People v. Papol

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
April 30, 2026

2026COA32

No. 24CA1349, People v. Papol — Juvenile Court — Direct
Filing in District Court

In this postconviction proceeding, a division of the court of

appeals considers, for the first time, whether certain statutory

processes for criminally prosecuting a juvenile in a district court

under the direct file statute in section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2020 — such as a transfer hearing — are jurisdictional or

procedural. If the defendant is age eligible and the criminal

offenses for which the defendant is charged are enumerated in the

direct file statute — which is the case here — the division concludes

that the statutory requirements are procedural, not jurisdictional.

As a result, because the defendant in this case entered into a valid

plea agreement, he waived any error committed by the district

court.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA32

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1349
El Paso County District Court No. 18CR5723
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

James Edward Papol,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur

Announced April 30, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Some juveniles alleged to have violated the law may be

adjudicated only in juvenile court based on (1) their age at the time

of the alleged offense and (2) the offense they are alleged to have

committed. See § 19-2.5-801, C.R.S. 2025. But juveniles over a

certain age, who are alleged to have committed an enumerated

offense in the direct file statute, may be criminally prosecuted in

district court. See Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶¶ 1, 15, 17

(describing the various ways a juvenile may be criminally charged in

a district court). Because of this dual justice system, this case

presents the following question: Are the prerequisites in the direct

file statute for the prosecution initiating a criminal action against a

juvenile charged with an enumerated offense jurisdictional or

procedural?

¶2 The answer to this question is critical because, if the statutory

prerequisites in this scenario are procedural, then any errors

committed by a district court could be waived if, as is the case here,

the defendant entered into a plea agreement. See, e.g., Neuhaus v.

People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (“[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the

chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process’ and

waives all non-jurisdictional errors in the defendant’s conviction.”

1
(quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973))); see also

People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. App. 2010) (“A valid,

unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections,

including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated.”).

But if the prerequisites are jurisdictional — meaning the juvenile

court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case and a district court

may acquire jurisdiction only after the juvenile court satisfies the

statutory requirements — then a defendant may raise the district

court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time, even, as here,

in a postconviction proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 2016

COA 57, ¶ 47 (“[A] court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction may

not be waived and can be raised at any time in a proceeding,

including for the first time on appeal.”).

¶3 In this case, defendant, James Edward Papol (Papol), appeals

the postconviction court’s order denying his request under Crim. P.

35(a) and (c) to set aside his plea agreement and vacate his criminal

conviction on grounds that the district lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his case. In 1988, when he murdered the victim,

M.V., Papol was fifteen years old. But as a cold case, the

prosecution did not file charges against Papol until 2018. The

2
prosecution filed the case in district court, but Papol argued it

should have been filed in juvenile court and that, as a result of this

error, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his

criminal case. The district court, as well as the postconviction

court, disagreed with Papol, finding that the 1988 direct file statute,

in effect at the time of the murder, applied — which permitted the

direct filing of criminal charges against juveniles fourteen years old

and older — and therefore his case had been properly filed in

district court.

¶4 We agree with Papol that his case should have been filed in

juvenile court based on the 2012 direct file statute. But we

disagree with him that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his case. Based on Papol’s age and the offense he

committed, his case was eligible for transfer from the juvenile court

to the district court under the 1988 direct file statute, so any error

in failing to file in juvenile court — and the absence of a transfer

hearing — was procedural rather than jurisdictional. This is

because, as we discuss in further detail below, Colorado district

courts have general jurisdiction over criminal cases, and the

General Assembly cannot limit that constitutionally derived

3
jurisdiction after it has granted it. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(1);

Garcia v. Dist. Ct., 403 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. 1965). As a result,

upon entry of his valid plea agreement, Papol waived the claim that

his criminal case was incorrectly filed in district court. Therefore,

we affirm the postconviction court’s order, albeit on different

grounds. See People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 55 n.7.

I. Background

¶5 M.V. was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1988. Although

law enforcement recovered DNA evidence from M.V.’s body, the

initial investigation did not lead to any arrests. Almost thirty years

later in 2018, using updated technology, an analyst with the

Colorado Springs Police Department developed a DNA profile from

the evidence previously recovered that matched Papol’s DNA. As

mentioned, he was fifteen in 1988.

¶6 Papol was charged with first degree murder, among other

offenses. The prosecution originally filed Papol’s case in juvenile

court but dismissed it shortly thereafter. The prosecution then filed

this action in district court under section 19-2-805(1)(a), C.R.S.

