Peo v. Pelico-Vargas

23CA0518 Peo v Pelico-Vargas 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0518
Larimer County District Court No. 21CR742
Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Hageo Misael Pelico-Vargas,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Hageo Misael Pelico-Vargas, appeals the trial

court’s judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him

guilty of sexual assault on a child. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Pelico-Vargas started sending Facebook direct messages to his

cousin’s daughter, M.V-V., when she was fourteen years old and he

was twenty-three. The messages started out friendly but over time

grew more sexual. At the time, Pelico-Vargas lived in the same

trailer park area as M.V-V.

¶3 Shortly before M.V-V.’s fifteenth birthday, Pelico-Vargas told

her that he had a surprise birthday present for her. Pelico-Vargas

asked M.V-V. if they could meet up before she went to school.

Pelico-Vargas picked up M.V-V. in his car and drove to a nearby

park. Once he’d parked, he told M.V-V. to go into a portable

bathroom located at the park. M.V-V. went into the portable

bathroom, and Pelico-Vargas followed. Pelico-Vargas then tried to

take off M.V-V.’s clothes. M.V-V. told Pelico-Vargas that she was

nervous and that maybe they could meet up another day. Pelico-

Vargas touched M.V-V.’s breasts and “private parts.” He then

asked her to perform oral sex on him, to which M.V-V. said no

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because “it was gross and [she had] never done it.” Pelico-Vargas

then told M.V-V., “You are going to like it, just bend down.” When

describing the interaction, M.V-V. said, “[He] pretty much like kind

of pushed me down toward his dick and forced me to suck it.”

When M.V-V. started to gag Pelico-Vargas told her, “[D]on’t be so

immature.” Pelico-Vargas then attempted to perform vaginal sex.

M.V-V. testified that at that point she was shaking and told him no.

Pelico-Vargas grew frustrated, and the two left the portable

bathroom.

¶4 At trial, M.V-V. testified to three other sexual interactions with

Pelico-Vargas. She testified that on one occasion when she was

fifteen years old Pelico-Vargas entered her parents’ house through

the window even though M.V-V. didn’t want him to come in. M.V-V.

told Pelico-Vargas that she wanted him to leave and didn’t want to

have sex, but Pelico-Vargas pushed her down on a bed and made

her perform vaginal sex. M.V-V. also said that on two separate

occasions Pelico-Vargas “convinced and forced” her to perform oral

sex on him when she met up with him to obtain marijuana that her

friend had paid him for.

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¶5 In October or November 2019, Pelico-Vargas’s girlfriend at the

time, Celestina Chavez, confronted M.V-V. at a family gathering.

M.V-V. and Chavez went to a nearby park and discussed M.V-V.

and Pelico-Vargas. In November 2019, Chavez confronted M.V-V.’s

mother, E.V-V., about M.V-V. and Pelico-Vargas having sex.

Chavez had Pelico-Vargas come outside during the interaction; E.V-

V. tried to slap Pelico-Vargas, but he ran into his house. In

January 2020, E.V-V. reported the allegations to a counselor at

M.V-V.’s school, who then contacted a school resource officer (SRO).

¶6 Pelico-Vargas was charged with sexual assault on a child

under section 18-3-405(1), (2), C.R.S. 2025; five counts of sexual

assault under section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021; and one count of

second degree burglary under section 18-4-203(1), (2)(a), C.R.S.

2021. Before trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss one of the

sexual assault counts. The prosecution dismissed another sexual

assault count during trial after the prosecution’s presentation of

evidence.

¶7 At trial, Pelico-Vargas disputed when the acts occurred and

claimed that they were consensual. He testified that the portable

3
bathroom incident occurred in February 2018, when M.V-V. was

sixteen or seventeen years old.

¶8 The jury found Pelico-Vargas guilty of sexual assault on a

child with applied force for the portable bathroom incident and

acquitted him of the remaining three sexual assault charges and

the burglary charge. Pelico-Vargas was sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of nine years to life in the custody of the

Department of Corrections followed by three years of mandatory

parole.

