Peo v. Bobian

24CA1327 Peo v Bobian 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1327
El Paso County District Court No. 14CR1322
Honorable Jessica Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Michael Conrad Bobian,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Fox, J., concurs
Sullivan, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Janet Kinniry, Alternate Defense Counsel, Gardner, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Michael Conrad Bobian, appeals the postconviction

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction

relief after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 T.D. gave her two children, four-year-old P.D. and six-year-old

C.D., to Bobian for an overnight visit. When Bobian did not return

the children, T.D. spoke with Bobian. He said that he was not

bringing the children back because P.D. had been touched

inappropriately. T.D. contacted the police, who obtained and

executed an arrest warrant at Bobian’s home, where officers found

the children unharmed.

¶3 The prosecution charged Bobian with two counts of second

degree kidnapping, one for each child. See § 18-3-302(2), C.R.S.

2025. The prosecution later amended the complaint to add three

habitual criminal counts for prior felony convictions. See

§ 18-1.3-801(2), C.R.S. 2025. Bobian pleaded not guilty and

proceeded to a jury trial.

¶4 Bobian asked the trial court to instruct the jury on a choice of

evils affirmative defense, asserting that P.D. had alleged sexual

1
abuse by T.D.’s boyfriend and that Bobian had not returned the

children because he was concerned about their safety. See

§ 18-1-702, C.R.S. 2025 (defining the choice of evils affirmative

defense). The court agreed to give a choice of evils instruction with

respect to P.D., but it declined to give one regarding C.D. because

C.D. had not alleged any sexual abuse. After hearing the evidence,

the jury acquitted Bobian on the charge of kidnapping P.D., but it

found him guilty of kidnapping C.D. The court then adjudicated

Bobian a habitual criminal and, after conducting an abbreviated

proportionality review, sentenced him to twenty-four years in

prison.

¶5 Bobian appealed and asserted, among other things, that the

trial court erred by denying him an extended proportionality review

of his sentence. A division of this court rejected his appellate

contentions, affirming the judgment and sentence. See People v.

Bobian, (Colo. App. No. 16CA1999, Nov. 7, 2019) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶6 Bobian then filed a timely pro se Rule 35(c) motion. The

postconviction court appointed counsel for Bobian, and counsel

2
filed a supplemental motion. After holding an evidentiary hearing,

the court denied Bobian’s Rule 35(c) claims in a written order.

II. Analysis

¶7 Bobian contends that the postconviction court erred when it

denied his Rule 35(c) motion. Specifically, he asserts that the

postconviction court erred by not (1) granting him a new

proportionality review or finding that his appellate counsel should

have raised new supreme court precedent as part of his appeal;

(2) finding that his counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a

plea offer to him; and (3) finding that his counsel was ineffective for

certain actions taken before and during trial. We agree in part.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 We review the denial of a Rule 35(c) motion after a hearing as

a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33,

¶ 25. We defer to the postconviction court’s factual findings if

supported by the record, but we review de novo the court’s ultimate

conclusions on performance and prejudice. People v. Sharp, 2019

COA 133, ¶ 12. The court determines the weight and credibility to

give witness testimony in a Rule 35(c) hearing. People v. Hardin,

2016 COA 175, ¶ 39. Accordingly, “[w]here the evidence in the

3
record supports the findings and holding of the postconviction court

that presided over an evidentiary hearing, the judgment will not be

disturbed on review.” People v. Wardell, 2020 COA 47, ¶ 27.

¶9 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the

defendant must establish that (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defendant, meaning that a reasonable probability exists that,

but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-96 (1984); Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062-63 (Colo.

2007); see also People v. Long, 126 P.3d 284, 286 (Colo. App. 2005)

(“To demonstrate [ineffective assistance of appellate counsel], the

defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he or she would have prevailed on the appeal.”). A

postconviction court may reject an ineffective assistance claim if the

defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or

prejudice. See People v. Aguilar, 2012 COA 181, ¶ 9.

