Peo in Interest of APR

23CA1928 Peo in Interest of APR 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1928
Weld County District Court No. 22JD52
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of A.P.R.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 A.P.R. appeals his adjudication of delinquency for sexual

assault. He argues that we must reverse his adjudication because

depriving a juvenile charged with a felony of the right to a jury trial

is unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions. He

alternatively argues that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his request for a jury trial and erred by denying his motion

to suppress a pretextual conversation. And, finally, he contends

that we must vacate the restitution order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After the victim reported to her father that A.P.R., then a

juvenile, sexually assaulted her at school, her father contacted the

police. The victim met with the investigating officer and agreed to

engage in a pretextual conversation with A.P.R. With the officer’s

help, the victim texted A.P.R. to talk about “what happened.”

During the conversation, the victim asserted that A.P.R. had raped

her and that she had told him “no a million times before [he] even

touched [her].” A.P.R. responded, “I realize that n I’m sorry . . . I

didn’t mean to do that to u.” He later added, “I really am sorry I

shouldn’t have done that to u.”

1
¶3 At the investigating officer’s request, A.P.R. agreed to an

interview. A.P.R. admitted that he and the victim — who he had

recently dated — had sex at school but said the sex was

consensual. When confronted with the text messages, A.P.R.

explained that he apologized in the text messages because the

victim regretted having sex.

¶4 The prosecution filed a petition in delinquency charging A.P.R.

with one count of sexual assault. The district court denied A.P.R.’s

request for a jury trial and his motion to suppress the text

messages.

¶5 After a bench trial, the court found A.P.R. guilty and

adjudicated him delinquent. The court sentenced A.P.R. to two

years of probation and later imposed restitution.

II. Right to Jury Trial

¶6 Though A.P.R. recognizes that the Colorado Supreme Court

has ruled that a juvenile does not have a state or federal

constitutional right to a jury trial, see A.C. v. People, 16 P.3d 240,

241, 243, 245 (Colo. 2001), he argues at some length that we

should reach a different conclusion largely based on out-of-state

authority, see In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 169-70 (Kan. 2008).

2
¶7 But A.C. is still good law and is thus binding on us. See

People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23. Because we are not at liberty to

overrule the Colorado Supreme Court, we assume A.P.R. is simply

preserving his ability to ask the Colorado Supreme Court to revisit

and overrule A.C.1 See People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 26 (The

supreme court “alone can overrule [its] prior precedents concerning

matters of state law.”).

¶8 We therefore conclude that the district court was not required

to grant A.P.R.’s request for a jury trial.

III. Discretionary Grant of Jury Trial

¶9 A.P.R. alternatively argues that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his request for a jury trial. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 A juvenile has a statutory right to a jury trial in two

circumstances — when charged as an aggravated juvenile offender

or with a crime of violence. See § 19-2.5-610(1), C.R.S. 2025; A.C.,

1 A.P.R. also argues that “depriving juveniles charged with felonies

of the right to jury trial violates Colorado statutes and rules of
procedure.” We do not address arguments that are presented in a
“cursory . . . and undeveloped manner.” People v. Gingles, 2014
COA 163, ¶ 29.

3
16 P.3d at 242-43. When — as here — a juvenile has been charged

with a felony that does not fall within those two circumstances, the

court “has discretion to grant a jury trial.” A.C., 16 P.3d at 243.

This discretion allows the court to “balance the benefits of informal,

speedy and rehabilitative proceedings against the severity of the

offense, the nature of the consequences and the particular facts of

the case.” Id. at 244.

¶ 11 We review a district court’s denial of a juvenile’s request for a

jury trial for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the

court’s decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

People in Interest of A.B.-B., 215 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Colo. App. 2009).

B. The Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion

¶ 12 The district court denied A.P.R.’s request for a jury trial,

concluding that a jury trial “would not be necessary or appropriate

in this case,” considering “the purpose of the juvenile code, and the

individual facts and circumstances.” A.P.R. says this was reversible

error because, in his view, the “particular facts of the case,” the

“severity of [the] felony offense[,] and the potential consequences of

a finding of guilt” outweighed the “benefits of informal, speedy[,]

and rehabilitative proceedings.”

4
¶ 13 But we disagree that the court abused its discretion. The case

involved a single felony count. The facts were simple and centered

on whether the victim consented to sex or not. There were few

witnesses, and the trial was short. And while the consequences of a

sexual assault adjudication are serious, the same is generally true

of any felony. Yet the General Assembly mandated jury trials for

only two types of felonies.2 See id. at 1210 (upholding denial of

request for a jury trial in a sexual assault on a child case when the

case “was not a factually complex case” and the number of

witnesses was limited).

