Peo v. Cumberbatch

23CA1345 Peo v Cumberbatch 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1345
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR20010
Honorable Alex C. Myers, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Steven Cumberbatch,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kira L. Suyeishi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Steven Cumberbatch, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree

murder after deliberation. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Evidence introduced at Cumberbatch’s trial would have

allowed the jury to find the following facts.

¶3 On December 2, 1994, the victim, Rita Desjardine, rented a

room at the Broadway Plaza Motel. Three days later, on December

5, a housekeeper saw Desjardine alive in her room with a Black

man.

¶4 At 11 a.m. on December 6, the housekeeper knocked on

Desjardine’s door but received no answer. Later, the housekeeper

knocked again and after receiving no answer, she used her passkey

to enter the room. She saw a woman’s feet on the bed. The

housekeeper assumed the woman was sleeping and closed the door.

The next morning, when the housekeeper and her coworker

received no answer after they knocked on Desjardine’s door, they

again opened the door and saw a woman in the same position as

the day before. They left and reported what they had seen to their

manager, who called the police.

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¶5 After first responders arrived, Desjardine — who was lying on

the bed on her back, naked, bloody, and partially covered with a

blanket — was pronounced dead at the scene.

¶6 The autopsy revealed that Desjardine had sustained

significant injuries: a laceration and bruising on the back of her

head caused by blunt force trauma with a “hard rigid object”;

bruising to the areas around her eyes and her eyelids, neck, hands,

armpit areas, and lower breastbone area, all caused by blunt force

trauma; petechial hemorrhaging of her eyes and eyelids; “through

and through” lacerations of her lips “caused by pressure from the

front of the mouth forcing the lips into and tearing along the teeth”;

extensive hemorrhaging of her tongue due to it being bitten down

on; scrapes to her face, neck, and hands; and hemorrhaging of her

genital area. Desjardine also had fluid in her lungs and an enlarged

liver. The medical examiner concluded that the cause of

Desjardine’s death was asphyxiation by smothering, and the

manner of her death was homicide.

¶7 During the initial investigation in 1994, five people were

named as possible suspects but were ultimately excluded.

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¶8 The case remained unsolved until, in 2018, the cold case unit

identified Cumberbatch as a possible suspect.1 Subsequent

reprocessing of some of the evidence in the case linked

Cumberbatch to the crime scene. Specifically, his DNA was found

on a detached table leg next to the bed; on a metal brace for the

detached table leg; in hairs discovered on Desjardine’s body; on a

pair of shorts next to the bed; on a gin bottle in the room; in

Desjardine’s oral, vaginal, and anal swabs; and in Desjardine’s

fingernail scrapings. The DNA evidence also eliminated the five

original potential suspects from further investigation. Additionally,

Cumberbatch’s fingerprints and palmprint were found on the metal

brace and on the bedsheet on which Desjardine’s body was found.

¶9 The prosecution charged Cumberbatch with first degree

murder after deliberation and first degree felony murder predicated

on sexual assault.

1 The jury only heard that the cold case unit “received some new

investigative information stating that Mr. Cumberbatch was a
possible suspect in this case.” However, during a pretrial hearing,
testimony established that in 2018, the unit was notified when DNA
from this case matched with Cumberbatch’s DNA from the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database. At the time,
Cumberbatch was serving a sentence for a felony conviction in
Virginia.

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¶ 10 Cumberbatch asserted an alternate suspect theory at trial and

argued that the forensic evidence was explained by the fact that he

and Desjardine had consensual sex. He maintained, however, that

he did not kill her.

¶ 11 The jury acquitted Cumberbatch of felony murder but

convicted him of first degree murder after deliberation. The trial

court sentenced him to life in prison without parole, to be served

consecutively to the sentence he was serving in Virginia.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 Cumberbatch contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence

that he acted with the required intent for first degree murder;

(2) the trial court erred by rejecting his tendered implicit bias jury

instruction; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors requires

reversal. We address each contention in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 13 Cumberbatch first argues that there was insufficient evidence

to allow the jury to conclude that he acted after deliberation and

with intent. We disagree.

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1. Standard of Review

¶ 14 “In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove every element

of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v.

