Peo in Interest of NKS

25CA1671 Peo in Interest of NKS 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1671
Rio Blanco County District Court No. 23JV1
Honorable Anne K. Norrdin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of N.K.S. and W.J.S., Children,

and Concerning I.R.S,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ*
Román, C.J., and Ashby*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Rose Pugliese, County Attorney, Meeker, Colorado; BTR Law, LLC, Benjamin T.
Rehbein, Grand Junction, Colorado for Appellee

Cassie L. Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, I.R.S. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationships with N.K.S. and W.J.S. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2022, the Rio Blanco County Department of

Human Services received a report of domestic violence and

substance use in the parents’ home. For approximately three

months, the parents worked with the Department on a voluntary

basis. However, when the parents did not comply with the

agreed-upon safety plan, the juvenile court granted the

Department’s request to remove the children and place them in

foster care.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, the Department filed a petition in

dependency and neglect concerning the then-three-year-old and

one-year-old children. Father admitted the allegations in the

petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent

or neglected. The court later adopted a treatment plan for father

that required him to (1) engage in substance abuse treatment and

demonstrate sobriety; (2) maintain stable employment and housing;

(3) gain an understanding of the children’s needs and demonstrate

1
appropriate parenting skills; (4) address his mental health issues;

(5) engage in domestic violence treatment; and (6) refrain from

further involvement in the criminal justice system.

¶4 In August 2024, the Department moved to terminate the

father’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

After a three-day hearing, the juvenile court denied the

Department’s motion, finding that the Department failed to prove

that father could not become fit within a reasonable time and that

no less drastic alternatives to termination existed.

¶5 Thereafter, the guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to terminate

father’s parental rights and the juvenile court held a second

termination hearing. After considering the evidence, the court

found that in the six months after the first termination hearing,

father had not improved or addressed the issues that brought the

family to the Department’s attention. Specifically, the court found

that despite the Department’s efforts to rehabilitate father, he (1)

had admitted to using methamphetamine a month before the

hearing; (2) was not engaged in substance abuse treatment; (3) had

not obtained stable housing; (4) had not completed his domestic

violence classes; (5) still struggled to regulate himself and act

2
appropriately during family time; and (6) refused to allow his

probation officer to speak to the Department about his probation

compliance. The court further found that father was unlikely to

become fit in a reasonable time and that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. Consequently, the court terminated

father’s parental rights approximately two and a half years after the

filing of the petition.

II. Motion to Continue

¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by denying his motion to continue the termination hearing so he

could obtain an expert witness. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 An indigent parent has a statutory right to the appointment of

an expert witness of his or her own choosing at state expense. See

§ 19-3-607(1), C.R.S. 2025. A request for the appointment of an

expert witness must be made within a reasonable time prior to the

termination hearing. People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1082

(Colo. App. 2005).

¶8 In ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court should

balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration of

3
justice against the facts underlying the motion, while considering

the child’s need for permanency. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019

COA 136, ¶ 44. When a child is under six years old at the time the

petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply, and the juvenile court

cannot delay or continue the termination hearing absent a showing

of good cause and a finding that the delay would serve the best

interests of the child. §§ 19-3-602(1), 19-3-104, 19-1-123, C.R.S.

2025.

¶9 We review a ruling on a motion to continue for an abuse of

discretion. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 908 (Colo.

App. 2005). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies

or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,

¶ 14. “The totality of the circumstances is relevant when

determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of

discretion by denying a continuance.” Id. (quoting People in Interest

of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo. 1990)).

4
B. Additional Facts

¶ 10 Approximately three weeks after the GAL moved to terminate

father’s rights, which was one month before the second termination

hearing, father filed a motion to continue the hearing. He argued

that without a continuance, he would be “deprived of any

meaningful opportunity to utilize the expert to which he [was]

entitled” under section 19-3-607. Specifically, he asserted that the

expert he had selected (the same expert mother had retained for the

first termination hearing) was unable to complete her evaluation

and report before the hearing date. The Department and GAL

objected to a continuance, arguing that a delay would not be in the

children’s best interests.

¶ 11 Following a hearing, the juvenile court denied father’s motion.

