Marriage of Goodvin

25CA2071 Marriage of Goodvin 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2071
Weld County District Court No. 24DR510
Honorable Troy Hause, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jamie Irene Goodvin,

Appellee,

and

Timothy Adam Goodvin,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Welling and Tow, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

No Appearance for Appellee

Timothy Adam Goodvin, Pro Se
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Timothy Adam

Goodvin (father) and Jamie Irene Goodvin (mother), father appeals

the portions of the district court’s permanent orders addressing the

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR), property division, and

the determination of spousal maintenance and child support. We

dismiss the appeal, in part, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 In May 2024, mother petitioned for dissolution after fourteen

years of marriage and two children. At the same time, mother

asked for, and the court granted, a temporary protection order

requiring father to stay at least 500 yards away from her. She also

filed a motion to restrict father’s parenting time under section

14-10-129(4), C.R.S. 2025. In that motion, she alleged that the

children were in imminent danger while in father’s care because he

was mentally unstable, had threatened suicide, and had “anger

issues.” The court temporarily restricted father’s parenting time.

¶3 Within a month, the district court held a hearing on whether

to make the temporary protection order permanent and whether to

continue the restriction on father’s parenting time. The court

denied mother’s request for a permanent protection order against

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father. After finding that the children were afraid of having

unsupervised contact with father, the court ordered that his

parenting time occur under the supervision of a family therapist.

¶4 In August 2025, the district court held a two-day permanent

orders hearing, at the conclusion of which it made oral findings of

fact and conclusions of law. In a subsequent written judgment, the

court made the following findings regarding the APR:

• Father committed acts of domestic violence against

mother throughout the marriage.

• Father’s testimony that he was a stay-at-home parent

during the marriage was not credible. Instead, the

credible evidence established that he was “absent as an

active parent for extended periods.”

• Mother had historically been the children’s primary

parent.

• An expert in family counseling who was supervising

father’s parenting time and who was the “most credible

witness regarding what is in the children’s best interests”

testified on that issue.

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• The children were initially resistant to participating in

supervised parenting time with father based on incidents

predating the parties’ separation. The expert opined that

the children’s apprehensions and fears were credible, and

they remained concerned about their parents having

contact. In addition, the expert said that the children

were “uncomfortable in a vehicle with [f]ather at this

time.”

• The expert “observed good interactions” between father

and the children during supervised parenting time;

however, the expert said that the children were “now

more comfortable with contact with [f]ather.”

• The expert recommended that father move from restricted

therapeutic visits with the children to restricted

monitored visits.

• The parties should consider putting the children in family

therapy “to focus on the children’s needs, assisting the

children in navigating the high conflict, and assisting the

children in having a healthy relationship” with both

parents.

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¶5 The district court made the following findings regarding

property division:

• Mother’s office property was worth $154,000 and was

encumbered by a $120,000 loan, leaving $34,000 in

equity that was marital property subject to division.

• Mother held a 5% interest in real property in Longmont

through her ownership in Fulton Investments, LLC. Both

parties valued the interest at $15,000, and mother

credibly testified that the Longmont property was

encumbered by a $13,700 loan, leaving $1,300 in equity,

which was marital property subject to division.

• Father testified that he did not know the current value of

mother’s Porsche. Mother credibly testified that she

owed more than what the vehicle was worth.

• The parties agreed that mother’s only retirement account

was worth $13,797.

• Early in the marriage, both parties contributed

substantially to the marital estate. However, once father

became self-employed, his financial support for the

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marital estate stopped. As a result, mother became the

family’s primary parent and provider.

• “Given the totality of the evidence,” an unequal property

division in favor of mother was equitable.

¶6 Lastly, the district court made the following findings

concerning spousal maintenance and child support:

• Mother underreported her income and was not credible

regarding her business expenses, which she overstated

by at least $2,400. After subtracting her business

expenses from her gross receipts and adding $2,400, her

gross monthly income was $7,000.

• Father was either voluntarily underemployed or

voluntarily unemployed and could earn $3,033 per

month.

¶7 From those findings, the district court determined that, to

serve the children’s best interests and protect their emotional

well-being, mother would be the primary residential parent and

father would have only restricted “monitored” parenting time for two

hours each week. Given the domestic violence finding and the

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parties’ “high conflict,” the court named mother the children’s sole

decision-maker, except as to certain extracurricular activities.

¶8 The district court then divided the marital estate as follows:

Marital Net Marital Mother’s Father’s
Asset/Debt Value Portion Portion
Marital $518,555 $518,555
Residence
Mother’s Office $34,000 $34,000
Property
Longmont $1,300 $1,300
Real Property
(through
Fulton
Investments
LLC)
Vehicles $62,600 $10,000 $52,600
Porsche ($21,371) ($21,371)
Bank $11,580 $11,547 $33
Accounts
Mother’s $13,797 $13,797
Retirement
Account
“Equalization” ($192,688) $192,688
Payment
TOTAL $375,140 $245,321

In making this division, the court noted that father had $48,153 in

a trust that was his separate property.