Vidauri, 2021 CO 25, ¶ 10. In reviewing challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de novo to

determine whether the direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a

conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63.

“[V]erdicts in criminal cases may not be based on guessing,

speculation, or conjecture.” People v. Procasky, 2019 COA 181,

¶ 18. However, we “may not serve as a thirteenth juror and

consider whether [we] might have reached a different conclusion

than the jury.” People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 33. Thus, we will

disturb the verdict only if, despite drawing every reasonable

inference in favor of the prosecution, the record is insubstantial and

insufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10.

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2. Applicable Law

¶ 15 In relevant part, the first degree murder statute provides, “A

person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if[,] . . .

[a]fter deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a

person other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of

another person.” § 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 16 “A person acts ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent’ when his

conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the

statute defining the offense.” § 18-1-501(5), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 17 “The term ‘after deliberation’ means not only intentionally but

also that the decision to commit the act has been made after the

exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the act.”

§ 18-3-101(3), C.R.S. 2025. “An act committed after deliberation is

never one which has been committed in a hasty or impulsive

manner.” Id. “The length of time required for deliberation,

however, is not long.” People v. Sanchez, 253 P.3d 1260, 1262

(Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 18 Deliberation and intent can often only be proved through

circumstantial or indirect evidence. People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 32,

¶ 36; People v. Dist. Ct., 926 P.2d 567, 571 (Colo. 1996). Intent may

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be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, People v. Tucker, 232 P.3d

194, 201 (Colo. App. 2009), or the fact that the defendant actually

completed the prohibited act, Johnson, ¶ 36. And “[t]he

circumstances surrounding a victim’s death may permit the

reasonable inference that the defendant had adequate time for the

exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the fatal act.” Dist.

Ct., 926 P.2d at 571.

3. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Establish Cumberbatch
Acted with Intent and After Deliberation

¶ 19 The circumstantial evidence presented here was sufficient to

establish that Cumberbatch acted with intent and after

deliberation. The jury heard evidence that Desjardine sustained

significant injuries to her head, face, mouth, neck, chest, and

hands from blunt force trauma and smothering. See People v.

Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242 (Colo. 1983) (The “nature and

number” of the victim’s wounds permitted the inference that the

attack “continued even after she had been rendered helpless,”

thereby establishing deliberation for first degree murder.). The

medical examiner testified that the cause of Desjardine’s death was

asphyxia by smothering due to the application of force sufficient to

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cause the severe injuries to her mouth, lips, and tongue, as well as

the fluid in her lungs and petechiae in her eyes. The large amount

of blood from the head lacerations and the petechiae in her eyes

both occurred before her death while she was being beaten and

smothered. The medical examiner also said that, if Desjardine had

been struggling, it would have taken “increasingly greater amounts

of force in order to accomplish” the asphyxia by smothering. See

People v. Solomon, 234 P.3d 501, 519 (Cal. 2010) (“From [the]

manner of [binding and asphyxiating the victims], the jury

reasonably could infer that [the] defendant had time to consider the

murderous nature of his actions.”). Moreover, the prohibited act

was completed. See Johnson, ¶ 36. Viewing this evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury

could have reasonably found that Cumberbatch carried out a

prolonged and highly forceful physical assault with the intent to kill

Desjardine and that, by the nature of her death, Cumberbatch

acted after exercising reflection and judgment.

¶ 20 Cumberbatch argues that the evidence was nevertheless

insufficient to show intent and deliberation because there was no

evidence that he (1) had animosity toward Desjardine; (2) had a

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motive to kill her; (3) threatened or menaced her; or (4) had a

relationship with or knew her before the killing. But while

additional proof of deliberation and intent can take these forms,

none of these things are required to prove first degree murder. See

People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 26 (Colo. 1981) (“Additional proof [of

deliberation] may take the form of enmity, hostility, jealousy, or

other manifestations of ill will between the accused and the victim.”