1988. The 1988 statute stated that a “juvenile may be charged by

the direct filing of an information in the district court or by

4
indictment only when . . . [t]he juvenile is fourteen years of age or

older and is alleged to have committed a class 1 felony.” Id.

(emphasis added).

¶7 As relevant here, the direct file statute was significantly

amended in 2010 and 2012 in three ways. First, the General

Assembly increased the minimum age required for direct filing in

district court from fourteen to sixteen years of age for juveniles

alleged to have committed a class 1 or class 2 felony. Ch. 264, sec.

1, § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1199. Contrast § 19-2-

517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2009, with § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2010.1

Second, it eliminated direct filing for juveniles fourteen or fifteen

years of age. Ch. 128, sec. 1, § 19-2-517(b)-(c), 2012 Colo. Sess.

Laws 440-41. And finally, it allowed a juvenile whose case was

direct filed in district court to request a reverse-transfer hearing to

1 The General Assembly repealed and relocated the juvenile statute

in 2021. Ch. 136, secs. 1-2, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 557-773. The
previous section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at
section 19-2.5-801(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. See Sec. 2, § 19-2.5-
801(1)(a)(I), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 613.

5
determine whether the case should be transferred to juvenile court.

Id. at 441; see § 19-2-517(3)(a), C.R.S. 2012.2

¶8 Papol argued below that the 2012 amendments governed in

his case and requested a reverse-transfer hearing, which the district

court denied. He then filed a motion to dismiss his case for lack of

statutory authority, arguing that the 1988 statute did not apply and

that, because he was fifteen at the time of the alleged offense, his

case had to be filed in juvenile court. The prosecutor opposed the

motion, arguing that the 1988 statute applied and, therefore, that

Papol’s case was eligible for direct filing in district court. The court

denied that motion as well.

¶9 The parties reached a disposition in which Papol pled guilty to

second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and four crime of

violence sentence enhancer counts, with a stipulated sentencing

range of forty to sixty years in prison. The district court sentenced

him to a total of sixty years in the custody of the Department of

Corrections with five years of parole.

2 Based on the statute’s 2021 repeal and relocation, section 19-2-

517(3)(a), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at section 19-2.5-801(4)(a),
C.R.S. 2025.

6
¶ 10 In 2023, Papol filed postconviction motions for relief under

Crim. P. 35(a) and (c), arguing, among other issues, that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his case because of

the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute. The postconviction

court denied the motions, holding that the district court had

jurisdiction over Papol’s case.3 It reasoned that the 1988 direct file

statute applied because the date of the offense, not the date of the

filing of the charges, dictated which version of the statute applied.

Papol appeals only the postconviction court’s jurisdictional ruling.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review de novo a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction

determination when there is no factual dispute. People in Interest of

J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶¶ 17-18. And we review de novo

questions of law, including a court’s statutory interpretation. Id.

III. Analysis

¶ 12 Papol contends that the postconviction court erred by

concluding that the 1988 version of the direct file statute applied

3 The postconviction court determined that Papol’s jurisdictional

challenge was not a challenge to his sentence under Crim. P. 35(a)
and resolved the issue under Rule 35(c).

7
and, consequently, argues that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over his case. We agree with the postconviction

court’s conclusion that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction over Papol’s case, but we disagree with how it arrived at

that determination.

¶ 13 The analytical rubric matters in this case for two reasons.

First, the postconviction court incorrectly relied on People v.

Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, ¶ 20 — in which a division of this court

concluded that the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute do

not apply retroactively — for purposes of holding that the 1988

statute applied. Instead, we conclude that the 2012 direct file

statute applies. And second, district courts have general

jurisdiction over criminal matters, and the mechanism by which a

juvenile’s case is transferred to the district court or reverse-

transferred from a district court to the juvenile court is procedural,

not jurisdictional, if the juvenile’s age and the enumerated offense

charged are within the scope of the direct file statute.

A. The 2012 Direct File Statute Applies to Papol’s Case

¶ 14 In analyzing Papol’s jurisdictional claim, the postconviction

court first determined that the 1988 version of the direct file statute

8
applied. It did so by applying the reasoning in Godinez. In that

case, the division held that the 2012 amendments to the statute

were not ameliorative or amendatory legislation and thus should

not be applied retroactively under People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66,

¶ 3. Godinez, ¶ 28. Because the postconviction court held that the

1988 version of the direct file statute applied to Papol’s case, it

concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 15 The Attorney General asserts that the postconviction court’s

analysis is correct and that the prosecution had authority to direct

file charges against Papol in the district court (because he was

fourteen years old or older and charged with a class 1 felony).

