Peo v. King

23CA1549 Peo v King 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1549
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5056
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Noel Lavertt King, Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Noel Lavertt King, Jr., appeals his conviction for

one count of first degree burglary and two counts of violation of a

protection order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, King was restrained by two protection orders that

prevented him from contacting his wife, contacting his two

daughters, or going near the family home. In the early morning of

September 3, King entered the home and assaulted the protected

parties. Police arrived after a 911 call and arrested King.

¶3 In relevant part, the charges brought against King included

violations of the protection orders and burglary by unlawfully

entering the home with the intent to violate the protection orders.

¶4 During trial, the court granted the prosecution’s request to

take judicial notice of the facts that King had been advised of the

two protection orders and that the protection orders remained

active on September 3.

¶5 The jury found King guilty of one count of first degree

burglary, two counts of violation of a protection order, and six

1
counts not raised on appeal.1 See § 18-4-202(1), C.R.S. 2025;

§ 18-6-803.5(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The trial court sentenced him to a

controlling sentence of twelve years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections.

II. Analysis

¶6 On appeal, King claims that the trial court (1) improperly took

judicial notice and (2) violated his due process rights. We consider

each contention in turn.

A. Improper Judicial Notice

¶7 King contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

taking judicial notice under CRE 201 of the adjudicative facts that

King had had actual knowledge of the two protection orders and

that the protection orders remained in effect on September 3, 2021.

We agree as to the former.

1 These unchallenged counts are two counts of child abuse, one

count of second degree assault, two counts of third degree assault,
and one count of obstruction of telephone or telegraph service. See
§ 18‑6‑401(1)(a), (7)(a)(III), (7)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑3‑203(1)(g),
C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑3‑204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑9‑306.5(1),
C.R.S. 2025. The jury also found King not guilty of one count of
child abuse, one count of second degree assault, two counts of third
degree assault, and one count of a crime of violence sentence
enhancer. See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(V); § 18-3-203(1)(g);
§ 18-3-204(1)(a); § 18‑1.3‑406(2)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.

2
1. Additional Background

¶8 During trial, the prosecution admitted into evidence two

mandatory protection orders against King, issued in El Paso County

Case Nos. 21M3966 and 21M2394 on July 28 and May 17, 2021,

respectively. The prosecutor noted that minute orders in each case

indicated that King had been advised of and had acknowledged

each protection order. In pertinent part, the protection orders

stated that they remained active until their respective cases reached

a disposition, which occurred in both cases on April 21, 2022. Both

cases were sealed shortly after that date.

¶9 At the end of the prosecution’s case and outside the presence

of the jury, the prosecutor moved the trial court to take judicial

notice of the minute orders from the prior cases. Defense counsel

objected, stating that judicial notice “has to be an undisputed fact.”

Defense counsel argued that the facts were disputed because the

court records were sealed and no witness had identified King as the

individual who was advised.

¶ 10 The trial court reviewed the court records and read the minute

orders aloud:

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[Case No. 21M3966:] Advised defendant via
video advisement. Defendant advised of
charges, possible penalties and mandatory
protection order on the record. Advised of
Senate Bill 13[-]197. Defendant acknowledged
[protection order], waives right to hearing on
the protection order provisions pertain[ing] to
S.B. 13[-]197. . . .

[Case No. 21M2394:] Advised of possible
penalties and mandatory protection order on
the record. Advised of Senate Bill 13[-]197.
Advised per House Bill 21-1255. Affidavit
provided set for compliance hearing.
Defendant acknowledged [protection order],
waives right to hearing on the protection order
provisions pertaining to S.B. 13[-]197 . . . .

(Emphasis added.) The court then overruled King’s objection and

ruled that it would take judicial notice of the facts contained in the

minute orders.

¶ 11 Defense counsel objected again and said that “the records

were not viewable because they are sealed” but also asked the court

“to take judicial notice of the dates [on which the cases] were

dismissed.” The court overruled her objection but granted her

request to include the dismissal dates.

