Peo v. Pratt

24CA0111 Peo v Pratt 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0111
Douglas County District Court No. 23CR415
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kevin Jodie Pratt,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury found defendant, Kevin Jodie Pratt, guilty of aggravated

motor vehicle theft, vehicular eluding, and reckless driving.

¶2 On appeal, Pratt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions and, in the alternative, argues that his

reckless driving conviction must merge into the vehicular eluding

conviction. We reject Pratt’s sufficiency challenges but agree with

his merger argument; therefore, we vacate the reckless driving

conviction and remand the case for correction of the mittimus.

I. Background

¶3 After learning that Pratt was driving a stolen car, officers in a

special motor vehicle theft unit began to follow him in unmarked

cars as he drove through parking lots and then on surface streets

toward the interstate.

¶4 When Pratt approached the highway on-ramp, one of the

unit’s officers activated the lights and sirens on his pickup truck.

Pratt did not pull over, so another officer waiting near the on-ramp

deployed a spike strip, a long tube with nails inside designed to

puncture and slowly deflate a vehicle’s tires. Pratt ran over the

spike strip and continued accelerating to merge onto the highway.

The officers followed Pratt onto the highway but, consistent with

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police department protocol, turned off their lights and sirens and

observed the speed limit.

¶5 Pratt drove on the highway for approximately a mile as the

driver’s side tires slowly deflated. After the tires began to smoke

and shred apart in traffic, rendering the car inoperable, Pratt pulled

the car to the side of the road. He and two passengers attempted to

flee on foot but were quickly apprehended.

¶6 The prosecution charged Pratt with, as relevant here,

aggravated motor vehicle theft, vehicular eluding, and reckless

driving.1 The jury found Pratt guilty of all charges.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenges

¶7 Pratt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his

convictions. He says that the prosecution failed to prove that he

drove recklessly, and because reckless driving is an element of

vehicular eluding and aggravated motor vehicle theft, all three

convictions must be vacated.

1 Pratt was also charged with, and found guilty of, obstruction of

justice, but he does not challenge that conviction on appeal.

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A. Standard of Review

¶8 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the

record de novo to determine whether the relevant evidence, both

direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to

support a conclusion by a rational jury that the defendant is guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13.

¶9 In conducting our review, we adhere to certain well-settled

principles. It is the jury’s role to evaluate the credibility of the

witnesses, determine the weight to give evidence, and resolve

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. Poe, 2012

COA 166, ¶ 14. We do not serve as a “thirteenth juror” to second-

guess findings that are supported by the evidence, Thomas v.

People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10 (citation omitted), or substitute our

judgment for that of the jury, People v. Strickler, 2022 COA 1, ¶ 11.

Our role is to determine whether the prosecution satisfied its

burden to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt every element of the charged offense. Thomas, ¶ 10.

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B. Reckless Driving Conviction

¶ 10 A person commits reckless driving when he drives a motor

vehicle “in such a manner as to indicate either a wanton or a willful

disregard for the safety of persons or property.” § 42-4-1401(1),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 According to Pratt, because he did not engage in any

“affirmative” dangerous acts — speeding, cutting off other drivers,

or disobeying traffic rules — the prosecution failed to prove a willful

disregard for the safety of others.

¶ 12 In our view, though, a rational jury could have concluded,

based on the following evidence and inferences that could

reasonably be drawn from it, that Pratt committed reckless driving

by continuing to drive on a highway even after he ran over the spike

strip and after his tires deflated and began to smoke.

• An officer activated his lights and siren in an attempt to

stop Pratt before Pratt took the on-ramp to the highway.

Pratt was aware of the officer but disregarded the signal to

stop.

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• Shortly thereafter, Pratt ran over the spike strip. He saw

the officer deploy the spike strip, proceeded anyway, and

felt the strip as he ran over it.

• Despite knowing that he had run over the spike strip, Pratt

continued to accelerate and merged onto the highway.

• After approximately thirty seconds of driving, Pratt’s driver’s

side tires were flat. Pratt continued driving in one of the

middle lanes of the highway with dozens of other cars

around him.

• Twenty-five seconds later, the flat tires began to smoke and

shred apart while Pratt drove. Pratt could have seen the

smoke. He continued to drive at highway speeds.

• Thirty seconds after smoke appeared, rubber came off the

flat tires and flew onto the highway. An officer saw other

vehicles driving over the debris.

• About ten seconds later, and only after the tires were

“completely shredded” and the car had effectively become

inoperable, Pratt finally pulled over to the side of the

highway and ran from the scene.

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¶ 13 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the

evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Pratt consciously and

willfully disregarded the safety of his passengers and other drivers

by continuing to drive at a high speed on a crowded highway for

more than ninety seconds after he knowingly ran over the spike

strip and for more than sixty seconds after his tires deflated.

¶ 14 According to Pratt, though, he would not have known it was

dangerous to continue driving until after the tires started to smoke

(about a minute after he drove over the spike strip), and, at that

point, he took only thirty-five seconds (forty by our count) to

carefully move to the shoulder and stop the car. Rather than

showing a willful disregard for others’ safety, he says, the timing

shows that he made safe decisions.