Papol, however, contends that the 2012 version of the direct file

statute should have applied because his case was filed in 2018, well

after the 2012 revisions (which allowed direct filing of charges only

if the juvenile was sixteen or older). He further contends that the

postconviction court erred in relying on Godinez because its

analysis on retroactivity does not apply to his situation. We agree

with Papol on both points.

¶ 16 Papol relies on Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo.

2007), for both contentions. We acknowledge that, in criminal law,

9
the “general rule is that the date of the offense governs the

applicable statute to be applied in charging the offense.” Id.; see

also People v. Woodward, 11 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 2000)

(concluding that the statute in effect at the time of the offense

controls); People v. Marlott, 552 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. 1976)

(requiring a criminal defendant to be sentenced under the statute in

effect at the time the offense was committed).

¶ 17 But Bostelman does not resolve the precise question here.

That case did not address the application of two different versions

of the direct file statute in a particular case. Rather, Bostelman

focused on interpreting section 19-2-517(1)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2005 —

which provided that “[a] juvenile may be charged by the direct filing

of an information in the district court or by indictment only

when . . . [t]he juvenile is fourteen years of age or older [and] has

allegedly committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony”

(emphases added) — to determine whether the age of the juvenile at

the time the offense occurred or at the time the charges were filed

governed. Although the case is not helpful to directly resolve the

question presented here, it directs one critical aspect of our

analysis: The supreme court held that “[a] juvenile’s age at the time

10
the delinquent act occurs . . . determines whether the prosecution

can file directly charges in district court.” Bostelman, 162 P.3d at

692. In other words, it is not the juvenile’s age when the

prosecution files charges that governs but the juvenile’s age when

the delinquent act occurred.

¶ 18 Because the postconviction court agreed that Bostelman did

not resolve the issue, it turned to Godinez to resolve whether the

2012 amendments to the direct file statute applied. Godinez held

that the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute were not

ameliorative, amendatory legislation subject to retroactive

application. Godinez, ¶ 28. As a result, the postconviction court in

this case concluded that the 1988 statute controlled.

¶ 19 We again agree with Papol that the postconviction court

misapplied Godinez to conclude that the 2012 statute should not be

applied to his case.

¶ 20 Godinez dealt with a juvenile defendant’s case that was direct

filed under section 19-2-517(1)(b), C.R.S. 2011, allowing the

prosecution to file charges in district court against a fourteen- or

fifteen-year-old for certain enumerated offenses. The 2012

amendments to the direct file statute eliminated that provision, so

11
the prosecution, under the new law, could direct file an action in

district court only if the juvenile was sixteen years of age or older

and charged with certain enumerated offenses. See § 19-2-

517(1)(a), C.R.S. 2012. The 2012 amendments went into effect a

few months after the juvenile’s case was filed. The juvenile argued

that the amendments applied retroactively, entitling him to a

reverse-transfer hearing under section 19-2-517(3), C.R.S. 2012.

Godinez, ¶ 4.

¶ 21 Godinez, ¶ 20, first relied on the axiomatic principle that

legislation is “presumed to have prospective application unless the

General Assembly expresses a contrary intent.” People v. Talley,

934 P.2d 859, 860 (Colo. App. 1996). This means that “[l]egislation

is applied prospectively when it operates on transactions that occur

after its effective date, and retroactively when it operates on

transactions that have already occurred or [on] rights and

obligations that existed before its effective date.” Godinez, ¶ 21

(quoting Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo.

1993)).

¶ 22 But Godinez, ¶ 15, also acknowledged that the supreme court

had recently decided Stellabotte. That case held that “ameliorative,

12
amendatory legislation applies retroactively to non-final convictions

under section 18-1-410(1)(f), [C.R.S. 2025,] unless the amendment

contains language indicating it applies only prospectively.”

Stellabotte, ¶¶ 28-30, 38. The Godinez division, however, concluded

that the 2012 amendments were not “ameliorative, amendatory

legislation” as contemplated by Stellabotte. Godinez, ¶ 28 (quoting

Stellabotte, ¶ 3). As a result, the division concluded that the

juvenile was not entitled to the benefit of the 2012 amendments to

the direct file statute, meaning his case had been properly filed in

the district court under the law at the time the case was filed.