II. Discussion

¶9 Pelico-Vargas contends that (1) the trial court erred by

allowing the officer who initially interviewed M.V-V. to testify about

which cases he refers for investigation and about M.V-V.’s

credibility; (2) the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct

during closing and rebuttal closing arguments; and (3) the

cumulative effect of the errors deprived Pelico-Vargas of a fair trial.

We address and reject each contention in turn.

A. Corporal Downing’s Testimony

¶ 10 Pelico-Vargas first contends that the trial court erred by

admitting Corporal Russell Downing’s testimony because his

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statements (1) described a screening process suggesting that Pelico-

Vargas was guilty and (2) implied that he believed M.V-V.’s version

of events. We disagree.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 11 Downing testified that he met with M.V-V. at her high school

after an SRO had reported a possible sex offense. Downing met

with M.V-V., the SRO, E.V-V., a family liaison who was translating

for E.V-V., and Downing’s trainee to conduct what he referred to as

a “minimal-facts interview.” Downing explained the responding

officer’s role in these types of situations:

[W]e conduct minimal-facts interviews on
possible sexual assaults. And the purpose of a
minimal-facts interview is to establish the who,
what, where, and when of a case. So we
establish who was involved, what occurred,
when it occurred, and what happened during
the incident.

The purpose of that is when we take a sex
assault case on the street, we get that minimal
information and then we establish whether or
not we think a sexual assault had occurred. If
we believe it had, then we contact our on-call
investigator, and we forward the case to
investigations.

So the reason we don’t get in depth in an
interview for minimal facts is so we don’t
further subject the victim to repeated reliving

5
and retelling of the incident and further
trauma with both myself in that place and the
investigator doing an investigation.

Downing testified that M.V-V. told him that, before her fifteenth

birthday, Pelico-Vargas contacted her and asked to take her to

school. She agreed, but on the way to school “they stopped at the

playground . . . where the sexual assault occurred.” When asked

about the Facebook messages, Downing testified,

[M.V-V.] didn’t go into detail in the
conversation because she said it started to
make her uncomfortable, and I did not press
because I could tell visibly that it was causing
her a bit of distress.

And in the minimal-facts — spirit of the
minimal-facts interview, I made a note of that
conversation for investigations to follow up,
but did not delve any further into that.

Downing testified that M.V-V. started getting emotional and teary

during the interview, so he “put the brakes on [his] part of the

interview.” Downing asked M.V-V. “if it was just touching or if it

was more,” and M.V-V. indicated “they had full sex.”

¶ 12 After his conversation with M.V-V., Downing contacted the

Larimer County Sheriff’s Office and gave the on-call investigator

“the brief of what had happened.” The on-call investigator told

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Downing that he would assign an investigator to the case. Downing

didn’t take part in the investigation.

¶ 13 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Downing if he

had collected any Facebook messages or followed up with M.V-V.’s

school attendance record. Downing said no, because these

activities weren’t part of the interview process but would be

something more in the “purview” of the primary investigating officer

who handled the case moving forward.

2. Comments on a Screening Process

¶ 14 Pelico-Vargas contends that Downing’s testimony implied that

only credible allegations of sexual assault are referred to an

investigator, indicating that law enforcement engaged in a

“screening process,” which suggested that Pelico-Vargas was guilty.

We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of

evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mendenhall, 2015

COA 107M, ¶ 60. Because this argument was unpreserved, we

review any error for plain error. People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 28.

“Plain error is obvious and substantial.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO

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63, ¶ 14. An error is obvious if a judge should have been able to

avoid it without the benefit of an objection. People v. Randell, 2012

COA 108, ¶ 86. An obvious error is one that contravened well-

settled legal principles, a clear statutory command, or Colorado

case law. People v. Thompson, 2018 COA 83, ¶ 34, aff’d, 2020 CO

72. An error is substantial if it “so undermine[s] the fundamental

fairness of the trial itself . . . as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Pollard, 2013

COA 31M, ¶ 43 (quoting Hagos, ¶ 14).