4
B. Proportionality Review and
Ineffectiveness Under Wells-Yates

¶ 10 Bobian asserts that the postconviction court erred by denying

his request for a new proportionality review in light of Wells-Yates v.

People, 2019 CO 90M. In the alternative, Bobian asserts that the

court erred by denying his claim that his appellate attorney was

ineffective in his direct appeal for failing to file a notice of

supplemental authority, a request for supplemental briefing, or a

petition for rehearing after the supreme court announced Wells-

Yates. We disagree with his first contention, but we agree with the

second.

¶ 11 The Eighth Amendment protects defendants from sentences

that are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. Id. at ¶ 5.

Accordingly, a defendant is entitled, on request, to a proportionality

review of a sentence under the habitual criminal statute. McDonald

v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 11. In the first stage — an abbreviated

proportionality review — a court considers the gravity or

seriousness of the offense in relation to the harshness of the

penalty. Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 10-11. If the abbreviated review gives rise

to an inference of gross disproportionality, then the court will

5
“proceed to the second stage, known as an extended proportionality

review.” McDonald, ¶ 14.

¶ 12 In Wells-Yates, the supreme court clarified existing law on

proportionality reviews. Among other things, the supreme court

explained that when conducting an abbreviated proportionality

review “the court must consider each triggering offense and the

predicate offenses together and determine whether, in combination,

they are so lacking in gravity or seriousness as to raise an inference

that the sentence imposed on that triggering offense is grossly

disproportionate.” Wells-Yates, ¶ 2. The supreme court also held

that, “in determining the gravity or seriousness of the triggering

offense and the predicate offenses, the court should consider any

relevant legislative amendments enacted after the dates of those

offenses, even if the amendments do not apply retroactively.” Id.

¶ 13 In this case, the trial court adjudicated Bobian a habitual

criminal and sentenced him to twenty-four years in prison based on

three prior convictions: (1) attempted criminal trespass in 2001;

(2) criminal mischief in 2002; and (3) attempted theft of $500 to

$15,000 in 2006. After an abbreviated proportionality review, the

court determined that Bobian’s sentence did not give rise to an

6
inference of gross disproportionality and declined to conduct an

extended proportionality review.

¶ 14 On direct appeal, Bobian asserted that the trial court had

erred by declining to conduct an extended proportionality review.

See Bobian, No. 16CA1999, slip op. at ¶ 28. After considering the

facts of Bobian’s predicate offenses, the division concluded that,

while none of the prior convictions were for crimes deemed grave or

serious, the “underlying actions in his predicate offenses [were]

grave and serious.” Id. at ¶ 38. For example, the division noted

that the facts alleged in two of the cases supported a charge of

burglary, which, at that time, constituted a per se grave or serious

offense. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 15 At the evidentiary hearing, Bobian’s appellate expert testified

that, considering that Wells-Yates was announced a few days before

the announcement of Bobian’s appeal, the attorney should have

either (1) filed a notice of supplemental authority, see C.A.R. 28(i);

(2) asked to submit supplemental briefing, see C.A.R. 27(a); or

(3) petitioned for rehearing, see C.A.R. 40(a). The expert also

testified that “if you run the [division’s] analysis of the

proportionality challenge through Well-Yates, you very likely end up

7
in a different place.” Among other things, the expert said that

second degree burglary was no longer per se grave and serious and

the division “completely ignore[d] the legislative changes,” even

though they were raised by Bobian’s appellate attorney. The expert

witness testified that Bobian’s class 4 felony criminal mischief

conviction had been reclassified to a class 6 felony, while his class 5

attempted felony theft conviction had been reclassified to a class 2

misdemeanor.

¶ 16 The postconviction court denied Bobian’s request for a new

proportionality review because he raised the proportionality of his

sentence on direct appeal, and Rule 35(c)(3)(VI) required it to deny

any claim that was raised and resolved in a direct appeal. The

court also determined that the exceptions in Rule 35(c)(3)(VI)(a)-(b)

did not apply. Because his claim did not involve newly discovered

evidence and Wells-Yates did not announce a new substantive rule,

see McDonald, ¶ 34, we agree. We therefore discern no basis to

reverse this decision.

