Peo in Interest of OG

25CA2043 Peo in Interest of OG 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2043
Jefferson County District Court No. 24JV30220
Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of O.G., a Child,

and Concerning S.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE ASHBY*
Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, S.G. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship O.G. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2024, the Jefferson County Division of Children,

Youth, and Families received a report of domestic violence in the

parents’ home. The Division sent a caseworker to investigate and,

upon seeing the then-five-month-old child, the caseworker became

concerned about his weight and appearance. The child was then

taken to the hospital to be evaluated where he was admitted and

diagnosed with severe malnourishment and multiple non-accidental

bone fractures.

¶3 Consequently, the Division filed a petition in dependency and

neglect. The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the

child to the Division, and the Division placed him with his paternal

grandparents.

¶4 The next day, mother was arrested and charged with felony

child abuse causing serious bodily injury. The criminal court

entered a mandatory protection order prohibiting mother from any

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contact with the child, and mother was held at the Jefferson County

jail pending trial.

¶5 Mother admitted the allegations in the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The

court then adopted a treatment plan for mother that required her

to, in sum, (1) engage in domestic violence treatment; (2) cooperate

with the Division by signing releases of information and

communicating with the caseworker; (3) attend individual therapy;

(4) complete an anger management evaluation and follow its

recommendations; (5) demonstrate the ability to meet all of the

child’s needs; and (6) complete a hands-on parenting class.

¶6 Thereafter, mother pled guilty to child abuse resulting in

serious bodily injury, and the criminal court sentenced her to

seventeen years in the Department of Corrections (DOC). As a

result, mother was transferred from jail to a DOC facility.

¶7 The Division later moved to terminate mother’s legal

relationship with the child. After a contested hearing, the juvenile

court granted the termination motion.

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II. Discussion

¶8 Mother’s sole appellate contention is that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Division made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child. We are not

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 When a juvenile court proceeds to termination under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, it must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected;

(2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is

unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

in a reasonable time. To determine whether a parent is unfit under

section 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), the court must consider whether the

department of human services made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See § 19-3-604(2)(h);

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). In

doing so, the juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by “considering the totality of the

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circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO

35, ¶ 33.

¶ 10 A parent’s incarceration does not excuse a department from

making reasonable efforts. See § 19-3-508(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025.

When a department learns of a parent’s incarceration, it must

communicate with the facility where the parent is held regarding

the requirements of the parent’s treatment plan and provide

information to the court detailing the services and treatment

available to the parent at that facility. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I)-(III). If the

caseworker is unable to determine any treatment or services

available to the parent, they must still report their efforts to obtain

such information. Id.

¶ 11 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. Id.

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B. Analysis

1. No Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 12 As a threshold matter, the Division argues that we need not

address mother’s reasonable efforts argument because, in addition

to terminating mother’s rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court terminated her rights under subsection (1)(b)(II) —

the subsection that allows a court to terminate a parent’s rights

when it finds that no appropriate treatment plan can be devised

because the parent is unfit based on a single incident resulting in

serious bodily injury (SBI). See People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA

57M, ¶¶ 20-21.

¶ 13 True, in its verbal and written orders terminating mother’s

rights, after the court made detailed findings of the criteria under

subsection (1)(c), it made a brief conclusion that “[n]o treatment

plan is currently devisable for either parent pursuant to C.R.S.

§ 19-3-604(1)(b)(II) as each parent pled to felony child abuse with

serious bodily injury.” And that finding is also supported by the

record.

¶ 14 Further, the Division correctly asserts that when a juvenile

court proceeds to termination under section 19-3-604(1)(b), it is not

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required to consider whether the department made reasonable

efforts. See § 19-3-604(1)(b)-(c), (2)(h); People in Interest of C.Z.,

2015 COA 87, ¶ 57. And section 19-3-604(1) permits termination

so long as “at least one of the statutory grounds has been

established by clear and convincing evidence.” People in Interest of

D.C-M.S., 111 P.3d 559, 561 (Colo. App. 2005). Thus, when a court

has properly terminated a parent’s rights under subsection (1)(b),

we need not address a parent’s appellate contentions that are

related only to subsection (1)(c). See People in Interest of T.L.B., 148

P.3d 450, 458 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining to address appellate

arguments related to section 19-3-604(1)(a) and (1)(c) because the

juvenile court’s findings met the criteria for termination under

subsection (1)(b)).

¶ 15 But, the Division acknowledges that in its motion to terminate

mother’s parental rights, it “did not request that the court

terminate . . . pursuant to section 19-3-604(1)(b).” Indeed, in its

motion, the Division moved for termination under section 19-3-604

without specifying a subsection, detailing only facts supporting the

criteria in subsection (1)(c) and did not mention any basis to

terminate mother’s parental rights under subsection (1)(b)(II)

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because no appropriate treatment plan could be devised. Further,

at the conclusion of its closing argument the Division, after

detailing each of the criteria to terminate mother’s parental rights

under subsection 1(c), suggested that the court could also consider

terminating mother’s parental rights under subsection (1)(b)(II).