(emphasis added)); People v. Oliver, 2020 COA 150, ¶ 12 (“[P]roof of

motive[, including animosity,] is not necessary to prove the

commission of a crime.”); § 18-3-102(1)(a) (requiring only the death

of “a person other than” the defendant, without regard to the

relationship between the defendant and the victim, for first degree

murder). The prosecution did not need to prove that Cumberbatch

knew Desjardine or threatened her before intentionally and

deliberately killing her. Nor did they have to prove why

Cumberbatch intentionally and deliberately killed her. They only

had to prove that he did. See Oliver, ¶ 12. Even without evidence

of a motive, animosity, threats, or a relationship, for the reasons

above, a reasonable juror could examine the circumstances

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surrounding Desjardine’s death and infer that Cumberbatch acted

with intent and after deliberation. See id.

¶ 21 Cumberbatch also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to

establish deliberation because there was “no evidence that the

instrument that caused the blunt force trauma was not obtained

hastily.” But this argument is unavailing because the blunt force

trauma is not what caused Desjardine’s death: the asphyxiation by

smothering did. And there is sufficient evidence from which the

jurors could conclude that even if he had obtained the instrument

that caused the blunt force trauma hastily, he had time to act with

intent and deliberation before he completed the asphyxiation that

resulted in her death.

¶ 22 We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supports the

first degree murder conviction.

B. Implicit Bias Instruction

¶ 23 Cumberbatch next contends that the trial court erred by

rejecting his tendered implicit bias jury instruction. Again, we

disagree.

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1. Additional Facts

¶ 24 Defense counsel tendered an implicit bias jury instruction,

arguing that “race is an issue in this case and there’s a concern

about implicit bias” because Cumberbatch is a “[B]lack male” and

Desjardine was a “white woman.” The proposed instruction read as

follows:

The prosecution has charged Mr.
Cumberbatch, an African American man, with
a crime involving violence. One of the
unfortunate truths about our great country is
that many of us make unfair judgments about
others, especially people who do not share our
race or ethnicity. In this case, there is a risk
that you will assess the evidence offered in this
case and make your decision based on widely
believed but untrue stereotypes about Black
men and criminal or violent conduct. It would
violate the core principles of our justice system
to allow these stereotypes to impact you. I
implore you to resist any urge to reach a
verdict that is influenced by bias for or against
any party or witness and to make your
decision based solely on the evidence
presented.

¶ 25 The prosecutor objected to the instruction, asserting that

implicit bias was not a “huge point of contention” because the case

was solved forensically, and the jurors would already be instructed

to not allow bias or prejudice to influence their decision.

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¶ 26 The trial court rejected Cumberbatch’s instruction. It

reasoned that (1) the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions

(COLJI-Crim.) did not include an implicit bias instruction;

(2) COLJI-Crim. was comprehensive, “leaving little room for

additional instructions”; and (3) it would be duplicative since the

jurors would already be instructed to “not be influenced by

sympathy, bias, or prejudice in reaching their decisions.”

¶ 27 While the trial court declined to give Cumberbatch’s implicit

bias instruction, it did give the standard instruction regarding bias:

During the trial, you received all of the
evidence that you may properly consider in
deciding the case. Your decision must be
made by applying the rules of law that I give
you to the evidence presented at trial.
Remember, you must not be influenced by
sympathy, bias[,] or prejudice in reaching your
decision.

You should not allow bias or any kind of
prejudice based upon gender to influence your
decision.

COLJI-Crim. E:01 (2022).

¶ 28 Eight months after Cumberbatch was convicted, the Colorado

Supreme Court Model Criminal Jury Instructions Committee

published the 2023 COLJI-Crim., which added language regarding

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implicit bias to its instruction for “Introductory Remarks, Juror

Qualifications, and Jury Selection”:

You must also not be biased for or against the
defendant, any witness, or any other party
based on any identifying characteristic such as
race, religion, age, gender, gender identity,
gender expression, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, national origin, disability,
socioeconomic status, or any other such
characteristic. And you must guard against
unconscious bias (also called implicit bias).
Unconscious biases are stereotypes,
perceptions, attitudes, or preferences that
people may hold without being aware of them.
Such biases can affect how we evaluate
information and make decisions. You must
not allow unconscious bias to influence your
verdict.

COLJI-Crim. B:01 (2023).

