Peo in Interest of Sherman

26CA0277 Peo in Interest of Sherman 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0277
Pueblo County District Court No. 26MH30009
Honorable Gregory J. Styduhar, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Kendrick Wayne Sherman,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Bernard* and Ashby*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Respondent, Kendrick Wayne Sherman, appeals the district

court’s order authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health

Hospital in Pueblo (the hospital) to involuntarily medicate him. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Sherman was committed to the hospital after being found

incompetent to proceed in a criminal case. He was diagnosed with

an unspecified mood disorder and his symptoms included

disorganized thinking, delusional statements, hypervigilance,

agitation, restlessness, and poor hygiene. While at the hospital,

Sherman had two violent outbursts. In the first one, he struck a

grievance box, and, in the other, he aggressively pounded on

windows and doors. Staff also became concerned about other

extreme self-harming behaviors. Consequently, the hospital staff

began administering emergency medication.

¶3 At the request of Sherman’s treating physician, Dr. Hareesh

Pillai, the People filed a petition to involuntarily medicate Sherman

with olanzapine (also known as Zyprexa), haloperidol (also known

as Haldol), and lithium. The district court held an evidentiary

hearing, at which Dr. Pillai and Sherman testified. After hearing

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the evidence and reviewing Dr. Pillai’s affidavit which was admitted

at the hearing, the court found that the People had established all

four elements for the involuntary administration of medication

under People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985), and

granted the petition.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶4 A district court may order the involuntary administration of

medication if the People prove by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision; (2) the treatment is necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental

health condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient causing

serious harm to himself or others at the institution; (3) a less

intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the patient’s

need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override any bona

fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing treatment. Id.

¶5 Application of the Medina test involves mixed questions of fact

and law. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We defer to the

district court’s factual findings if they have record support and

review its legal conclusions de novo. Id.

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¶6 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting an involuntary medication order, we must affirm if the

evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

People, is sufficient to support the order. People in Interest of

R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. As the fact finder, the district court

determines the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the

evidence, along with the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from the evidence. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.

III. Analysis

¶7 Sherman contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove

the first and fourth Medina elements. We disagree.

A. The First Medina Element

¶8 The first Medina element requires the People to establish “the

patient’s incompetency to make treatment decisions.” R.K.L., ¶ 32

(quoting Medina, 705 P.2d at 973). To find the People did so, a

district court must be satisfied that “the patient’s mental illness has

so impaired his judgment as to render him ‘incapable of

participating in decisions affecting his health.’” People in Interest of

Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 132 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Medina,

705 P.2d at 973).

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¶9 The district court found that Sherman has limited insight into

his mental illness and is incompetent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision. In doing so, the court noted that Sherman

presented with symptoms at the jail and had stopped taking

prescribed Zyprexa. The court found that following his refusal of

medication Sherman’s mental health declined further and he

exhibited concerning behaviors such as continuing to sunbathe for

hours, even after developing a sunburn and despite redirection;

pretending to ski while walking; exhibiting an irregular gait; and

engaging in other alarming self-harm behaviors.

¶ 10 In contrast, Sherman denied having a mental illness and

justified or denied the concerning behaviors. And he testified that

he came to the hospital “for the food . . . because [he] was literally

underweight” and not “for [his] mental health.”

¶ 11 In arguing that he is competent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision, Sherman asserts that Dr. Pillai testified that he

demonstrated insight into his mental illness. That assertion is

misleading because Dr. Pillai testified that Sherman’s insight into

his mental illness was limited to understanding that he had been

diagnosed and treated in the past. Dr. Pillai testified that Sherman

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does not currently recognize that he suffers from active symptoms

of a psychiatric illness and “does not seem to understand how these

symptoms of his illness affect his behavior on the unit.”

¶ 12 Sherman also asserts that he is competent to participate in his

treatment decisions because he agreed at the evidentiary hearing to

take Zyprexa. But Dr. Pillai testified that Sherman needs both

Zyprexa and lithium to effectively treat his symptoms. And Dr.

Pillai expressed doubt that Sherman would consistently consent to

taking Zyprexa given his previous refusal and the fact that he did

not fully understand his need for medication. See id. at 132

(affirming the finding that the patient was incompetent to effectively

participate in the treatment decision because, among other reasons,

she had not “embraced her need for treatment”).

B. The Fourth Medina Element

¶ 13 In assessing the fourth Medina element, a court must first

determine “whether the patient’s refusal is bona fide and

legitimate.” Medina, 705 P.2d at 974. If so, the court must then

determine “whether the prognosis without treatment is so

unfavorable that the patient’s personal preference must yield to the

legitimate interests of the state in preserving the life and health of

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the patient placed in its charge and in protecting the safety of those

in the institution.” Id.

¶ 14 After considering the evidence, the district court acknowledged

that Sherman reported some side effects from the medications

administered on an emergency basis but that his “need for

treatment is sufficiently compelling” to override any bona fide and

legitimate interest he had in refusing the treatment.

¶ 15 On appeal, Sherman simply reasserts that he has a bona fide

and legitimate interest in declining the medication because he

experienced some side effects. However, he provides no argument

disputing the district court’s finding that his need for treatment is

sufficiently compelling to override his interests.

¶ 16 Notably, Sherman does not contest the district court’s finding

that the second Medina element was met, namely, that the

requested medications are necessary to prevent a significant and

likely long-term deterioration in his mental health condition. And

Dr. Pillai testified as much. Moreover, Dr. Pillai testified that the

medications were necessary to prevent Sherman from continuing to

harm himself and others.

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¶ 17 Given Dr. Pillai’s testimony and affidavit, which the district

court credited, and Sherman’s failure to provide any argument

related to the People’s interest in preserving Sherman’s life and

health and the safety of others, we discern no error in the court’s

ultimate finding that the fourth Medina element was satisfied.

IV. Disposition

¶ 18 We affirm the order.

JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE ASHBY concur.

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