Peo in Interest of XIM

25CA1698 Peo in Interest of XIM 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1698
Jefferson County District Court No. 24JV30171
Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of X.I.M., a Child,

and Concerning I.A.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Grove and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney,
Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 I.A.M. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-

child legal relationship with X.I.M. (the child). He contends that the

juvenile court erred by finding that he was unlikely to become fit

within a reasonable period of time. We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families

filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that the child

had tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl at birth and

was experiencing withdrawals. The petition also alleged that father

admitted to regularly using fentanyl and methamphetamine.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the child

to the Division, and the child was placed with paternal relatives.

During the initial assessment, an intake caseworker spoke with

father by phone and told him about the case. But after that, the

Division was unable to locate him and, therefore, served him with

the petition by publication. The court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for father.

¶4 In the meantime, the Division continued trying to locate and

engage father. The caseworker was finally able to reach him again

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months after the adjudication, and father maintained consistent

communication with the caseworker for the remainder of the case.

¶5 Weeks after establishing contact with father, the Division

moved to terminate father’s parental rights. The juvenile court

granted the motion after an evidentiary hearing. Although the court

noted that father had made some improvement, it found that he

had made no progress in addressing his substance use and that he

could not demonstrate sobriety in a reasonable amount of time.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship, the juvenile

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child

has been adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has

not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is

unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

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provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶8 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific

and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the child. Id. at ¶ 25.

¶9 But a “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And

even when a parent has made progress on a treatment plan, the

court is not required to give the parent additional time to become

fit. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25. In addition, when, as in this case, the child

is under six years old when the petition is filed, the action is subject

to the expedited permanency planning provisions, and the court

must place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. See id. at ¶ 25; §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

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¶ 10 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

clear error, but we review its legal conclusions de novo. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The determination of

whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable time is a

factual question that we review for clear error. S.Z.S., ¶¶ 25, 29;

People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 256 (Colo. 2010).

III. Analysis

¶ 11 Father does not challenge the finding that he was unfit at the

time of the termination hearing. He argues only that the juvenile

court erred by finding that he could not become fit in a reasonable

time because he was making progress and the child could wait

another six months for him to become sober. We disagree.

¶ 12 The juvenile court’s finding that father’s conduct or condition

was unlikely to change within a reasonable period of time was

based primarily on his continued use of methamphetamine and

fentanyl. See § 19-3-604(2)(e) (requiring court to consider use of

controlled substances in determining parent’s unfitness, conduct,

or condition). The court found that father had made no progress in

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addressing his substance use during the thirteen months the case

had been open and that the six months it would take for him to

demonstrate sobriety was not a reasonable amount of time for the

child, given the duration of the case and the child’s young age. The

court also found that father failed to make progress in other aspects

of his treatment plan and had not regularly attended family time.

¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings. Father’s treatment

plan required him to, among other things, complete a substance

use assessment and follow all recommendations, submit to random

urinalysis (UA) testing, participate in family time, and provide a safe

and stable environment that would meet the child’s needs. The

caseworker testified that father failed to make progress in nearly

every aspect of this plan, even after the Division established

consistent contact with him. He did not complete a substance use

assessment or the paperwork to begin the intake process, despite

the program’s proximity to his home. He did not submit any UAs,

nor did he call the UA hotline at any point in the case, despite the

caseworker’s attempts to help notify him when he was due to test.

And while he attended some family time, he missed over half of his

scheduled sessions and was late for all but one visit.

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¶ 14 The caseworker opined that, given father’s historical failure to

engage in the case, he would need to demonstrate consistent

engagement with his treatment plan for “a minimum of six months

or longer” before the child’s return home could be considered.

¶ 15 Father points out that he did obtain housing and reportedly

had obtained employment. Indeed, the court acknowledged these

improvements. But the caseworker also testified that at the time of

the termination hearing, father was being evicted. And regardless

of father’s progress in certain areas, the court found that his

continued failure to address his substance use meant that he was

not likely to become fit within a reasonable amount of time. See

S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29 (holding that juvenile court did not err by

failing to give parent additional time to become fit, even though she

had complied with parts of her treatment plan).

¶ 16 Father also argues that there was no evidence that “the child

was in desperate need of permanency” and that the court could

have given father an additional six months to establish sobriety.

But the caseworker opined that the child needed “a stable, sober

caregiver” and “permanency and consistency.” She noted the

child’s young age and explained that the child had lived with

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paternal relatives his entire life and was bonded to them and their

children. In contrast, she did not believe that father and the child

were bonded and opined that termination was in the child’s best

interests, given father’s lack of engagement with his treatment plan.

Moreover, as noted above, the expedited permanency planning

provisions require children under the age of six to be placed in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible. § 19-1-102(1.6).

¶ 17 Finally, father suggests that he should have been given more

time to comply with his treatment plan because he was not aware of

the case until four months before the termination hearing. But the

record indicates that father was aware of the case from the outset.

The caseworker testified that an intake caseworker had spoken with

father when the case opened to let him know about the case. The

caseworker also explained that paternal relatives had told him

father was aware of the case but did not want to meet with the

Division because he had an open warrant. And father admitted

that, before his contact with the caseworker, he knew he needed to

“get [ahold] of someone from Jefferson County” to see the child.

¶ 18 In sum, father’s argument effectively asks us to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,

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which we cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Rather, because there is

record support for the juvenile court’s finding that father could not

become fit within a reasonable time, we cannot disturb it. See id.

IV. Disposition

¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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