¶ 17 As to Bobian’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claim, the postconviction court determined that Bobian failed to

establish any prejudice from his appellate counsel’s failure to

8
submit supplemental authority, ask for supplemental briefing, or

petition for rehearing. In support, the court determined that

(1) “the standard articulated in Wells-Yates and the standard used

by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the proportionality of

[Bobian’s] sentence were nearly identical,” and (2) “the Court of

Appeals was presented with subsequent legislative changes.”

¶ 18 We disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion on this

point. Although the division conducted the proportionality review

by considering Bobian’s triggering and predicate offenses together

to determine whether they were so lacking in gravity or seriousness

as to raise an inference of gross disproportionality, the division’s

analysis would likely have been different under Wells-Yates. First,

in light of Wells-Yates, second degree burglary is no longer

considered per se grave or serious. See People v. Session, 2020

COA 158, ¶ 49. Second, even though Bobian’s appellate attorney

presented evidence of the legislative changes, nothing in the opinion

suggests that the division considered those changes in reaching its

9
decision.1 See Wells-Yates, ¶ 53 (concluding that, because the

division did not consider the statutory changes, it erred).2

¶ 19 We therefore conclude that the postconviction court erred by

determining that Bobian had failed to establish prejudice because a

reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the appeal would

have been different. See Long, 126 P.3d at 286. We reach this

conclusion because, following Wells-Yates, divisions of this court

have frequently reversed or vacated sentences and remanded cases

for a new proportionality review under similar circumstances. See,

e.g., People v. Caime, 2021 COA 134, ¶ 57 (remanding to the trial

court for a new proportionality review where the predicate offenses

1 The partial dissent correctly notes that Bobian didn’t specifically

raise legislative changes in his appellate briefs. However, the
legislative changes were argued to the postconviction court, which
relied on the legislative changes being presented to the division on
direct appeal as a justification for concluding that the division’s
analysis wouldn’t have changed under Wells-Yates v. People, 2019
CO 90M. Thus, the legislative changes are a key part of the court’s
rationale in the order challenged on appeal. We therefore
respectfully disagree that the legislative changes cannot serve as
one of the bases for reversal. Moreover, we may “notice any error
appearing of record.” C.A.R. 1(d).

2 The People assert that the relevant statutory changes were

“intended merely to account for inflation.” But the People don’t cite
any authority that these types of changes aren’t nonetheless
relevant under Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M.

10
were not considered per se grave and serious after Wells-Yates);

People v. Tran, 2020 COA 99, ¶ 97-101 (remanding, in part,

because the trial court did not consider subsequent legislative

amendments, and it considered a second degree burglary conviction

as per se grave and serious).

¶ 20 Finally, although the postconviction court questioned whether

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient under the

circumstances, it did not definitively rule on whether Bobian’s

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to raise

Well-Yates.3 See Aguilar, ¶ 9. Because the question of whether

appellate counsel performed deficiently requires additional

factfinding, which is not our role, see People v. A.W., 982 P.2d 842,

852 (Colo. 1999), we must reverse and remand the order to the

postconviction court for further findings and conclusions.

3 The postconviction court was, in part, skeptical that appellate

counsel should have addressed Wells-Yates in the three day window
between when it was announced and the announcement of the
division’s opinion in Bobian’s direct appeal. Regardless, counsel
would have had an additional fourteen days after the division’s
opinion was announced to file a petition for rehearing or move for
additional time to do so. See C.A.R. 40(a)(1).

11
C. Ineffectiveness for Failing
to Present Plea Negotiations

¶ 21 Bobian contends that the postconviction court erred by

denying his claim that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to

present him with favorable plea offers. We disagree.