¶ 14 Because the district court considered the appropriate

factors — albeit briefly — we cannot say it abused its discretion

even if we might have reached a different result. See People in

Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶ 60, aff’d, 2019 CO 53.

¶ 15 To the extent A.P.R. argues that the court was required to

grant a jury trial because the judge made pretrial rulings and

purportedly formed unfavorable credibility opinions, we disagree.

2 While A.P.R. was concerned about sex offender registration, the

court held that “registration for this crime when [A.P.R.] was a
juvenile, would not be appropriate.”

5
The court’s rulings and knowledge of the case are insufficient to

establish bias. People in Interest of S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 448 (Colo.

App. 2004) (“Unfavorable rulings and a court’s alleged personal

opinion formed from the judicial proceeding are insufficient to

establish bias.”); see also People v. Roehrs, 2019 COA 31, ¶ 21

(discussing the scope of the extrajudicial source doctrine). And

A.P.R. points to nothing in the record to suggest that the court

prejudged the case or that A.P.R. did not receive a fair trial.

¶ 16 We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion by denying the request for a jury trial.

IV. Motion to Suppress

¶ 17 Before trial, A.P.R. moved to suppress the text messages

between himself and the victim in which he acknowledged her rape

accusation and apologized to her several times. The motion argued

that the text messages should be suppressed because they were a

product of custodial interrogation, and, even if not in custody, his

statements were involuntary.

¶ 18 After a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding the text

messages were not the product of a custodial interrogation and

were voluntary.

6
¶ 19 A.P.R. says this was reversible error. While he doesn’t appear

to challenge the court’s ruling that he wasn’t in custody during the

text exchange, he argues that the court should’ve suppressed the

text conversation because it was coerced through the victim and

elicited through outrageous governmental conduct.3

A. Standard of Review

¶ 20 The district court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents a

mixed question of fact and law. People v. Ashford, 2020 CO 16, ¶ 9.

We defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by

competent evidence, but we review the legal effect of those findings

de novo. Id. “[T]he ultimate determination of whether a statement

is voluntary is a legal question and is reviewed de novo.” Effland v.

People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010).

B. The Text Conversation Was Voluntary

¶ 21 Even if a defendant is not in custody, statements that are

involuntary or coerced are inadmissible. People v. Medina, 25 P.3d

1216, 1221-22 (Colo. 2001). A statement is involuntary only if

3 To the extent that A.P.R. argues that the police violated his

reasonable expectation of privacy by directing the text conversation,
he doesn’t develop that argument, and we will not address it. See
Gingles, ¶ 29.

7
“coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing

the statement.” Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. The voluntariness

inquiry focuses on the conduct of law enforcement and whether

that conduct was of such nature as to overbear the defendant’s will.

Id.

¶ 22 To determine whether police behavior was coercive, the court

considers the following nonexhaustive list of factors:

• whether the defendant was in custody;

• whether the defendant was free to leave;

• whether the defendant was aware of the situation;

• whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with

counsel or anyone else prior to or during the interrogation;

• whether the statement was made during the interrogation

or volunteered later;

• the method or style of the interrogation;

• the defendant’s mental and physical condition just prior to

the interrogation;

• the length of the interrogation; and

• the location of the interrogation.

8
People in Interest of Z.T.T., 2017 CO 48, ¶ 13.

¶ 23 The record here does not indicate governmental coercion. To

be sure, though A.P.R. wasn’t in custody, he also wasn’t aware that

the police were involved in directing the text conversation between

himself and the victim. But he was very much aware of the rape

allegation. And he was free to choose whether to acknowledge or

respond to the victim’s text messages. That is, he wasn’t forced to

respond, let alone apologize to the victim. See People v. Nkongolo,

2025 CO 20, ¶ 27. And A.P.R. had control over the duration of the

conversation and could have stopped responding at any point. See

id. Beyond that, nothing in the record suggests that A.P.R. was in

emotional or physical distress, the text messages contain no threats

or promises, and it “isn’t inherently coercive for police officers to

use an agent” to attempt to get information from a suspect. Id. at

¶ 24 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)); see also

People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[T]he

limited use of ruses is supported by the overwhelming weight of

authority.”).

¶ 24 While A.P.R. says that “[h]ad police questioned him without

deception, he’d be entitled to his parents[’] presence and a lawyer,”

9
that’s not accurate. A juvenile has the right to have a parent

present during a custodial interrogation. § 19-2.5-203(1), C.R.S.