¶ 15 Even assuming that this is one reasonable interpretation of

the evidence, it is not the only one. As we have explained, the jury

could have determined that Pratt “consciously ch[ose] a dangerous

course of action,” Martin v. People, 495 P.2d 537, 539 (Colo. 1972),

when he continued to drive at a high speed for more than a minute

after his tires were flat.

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¶ 16 It is the jury’s role, not ours, to decide whether the evidence

weighs more heavily in favor of the prosecution or the defense. Poe,

¶ 14. And “where reasonable minds could differ,” the evidence is

sufficient to sustain the conviction. People v. Yeadon, 2018 COA

104, ¶ 21, aff’d, 2020 CO 38.

¶ 17 Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support Pratt’s reckless driving conviction, we reject Pratt’s

argument that, by extension, his vehicular eluding and aggravated

motor vehicle theft convictions are unsupported by sufficient

evidence because they were dependent on the reckless driving

conviction.2

C. Vehicular Eluding Conviction

¶ 18 A person commits the crime of vehicular eluding if, while

operating a motor vehicle, he (1) knowingly eludes or attempts to

elude a police officer who is also operating a motor vehicle; (2)

knows or reasonably should know that he was being pursued by

2 Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

the reckless driving conviction, we need not resolve the parties’
dispute concerning whether the jury had access, during
deliberations, to the entirety of an officer’s body camera footage or
only the portion shown during trial.

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the police officer; and (3) operates his vehicle in a reckless manner.

§ 18-9-116.5(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 19 At trial, a law enforcement witness testified that the officer in

the pickup truck deactivated his lights and siren once he merged

onto the highway, consistent with police department policy, which

“states that officers are only to pursue vehicles for . . . violent

felonies and serious person’s crimes,” and, therefore, the officer in

the pickup truck “was no longer in pursuit of [Pratt’s] vehicle” when

he turned off his lights and siren.

¶ 20 Pratt contends that because the reckless driving element must

occur simultaneously with the officer’s pursuit and because he

drove recklessly on the highway after the officer was no longer in

pursuit, the prosecution failed to prove vehicular eluding. We are

not persuaded.

¶ 21 Even assuming a simultaneity requirement, but see People v.

Sherwood, 5 P.3d 956, 959 (Colo. App. 2000) (The vehicular eluding

statute “does not require that the eluding and the reckless behavior

be simultaneous.”), here, the pursuit and reckless driving occurred

simultaneously.

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¶ 22 Our legal analysis of whether the officer’s pursuit continued

after he turned off his lights and siren is not dependent on the

witness’s description of police department protocols or definitions.

See Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 82 (Colo. 2003)

(court should not have adopted the definition of “pursuit” from the

police department’s manual). Rather, we look to the ordinary and

common meaning of the word, which is generally found in the

dictionary. Id. To “pursue” means “to follow in order to

overtake[ or] capture” or to “chase.” Webster’s New World College

Dictionary 1166 (4th ed. 1999); see also Black’s Law Dictionary

1495 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “pursue” as “[t]o follow persistently

in order to seize or obtain” or “to chase or hunt”).

¶ 23 An officer’s use of lights and a siren is not dispositive of

whether he is pursuing a suspect. See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 82

(officer who had not activated his lights and siren was in pursuit of

a driver when he “hurriedly followed the driver in order to

apprehend him”); see also People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471,

479 (Colo. App. 2011) (under the vehicular eluding statute, the

element of pursuit can be proved “absent any audible or visual

signal from the officer”).

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¶ 24 After activating his lights and siren for twenty-five seconds,

the officer in the pickup truck deactivated those signals once he

drove onto the highway. But he continued to closely follow Pratt for

the purpose of apprehending him. The officer was about three

seconds behind Pratt when Pratt pulled over and fled the scene.

The officer parked his truck and continued the chase on foot. On

this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the officer

was pursuing Pratt (and Pratt was aware of the pursuit) even after

the officer turned off his lights and siren. See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at

82; State v. Johnson, 580 P.3d 20, 27-28 (Kan. 2025) (evidence was

sufficient to show that reckless driving occurred during police

pursuit even though the officer had turned off his lights and siren

because the officer “continued driving in the same direction as [the

defendant] had fled in an effort to locate, overtake, and apprehend

him”).

III. Merger

¶ 25 Pratt contends, the People concede, and we agree that Pratt’s

conviction for reckless driving must nonetheless be vacated.

Because reckless driving is a lesser included offense of vehicular

eluding and both offenses were committed as part of a single

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criminal episode, the reckless driving conviction must merge into

the vehicular eluding conviction. See People v. Dominguez, 2019

COA 78, ¶¶ 64-65; Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d at 479.

¶ 26 Accordingly, we vacate the conviction for reckless driving and

remand the case to the trial court for correction of the mittimus.3

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 We affirm Pratt’s convictions for vehicular eluding and

aggravated motor vehicle theft. We vacate the reckless driving

conviction and remand the case to the trial court for correction of

the mittimus. (The portion of the judgment related to the

obstruction of justice conviction remains undisturbed.)

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

3 The mittimus also incorrectly states that Pratt pleaded guilty. On
remand, we direct the trial court to correct the mittimus to reflect
that Pratt was convicted on the jury’s verdict. See Crim. P. 36;
People v. Wood, 2019 CO 7, ¶¶ 39-40 (clerical errors in the
mittimus should be corrected pursuant to Crim. P. 36 “to ensure
that judgments and sentences are documented accurately”).

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