¶ 22 If a plea offer is extended to a defendant through counsel but

counsel fails to convey the offer to the defendant, the deficient

performance prong under Strickland is met even if the defendant

received a fair trial. See People v. Perry, 68 P.3d 472, 477 (Colo.

App. 2002); see also People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶ 17 (“Failure

to correctly advise a defendant about [a plea offer] deprives the

defendant of the opportunity to make a reasonably informed

decision whether to accept or reject an offer and constitutes

deficient performance under Strickland.”). To establish prejudice,

the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s failure to convey the plea offer, he would have

accepted the plea offer rather than going to trial. See Carmichael v.

People, 206 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2009), overruled on other grounds

by, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).

12
¶ 23 At the hearing, Bobian maintained that the prosecution had

tendered two plea offers to his attorney, but his attorney did not

present either of those offers to him. The two purported offers and

the court’s ruling were as follows:

• Offer 1: Bobian would plead guilty to false imprisonment, a

class 5 felony with a stipulated sentence of four years in

prison with two years parole.

• Offer 2: A plea agreement that would result in a term of

probation.

• After hearing the evidence, the postconviction court found

that plea counsel presented Offer 1 to Bobian, but he

rejected it. The court also found that, contrary to Bobian’s

assertion, the prosecution never made Offer 2. Rather, the

court concluded that, when counsel mentioned Offer 2

during his attorney disciplinary case, he was referring to

Offer 1. Specifically, the court found that “[t]he

discrepancies in trial counsel’s later recollection of whether

the offer was an offer which would have resulted in

probation rather than parole can be explained by the

passage of time.” The court also determined that, even if

13
counsel failed to properly convey a plea agreement, the

evidence did not support a conclusion that Bobian would

have accepted a plea agreement.

¶ 24 We cannot disturb this determination because the record

supports the postconviction court’s findings. See Wardell, ¶ 27;

Hardin, ¶ 39; see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly

erroneous.”). The prosecution submitted proposed plea paperwork

that described Offer 1. In pertinent part, Bobian’s trial attorney

testified that he presented Bobian with Offer 1, but Bobian rejected

the offer because “he felt he was innocent” and did not want to be

subject to any supervision by either parole or probation. Bobian’s

attorney also testified that he could not remember whether the plea

offer included a probation term rather than a parole term, but he

clarified that there was only one offer and that offer “would have

been no jail time.” And Bobian did not present any evidence beyond

his own testimony that the prosecution had ever tendered an offer

involving probation.

14
D. Ineffective Preparation and
Performance of Counsel at Trial

¶ 25 Bobian argues that the postconviction court erred by denying

his claims that trial counsel was ineffective in counsel’s preparation

for and performance during the trial. Specifically, Bobian asserted

that his attorney (1) failed to properly investigate the case because

he did not interview T.D. or the children’s grandmother, R.H.;

(2) did not prepare him to testify at trial, and during his testimony,

did not assist him on direct examination or object during cross-

examination; and (3) improperly elicited prejudicial statements —

which the trial court had already precluded before trial — about a

relationship between him and T.D. when she was underage.

¶ 26 The postconviction court did not determine whether any of

these acts constituted deficient performance. Instead, the court

found that, even if counsel performed deficiently, none of the errors

could have impacted the outcome of the case because Bobian

“admitted to the crimes charged” when he decided to present a

choice of evils affirmative defense.

¶ 27 We disagree because it is undisputed that the trial court

allowed Bobian to present the affirmative defense of choice of evils

15
only with respect to P.D., and the jury found Bobian not guilty of

kidnapping P.D. As to C.D., Bobian did not “admit[] to the crimes

charged,” as the postconviction court found. Rather, Bobian

attempted to establish that he did not intend to keep or conceal

C.D. from her mother and that her mother was an unreliable

witness. Therefore, we are not convinced by the postconviction

court’s reasoning that, even if counsel performed deficiently, these

errors could not have impacted the outcome of the case. See People

v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 20 (noting that the reasonable

probability standard is a “probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome” and is a lower standard than

preponderance of the evidence).

