Peo in Interest of DJL

25CA1538 Peo in Interest of DJL 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1538
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV196
Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.J.L., a Child,

and Concerning A.R.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Harald Van Gaasbeek, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Fort Collins,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, A.R.A. (mother) appeals

the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with

D.J.L. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about

mother’s substance dependence. The petition also alleged that the

then-eight-year-old child, who had several serious medical and

neurological diagnoses, was not receiving proper medical care.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. More than

three years after filing the petition, the Department moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court granted the

motion after a contested hearing.

II. Notice of Grounds for Termination

¶4 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

terminating her parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025 (authorizing termination due to abandonment), without notice

that her rights might be terminated under that subsection. We

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agree that mother did not have adequate notice of this basis for

termination, but we conclude that the error was harmless.

¶5 The Department’s termination motion began, “Comes now, the

Petitioners pursuant to C.R.S. § 19-3-601, et seq. and moves for an

order terminating the parent-child legal relationship . . . .” The

motion does not include any other statutory reference. The grounds

stated include the child’s adjudication, the adoption of an

appropriate treatment plan, mother’s failure to comply with the

treatment plan, and that mother was unfit and unlikely to become

fit within a reasonable time — all elements required by section

19-3-604(1)(c). Although the “Advisement of Rights” section of the

motion advises mother that the court may terminate her parental

rights if it finds “[t]hat you have abandoned your child,” the motion

does not allege that mother abandoned the child and does not

contain any language suggesting that the Department intended to

seek termination on the basis of abandonment. During the

termination hearing, the Department did not ask the court to

terminate mother’s rights on abandonment grounds.

¶6 Under these circumstances, we agree that the court erred by

terminating mother’s parental rights due to abandonment pursuant

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to section 19-3-604(1)(a). However, mother’s parental rights were

also terminated pursuant to section 19-3-604(1)(c) based on her

failure to comply with an appropriate treatment plan. Mother does

not challenge the notice she received regarding that provision. We

agree that her other claims, addressed below, would impact

termination under section 19-3-604(1)(c) if they were successful.

But because we ultimately affirm the termination based on section

19-3-604(1)(c), any deficiency in notice regarding section

19-3-604(1)(a) was harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61 (an error is harmless

when it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties); People

in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (“An error affects a

substantial right only if it can be said with fair assurance that the

error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself.” (citation modified)).

III. Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

¶7 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by granting

her court-appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶8 Mother did not appear at the first hearing held in this case in

April 2022. Mother appeared at the second hearing in May 2022

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and requested counsel, and the juvenile court appointed counsel for

her that day. In October 2023, mother appeared and requested

new counsel “because there’s been so much miscommunication.”

At that time, the juvenile court advised her, “I can appoint a new

attorney for you, but I’m not going to keep appointing attorneys

over and over again, okay?”

¶9 Mother’s second attorney served mother with a notice of intent

to withdraw in July 2024. When mother did not file an objection,

the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The court did not

automatically appoint mother a new attorney. Mother next

appeared at the October 2024 hearing and requested an attorney;

the court reappointed the second attorney that same day. That

attorney again served mother with a notice of intent to withdraw in

July 2025, after the Department filed its motion to terminate

parental rights.

¶ 10 The termination hearing took place fifteen days after counsel

moved to withdraw for the second time. Mother did not file an

objection to her counsel’s withdrawal and did not appear at the

termination hearing. Counsel reported to the court that, after

serving mother with the withdrawal notice, she spoke with mother

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and a “treatment provider” and explained that she would “move

forward with” her motion to withdraw unless mother either assisted

in preparation for the termination hearing or attended the

termination hearing.” Counsel asked the court “to terminate [her]

appointment, given that neither of those [had] occurred.”

B. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 11 Whether to grant an attorney’s motion to withdraw is a

decision left to the sound discretion of the juvenile court that will

not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of direction. People

in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986). The juvenile

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the

law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

¶ 12 Motions to withdraw are addressed by C.R.C.P. Rule 121,

section 1-1(2)(b). As relevant here, “an attorney may withdraw from

a case only upon approval of the court.” Id. “Such approval shall

rest in the discretion of the court, but shall not be granted until a

motion to withdraw has been filed and served on the client and . . .

at least [fourteen] days have expired after service of said motion.”

Id. The motion must also contain certain advisements, including

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the client’s right to file an objection within fourteen days. C.R.C.P.

121, § 1-1(2)(b)-(c).

C. Analysis

¶ 13 The juvenile court noted that (1) counsel filed the motion to

withdraw; (2) the appropriate amount of time had passed; and

(3) mother failed to appear at the hearing. The court then granted

the motion “based on the record made by [mother]’s attorney.”

¶ 14 We discern no error. Mother does not assert, and the record

does not reveal, any deficiency in trial counsel’s notice or motion to

withdraw. Although mother now asserts that the court’s ruling was

deficient because its “findings were insufficient to permit this court

to determine whether it was appropriate to grant the motion to

withdraw,” she does not provide authority, and we are not aware of

any, requiring a juvenile court to make specific findings before

granting a properly filed and served motion to withdraw. In any

event, the court stated it was relying on mother’s attorney’s

representation that mother did not assist in preparing for the

hearing along with mother’s failure to appear, which is sufficient.