2. Standard of Review

¶ 29 “We review jury instructions de novo, as a whole, to determine

whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law.”

People v. Toro-Ospina, 2023 COA 45, ¶ 41. But we review a trial

court’s decision whether to give a particular instruction for an

abuse of discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it

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misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Quillen, 2023 COA

22M, ¶ 14.

3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
by Rejecting the Instruction

¶ 30 Cumberbatch argues that his tendered implicit bias jury

instruction was necessary because “[i]t is indisputable that our

country has a long and tragic history of racism, and the ‘fear’ of

Black men perpetuating sexual assault against white women is

embedded in that history.” We recognize this point and the “tragic

history of punishing [B]lack men for sexual crimes against white

women much more severely than white men who committed the

same crimes.” People v. Robinson, 2017 COA 128M, ¶ 24, rev’d.

Nonetheless, under these facts, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by rejecting Cumberbatch’s instruction.

¶ 31 In Toro-Ospina, a division of this court addressed a pre-2023

implicit bias instruction. There, the defendant tendered an implicit

bias instruction due to concerns about bias against him for not

being a native English speaker and for needing an interpreter.

Toro-Ospina, ¶ 39. The proposed instruction read: “Unconscious

biases are stereotypes, attitudes, or preferences that people may

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consciously reject but may be expressed without conscious

awareness, control, or intention. Like conscious bias, unconscious

bias can affect how we evaluate information and make decisions.”

Id. at ¶ 42. The division determined that it was within the trial

court’s discretion to choose whether to provide the instruction

because neither the General Assembly nor the Colorado Supreme

Court had required an instruction containing that language. Id. at

¶¶ 46-47.

¶ 32 Despite Cumberbatch’s urgings to the contrary, we agree with

the division’s reasoning in Toro-Ospina and follow it here. In this

case, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the

tendered implicit bias instruction because no statute or case law

required one at the time. See id. at ¶ 47. Under these

circumstances, the court’s decision to reject an instruction it was

not required to give “fell within a range of reasonable options.” Id.

(quoting Vigil v. People, 2019 CO 105, ¶ 14). And the supreme

court did not add the new implicit bias instruction to COLJI-Crim.

until well after Cumberbatch was convicted. Accordingly, the trial

court’s instructions, as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the

governing law. Id. at ¶ 41.

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¶ 33 Moreover, though the trial court did not give Cumberbatch’s

tendered instruction, it did instruct the jurors not to allow bias or

prejudice to affect their decisions. And “we must presume that the

jury followed all of the court’s instructions.” Johnson v. People,

2019 CO 17, ¶ 16.2

¶ 34 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by rejecting Cumberbatch’s tendered implicit

bias instruction.

C. Cumulative Error

¶ 35 Finally, Cumberbatch contends that cumulative error

warrants reversal.

2 Though the trial court did not indicate it was rejecting

Cumberbatch’s tendered instruction based on its content, the
tendered instruction contained problematic language not present in
the 2023 COLJI-Crim. instructions or Toro-Ospina. Cumberbatch’s
proposed instruction included language that was argumentative
(“One of the unfortunate truths about our great country is that
many of us make unfair judgments about others, especially people
who do not share our race or ethnicity.”), inflammatory (“It would
violate the core principles of our justice system to allow these
stereotypes to impact you.”), and assumptive (“[T]here is a risk that
you will assess the evidence offered in this case and make your
decision based on widely believed but untrue stereotypes . . . .”).
And it suggested that the trial court was requesting a personal favor
by telling the jury, “I implore you to resist any urge . . . .” These
points bolster our conclusion that the court did not abuse its
discretion.

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¶ 36 “The doctrine of cumulative error is based on the notion that

multiple errors, in isolation, may be viewed as harmless, but the

synergistic effect of the multiple errors may be so prejudicial that

they deprive a defendant of a fair trial.” People v. Serna-Lopez, 2023

COA 21, ¶ 47. “Stated simply, cumulative error involves cumulative

prejudice.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. Therefore,

we must conduct a cumulative error analysis only when we have

identified multiple errors. See id.

¶ 37 Because we have not identified any errors, we reject

Cumberbatch’s cumulative error claim.

III. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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