¶ 28 Because the postconviction court did not rule on whether

Bobian’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, we must also

reverse and remand this part of the order to the postconviction

court for further findings and conclusions. See A.W., 982 P.2d at

852; Aguilar, ¶ 9.

E. Claim Raised for the First Time on Appeal

¶ 29 Bobian asserts, for the first time, that the prosecution failed to

disclose statements made by T.D. Because this issue is not

16
properly before us, we decline to address it. See People v. Goldman,

923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Allegations not raised in a

[Rule] 35(c) motion or during the hearing on that motion and thus

not ruled on by the trial court are not properly before this court for

review.”).

F. Abandoned Claims

¶ 30 Any claims that Bobian raised in his postconviction motion, in

his supplemental motion, or at the hearing but did not reassert in

this appeal are abandoned. See People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801

(Colo. App. 2007).

III. Disposition

¶ 31 The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is

remanded to the postconviction court for it to reconsider whether

Bobian has established ineffective assistance of his trial or appellate

counsel in the areas discussed, supra Part II.B and Part II.D.

JUDGE FOX concurs.

17
JUDGE SULLIVAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 32 I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned decision except for its

conclusion in Part II.B to reverse in part. Specifically, I disagree

with the majority that the postconviction court erred when it denied

Bobian’s claim that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to raise Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M. In my

view, no reasonable probability exists that the division that heard

Bobian’s direct appeal would have ruled differently had his

appellate attorney brought Wells-Yates to the division’s attention. I

therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse

the postconviction court’s order on that issue.

I. Additional Background

¶ 33 Bobian initially raised an Eighth Amendment proportionality

argument with the trial court, prior to his direct appeal. That court

conducted an abbreviated proportionality review and concluded his

sentence wasn’t grossly disproportionate.

¶ 34 On November 4, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court

announced its decision in Wells-Yates, seeking to “clarify” the

proportionality framework for habitual sentences in Colorado.

Wells-Yates, ¶ 25; see also McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶¶ 29-

18
34 (holding Wells-Yates didn’t announce a new substantive rule but

merely clarified how to evaluate the proportionality of a habitual

sentence).

¶ 35 Three days later, the division of this court considering

Bobian’s direct appeal affirmed his sentence without mentioning

Wells-Yates. See People v. Bobian, slip op. at ¶¶ 42-43 (Colo. App.

No. 16CA1999, Nov. 7, 2019) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(e)). While conducting a fact-based assessment of the gravity and

seriousness of Bobian’s offenses as a whole, the division noted in a

single sentence that the facts underlying two of his three predicate

offenses — his 2002 criminal mischief conviction and his 2006

attempted theft conviction — would have supported a burglary

charge, which was considered a per se grave and serious offense

before Wells-Yates. Id. at ¶ 40 (citing People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d

30, 37 (Colo. 1992)).

¶ 36 Bobian then filed a petition for postconviction relief under

Crim. P. 35(c), claiming his direct appeal counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to raise Wells-Yates. In a thorough

order, the postconviction court rejected Bobian’s claim, concluding

that Bobian failed to prove prejudice. The court reasoned that the

19
proportionality standard articulated by Wells-Yates and the

standard applied by the division on direct appeal were “nearly

identical.”

II. Second Degree Burglary

¶ 37 The majority concludes that a reasonable probability exists

that the division considering Bobian’s direct appeal wouldn’t have

affirmed his sentence had it considered Wells-Yates. It notes that,

after Wells-Yates, second degree burglary is no longer designated as

grave or serious per se, Wells-Yates, ¶ 65 n.17, and yet the division

partially relied on that designation when assessing the gravity and

seriousness of two of Bobian’s predicate offenses. On the record

before us, I see no reversible error.