2025. But the text exchange was not a custodial interrogation.

¶ 25 We also disagree with A.P.R.’s assertion that the police

involvement with the text conversation constituted outrageous

governmental conduct, which is “conduct that violates fundamental

fairness and is shocking to the universal sense of justice.” People v.

Medina, 51 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d sub nom.,

Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003). While the police

worked with the victim to direct the text conversation, A.P.R. was

free to respond or ignore the text messages. And A.P.R. doesn’t

explain how police involvement violated fundamental fairness or

shocked the universal sense of justice. See People v. Burlingame,

2019 COA 17, ¶ 12 (“Instances where trial courts have found

outrageous government conduct in Colorado are vanishingly rare,

and the threshold for such a finding appears to be exceedingly

high.”).

¶ 26 Finally, we decline A.P.R.’s request to abandon the totality of

the circumstances voluntariness inquiry and craft a new rule in

juvenile cases that prohibits police from using pretextual

10
communications “without the child’s awareness and parent’s

presence.” We are aware of no authority — and A.P.R. directs us to

none — to suggest that the multifactor voluntariness inquiry should

be different depending on the age of the defendant. See Nkongolo,

¶¶ 23-31 (examining coercion “from the suspect’s perspective”

based on the totality of the circumstances).

V. Restitution

¶ 27 Finally, A.P.R. asks us to vacate the restitution order because

(1) the court did not enter a valid restitution order at sentencing;

(2) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to prove the

amount of restitution owed; and (3) the court imposed restitution

without supporting documentation or disclosure. We affirm the

restitution order.

A. Additional Background

¶ 28 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that “there

[wa]s some crime victims compensation for some of the medical bills

that the victim received,” and while “a crime victim’s application”

had been received, the prosecution did not “have the information”

about “how much was paid out.” The prosecution requested “to

11
reserve [restitution] for 45 days so [it] c[ould] file that notice with

the [c]ourt.”

¶ 29 A.P.R. objected under People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, arguing

that restitution must be entered at the time of sentencing unless

there was good cause shown and that the defense had not been

“provided any information in discovery about the content or amount

of any crime victim compensation record.”

¶ 30 The court ruled,

As it relates to restitution, the [p]rosecutor is
indicating that they have not received an
award letter yet from Crime Victim
Compensation, but that they see that an
application was filed. I’m going to give the
[p]rosecution 30 days from today’s date to file
that Notice of Restitution. I’m finding
pursuant to 18-1.3[-]603[,C.R.S. 2023,] based
on the representation of [the prosecutor] that
restitution may be requested. The specific
amount of restitution for the benefit of the
Crime Victim Compensation Fund has not yet
been determined. They have not received an
award letter. You may want to relay to them
that you have 30 days to do that. It may be
that there’s future treatment that’s going to be
requested. If so, that needs to be made within
30 days pursuant to 18-1.3[-]603[, C.R.S.
2023,] for future restitution payments for
treatment.

If I get a Notice of Restitution within 30 days,
I’ll give the [d]efense an opportunity to file an

12
objection pursuant to People v. Weeks as cited
by [defense counsel]. We’ll have a hearing
within 91 days of today’s date unless good
cause exists. But today the [c]ourt also is
finding that there is good cause and
extenuating circumstances to allow the
[p]rosecutor to have 30 days to file a Notice of
Restitution since her file does not reflect any
awards that were made by Crime Victim
Compensation, which is a different body than
the District Attorney’s Office.

¶ 31 The mittimus entered the day of sentencing stated,

“[R]estitution [is] reserved for 30 days, [and the] court finds ongoing

restitution under crime victim compensation fund.”4

¶ 32 Less than a week after the sentencing hearing, the prosecution

filed a notice of restitution, requesting $4,851 for the crime victim

compensation fund. A.P.R. objected to the requested restitution,

again arguing it should have been presented at sentencing.

¶ 33 At the restitution hearing, the director of victims’ services and

manager of the district attorney’s crime victim compensation

program testified that the program paid $4,851 for the victim’s

4 The summary of the sentencing hearing in the register of actions

stated, “[R]estitution reserved for 30 days, makes findings pursuant
to [section] 18-1.3-603, [C.R.S. 2023,] to allow defense finds good
cause to address restitution after sentencing.”

13
medical expenses.5 The program manager explained that the

“details of the claim” are confidential but that she reviewed the

claim, that it was for medical expenses paid directly to providers,

and she described what the program reviewed to determine that the

expenses were proximately caused by A.P.R.’s conduct.