¶ 16 Accordingly, although the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings related to termination under section 19-3-604(1)(b)(II), we

decline under these circumstances to find that mother is precluded

from arguing we should reverse the termination order because

under subsection (1)(c) it was error for the court to find that the

Department had failed to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her

Having decided that, we discern no error in the court’s order

terminating mother’s rights under subsection (1)(c) and reject

mother’s argument that the court erred by finding that the Division

made reasonable efforts as follows.

2. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 17 The juvenile court found that the Division made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child. To

that end, the court found that the caseworker made “various

attempts to get [mother] engaged in services despite [her]

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incarceration and the protection order.” The court further found

that the Division’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in

rehabilitating mother because of the requirements of the criminal

case, and more specifically, the protection order that prohibited

contact between mother and the child.

¶ 18 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that she referred mother to the public health

nurse and the parenting program. Both the public health nurse

and the parenting program provided services to mother while she

was at the jail, designed to help her understand child development

and improve her parenting skills. However, the caseworker’s court

report, which was admitted into evidence, indicates that neither the

public health nurse nor the parenting program could provide

services to a parent at a DOC facility. Thus, when mother was

transferred to the DOC facility, those services ended.

¶ 19 The caseworker also testified that throughout the case, she

encouraged mother to participate in the services that were offered to

her by the jail and the DOC facility. In terms of those services, the

caseworker testified that mother had been on the waitlist for

individual therapy while she was at the jail, but mother was

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transferred to the DOC facility before any individual therapy

occurred. Further, while mother was at the jail, she attended group

therapy, met with a psychiatrist who helped her with medication

management, and completed several parenting and anger

management courses.

¶ 20 Next, the caseworker testified that at the DOC facility, mother

attended weekly individual therapy. By the time of the termination

hearing, mother was enrolled in an anger management group and

on the waitlist for a dialectical behavioral therapy group. Mother

had also completed an anger management evaluation at the DOC

facility, but the caseworker was waiting for mother’s case manager

to provide the recommendations from that evaluation.

¶ 21 We reject mother’s argument that the Division failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not comply with the requirements

of section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I). The record belies mother’s assertion.

First, the caseworker specifically testified that she had been “in

collateral contact with the Jefferson County jail and [mother’s] DOC

facility.” She further testified that she “provided [each facility] with

[mother’s] treatment plan” and inquired about the services they

offered. See § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I) (requiring a department to

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communicate with an incarcerated parent’s facility regarding the

requirements of the court-ordered treatment plan). Second,

throughout the case, the caseworker filed court reports that

included summaries of the services and treatment that each facility

provided to mother. See id. (requiring the caseworker to include

information in their report that details the services and treatment

available to a parent at the facility or jail where the parent is

incarcerated).1

¶ 22 We also reject mother’s argument that the Division failed to

make reasonable efforts because the caseworker did not refer

mother to any “outside providers [who] may have been able to

provide services to mother in DOC.” Mother does not identify what

specific services were lacking. Nor does she articulate how those

services would have made a difference in the outcome of the case.

This is especially so given the juvenile court’s finding that the

“primary impediment” to mother becoming fit was the mandatory

1 Although mother also argues that the Division failed to comply

with section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), we note that subsection (1)(e)(III)
applies when, “after the dispositional hearing,” a parent becomes
continuously incarcerated. Here, mother became incarcerated
before the dispositional hearing, and thus, subsection (1)(e)(III) does
not apply.

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protection order that prevented any contact with the child — an

impediment that the Division could not have eliminated even if it

had referred mother to “outside providers.” Thus, even if the

caseworker’s efforts to find “outside providers” were lacking, any

error in the court’s determination that the Division made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother was harmless. See C.A.R.

35(c); C.R.C.P. 61; People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 21

(an error is harmless if it can be said with fair assurance that it did

not substantially influence the outcome of the case or impair the

basic fairness of the trial itself).

¶ 23 Similarly, we reject mother’s argument that the Division failed

to make reasonable efforts because it did not move to modify

mother’s treatment plan when she was transferred from the jail to

the DOC facility. Her argument is based on the fact that even after

mother was transferred to the DOC facility, her treatment plan still

required her to “engage in any relevant services that Jefferson

County jail offers” instead of services offered by DOC. Again,

mother does not explain how modifying the treatment plan to say

“DOC” instead of “Jefferson County jail” would have changed the

outcome of the case. This is especially true in light of the evidence

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showing that the caseworker was in contact with the case manager

at mother’s DOC facility and that mother was engaged in the

services offered by the DOC facility. Accordingly, any error related

to the failure to modify mother’s treatment plan was harmless.

See C.A.R. 35(c); C.R.C.P. 61; M.H-K., ¶ 21.

¶ 24 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s finding that the Division made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child. Thus, we see no

reason to reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c).

III. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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