¶9 In addition, the district court ordered mother to pay father the

maintenance guideline amount of $735 per month for three years,

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affording him time to find suitable employment. The court directed

father to pay mother monthly child support of $739.

II. Missing Hearing Transcripts

¶ 10 To begin, we note that father did not provide us with the

transcripts of the two-day permanent orders hearing or the district

court’s oral ruling.

¶ 11 As the appellant, father bears the responsibility to include in

the appellate record all transcripts necessary for us to resolve the

issues he raises in this appeal. C.A.R. 10(d)(3). That gap in the

record has significant consequences because, as a matter of law, we

must presume that the missing portions of the record support the

district court’s findings and conclusions. See In re Marriage of

Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d 1225, 1229 (stating that,

absent a transcript, the appellate court must presume that the

evidence supports the district court’s findings); see also In re

Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d 246, 250 (“Where

the appellant fails to provide . . . a transcript, the [appellate] court

must presume that the record supports the judgment.”); McCall v.

Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A party cannot

overcome a deficiency in the record by statements in the briefs.”).

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¶ 12 We are mindful that father is pro se. However, “[a self-

represented] litigant who chooses to rely upon his own

understanding of legal principles and procedures is required to

follow the same procedural rules as those who are qualified to

practice law and must be prepared to accept the consequences of

his mistakes and errors.” Rosenberg v. Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26

(Colo. App. 1992).

III. APR

A. Standard of Review

¶ 13 A district court has broad discretion when allocating parental

responsibilities. See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8,

544 P.3d 1258, 1265 (addressing parenting time); see also In re

Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 23, 428 P.3d 550, 554

(addressing decision-making responsibility).

¶ 14 We will not disturb the district court’s decision absent a

showing that the court abused its discretion, meaning that it

misapplied the law or acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair manner. See Collins, ¶ 8, 544 P.3d at 1265 (addressing

parenting time); see also Morgan, ¶ 26, 428 P.3d at 554 (addressing

decision-making responsibility).

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¶ 15 We review de novo whether the district court applied the

correct legal standard in making its APR decision. In re Marriage of

Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 21, 490 P.3d at 1091.

B. Restriction of Father’s Parenting Time

¶ 16 Father contends that, once the district court denied mother’s

request for a permanent protection order, his emergency parenting

time restriction should have “evaporated.” We dismiss this part of

the appeal.

¶ 17 Temporary orders terminate “when the final decree is entered.”

§ 14-10-108(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d

291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005). Thus, a party seeking review of a

temporary parenting time order must pursue appropriate relief

through a C.A.R. 21 petition. People in Interest of M.W., 140 P.3d

231, 233 (Colo. App. 2006) (Because “temporary custody orders are

not subject to appeal, . . . review must be taken pursuant to C.A.R.

21.”). Once the district court enters permanent orders, the

temporary parenting time order is no longer appealable. See Salby,

126 P.3d at 295.

¶ 18 The record shows that father did not seek C.A.R. 21 relief.

Accordingly, he cannot now appeal the temporary parenting time

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order. Because the entry of the permanent orders mooted any

errors in the district court’s temporary parenting time order, any

opinion concerning that order would be advisory and, therefore,

improper. See § 14-10-108(5)(c); Salby, 126 P.3d at 301 (providing

that an issue is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no

practical legal effect upon the existing controversy); Stor-N-Lock

Partners #15, LLC v. City of Thornton, 2018 COA 65, ¶ 38, 488 P.3d

352, 359 (Appellate courts avoid issuing advisory opinions that

“would have no practical effect on an existing controversy.”). We

therefore decline to consider father’s appellate arguments regarding

the temporary parenting time order and dismiss this part of the

appeal.

¶ 19 To the extent that father argues the district court erred by

continuing his parenting time restriction at the permanent orders

hearing without making findings, we are not persuaded. See

§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) (“[I]n any order . . . continuing a parenting time

restriction, the [district] court shall enumerate the specific factual

findings supporting the restriction.”); In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 27, 519 P.3d 736, 741. In the permanent orders,

the court cited the expert’s testimony that father’s parenting time

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was going well, but it also found that orders were “necessary for the

emotional protection of the children in this high conflict matter.”

Relying on the expert’s credible testimony, the court adopted the

expert’s recommendation to transition to supervised monitored

parenting time. See Thorburn, ¶ 49, 519 P.3d at 744 (stating that it

is for the district court to determine witness credibility and the

weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom). And we

must presume that the missing transcripts, including the transcript

reflecting the expert testimony that the court credited, support the

court’s findings and determination. See Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at

1229; Dean, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d at 250.

C. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 20 Father contends that the district court did not make the

required findings when granting mother most, if not all,

decision-making responsibilities. We disagree.

¶ 21 When a party has committed domestic violence, it is not in the

children’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making

responsibility over the abused party’s objection unless the district

court finds credible evidence of the parties’ ability “to make

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decisions cooperatively in the best interest of the child[ren]” and “in

a manner that is safe for the abused party and the child[ren].”

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(b), (4)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 22 The district court found that mother was the victim of father’s

domestic violence. The court indicated that the parties were in

“high conflict,” which necessitated an order requiring no

face-to-face contact and that all parenting time exchanges occur

through a third party. The court specifically found that the

children were still concerned about the parties’ interaction and that

they would benefit from family therapy to help them navigate the

parental conflict.

¶ 23 So contrary to father’s contention, the district court made

sufficient findings, and we can understand the basis of its decision.

See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9, 446 P.3d 968, 970

(“The district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to

give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its

order.”); In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App.

1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence

which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the

issues raised.”). Given the court’s findings of domestic violence and

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ongoing high conflict, its allocation of decision-making

responsibilities was not an abuse of discretion. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(b), (4)(a)(II)(A); Morgan, ¶ 23, 428 P.3d at 554.

IV. Property Division

A. Standard of Review

¶ 24 A district court has broad discretion to equitably divide a

marital estate based on the particular facts and circumstances of

the case, and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of

that discretion. Collins, ¶ 19, 544 P.3d at 1267; see § 14-10-113(1),

C.R.S. 2025; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 67,

559 P.3d 662, 667 (weighing the section 14-10-113(1) factors is

within the court’s sound discretion). The property division need not

be equal. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9, 561

P.3d 417, 421.

B. Mother’s Office Property

¶ 25 Father contends that the district court erred by classifying

mother’s office property as her separate property. See

§ 14-10-113(1) (stating that, before dividing the marital estate, the

district court must first determine whether each asset is marital

property, which is subject to division, or separate property, which is

13
not). He is mistaken. The court determined that the office property

was marital and awarded it to mother.

¶ 26 Father also challenges the district court’s finding that the

office property had a value of $34,000, arguing that the $120,000

loan lacked an “enforceable promissory note” and that mother was

not obligated to repay it. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA

11, ¶ 4, 459 P.3d 757, 759 (holding that, when dividing the marital

estate, the district court must value each asset). But the court

credited mother’s testimony that the loan existed and remained

outstanding. See Thorburn, ¶ 49, 519 P.3d at 744. And we must

again presume that the record would support the court’s valuation

finding. See Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at 1229.

¶ 27 Father maintains that the property division should be reversed

because the district court omitted mother’s rental income from the

office property. But we do not address this argument because he

does not support it with legal authority or meaningful legal

analysis. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27, 486

P.3d 352, 357 (holding that an appellate court will not consider an

argument not supported by meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021

CO 12, 480 P.3d 676.

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C. Father’s Financial Contributions and Improvements to
the Marital Residence

¶ 28 Next, father contends that the district court erred by dividing

the marital estate because it ignored his financial contributions

from his family trust and the work he put into improving the

marital residence during the marriage. See § 14-10-113(1)(a) (the

district court considers a party’s contribution to acquiring the

marital property as a factor when dividing the marital estate). The

court, however, expressly found that both parties made substantial

contributions to the marital estate, and we presume the court

considered all the evidence admitted at the permanent orders

hearing. See Collins, ¶ 21, 544 P.3d at 1267.

D. Omitted Property

¶ 29 We reject father’s contention that the district court’s property

division omitted mother’s interest in Fulton Investments LLC, the

Porsche, and her retirement account.

¶ 30 The district court must allocate all marital assets and debts.

See In re Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App. 2003). “If

property is omitted from permanent orders without explanation, the

15
property division cannot stand.” In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d

806, 815 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 31 The district court found that mother’s 5% interest in Fulton

Investments LLC, through which she held an interest in the

Longmont property, was marital property; valued it at $1,300; and

awarded it to her. The court also found that the Porsche was

marital property, determined it had a negative value, and awarded it

to mother. Finally, the court found that mother’s retirement

account was entirely marital, accepted its stipulated value of

$13,797, and awarded it to her. Because the court classified,

valued, and distributed each of those assets, we discern no error.

See § 14-10-113(1); Wright, ¶ 4, 459 P.3d at 759; Page, 70 P.3d at

582.