¶ 34 It was also established during the hearing that the prosecution

had the payment information before the sentencing hearing and

that it had been provided in discovery to defense counsel.

¶ 35 A.P.R. asked the court to deny restitution because it was

untimely under Weeks and because without the confidential victim

compensation records, he had no meaningful opportunity to test

proximate cause.

¶ 36 The court imposed the requested restitution. It found that the

prosecution proved through the manager’s testimony that “there

were medical expenses that were directly and proximately caused”

5 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution admitted an exhibit

through this witness. That exhibit, however, is not part of the
appellate record. “It is the appellant’s responsibility to designate
the record on appeal, including those parts of the trial proceedings
that are necessary for purposes of the appeal, and to ensure that
the record is properly transmitted to an appellate court.” People v.
Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 12. We presume that material portions
omitted from the record would support the order. See id.

14
by A.P.R. Because the restitution order was entered “well within”

the statutory deadline, the court found that it was timely under

Weeks.6

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 37 If a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent has caused

personal injury to a victim, the court shall require the juvenile to

make restitution per the restitution statute. § 19-2.5-1104(1),

C.R.S. 2025. The restitution statute provides that “[e]very order of

conviction of a felony . . . [or] misdemeanor . . . shall include

consideration of restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2023.7

¶ 38 The restitution statute then identifies “four options — and only

four options — related to the types of restitution orders [district]

courts may enter.” Weeks, ¶ 3. One of these options — relevant

here — is an “order that the defendant is obligated to pay

restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be

6 Restitution was imposed fifty-three days after the court sentenced

A.P.R.
7 Though the restitution statute, including the statutory deadline to

enter restitution, has since been amended, see Ch. 307, sec. 1,
§ 18-1.3-603(1), (1)(b), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606, we cite —
throughout this opinion — the statute in effect at the time of
A.P.R.’s sentencing.

15
determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the

order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the

time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.”

§ 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

¶ 39 Thus, while a court may not reserve the issue of restitution in

its entirety at sentencing, an order under subsection (1)(b) permits

“a finding of restitution liability at sentencing and postponement of

the determination of the amount of restitution until after

sentencing.” Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶ 28. And the liability

finding may be “implicit.” Id. at ¶ 29; see also Weeks, ¶¶ 11, 16

(recognizing an implicit finding of restitution liability when, among

other things, the prosecution informed the court at sentencing that

it would be seeking restitution but hadn’t yet filed the motion).

¶ 40 A sentence that does not adhere to the requirements of section

18-1.3-603(1) constitutes an illegal sentence and must be corrected.

Snow, ¶¶ 2-5.

¶ 41 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. Tennyson v.

People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 23.

16
C. The Restitution Order Is Valid

¶ 42 A.P.R. does not dispute that the restitution order was entered

within the statutory deadline, thus he no longer maintains that the

restitution order is untimely under Weeks. And though the

prosecution did not submit the restitution information before

sentencing — as it should have under section 18-1.3-603(2)(a) —

A.P.R. does not argue any prejudice from that delay. See People v.

Martinez Rubier, 2024 COA 67, ¶ 49.

¶ 43 Instead, A.P.R. argues that the court did not enter a valid

restitution order because it reserved restitution entirely. That’s so,

he says, because the court said that “restitution may be requested.”

¶ 44 But A.P.R. reads that phrase in isolation. Reading that phrase

in context with the discussion of restitution at the sentencing

hearing, we do not agree that the court reserved restitution entirely.

Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecution represented that

a crime victim’s application had been filed for “medical bills” and

that she didn’t know the amount. In that context, and under

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), the court allowed the prosecution

additional time to determine “the specific amount of restitution.”

Given this specific extension to determine the amount of restitution

17
owed, we infer that the court at least implicitly (if not explicitly)

determined restitution liability and reserved only the determination

of the amount owed. See Weeks, ¶¶ 11, 16; see also Tennyson,

¶¶ 9-10 (inferring an implicit determination of restitution liability

when the court gave the prosecution ninety days to determine the

amount of restitution due).

¶ 45 That makes this case unlike Snow. In that case, at

sentencing, “the prosecution did not request restitution or give any

indication that it intended to seek restitution.” Id. at ¶ 7. Rather, it

asked the court to simply reserve restitution. The court agreed and

entered an order reserving restitution for sixty days without any

distinction between liability and the amount owed. Id. Under those

circumstances — when the court “deferred the issue of restitution

in its entirety” — the supreme court concluded that the sentence

was illegal. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 22-23.