¶ 16 References to a screening process are improper because they

suggest that there is additional evidence unknown to the jury that

supports the defendant’s guilt and reveal the witness’s or

prosecutor’s personal opinion. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d

1043, 1052 (Colo. 2005). “When probable cause to charge a

defendant is not at issue[,] . . . the prosecution’s presentation of

evidence about charging decisions may imply that, because of a

pretrial screening process, only guilty parties are charged with

crimes and thus the defendant must be guilty.” Mendenhall, ¶ 62.

Although a witness cannot testify that he believes a defendant

committed the crime at issue, in some circumstances, “police

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officers may testify about the reasons they took certain investigative

steps, even where this testimony touches upon prohibited subjects.”

Penn, ¶¶ 31-32.

b. Analysis

¶ 17 Here, Downing didn’t refer to a screening process. Rather, he

explained the process for a minimal-facts interview and that the

interview’s purpose was to establish “who was involved, what

occurred, when it occurred, and what happened during the

incident.” After the “minimal information” was collected, Downing

testified that the next step was to “establish whether or not we

think a sexual assault had occurred”; if so, the case would be

forwarded to an investigator.

¶ 18 Downing explained that his role as the responding officer was

to gather basic information and assess whether further

investigation is necessary. He didn’t describe a charging decision or

a screening process that weeds out cases based on the strength of

the evidence. See People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 42. He simply

described the steps involved with collecting information and

referring a case for investigation. Cf. Mendenhall, ¶ 63 (concluding

that an investigator’s statements about how many cases he receives

9
and how many of those cases resulted in charges constituted

inadmissible evidence).

¶ 19 Likewise, Downing’s testimony was limited to minimal

information that he collected during M.V-V.’s interview and didn’t

hint about evidence unknown to the jury or that Downing believed

Pelico-Vargas was guilty. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1052

(the prosecutor’s statements — “There is a screening process for

charging cases, and it takes a lot more than somebody saying that

person did it” and “It takes the type of evidence that we have here”

— were improper (emphasis omitted)). Downing testified that after

he finished his interview, he referred the matter to the Sheriff’s

Office and that he had no further involvement with the case.

¶ 20 Accordingly, the court didn’t err, let alone plainly err, by

allowing Downing’s testimony.

3. Credibility of M.V-V.

¶ 21 Pelico-Vargas argues that Downing’s testimony impermissibly

bolstered M.V-V.’s credibility because unless Downing believed M.V-

V.’s allegations, he wouldn’t have referred her case for investigation.

We disagree.

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a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 22 As mentioned, we review the trial court’s ruling on the

admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Mendenhall,

¶ 60.

¶ 23 Witnesses cannot testify that another witness told the truth on

a particular occasion. Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 32. But

“a detective may testify about his or her assessments of interviewee

credibility when that testimony is offered to provide context for the

detective’s interrogation tactics and investigative decisions.” Davis

v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶ 19.

b. Analysis

¶ 24 Pelico-Vargas argues that Downing’s statements implied that

he believed that M.V-V. was telling the truth. We are unpersuaded.

Downing’s testimony didn’t convey his opinion that Pelico-Vargas

was guilty or that M.V-V. was credible. Rather, his statements

explained the minimal-facts interview process and M.V-V.’s

description of events. The prosecutor didn’t ask Downing to opine

on M.V-V.’s truthfulness. Downing’s statements merely provided

context for his involvement in the interview process and the steps a

responding officer takes when a sexual assault is reported.

