his disability.

C. Analysis

¶ 15 The juvenile court concluded that, understanding father’s

condition, status, and treatment plan terms, the Department made

reasonable efforts.

¶ 16 The record reflects that the Department (1) provided

supervised family time for father at his nursing home and

scheduled phone contact for the children and father; (2) spoke to

two of father’s medical social workers and their director;

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(3) investigated dementia-specific resources for the children;

(4) offered the children the opportunity to speak to father’s medical

social worker about father’s condition; (5) investigated

transportation options for father to attend family time in the

community; (6) remained in communication with father and his

team; (7) enrolled the children in therapy; and (8) encouraged the

children to attend therapy specific to father’s condition.

¶ 17 Nevertheless, father asserts that the Department failed to

make reasonable efforts and reasonably accommodate his disability

because the caseworker did not provide mechanisms to enhance his

relationship with the children, engage in more frequent contact with

him, or proactively reach out to his providers. But, as detailed

above, the record reflects that the caseworker maintained contact

with father and his team and made resources available to the

children to maintain a relationship with father and process his

illness. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that, had the

caseworker communicated with father more frequently or provided

the children with additional dementia-specific resources, it would

have made a difference in the outcome of the case — particularly

considering father’s diagnosis and its undisputed impact on his

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ability to parent the children. Following the termination hearing,

father acknowledged, through his counsel’s closing argument, that

father’s treatment plan “was never designed to rehabilitate him as a

parent, because he cannot be, based on terminal illness.” See

People in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (“An error affects a

substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the

error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself.’”) (citation omitted); see also

§ 19-3-507(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (“If one or both of the parents have a

disability, reasonable accommodations and modifications, as set

forth in the [ADA] . . . , are necessary to ensure the treatment plan

components are accessible.”); People in Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d

727, 730 (Colo. App. 1981) (“The sole purpose of the treatment

plan . . . is to reunite a parent and child in the kind of relationship

which will be beneficial to both, under conditions which are

designed to eliminate those factors which necessitated society’s

intrusion into the family in the first instance.”).

¶ 18 Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern

no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Department

made reasonable efforts.

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IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 19 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time because,

in her view, she made substantial progress in her treatment plan

objectives. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 20 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders him

or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in

Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable

parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide

nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs. People in

Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A parent’s

noncompliance with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a

lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore,

may also be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest

of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 21 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

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parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific

and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at

¶ 25. But a “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 22 Mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) maintain

caseworker contact; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation to

determine the most appropriate course of treatment; (3) cooperate

with all requested urinalysis (UA) tests; (4) maintain and budget

legal income to meet her financial obligations; (5) complete a mental

health evaluation and comply with all treatment recommendations;

(6) attend family time; and (7) provide a safe, stable, and suitable

residence for the children.

¶ 23 The juvenile court found that, although mother had made

some progress on her treatment plan, she did not reasonably

comply with the plan overall and continued to exhibit the same

concerns that originally necessitated the Department’s involvement

with the family. Therefore, the court found mother to be unfit. The

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court further determined that mother could not become fit within a

reasonable time because she had not progressed beyond supervised

family time or demonstrated her sobriety or the ability to manage

her anger over the course of the two-year-long case.

¶ 24 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

Department asked mother to submit to random, weekly UAs. But

mother submitted only a small percentage of her required UAs

during the last year of the case. Mother’s therapist expressed

concern that mother was not complying with required UA testing

and that mother had sent a threatening email to Ja.C.’s guardian

ad litem one week before the final day of the termination hearing.

The therapist agreed that mother “still ha[d] a lot of work to do”

regarding impulse control, coping skills, and anger management.

¶ 25 The caseworker testified that, over the course of the

two-year-long case, mother had not maintained stable employment,

shown sustained sobriety, or demonstrated the ability to use coping

skills or tools to manage her anger. Therefore, the caseworker

opined that mother was unlikely to become fit if given more time.

¶ 26 Even so, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because

she made “significant improvements” in managing her mental

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health needs, consistently attended family time, and had a strong

relationship with the children. To be sure, the court recognized

that mother had done some work during the case, and it

commended her ongoing participation in mental health treatment

and family time. Nevertheless, the court found, with record

support, that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable

time based, in large part, on her lack of progress in the key areas of

substance use and anger management. It is not our role to reweigh

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile

court. See id. at ¶ 29. And because the record supports the court’s

findings, we have no basis to disturb them. See id. We therefore

reject mother’s assertion.

V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 27 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. We are

not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 28 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In

considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give

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primary consideration to the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other

things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be

beneficial to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to

care for the child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA

195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see

People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009);

and (3) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, see

People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 29 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the children’s

best interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination.

Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 30 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

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instead finds that termination is in the children’s best interests, we

are bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its

findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 31 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to

termination but found that none of them would meet the children’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs. In so finding, the

court considered the foster parents’ preference for adoption, the

children’s wishes, mother’s ongoing struggles with substance use

and anger management, and any benefit to the children of

continuing their relationships with the parents.

¶ 32 The record supports these findings. The caseworker reported

that visiting father was difficult for the children, in part, due to his

declining short-term memory and lack of consistent engagement

with the children during visits. And mother continued to involve

the children in inappropriate conversations during family time. The

caseworker testified that she and the children’s guardian ad litem

discussed the option of an APR with the children several times over

the course of the proceedings. But the children consistently

expressed feeling unsafe when discussing an APR and potential

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return to mother’s home. And, due to his dementia and terminal

illness, father acknowledged throughout the case that he could not

be a custodial parent for the children. Overall, the caseworker

opined that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination

and that termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶ 33 Moreover, the caseworker testified that she had discussed

various permanency options with the foster parents on multiple

occasions, and the foster parents preferred termination and

eventual adoption over an APR. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300

P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011); see also People in Interest of P.D.,

580 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. App. 1978) (noting that a court cannot

enter an APR to an unwilling party who is not the child’s parent).

Contrary to mother’s arguments, the lack of direct testimony from

the foster parents and there being no evidence that the foster

parents would have had “the children removed from their home if

they were not immediately allowed to adopt” do not, on their own,

require the court to find that an APR was a viable less drastic

alternative. Rather, as detailed above, in assessing whether an APR

was viable the court properly considered numerous factors together

with the foster parents’ preference for adoption. See Z.M., ¶ 29.

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¶ 34 True, as both parents point out, an APR would have preserved

the children’s relationships with the parents. But that is just one

factor for the court to consider in analyzing whether any less drastic

alternatives are viable. See A.R., ¶ 38. And after considering the

evidence presented, including testimony from the family time

supervisor regarding the children’s bond and relationship with both

parents and father’s two expert witnesses regarding the benefits of

an APR over termination and adoption, the juvenile court

determined that termination was in the children’s best interests.

The parents’ arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence

and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we

cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 35 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination, which was in

the children’s best interests, we must accept its determination. See

B.H., ¶ 80.

VI. Disposition

¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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