¶ 12 At the end of the trial, the court provided the jury with the

following instruction on judicial notice and the court’s judicially

noticed facts from the minute orders:

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A party may ask the [c]ourt to take judicial
notice of certain facts. When the [c]ourt takes
judicial notice of a fact, it means that the
[c]ourt has allowed the fact into evidence
without requiring proof of it. You may, but are
not required to, accept any fact judicially
noticed by the [c]ourt. It is entirely your
decision to determine what weight, if any, shall
be given to the evidence.

In this case, the [c]ourt has taken judicial
notice of the following facts:

Regarding [the protection order in El Paso
County Case No. 21M3966]: On July 28, 2021,
the Defendant, Noel King, was advised of the
mandatory protection order and acknowledged
it. The mandatory protection order was still
active on September 2-3, 2021.

Regarding [the protection order in El Paso
County Case No. 21M2394]: On May 12, 2021,
the Defendant, Noel King, was advised of the
mandatory protection order and acknowledged
it. The mandatory protection order was still
active on September 2-3, 2021.

Both cases associated with the protection
orders . . . were dismissed on April 21, 2022.

¶ 13 The court further instructed the jury that, as an element of

first degree burglary, the prosecution had to prove that King

intentionally committed the crime of violation of a protection order.

And it instructed that one of the elements of violation of a

protection order was that King had “been personally served with a

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protection order that identified [King] as a restrained person, or

otherwise ha[d] acquired from the court or law enforcement

personnel actual knowledge of the contents of a protection order

that identified [King] as a restrained person.” See

§ 18-6-803.5(1)(a).

2. Standard of Review

¶ 14 We review a trial court’s decision to take judicial notice under

Rule 201 for an abuse of discretion. People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161,

¶ 22. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous

understanding or application of the law.” Id. (quoting People v.

Orozco, 210 P.3d 472, 475 (Colo. App. 2009)).

¶ 15 If a nonconstitutional trial error was preserved by objection,

we review it for harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12.

Under this standard, if we determine a trial court erred, we will

reverse the judgment only if the error “substantially influenced the

verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.” Id. (quoting

Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)). That means “an

objected-to trial error is harmless if there is no reasonable

6
possibility that it contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” Pernell

v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶ 22.

3. Applicable Law

¶ 16 Under Rule 201(b), a trial court may take judicial notice of a

fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” As it

relates to court files, a trial court can take judicial notice of

adjudicative facts in its own court records if those facts merely

establish “that various proceedings or actions have already taken

place.” Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, ¶ 12. This, for example, may

include “such things as a calendar date, the term of a public office,

and matters found in statistical charts.” Id. at ¶ 10.

¶ 17 However, the truth or accuracy of an adjudicative fact isn’t

indisputable just because it is specifically sourced from court

records. Id. Rather, a fact is indisputable if it is commonly

verifiable, meaning any error in the particular source “can be easily

demonstrated.” Id. While “the occurrence of [a] legal proceeding or

other court action itself” is commonly verifiable, “the resolution of a

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factual matter at issue in a prior judicial proceeding” is not, making

the latter adjudicative fact an improper subject for judicial notice.

Id. at ¶ 17.

4. Preservation

¶ 18 We are unconvinced by the People’s assertion that King failed

to preserve this issue by not directing the trial court to consider the

specific parameters of Doyle. King wasn’t required to cite case law

in his objection to preserve his issue for appellate review. See

People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 29 (holding that formulaic

language is not required for preservation). And King objected that

the minute orders weren’t “properly judicially noticed” because they

weren’t “undisputed,” which sufficiently called the court’s attention

to the issue. Further, defense counsel argued that there had “not

been any witnesses presented to identify the individual who was

advised as Mr. King” in the minute orders. After this exchange, the

court ruled on the propriety of the judicial notice, preserving the

contention for appeal. See People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 31

(“Where, despite imprecision in the objection, the trial court

actually rules on the claim raised on appeal, and makes findings of

fact and conclusions of law, the claim is sufficiently preserved.”).

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5. Improper Judicial Notice of King’s
Knowledge of the Protection Orders

¶ 19 As to the substance of his contention, King argues that the

following were not judicially noticeable facts under Doyle: (1) King

had been advised of and had acknowledged the protection orders,

and (2) the protection orders remained active when the charged

crimes occurred.