¶ 23 Whether we agree with Godinez’s outcome is irrelevant

because a Stellabotte analysis is applicable in situations where the

amendatory legislation “became effective at any time before the

conviction became final on direct appeal” under section 18-1-

410(1)(f). Stellabotte, ¶ 26. In other words, we agree with Papol

that the question of whether the 2012 amendments apply

retroactively as amendatory, ameliorative legislation to his case is

inapplicable because, although the offense for which he was

charged was committed in 1988, the prosecution had not yet filed

charges against him when the 2012 amendments were enacted.

13
Therefore, the default rule — that legislation applies prospectively to

transactions occurring after the effective date — entitles Papol to

the benefit of the 2012 amendments. See § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025;

Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 11.

¶ 24 The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that because the

murder occurred in 1988, the relevant “transaction” occurred before

2012. But the prosecution’s action to file charges against Papol did

not occur until 2018. We agree that the substantive law that

applies is the law in effect at the time the offense occurred. See

Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 984 n.7 (Colo. 2006) (“[A]

substantive rule is one that ‘alters the range of conduct or the class

of persons that the law punishes.’” (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin,

542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004))). But a law or rule is procedural when “it

regulates ‘only the manner of determining the defendant’s

culpability.’” Id. at 984 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353). In

the context of this case, when (as discussed below) the changes to

the statute affected only the manner in which Papol could be

charged with a criminal offense and not whether he could be

charged at all, the 2012 amendments were procedural. Therefore,

the 2012 direct file statute applies to Papol’s case.

14
¶ 25 For these reasons, the postconviction court erred by relying on

Godinez to determine that the 1988 direct file statute applied.

Because the 2012 amendments govern — and Bostelman, 162 P.3d

at 692, tells us that the age when the delinquent committed the

alleged crime, not when the prosecution filed charges, controls —

the prosecution should have filed Papol’s case in juvenile court

under section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012, since Papol was fifteen

in 1988. But this determination does not end our inquiry. We next

turn to Papol’s claim that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction.

B. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 26 We start by revisiting Godinez’s analysis dealing with

jurisdiction. In addition to contending that the 2012 amendments

retroactively applied to him, the juvenile in Godinez also argued

that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction over his case

when the General Assembly increased the direct filing age for

juveniles from fourteen to sixteen years or older. Godinez, ¶ 19.

¶ 27 But the division rejected this argument, holding that

“[a]mending procedures by which jurisdiction is obtained is not the

same as removing jurisdiction entirely,” id. at ¶ 24, because the

15
“district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over [certain-aged]

defendants does not derive from the direct-file statute,” but rather

from the state’s constitution, id. at ¶ 23. See Colo. Const. art. VI,

§ 9(1) (“The district courts shall be trial courts of record with

general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil,

probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided” in the

constitution. (emphasis added)).

¶ 28 Papol is not entirely wrong that, in some instances, the district

court may not have subject matter jurisdiction over a juvenile. But

this principle is more nuanced than it may appear at first blush. As

we discuss below, if the prosecution files a juvenile’s case in district

court and the juvenile is not age eligible or the offense is not an

enumerated offense in the direct file statute for which the juvenile is

charged, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

action because the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over

certain aged juveniles for nonenumerated offenses. To put this in

context, we first turn to Sandoval, ¶¶ 16-17, which provided a

historical overview of Colorado’s direct file statute in the Children’s

Code.

16
¶ 29 Sandoval noted that Colorado was a pioneer in creating a

juvenile justice system, with the county courts in the 1960’s having

jurisdiction of “delinquent children” aged sixteen years or younger

who violated state or municipal laws, except for Denver, which had

a separate juvenile court under the state constitution. Id. at ¶ 25

(quoting Ch. 85, secs. 1-2, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 178-79). In 1963,

voters passed a constitutional amendment that went into effect in

1965, “vest[ing] the district courts with original jurisdiction in ‘all

civil, probate, and criminal cases.’” Id. at ¶ 26 (quoting Ch. 313,

sec. 1, 1963 Colo. Sess. Laws 1050). The General Assembly

enacted implementing legislation in 1964, ostensibly giving the City

and County of Denver Juvenile Court “exclusive jurisdiction” over

cases in which a child was under sixteen years of age and charged

with a “crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment.”