The court noted that it was required to be “particularly mindful of

[the] child[ren’s] need for stability and the potential harm caused by

delays” because the children were under six years old, which was a

“critical bonding and attachment period.” It then found that a

continuance was not in the children’s best interests because their

“dire need for permanency” was “present and obvious” to the court

at the time of the first termination hearing, and that need still

5
existed. The court further found that father had not established

good cause for a continuance, noting that the expert witness father

selected had already “become acquainted with this particular

family” because she had completed an evaluation and testified at

the first termination hearing.

¶ 12 Nonetheless, the juvenile court stated that it “understood

[father’s] statutory right to an expert witness” and that it would

appoint the requested expert if father wanted to utilize her “in some

other capacity” that would allow her to complete a report and testify

at the already-scheduled hearing.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that a

continuance was not in the children’s best interests. Indeed, when

the motion to continue was filed, the case had been open for over

two years and the children had been in foster care the entire time.

Moreover, at the first termination hearing — approximately five

months before father’s motion to continue the second termination

hearing — the caseworker testified that the children already had

“severe attachment issues” and opined that they needed

permanency “sooner than later.”

6
¶ 14 Further, the juvenile court made specific findings, supported

by the record, that continuing the second termination hearing was

not in the children’s best interests. After making these findings, the

court could not continue the hearing regardless of whether father

established good cause to continue it. See § 19-3-104 (a

termination hearing in an EPP case “must not be delayed or

continued” unless there is a showing of good cause and the court

finds that the continuance is in the children’s best interests).

¶ 15 To the extent that father argues that the denial of the

continuance deprived him of his statutory right to an expert

witness, which made the proceedings fundamentally unfair, we

disagree. First, the record does not indicate that the juvenile court

denied father’s request for an expert witness. Rather, the court

denied his motion to continue but still offered to appoint the

requested expert in a different capacity, such as a consultant, so

that she could complete a report and testify at the

already-scheduled hearing. In other words, the court determined

that the scope of the expert’s opinion would need to be limited

because the children’s “dire” need for permanency required quick

resolution of the proceedings. See People in Interest of E.S., 49 P.3d

7
1221, 1224 (Colo. App. 2002) (a parent’s “statutory right to an

expert witness may be limited in scope” if necessary to meet the

child’s needs because a parent’s right to due process is “subject to

the power of the state to act in the best interests of the child”).

¶ 16 Second, even assuming without deciding that father’s due

process rights were violated by the denial of the continuance, father

has not demonstrated actual prejudice. See E.B., ¶ 17 (a parent

arguing that a denial of a continuance violated due process must

demonstrate actual prejudice). Father claims that the expert

witness was necessary to present an “effective” and “zealous”

defense, and states in general terms what the witness might have

said had she completed her evaluation. However, father does not

explain how that testimony would have changed the outcome of the

case, particularly in light of the juvenile court’s findings that father

failed to comply with nearly all of the objectives of his treatment

plan. See C.R.C.P. 61; C.A.R. 35(c); People in Interest of C.C.,

2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (an appellate court may disregard any error if it

can be said with fair assurance that the error did not substantially

influence the outcome of the case or impair the basic fairness of the

trial).

8
¶ 17 Based on the foregoing, we perceive no abuse of discretion

because the juvenile court properly weighed the reason proffered for

the continuance with the need for prompt resolution of the

proceeding and the children’s best interests.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 18 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and

reunite him with the children. Specifically, he argues that the

Department failed to provide adequate family time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 19 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,

by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 20 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

9
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services

provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 21 As relevant here, a department must provide family time

services for parents with children in out-of-home placement if those

services are determined to be necessary and appropriate by the

individual case plan. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest of

E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 14. The children’s health and safety are the

paramount concerns in determining whether, and what type of,

family time services are necessary and appropriate. See People in

Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17. Family time services shall be

designed to promote the children’s health, safety, and well-being;

facilitate the speedy reunification of a parent and their children;

and promote the children’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-208(2)(a).

¶ 22 The juvenile court should analyze a department’s efforts by

considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

10
completion of the entire treatment plan. People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. A parent is ultimately

responsible for using the services to obtain the assistance needed to

comply with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 23 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent. Id.