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¶ 25 Additionally, Downing’s testimony was too attenuated from

any inference he believed M.V-V. was credible. Downing testified

that based on the information that he gathered from M.V-V., he

forwarded on her case for investigation. To conclude from that

testimony that Downing believed M.V-V. was credible, a juror would

have to infer that, based on the minimal information provided, (1)

Downing believed M.V-V. was telling the truth (rather than that he

believed the events as she recounted them amounted to a sexual

assault), and (2) Downing believed that a sexual assault occurred

and that M.V-V. was the victim. That is too much of a stretch. See

Penn, ¶ 40 (“To reach [the conclusion that the officer was opining on

K.H.’s credibility] based on the officer’s statement that he had

‘reason to arrest’ Penn, the jury would have to infer that [the officer]

both relied on K.H.’s statement and that he was arresting Penn

because he subjectively believed that K.H. was telling the truth.”).

Because Downing’s testimony concerned his investigatory steps

during the interview process and his statements didn’t indicate his

opinion about M.V-V.’s truthfulness or Pelico-Vargas’s guilt, the

court didn’t err by allowing Downing’s testimony.

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B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 26 Pelico-Vargas contends that the prosecutor committed

reversible misconduct by impermissibly appealing to the jury’s

emotions and sympathy for M.V-V. We disagree.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 27 During voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors what

emotions they might anticipate a witness or named victim to

experience when testifying before a room of strangers. Prospective

jurors answered that the individual might be “very distraught,”

“very emotional,” “very fearful,” “very nervous and panicked,”

“ang[ry],” and “relie[ved] being able to tell the story.” Defense

counsel didn’t object to the question or the answers.

¶ 28 During closing, the prosecutor made the following remarks:

[A]fter multiple years of this sexual abuse by
the defendant, [seventeen-] year-old [M.V-V.],
quiet, shy, timid [M.V-V.] was confronted by
the defendant’s angry, crying, intoxicated adult
girlfriend accusing [M.V-V.] of having an affair
with the very adult family member who had
been sexually abusing her.

....

We talked in jury selection about why a victim
of child sexual assault might not report it right
away, might not report it at all. We talked
about how you are going to hear testimony

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from [M.V-V.] about the shame, the
embarrassment, confusion, and fear that she
felt starting when she was [fourteen] years old
during this first incident . . . .

....

She regretted letting him drive her to school.
He was the adult family member telling her
what to do, sending her private sexual
messages over the Internet, telling her that he
had a birthday present for her, asking her if he
could pick her up and drive her to school when
no one else was around. He was the one who
took advantage of her quiet, timid demeanor.

....

She internalized shame around her own body
because of what he did to it.

....

She was living in fear. She was avoiding her
own family events because of this defendant’s
repeated sexual abuse of her.

Defense counsel didn’t object to any of these statements.

¶ 29 During defense counsel’s closing, he reiterated the defense’s

theory of the case — that M.V-V. and Pelico-Vargas had a “fully

consensual, completely legal sexual relationship” and that the

encounters occurred when M.V-V. “was over the age of [fifteen].”

Defense counsel argued that M.V-V. didn’t provide a specific day

when the encounters occurred, only a three-week window, while

14
Pelico-Vargas “maintained all along” that the sexual conduct

occurred when M.V-V. was between sixteen and seventeen years old

in February 2018. Defense counsel further highlighted that M.V-

V.’s original written statement and her forensic interview didn’t

include allegations of assault in exchange for marijuana. Defense

counsel also argued that M.V-V.’s story was inconsistent because

the marijuana exchange allegations were new details that she didn’t

include in her original statements. Defense counsel then said,

[Chavez] acknowledged, yes, I was making an
assumption that [carne asada] referred to a
sexual act, but, come on, this was referring to
a sexual act. If we are to believe the theory of
the prosecution that this was indeed just a
late-night cookout, then I guess [M.V-V.] is
inviting over someone who had sexually
assaulted her before her birthday, inviting him
over to her home so she can make him food.
That doesn’t make sense either.

What makes sense and what was happening is
two people were engaging in a consensual
sexual relationship that they did not want
anyone else to know about. That’s why
nothing was said when any of these acts
originally occurred. That’s why initially, when
confronted by other individuals, they denied it
or minimized it, and that’s why code words
and innuendoes and things like that were
used.