Id. at ¶ 27 (quoting Ch. 46, sec. 3(3), 1964 Colo. Sess. Laws 438).

¶ 30 The supreme court recognized that “it has long been the rule

that the Denver Juvenile Court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction, for

example, in delinquency and dependency matters.” Garcia, 403

P.2d at 219. But it nonetheless invalidated the 1964 statute

because “the General Assembly’s attempted grant of exclusive

17
jurisdiction to the juvenile court over crimes charged against

children under sixteen was unconstitutional.” Sandoval, ¶ 28

(emphasis added) (citing Garcia, 403 P.2d at 218). Garcia reasoned

that the 1964 statute conflicted with the constitution’s general

grant of jurisdiction to district courts in all criminal cases. 403

P.2d at 218; see Sandoval, ¶ 28.

¶ 31 The General Assembly responded to Garcia by passing a new

law in 1967 that provided exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court

over proceedings involving juveniles — children between ten and

seventeen years old — who could be adjudicated delinquent by

violating a state or federal law, instead of being prosecuted for

crimes. Sandoval, ¶ 29 (“[T]he 1967 statute referred to violations of

law by children, rather than crimes.”). The 1967 legislation was a

precursor to the 2012 direct file statute, allowing a child to be

charged with a felony only if “(1) the juvenile court certified the

child to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court or (2) a

child sixteen years of age or older was charged in district court with

a crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment.” Id.

at ¶ 30 (citing Ch. 443, sec. 1, § 22-1-4(4)(a)-(b), 1967 Colo. Sess.

Laws 997).

18
¶ 32 The supreme court upheld the 1967 legislation in People ex rel.

Terrell v. District Court, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (Colo. 1967). We pause

for a moment to discuss Terrell because it is important to

understand that, in that case, when the supreme court used the

word “jurisdiction,” it meant that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over that juvenile’s case. We provide a more

detailed explanation of Terrell below to demonstrate that it is not

contrary to our holding today.

¶ 33 In Terrell, the juvenile, who was fifteen at the time of the

alleged offense, was charged in the district court with assault with a

deadly weapon. Id. The juvenile filed a motion to dismiss,

requesting that his case be transferred or dismissed on the basis

that “because of his age, the only proceeding which could be

brought against him was [a] delinquency proceeding in the [juvenile

court].” Id. at 764. The court in Terrell determined that the 1967

statute barring juveniles sixteen or younger from being prosecuted

with felonies was constitutional because the General Assembly “has

the power to create and define crimes, subject of course to any

applicable constitutional limitations.” Id. at 765. And “[a]s a

corollary, the [General Assembly] may within reasonable limits fix

19
the age below which there can be no criminal responsibility.” Id.

Thus, the court held that the statute was inapplicable because the

juvenile in Terrell was fifteen at the time the offense occurred, and

“the legislative intent was that a child under sixteen years of age

under no circumstance was to be charged with the commission of

a felony.” Id. at 765-66. In other words, the juvenile in Terrell

could only be adjudicated delinquent for what the 1967 law and

Sandoval referred to as his “violations of law.” Sandoval, ¶ 29

(emphasis omitted). This meant the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over his case.

¶ 34 Sandoval elaborated on the distinction between the juvenile

court having subject matter jurisdiction over delinquent acts and

the district court having subject matter jurisdiction over criminal

prosecutions. There, the issue was whether a juvenile’s case was

improperly direct filed in district court because the offense for

which the juvenile was charged was not enumerated, and he was

fifteen at the time the offense occurred. Id. at ¶ 19 (stating that the

parties conceded, and the division agreed, that neither of the

offenses for which the juvenile was charged were crimes of violence

20
as enumerated in the direct file statute in effect when the offenses

occurred).

¶ 35 The Sandoval division reasoned that the district court’s

“jurisdiction over direct file cases against juveniles constitutes

subject matter jurisdiction,” while the district court “lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over cases involving juveniles who have

committed delinquent acts.” Id. at ¶ 53. A district attorney “may

invoke a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over enumerated

types of cases under the direct file statute,” and “[b]ecause direct

file cases charge crimes, as opposed to delinquent acts, the

enumerated crimes constitute a class or type of criminal cases and

thus fall within the district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.

(emphasis added).