B. Additional Facts

¶ 24 When the case opened, the juvenile court ordered the

Department to provide supervised family time for father. The

Department arranged for the children to have in-person family time

with father three times per week in Rangely, Colorado (where father

lived). However, because the children’s foster home was in Meeker,

Colorado, the Department became concerned that traveling to and

from Rangely three times per week was too much for the children —

the children were spending about two hours in a car every time they

11
had a visit. Consequently, the Department changed father’s family

time to one visit per week in Rangely and two visits per week in

Meeker. At that point, the Department was transporting the

children to their family time in Rangely and providing father with

gas vouchers to drive to Meeker for the family time there. But

father made it to only four out of thirty-five sessions scheduled in

Meeker. Thus, starting in August 2023, the Department changed

the family time schedule to one in-person visit in Rangely and two

virtual visits every week.

¶ 25 In January 2024, the Department and the GAL moved the

juvenile court to order that the level of family time supervision

increase to a therapeutic setting. After a contested hearing, the

court found that the children were “not doing well emotionally in

connection with visits” and that their attachment to the parents

was “growing more disorganized rather than improving.” The court

then ordered that father’s family time decrease to one in-person

therapeutic visit per week.

¶ 26 Thereafter, the Department provided one therapeutic visit per

week until the first termination hearing in January 2025. Shortly

after that hearing, the therapeutic family time provider resigned

12
because, according to the caseworker, there were scheduling issues

and the provider did not believe father was willing to implement her

recommendations. Within five weeks, the Department had

arranged therapeutic family time with a new provider.

Consequently, from April 2025 until the second termination

hearing, the new provider facilitated weekly in-person therapeutic

visits for father and the children.

C. Analysis

¶ 27 In its oral termination ruling, the juvenile court found that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father by

“providing screenings, assessments, individual case plans,

information and referral services, visitation services, transportation

assistance, placement services for the children and case

management.” It found that “despite those efforts,” father was still

unfit.

¶ 28 Father challenges the court’s reasonable efforts finding only as

it relates to family time. He does not assert that the Department

wholly failed to provide family time services, as required under

section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Rather, he asserts that the family time

provided by the Department was inadequate because (1) the virtual

13
visits did not provide father with an opportunity to maintain his

connection with the children; (2) when the children began acting

out after family time, the Department sought to restrict father’s

family time instead of providing more supportive in-person family

time; and (3) the Department failed to provide any family time for

five weeks after the first therapeutic family time provider terminated

her services. We reject all three arguments.

¶ 29 First, the record indicates that the Department’s decision to

convert two of father’s weekly visits from in-person to virtual was

based, at least in part, on father’s failure to attend the in-person

visits in Meeker. In fact, around the time the visits were converted

to virtual, the caseworker reported that the Department made that

decision “in hopes of more participation” from father. It was also

based on the oldest child’s educational needs (her preschool

schedule). Even after the Meeker visits were converted to virtual

visits, the Department was still transporting the children to Rangely

for weekly in-person visits with father.

¶ 30 Second, the Department’s decision to move for an increase of

family time supervision level does not show that it failed to make

reasonable efforts. Rather, the Department moved for therapeutic

14
family time because it was concerned that the supervised visits with

father had become emotionally harmful to the children. See

§ 19-3-217(d), C.R.S. 2025 (a court may restrict family time if it is

necessary to protect a child’s safety or mental, emotional, or

physical health). Moreover, the level of supervision for family time

is within the juvenile court’s purview, not the Department’s. People

in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (family

time orders are always “subject to the continuing supervision and

review by the trial court, which, in the final analysis, retains

ultimate decision-making authority in the case”). Here, based on

the evidence presented at a contested family time hearing, the

juvenile court found that an increase to therapeutic supervision

and a decrease to one visit per week were necessary to protect the

children’s emotional well-being. Thereafter, the Department

provided the type and frequency of family time ordered by the court.