¶ 20 Regarding whether “the Defendant, Noel King,” was present for

the advisement and acknowledgment of the protection orders, the

court strayed past the proper boundaries of Rule 201. Instead of

merely taking judicial notice to establish that the proceedings or

actions had already taken place, as reflected in court records, it

took judicial notice of adjudicative facts from the prior cases that

were subject to reasonable dispute.

¶ 21 To illustrate, in Doyle, the defendant was charged with

violating a condition of his bail bond. Doyle, ¶ 1. The trial court

took judicial notice from the court record of the fact that the

defendant failed to appear in court on a particular day as mandated

by a condition of his bond. Id. The supreme court held that the

trial court erred because it did not “merely tak[e] notice of its own

9
prior finding and the effect of that finding.” Id. at ¶ 13. Instead,

the judicial notice improperly “extended to the accuracy of the

court’s finding at that prior proceeding,” which was not beyond

reasonable questioning. Id. Thus, it concluded that the

defendant’s failure to appear was disputable and improper for

judicial notice. Id.

¶ 22 Contrast those events to the events in People v. Sa’ra, when

the trial court took judicial notice that a person with the

defendant’s name appeared for sentencing in a prior felony case.

117 P.3d 51, 55-56 (Colo. App. 2004). A division of this court held

that the judicially noticed fact there was not subject to reasonable

dispute because the trial court did not identify “that [the] defendant

was, in fact, the person who appeared before the court” in the prior

proceeding. Id. at 56; cf. Sena, ¶ 27 (holding that judicial notice of

an outstanding arrest warrant was proper because the trial court

did not take “an additional step beyond notice of the existence of a

record”).

¶ 23 Here though, the court took judicial notice of facts that were

subject to reasonable dispute. The court did not merely note that

court records indicated that an individual named Noel King was

10
advised in the prior protection order cases. The accuracy of those

facts would be readily verifiable by reference to the court records

themselves. Instead, the court went one step further and took

judicial notice that, in fact, “the Defendant, Noel King,” appeared,

was advised, and acknowledged the protection orders in the prior

cases. The accuracy of the court’s prior findings was not beyond

reasonable dispute merely because the findings were sourced from

court records. See Doyle, ¶¶ 10-12. And whether the individual

who was advised in those earlier proceedings was actually the same

Noel King was subject to reasonable dispute. Therefore, the court’s

judicial notice of these disputable facts was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 24 But with regard to the protection orders being active on

September 3, those adjudicative facts were proper subjects for

judicial notice. Regardless of whether it was the same Noel King

who appeared at the advisements, the court’s issuance of the

protective orders — which stated that they remained active until the

final dispositions of the prior cases — established when the orders

were in effect and when they expired according to the disposition

dates of the prior cases. The legal effects of the minute orders in

this respect are undisputable because they can be easily verified by

11
the court records and protection orders themselves. See Doyle,

¶ 10.

¶ 25 Nonetheless, King argues that there is no “legal effect”

exception under Doyle. But we disagree with the premise that there

is an exception at issue here. Notice of the protection orders’

effective dates and their respective cases’ disposition dates are the

type of commonly verifiable “calendar date[s]” showing that “various

proceedings or actions have already taken place.” Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12.

This makes them the exact kind of facts permissible for judicial

notice — not an exception to the rule.

¶ 26 We therefore conclude that the court erred by taking judicial

notice that King was advised in a prior proceeding, but it did not err

by taking judicial notice that the protection orders were active on a

particular date.

6. Judicial Notice of King’s
Knowledge Was Not Harmless

¶ 27 Determining whether the erroneous admission of evidence is

harmless depends on several factors, including (1) whether the

evidence was important; (2) whether it was cumulative; (3) whether

there was corroborating or contradicting evidence on the point at

12
issue; and (4) how strong the prosecution’s case was overall. People

v. Faussett, 2016 COA 94M, ¶ 54. We address each factor in turn.