See M.M., 726 P.2d at 1121.

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¶ 15 To the extent mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

declining to sua sponte appoint her an attorney for the fourth time,

we discern no error. A parent has a statutory right to appointed

counsel in termination proceedings. C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627,

636 (Colo. 2004). “[D]ue process requires the appointment of

counsel only where the parent’s interests are at [their] strongest,

where the state’s interests are at their weakest, and the risks of

error are at their peak.” Id. at 636-37. But a parent’s interest in

being represented must be balanced with a child’s interest in

permanency. Id. at 637.

¶ 16 Here, mother failed to assist her counsel in preparation,

appear at the termination hearing, and contest her attorney’s

withdrawal despite being given a proper opportunity. The

Department presented one witness, mother’s caseworker, who

testified that mother recently began outpatient substance

dependence treatment but otherwise had not engaged or complied

with any element of her treatment plan in the more than three years

the case was open. The caseworker testified that mother saw the

child only once in the year she served as the caseworker. We

conclude that, like the proceedings in C.S., “the simplicity of the

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hearing and the weight of the evidence against [mother] presented

at the hearing were such that the absence of counsel did not render

the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Id.

¶ 17 Furthermore, mother did not have a reasonable expectation

that the juvenile court would appoint her counsel in her absence.

Recall that the three times the juvenile court appointed mother

counsel during the life of the action, it did so only after mother

appeared and requested counsel. However, mother did not appear

at the termination hearing and did not request that a new attorney

be appointed for her.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 18 Mother also contends that she received ineffective assistance

of counsel. We are not persuaded.

A. Relevant Law

¶ 19 To successfully assert a claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel, a parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance was

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and

(2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. A.R. v. D.R., 2020

CO 10, ¶ 48; People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291-92 (Colo.

App. 2007). For the performance prong, a defendant must prove

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that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984); see A.R., ¶¶ 48, 60 (the Strickland standard applies to

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency or neglect

proceedings). To show prejudice, the parent must show a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance

or unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. A.R., ¶ 60.

¶ 20 Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in

dependency or neglect cases can be raised for the first time on

appeal, the record may be insufficiently developed to allow us to

resolve the parent’s contentions without a remand to the district

court for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 63. To justify such a

remand, however, the parent must allege facts with sufficient

specificity to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. For example, if a parent alleges that

counsel performed deficiently by failing to call or cross examine

witnesses, the parent must identify the witnesses, describe the

expected substance of their testimony, and provide a clear

explanation of how that testimony would have affected the outcome

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of the proceeding. See C.H., 166 P.3d at 291. If the parent’s

allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may summarily deny the

ineffective assistance claim. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 21 Mother contends that counsel performed deficiently by moving

to withdraw, failing to communicate with mother after advising her

of the motion to withdraw, failing to investigate witnesses, failing to

request a continuance of the termination hearing to allow mother to

appear, and declining to represent mother at the termination

hearing. Mother argues that counsel’s conduct was inconsistent

with their ethical obligations.

¶ 22 But even if counsel’s performance fell below the

reasonableness standard, mother has failed to sufficiently allege the

requisite prejudice resulting from the allegedly deficient

performance.

¶ 23 Mother generally contends that, had they been subpoenaed to

testify, her “treatment provider and peer coach” would have testified

as to mother’s “progress on her sobriety, her stability, and her

transportation and phone barriers to in-person visitation.” Mother

further contends that “with proper advocacy from her attorney,

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[mother] would have presented evidence of her sobriety, her

substance use disorder treatment, her barriers to visitation, and

her stability.” Without specifying how, mother claims that “with

proper advocacy, [she] would have presented evidence of her

compliance with the treatment plan and sufficient evidence that she

was able to become fit within a reasonable time.”

¶ 24 But even if this evidence had been presented, we conclude

that there is not a reasonable probability it would have changed the

outcome of the proceeding. See A.R., ¶ 60. The caseworker testified

that mother began outpatient substance dependence treatment “a

week or two” before the termination hearing. The caseworker

testified that mother did not provide any of the urinalysis testing

required by the treatment provider. Mother does not challenge this

testimony, nor does she assert that she would have been able to

present any evidence contradicting the caseworker’s testimony that

mother did not participate in treatment or family time with the child

for most of the three-year case. See People in Interest of A.J.L., 243

P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010) (the juvenile court is not required to give

greater weight to more recent evidence); People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 25 (the juvenile court is not required to give a

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parent more time even if there is recent progress on a treatment

plan); see also § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A) (when a parent has not

attended family time without good cause, the court “shall not” find

the parent is in reasonable compliance with a treatment plan).

¶ 25 Because mother fails to make a prima facie showing of

ineffective assistance of counsel, we deny her claim. See C.H., 166

P.3d at 291.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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