¶ 32 We decline to address father’s related assertion that the

district court failed to divide mother’s business — Goodvin

Properties LLC — as well as her airline miles and points. Without

the benefit of the hearing transcripts, we do not know whether or

how the issues were raised at the hearing. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)-(B)

(An appellant’s opening brief must include, among other things, a

statement on “whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved,

16
the precise location in the record where the issue was raised and

where the court ruled” and “a clear and concise discussion of the

grounds upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal[,] . . . with

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the

appellant relies.”); see also O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631

(Colo. App. 2010) (declining to address an issue because the parties

failed to direct the court to a place in the record where the issue

was raised and ruled on). In any event, father does not develop this

assertion. See Zander, ¶ 27, 486 P.3d at 357.

V. Maintenance and Child Support

A. Standard of Review

¶ 33 We review maintenance and child support orders for an abuse

of discretion. See In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58,

534 P.3d 531, 542 (addressing maintenance); see also Collins, ¶ 37,

544 P.3d at 1269 (addressing child support).

B. Father’s Gross Income

¶ 34 Father contends that the district court erred by finding that he

was voluntarily unemployed and by imputing to him a monthly

income of $3,033 when determining maintenance and child

support. We disagree.

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¶ 35 When calculating maintenance and child support, income

means a party’s actual gross income if the party is fully employed.

See § 14-10-114(8)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (addressing maintenance); see

also § 14-10-115(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (addressing child support). If,

however, a party is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily

underemployed, maintenance and child support must be based on

that party’s potential income. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV) (addressing

maintenance); see also § 14-10-115(5)(b)(I) (addressing child

support). “Potential income” is the amount a party could earn from

a full-time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated

earning ability. Capparelli, ¶ 35, 561 P.3d at 425 (quoting People in

Interest of A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632, 637 (Colo. App. 2001)).

¶ 36 Income imputation is a question of fact, and the district

court’s findings regarding potential income are entitled to deference

if adequately supported by the record. In re Marriage of Yates, 148

P.3d 304, 311 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 37 In its temporary orders, the district court found that father

was earning very little from his business buying and selling

motorcycle parts. The court found that he was voluntarily

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underemployed and imputed to him a minimum wage income of

$2,499 per month.

¶ 38 More than a year later, at the permanent orders hearing, the

district court found that father remained voluntarily underemployed

so long as he continued in his motorcycle business, or voluntarily

unemployed if he did not. The court added that father had “done

nothing to maximize his earning ability since temporary orders.”

See People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003) (“A [district]

court may interpret a parent’s lack of initiative in finding or keeping

work as a voluntary refusal to fulfill a support obligation.”).

¶ 39 The district court imputed to father a monthly income of

$3,033 based on his knowledge of and sales experience with

motorcycles. Those findings are sufficient, and we presume the

missing transcripts would support the court’s income finding. See

Gibbs, ¶ 9, 446 P.3d at 970; Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at 1229.

C. Mother’s Gross Income

¶ 40 Father contends that, because mother did not comply with her

C.R.C.P. 16.2 financial disclosure obligation, the district court

lacked adequate evidence to determine her gross income and clearly

erred by finding she earned $7,000 per month. He also argues that

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the court erred by excluding her rental income from the office

property. But because father did not provide us with transcripts of

the permanent orders hearing, we must presume they would

support the court’s income finding. See Beatty, ¶ 15, 279 P.3d at

1229.

¶ 41 Moreover, father insists that the district court failed to

consider evidence that mother used her business accounts to pay

personal expenses. The court, however, directly addressed that

issue. It found mother’s testimony regarding “payments for her car,

truck, and some of [her] travel expenses and meals” not credible

because those “areas [could] be easily manipulated to also pay

personal expenses.” After reviewing mother’s Schedule C, the court

found that she overstated her business expenses by a minimum of

$2,400 and, as a result, added that amount to her gross income.

D. Maintenance Term

¶ 42 Father contends that the district court failed to explain why it

limited his maintenance award to three years despite the parties’

fourteen-year marriage. We are not persuaded.

¶ 43 The district court found that father was currently unemployed

but capable of working. The court determined that the guideline

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maintenance term was inappropriate and instead set a three-year

term, explaining that this period would give him sufficient time to

secure suitable employment.

¶ 44 Although the duration of the marriage is one of the factors the

district court must consider, it is not dispositive. See

§ 14-10-114(3)(c)(VII). The court must also evaluate the parties’

employability obtainable through reasonable diligence and

additional training or education. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(V). Given

the court’s finding that three years was ample time for father to

reenter the workforce and become self-supporting, we cannot say

that the court’s three-year term was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. See Medeiros, ¶ 58, 534 P.3d at 542;

Collins, ¶ 37, 544 P.3d at 1269.

VI. Disposition

¶ 45 The portion of the appeal challenging the temporary parenting

time order is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE TOW concur.

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