¶ 28 First, the improper judicially noticed fact was important

because it established a specific element of the crimes laid out in

the jury instructions. To convict King of violating a protection

order, the jury had to find that King had “actual knowledge of the

contents of a protection order that identified [King] as a restrained

person.” (Emphasis added.) See § 18-6-803.5(1)(a). Taking judicial

notice of the fact that King had been advised of and acknowledged

the protection order was directly probative of this element. And in

turn, this proof of King’s actual knowledge was directly probative of

the element for first degree burglary that King had an intent “[t]o

commit [in the home] the crime of Violation of a Protection Order.”

See § 18-4-202(1).

¶ 29 Second, the only cumulative evidence here of King’s actual

knowledge of the contents of the protection orders besides the

judicially noticed facts was his alleged signatures on the protection

13
orders.2 The signatures were each under provisions that said, “By

signing, I acknowledge receipt of this [o]rder.”

¶ 30 Third, there was some contradictory evidence on the point at

issue. It is true that King’s main theory of defense in his closing

argument focused on disputing that he knowingly violated the

protection orders because his wife gave him permission to come into

the home. See id. But while this defense didn’t directly argue that

King lacked knowledge of the protection orders, defense counsel

nonetheless contested the issue. After an officer testified to the

validity of the protection orders, King’s lawyer elicited testimony on

2 King claims that the holding of Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10,

precludes us from analyzing any cumulative evidence. We are
unpersuaded because, in Doyle, the supreme court forewent a
cumulative-evidence analysis because the trial court’s jury
instruction, stating that the defendant’s failure to appear was “not
subject to reasonable dispute” and that “the court ha[d] accepted
[that fact] as being true,” stamped the improper evidence with the
trial court’s imprimatur in a way that “clearly posture[d] the
judicially noticed fact . . . as something more than cumulative
evidence.” Id. at ¶¶ 5, 15-17. By contrast, here, the trial court’s
judicial notice instruction, stating that it had “allowed the fact[s]
into evidence without requiring proof of [them]” and that the jury
could “but [was] not required to, accept any fact judicially noticed
by the [c]ourt,” didn’t infringe on the jury’s prerogative to determine
the weight of the evidence. As a result, we may consider cumulative
evidence because the judicially noticed facts here weren’t
sanctioned to be “more than cumulative evidence.” Id. at ¶ 15.

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cross-examination that the officer wasn’t present when the orders

were issued and didn’t personally know who signed them. This

presented at least some evidence to challenge King’s signatures as

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actual knowledge of

the protection orders’ contents.

¶ 31 Fourth, although the prosecution presented copies of the

protection orders, the absence of any other proof establishing his

identity suggests a lack of overall strength in the prosecution’s case

on this issue.

¶ 32 Taking these factors together, we cannot conclude that “there

is no reasonable possibility that [the error] contributed to [King]’s

conviction.” Pernell, ¶ 22. To be sure, as the People argue, the jury

could have inferred from specific details contained in the protection

orders — details that included King’s physical appearance,

relationship to the victim, and address of the home where the

crimes took place — that the signatures didn’t belong to some other

person with King’s name. But the judicially noticed facts eliminated

the need for it to do so. The judicial notice permitted the jury to

find King’s actual knowledge without requiring any inferential steps.

And indeed, the judicial notice provided some indicia of the trial

15
court’s imprimatur on the judicially noticed facts, as the jury could

reason that the facts wouldn’t have otherwise been admitted unless

the court found them valid to some degree. See Doyle, ¶¶ 15-16. It

follows that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury accepted

the clarity and authority of the judicial notice without resorting to

inferences from the other evidence, particularly given King’s

contesting of the validity of the signatures on the protection orders

and the limited evidence presented by the prosecution.3 See

Pernell, ¶ 22. Therefore, we reverse the conviction and remand the

case for retrial on the two counts of violation of a protection order

and one count of first degree burglary.