15
¶ 30 Defense counsel argued that the first time M.V-V. “said

anything other than this was a consensual relationship was when

she spoke to her school counselor in January of 2020.” According

to defense counsel, M.V-V.’s memory was “riddled with inaccuracies

and changes at a moment’s notice.”

¶ 31 During rebuttal closing, the prosecutor said,

[M.V-V.] explained to you why she made the
decisions that she did. Think about that
explanation. Think about what she was going
through when you consider why she initially
reported just the initial two incidents and then
later was able to be forthcoming and tell you
all about what happened in the incidents in
the car as well.

....

When you are weighing out all of the evidence
that you have heard over the course of this
trial, consider which makes more sense; that
[M.V-V.], who had to relive the most intimately
horrific moments of her young life in front of a
room full of strangers, in front of her abuser,
that she didn’t remember a few of the details,
that she had a hard time being forthcoming
about each of these incidents, especially the
ones where she blamed herself so much for
putting herself in a position where the
defendant took advantage and again sexually
assaulted her because she wanted marijuana,
or that the defendant, who testified today
about completely new information even just
from direct examination to cross-examination,

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whether it makes more sense that suddenly on
the day that he testifies in his own trial,
suddenly he would have a date, almost a date
specific that now suddenly he knows is when
the incident in the porta-potty took place, and
that it just so happens to be when [M.V-V.]
would have been [sixteen] years old, now that
he understands what the laws are that are —
that make up the counts that he is facing,
especially Count 1, that sexual assault on a
child.

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 32 We apply a two-step analysis to prosecutorial misconduct

claims. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010). First,

we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct was improper based

on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Second, we determine if

any improper conduct warrants reversal under the applicable

standard of reversal. Id.

¶ 33 In determining whether the statements were improper, we

review for an abuse of discretion. People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113,

¶ 58. If we determine that any of the statements were improper, we

apply the plain error standard — because counsel didn’t object —

and reverse only if the error “so undermined the fundamental

fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Penn, ¶ 28 (quoting

17
Hagos, ¶ 14). Prosecutorial misconduct rarely constitutes plain

error, People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 43, and only does if it is

“flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper,” People v. Walker,

2022 COA 15, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA

1, ¶ 86).

¶ 34 Claims of improper closing argument are evaluated as a whole

in light of the entire record. People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 113, 123

(Colo. App. 2009). Prosecutors have wide latitude during closing

argument. People v. Fortson, 2018 COA 46M, ¶ 58. But they “may

not pressure jurors by suggesting that guilty verdicts are necessary

to do justice for a sympathetic victim.” People v. McBride, 228 P.3d

216, 223 (Colo. App. 2009). Nor may a prosecutor “induce the jury

to determine guilt based on passion or prejudice.” People v.

Romero, 2015 COA 7, ¶ 43. A prosecutor’s closing statements

“must refrain from making arguments ‘which would divert the jury

from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.’” People v. Carian,

2017 COA 106, ¶ 56 (quoting Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049).

“Golden rule” arguments — which ask the jurors to place

themselves in the victim’s position — are improper because they

encourage the jury to decide the defendant’s guilt based on emotion

18
or personal interest rather than an assessment of the evidence.

Munsey, 232 P.3d at 123.

3. Analysis

¶ 35 Pelico-Vargas argues for the first time on appeal that the

prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal improperly appealed to the jurors’

sympathy for M.V-V. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor’s

statements implored the jurors to find M.V-V.’s testimony more

credible because of what Pelico-Vargas “put her through” and what

M.V-V. felt during the alleged years of abuse. However, the

statements during closing were anchored in the evidence presented

during trial. M.V-V.’s friend testified that M.V-V. was quiet and

shy, and the statements about what M.V-V. was feeling were

directly from M.V-V.’s testimony that she regretted meeting up with

Pelico-Vargas, she avoided family gatherings because she didn’t

want to see him, and she wished that her body was different. Cf.