¶ 46 We therefore reject A.P.R.’s contention that the restitution

order was not valid under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

18
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 47 A.P.R. next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove

“the amount payable” to the crime victim compensation board

(CVCB).8

¶ 48 Crime victims may seek compensation from the CVCB for

losses caused by criminal conduct, including medical expenses.

See §§ 24-4.1-102(1), -108(1), -109(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. When a

CVCB pays a victim compensation claim, it is a “[v]ictim” for

purposes of the restitution statute. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV), C.R.S.

2025. Therefore, “[i]f a CVCB awards compensation to a victim or

other qualifying person, the CVCB is eligible to seek and obtain

restitution from a defendant in [a] criminal proceeding.” People v.

Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶ 13.

¶ 49 “The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the

victim’s loss and the amount of that loss.” People v. Fregosi, 2024

COA 6, ¶ 44. For CVCB claims, however, the restitution statute

8 A.P.R. does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to show

that his conduct proximately caused the victim’s injuries. He
challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the amount
of restitution owed.

19
creates a rebuttable presumption that the amount paid by the

CVCB is a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. See

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(a). The rebuttable presumption shifts the burden

to the defendant to present evidence to show that the amount paid

was not the direct result of their criminal conduct. People v. Henry,

2018 COA 48M, ¶ 19.

¶ 50 To trigger the rebuttable presumption, however, the

prosecution must establish the amount of assistance provided.

Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20. The restitution statute prescribes two ways

of establishing this amount: (1) “[a] list of the amount of money paid

to each provider”; or (2) “[i]f the identity or location of a provider

would pose a threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, summary

data reflecting what total payments were made for” by category.

§ 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(I), (II)(A)-(E).

¶ 51 But the prosecution need not rely on the statutory

presumption to establish the amount of restitution; rather, it can

also rely on “other means.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a); see also Fregosi,

¶ 47 (rejecting the defendant’s sufficiency challenge to the

restitution order, by noting, in relevant part, that the record showed

the prosecution “did not rely solely on the CVCB summaries”).

20
¶ 52 A.P.R. argues that the prosecution failed to comply with the

statutory criteria to establish the rebuttable presumption. But the

prosecution didn’t rely on the statutory presumption to establish

the amount of restitution owed. Instead, it presented direct

testimony from the crime victim compensation program manager,

who testified independently about the victim’s claim. She confirmed

that the CVCB reviews the police report, the itemized bills showing

the dates of service, and the services provided. The program

director also explained that the CVCB would not pay for expenses

that were not directly related to A.P.R.’s criminal conduct and that

it does not pay for evidence gathering, including sexual assault

nurse examinations. And she confirmed that the process was

followed in this case to determine that the victim’s medical

expenses were proximately caused by A.P.R. and were statutorily

eligible expenses. See Fregosi, ¶¶ 46-49 (rejecting the defendant’s

sufficiency challenge because the record provided sufficient

evidence to uphold the restitution order without relying solely on

the CVCB summaries).

¶ 53 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that it was sufficient to prove by a

21
preponderance of the evidence the amount of restitution owed to

the CVCB.

E. Document Disclosure

¶ 54 A.P.R. also asserts — with no citation to any legal authority —

that the district court violated his constitutional right to due

process because it imposed restitution “without supporting

documentation or disclosure.”

¶ 55 Although a CVCB’s records relating to the claimed amount of

restitution are confidential, § 24-4.1-107.5(2), C.R.S. 2025, a

defendant may seek information in the CVCB’s records by first

requesting the district court to conduct an in camera review of the

records, § 24-4.1-107.5(3); see People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111,

¶¶ 16-17.

¶ 56 A.P.R. does not allege that he requested an in camera review

and, if he did, how the court erred by denying his request. Beyond

his failure to seek CVCB records, A.P.R. does not dispute that he

received sufficient notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek

restitution, the basis of its claim, and an opportunity to contest it.

Thus, due process was satisfied. See People v. Perez, 2020 COA 83,

¶ 49 (due process is satisfied, in the restitution context, when the

22
defendant receives notice of the factual basis for the restitution

order and an opportunity to contest that basis), overruled in part on

other grounds by, Weeks, ¶ 47 n.16, and cert. granted, judgment

vacated on other grounds, and case remanded, (Colo. No. 20SC559,

Dec. 6, 2021) (unpublished order).

VI. Disposition

¶ 57 We affirm the judgment and the restitution order.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

23