3 To the extent it may arise at retrial, we are unpersuaded by King’s

claims that the trial court’s judicial notice improperly emphasized
the protection orders themselves by implying the orders were
consistent with judicially noticed facts. In the judicial notice
instruction, the protection orders were referenced generally for
context, and the court did not draw the jury’s attention to any
prominent aspects of the protection orders, such as the signatures.
See People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 71 (“[A] trial court ‘has no
duty to, and should not, select the salient points in the evidence,
favorable or unfavorable, and specifically call them to the attention
of the jurors.’” (quoting Wertz v. People, 418 P.2d 169, 170 (Colo.
1966))).

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B. Due Process

¶ 33 King next argues that the trial court violated his due process

rights by taking judicial notice without providing King with

sufficient notice or an opportunity to review the sealed minute

orders. We decline to address the merits of this contention.

¶ 34 “To preserve a Colorado Constitutional argument for

appeal, . . . a defendant must make an objection sufficiently specific

to call the attention of the trial court to the potential Colorado

Constitutional error.” Martinez v. People, 244 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo.

2010); accord People v. Harmon, 2025 COA 38M, ¶ 56 (“[W]e

generally do not address constitutional arguments raised for the

first time on appeal.”) (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026).

¶ 35 As discussed, King objected to the court taking judicial notice

of the contents of the minute orders on the basis that they

contained disputed facts. While his objection mentioned that the

records were inaccessible, King couched this inaccessibility within

his overall objection of improper judicial notice. And after the court

read the contents of the minute orders in open court, King made no

objection relating to the inaccessibility of those orders.

17
¶ 36 Thus, we will not review the contention because King’s

objection didn’t apprise the trial court of a due process issue,

meaning the court couldn’t develop a record on the matter. See

People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, ¶¶ 14-16 (holding that we have

discretion not to review unpreserved constitutional challenges if

there isn’t a sufficiently developed record); Martinez, 244 P.3d at

140 (holding that the appellate court erred in considering a

constitutional contention because the defendant’s objection at trial

to improper testimony failed to preserve a constitutional argument

for appeal); see also Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 12 (“[I]t is not

enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal

way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . .” (quoting United

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))). Specifically, the

record is insufficiently developed in this case because we don’t see

18
how the trial court “refus[ed] to disclose records” when it read the

contents of those records during trial.4

¶ 37 As for advance notice, Rule 201(f) allows judicial notice to “be

taken at any stage of the proceeding.” And Rule 201(e) specifically

contemplates a situation where advance notice doesn’t occur: “In

the absence of prior notification, the request [to be heard] may be

made after judicial notice has been taken.” No such request exists

in the record.

III. Disposition

¶ 38 During the pendency of this appeal, King filed a motion for

correction of the mittimus in the underlying trial court case. We

take judicial notice of the subsequent proceedings in the trial court.

See Sa’ra, 117 P.3d at 56. The trial court granted King’s request

4 The only explanation King offers for why the court’s ruling at this

particular stage of the proceedings was inappropriate is that he
didn’t have access to the records, and he hadn’t received advance
notice. But as we note, the court did give him access to the records
by reading them in court, and he didn’t ask for additional access to
them. So even if we were to consider this contention on the merits,
we would reject it. In addition, King notes that defense counsel is
still unable to access the minute orders from the sealed court
record. We have confirmed the accuracy of the trial court’s reading
of the minute orders into the record. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d
51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A court may take judicial notice of the
contents of court records in a related proceeding.”).

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and issued an amended mittimus reflecting that he was acquitted of

the crime of violence sentence enhancer count. While the amended

mittimus appears to be correct, King’s direct appeal of his

convictions divested the trial court of jurisdiction relating to the

judgment of conviction on appeal. See People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d

841, 844 (Colo. 1982) (“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by

statute or rule, once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court

has no jurisdiction to issue further orders in the case relative to the

order or judgment appealed from.”).

¶ 39 The judgment of conviction for one count of first degree

burglary and two counts of violating a protection order are reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. The trial court should issue an amended mittimus

after reacquiring jurisdiction following issuance of the appellate

mandate to reflect the jury’s not guilty verdict for the crime of

violence sentence enhancer count. See Crim. P. 35(a). All other

aspects of the judgment of conviction not challenged on appeal

remain undisturbed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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