¶ 38 In Bobian’s direct appeal, the division analyzed Bobian’s

conduct that led to his convictions and concluded that, while none

of Bobian’s offenses were per se grave or serious, his “underlying

actions” were “grave and serious.” Bobian, No. 16CA1999, slip op.

at ¶¶ 38-41; cf. Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89, ¶ 25 (while theft isn’t

per se grave or serious, it may rise to a grave or serious offense

based on “the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular

crime committed”). No one claims that Wells-Yates altered how a

20
court analyzes whether a defendant’s particular conduct amounts

to a grave or serious offense. And as the postconviction court

observed, the division in Bobian’s direct appeal adhered to the

established standard. Indeed, by “consider[ing] ‘the harm caused or

threatened to the victim or to society and the culpability of the

offender,’” Bobian, No. 16CA1999, slip op. at ¶ 32 (citation omitted),

the division applied the same standard recited in Wells-Yates, see

Wells-Yates, ¶ 12 (“[C]ourts should consider ‘the harm caused or

threatened to the victim or society,’ as well as ‘the culpability of the

offender.’” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983))).

¶ 39 Moreover, while I agree that the division noted that Bobian’s

underlying conduct in two of his predicate offenses supported a

burglary charge (which constituted a per se grave or serious offense

before Wells-Yates), I don’t believe the division’s ultimate conclusion

depended on that premise. As I read it, the division determined

that Bobian’s predicate offenses were grave or serious because, in

each case, Bobian “entered a dwelling that was not his own without

permission . . . [when] a resident of the dwelling was home,” which

“would reasonably cause residents to have a heightened sense of

alarm, resulting in an increased potential for violence.” Bobian, No.

21
16CA1999, slip op. at ¶ 39. Again, that type of fact-specific

analysis is consistent with Wells-Yates. See Wells-Yates, ¶ 12. I’m

unaware of any case in Colorado in which an appellate court has

reversed or vacated a sentence for a new proportionality review

based on an offense no longer qualifying as a per se grave or serious

crime when the lower court also performed a factual analysis of the

underlying conduct and determined that the defendant’s offense, as

committed, was grave or serious.

¶ 40 Finally, neither Wells-Yates nor the majority’s analysis impacts

the division’s conclusion that Bobian’s triggering offense and his

2001 predicate offense were factually grave or serious as

committed. See Bobian, No. 16CA1999, slip op. at ¶ 41. Once a

court determines that an offense is grave or serious, “any review [of

the harshness of the penalty] is substantially circumscribed

because the legislature’s establishment of the harshness of the


The majority cites People v. Caime, 2021 COA 134, and People v.
Tran, 2020 COA 99, to support its decision to reverse and remand.
But in both cases, the divisions remanded for a new proportionality
review because the trial courts’ designations of certain offenses as
per se grave or serious were no longer correct after Wells-Yates. See
Caime, ¶¶ 47-48; Tran, ¶¶ 96-103. Unlike the division’s analysis
here on direct appeal, no fact-specific analysis occurred in either
Caime or Tran.

22
penalty deserves great deference.” Wells-Yates, ¶ 62. This, too,

suggests the division wouldn’t have changed its decision had it

considered Wells-Yates.

¶ 41 Given all this, I don’t perceive a reasonable probability that the

division would have altered its proportionality conclusion had Wells-

Yates been brought to its attention. See People v. Long, 126 P.3d

284, 286 (Colo. App. 2005).

III. Legislative Changes

¶ 42 The majority also points out that the division in Bobian’s

direct appeal didn’t consider intervening legislative changes as

Wells-Yates requires. But Bobian doesn’t mention any legislative

changes in either his opening or reply brief, much less develop any

argument supporting reversal based on such changes.

¶ 43 In light of his limited argument, I wouldn’t rely on unspecified

legislative changes as a basis for reversing the postconviction

court’s judgment. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“[W]e

adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the

parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the

role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”); People v. Larsen,

2023 COA 28, ¶ 19 n.4 (declining to consider “conclusory and

23
insufficiently developed” arguments regarding sentencing in an

appeal from a postconviction proceeding).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 44 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

decision to reverse in Part II.B.

24