¶ 36 Papol’s argument that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction in his case depends, in part, on his view that

jurisdiction was not “invoked” because the statutory prerequisites of

the direct file statute were not satisfied. This position appears to be

supported by language in Sandoval that says, “When the [district

court]’s jurisdiction over a case under the direct file statute has not

been properly invoked, the subject matter of the case remains

21
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [juvenile court] to adjudicate

delinquency proceedings.” Id. But the issue in Sandoval was

similar to the situation in Terrell: Because of the age of the juveniles

and because the offenses they were charged with were not

enumerated offenses in the direct file statutes in effect during the

relevant time periods, the juveniles could not be held criminally

liable for their conduct.

¶ 37 Sandoval was correct when it concluded that “the

jurisdictional defect ar[ose] from the type of case in which

jurisdiction was asserted,” id. at ¶ 54, meaning the juvenile in

Sandoval could only be adjudicated delinquent for his violation of

law in the juvenile court. In short, Terrell and Sandoval stand for

the legal proposition that a district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a case involving a juvenile’s violation of the law

that the General Assembly intended only to be subject to a

delinquency proceeding rather than a criminal case.

¶ 38 Papol’s situation is not the same as the juveniles’

circumstances in those cases. He acknowledges that, even under

the 2012 direct file statute, his case was eligible for transfer to the

district court. See § 19-2-518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2012 (stating that

22
upon filing a petition, a juvenile’s case could be transferred to

district court if the juvenile was “[f]ourteen years of age or older” at

the time of the commission of the alleged offense and was alleged to

have “committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony”).4

Nonetheless, he contends that because he did not receive a transfer

hearing in juvenile court under section 19-2-518(1)(a)(I)(B)(II), the

juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over his case, and the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 39 We disagree. A juvenile’s request for, and a juvenile court’s

grant of, a transfer hearing — though important safeguards to

protect juveniles — are procedural mechanisms, not jurisdictional

prerequisites, for a juvenile’s case to be transferred to a district

court when the juvenile is age eligible and alleged to have

committed an offense enumerated in the direct file statute. In other

words, Papol’s situation did not require “invoking” the subject

matter jurisdiction of the district court because the 2012

amendments made his age and the offense for which he was

4 Based on the statute’s 2021 repeal and relocation, section 19-2-

518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at section 19-2.5-
802(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.

23
charged eligible for transfer to district court for criminal

prosecution. The General Assembly’s passage of the 2012

amendments contemplated that juveniles similarly situated to Papol

could be adjudicated delinquent for a violation of the law in juvenile

court or could be prosecuted for, and convicted of, a crime in

district court based on his age and the charged offense. In this

particular situation, the court’s compliance with the statutory

requirements to transfer his juvenile case to district court is a

procedural safeguard, not a jurisdictional prerequisite, under

section 19-2-517(1)(a), C.R.S. 2012.

¶ 40 Our holding is not intended to minimize the importance of the

procedural mechanisms the General Assembly has enacted to

protect juveniles being charged with criminal prosecutions. Indeed,

the prosecution should be aware that, if a juvenile’s case is direct

filed in district court and the juvenile is not both age eligible and

charged with an enumerated offense in the direct file statute, Terrell

and Sandoval compel a conclusion that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over that action. But if the district court

already has subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of section 19-2-

517(1), C.R.S. 2020 (current version at § 19-2.5-801(1)), any error

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relating to the district court’s or the juvenile court’s compliance

with section 19-2-518, C.R.S. 2020 (current version at § 19-2.5-

802, C.R.S. 2025), is procedural and does not affect the district

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Application to Papol’s Case

¶ 41 Because the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute apply,

Papol’s case should have been filed in juvenile court. But because

he was fifteen at the time of the alleged offense and he was charged

with a class 1 felony, the prosecutor could have sought to have his

case transferred to the district court under section 19-2-

518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2012. Therefore, the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction over his case by virtue of section 19-2-

517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012, which made Papol an eligible age to be

held criminally liable for first degree murder. And because this

error is procedural, not jurisdictional, we conclude that Papol

waived his claim when he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

entered into his plea agreement. See Neuhaus, ¶ 8; Butler, 251 P.3d

at 520.

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¶ 42 As a result, the postconviction court’s order denying Papol’s

request for postconviction relief is affirmed, albeit on different

grounds. See Thompson, ¶ 55 n.7.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 43 We affirm the postconviction court’s order.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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