¶ 31 Third, although the caseworker admitted that father did not

have any family time in the five weeks after the first therapeutic

family time provider resigned, the record indicates that the

Department made significant efforts to provide family time during

that period. Specifically, the caseworker testified that when she

15
found out that the first therapeutic family time provider would be

resigning, she asked that provider for recommendations of other

providers who could facilitate therapeutic family time. The provider

gave “a couple” of recommendations, and the caseworker contacted

them. The caseworker then “researched and reached out” to “more

than eight, if not upwards of twelve” additional providers to find a

new therapeutic supervisor. Eventually, after speaking to one of

the providers three times, the caseworker “begged and pleaded

enough” to convince that provider to take the referral. Thereafter,

father’s weekly therapeutic visits resumed and continued through

the second termination hearing. Thus, the record belies father’s

assertion that the five-week lapse in family time showed a lack of

reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.

¶ 32 Moreover, even if the Department’s efforts were lacking during

the time period in which father did not have family time, father does

not explain how five weeks without family time in a two-and-a-half

year case rendered the Department’s overall efforts unreasonable.

In light of the ample evidence showing that the Department

provided numerous services (including family time services) to

father throughout the case, we do not see how the five weeks

16
without family time rendered the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts

finding erroneous. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (to analyze reasonable efforts,

the court must look at the totality of the circumstances).

¶ 33 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate father and reunite him with the children.

IV. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 34 Last, father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. He

asserts that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between

him and mother was a viable permanency option. We discern no

error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 35 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less

drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,

¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other things, (1)

17
whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial

to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the

child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38,

and (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People in

Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 36 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Long-term or permanent placement with a

family member, short of termination, may not be in the child’s best

interests if it does not provide the permanence that adoption would

provide or otherwise meet the child’s needs. A.R., ¶ 41. If a

juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

alternative and order termination. A.M., ¶ 32.

¶ 37 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are

bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its

findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

18
B. Analysis

¶ 38 As a threshold matter, the Department and GAL argue that

father failed to preserve his less drastic alternatives argument

because father offered no evidence and made no argument about an

APR at the termination hearing. Because we discern no error, we

do not find it necessary to determine whether this argument must

be preserved and, if so, whether father preserved it.

¶ 39 The juvenile court considered several less drastic alternatives

to termination — an APR between the foster parents and father, an

APR between mother and father, long-term foster care, and a

guardianship. But it found that none of those options would be in

the children’s best interests. The court’s conclusion was based on

its consideration of “the children’s age[s], their developmental

needs, [and] . . . the length of time they [had] been placed outside of

the home.”

¶ 40 Regarding the possibility of permanent foster care, the juvenile

court found that the children’s needs suggested a “secure form of

permanency,” and that, “[p]ermanent foster care would be a limbo

state that would be confusing to them and undermine their feeling

of security, safety and permanency.” The court concluded that,

19
“[a]ny APR agreement between the child's caregiver and father

would likely result in conflict that would be emotionally unsafe,

potentially physically unsafe, and threatening to the girls'

permanency”.

¶ 41 As relevant to father’s appellate argument, the court found

that an APR between father and mother was not a viable option

because “the domestic violence between the parents [had] not been

remedied” and because “denying termination for father and hoping

that an APR . . . could be devised” would cause further delay, which

was not in the children’s best interests.

¶ 42 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker, who testified as an expert in child welfare and case

management, opined that termination was in the children’s best

interests because throughout the case the children had become

increasingly dysregulated and escalated before, during, and after

their family time with father. The caseworker testified that even if

mother became fit at some point in the future, an APR between the

parents would not be in the children’s best interests because, at the

time of the hearing, father was still “demonstrating domestic

violence behaviors” toward mother. For example, the caseworker

20
testified that father had posted “belittling and demeaning” things

about mother on his social media page just a few days before the

hearing. The caseworker further testified that father had not

completed his domestic violence treatment or classes.

¶ 43 To the extent father argues that termination was not in the

children’s best interests because he had a good relationship with

them, we note that a child’s bond to a parent is just one factor for

the court to consider in analyzing whether any less drastic

alternatives are viable. Here, even after considering the testimony

about the children’s bond with father, the juvenile court still

concluded, based on the children’s needs, that termination was in

their best interests. We cannot reweigh this evidence. See People in

Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

¶ 44 Therefore, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that termination, not an APR, was in the children’s best

interests, we discern no basis for reversal. See B.H., ¶ 80.

V. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE ASHBY concur.

21