People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶¶ 32-34 (holding that the

prosecutor committed misconduct during opening statement by

giving a first-person narrative of a homicide victim because the

statements were not references to evidence that would be

19
introduced during trial and constituted the prosecutor’s personal

opinion about what the victim would say if he testified).

¶ 36 Further, these statements didn’t ask the jury to do justice for

M.V-V. and decide the case based on sympathy rather than

evidence. Cf. People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶¶ 41-42 (The court

concluded that the prosecutor’s “plea for justice” before

deliberations to be improper when the prosecutor said that the

“[victim’s] day of justice is a long time coming. That’s today. Hold

him accountable for what he did to that girl that night.”). The

prosecutor’s closing argument focused on the evidence presented at

trial, each count that Pelico-Vargas was charged with, and witness

testimony relating to each count. The prosecutor indicated that the

jury determines the credibility of the witnesses and that, based on

the evidence, the People had proved the charges beyond a

reasonable doubt.

¶ 37 Additionally, the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal arguments

centered on the evidence presented at trial and responded to

defense counsel’s closing arguments. Defense counsel highlighted

that M.V-V. made the marijuana exchange allegations after the

original sexual assault allegation and that M.V-V. gave a three-week

20
window but didn’t know an exact date when the first assault

occurred. The prosecutor’s request to “[t]hink about what she was

going through when you consider why she initially reported just the

initial two incidents” was in response to defense counsel’s argument

about M.V-V.’s change of story, not an appeal to the jury’s

sympathy for M.V-V. It asked the jurors to consider the evidence

presented during M.V-V.’s testimony about why she was not

initially forthcoming.

¶ 38 Additionally, the prosecutor’s statements about “what makes

more sense,” describing that M.V-V. had to talk about the most

“horrific moments” of her life and that she “blamed herself” for

putting herself in that position, were in response to defense

counsel’s closing argument about the inconsistency and lack of

specificity in M.V-V.’s testimony. These statements also responded

to defense counsel’s closing argument about “what makes sense,”

why the allegations were not initially reported, and why M.V-V.’s

memory was “riddled with inaccuracies.” The prosecutor’s

statements reiterated the initial closing argument as to M.V-V.’s

actions and why those actions didn’t discredit her account of

events. See People v. Welsh, 176 P.3d 781, 788 (Colo. App. 2007) (A

21
prosecutor “may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence as to

the credibility of witnesses.”). Additionally, the prosecutor’s last

comment to the jury before deliberations reiterated that it was the

jury’s role to consider and weigh all the evidence and didn’t suggest

that the jury should decide the case on other grounds.

¶ 39 Pelico-Vargas argues nevertheless that the prosecutor’s closing

and rebuttal arguments were a continuation of the prosecutor’s voir

dire, “which invoked a type of ‘golden rule’ sentiment.” But the

prosecutor didn’t ask jurors to imagine themselves in the victim’s

place. Rather, the statements during closing and rebuttal

discussed M.V-V.’s emotions and the impacts of the alleged sexual

contact on her. Cf. People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 809 (Colo. App.

2004) (holding that the prosecutor’s questions to the jury — “Would

you want to be moved, particularly in the way [the victim] was, with

a gun touching your right temple? Do you think you would feel that

your risk of harm was being substantially increased?” — were

improper). Accordingly, the challenged statements weren’t “golden

rule” arguments.

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C. Cumulative Error

¶ 40 Pelico-Vargas contends that the claimed errors collectively

prejudiced his substantial rights and therefore require reversal.

Cumulative error applies when multiple errors in the aggregate

prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. Howard-Walker v.

People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. Under the cumulative error doctrine,

multiple errors must have occurred. People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85,

¶ 141. Because we haven’t identified multiple errors, the

cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

III. Disposition

¶ 41 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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