Anderl v. Dept of Human Services

25CA0117 Anderl v Dept of Human Services 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0117
State Personnel Board Case No. 24G58

Darla Anderl,

Complainant-Appellant,

v.

Department of Human Services, Wheat Ridge Regional Center,

Respondent-Appellee,

and

State Personnel Board,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER*
Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Darla Anderl, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob W. Paul, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

No Appearance for Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Complainant-Appellant, Darla Anderl, appeals the order of the

State Personnel Board (the Board) dismissing her petition for a

hearing. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 In August 2023, Anderl began working as a “Health Care

Services Trainee II” at the Wheat Ridge Regional Center (WRRC) of

the Division of Regional Centers within the Colorado Department of

Human Services (the Department). Upon her hire, Anderl was a

probationary employee for a twelve-month period.

¶3 On January 14, 2024, WRRC terminated Anderl’s

probationary employment. The termination letter stated that Anderl

failed to properly administer medication to residents on two

occasions, December 13 and 19, 2023. The letter also asserted that

between November 7 and December 26, 2023, Anderl arrived late

for her scheduled shift four times.

¶4 On January 24, Anderl petitioned the Board for an evidentiary

hearing. She alleged that her termination resulted from

discrimination in violation of section 24-34-402, C.R.S. 2025, of the

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), and retaliation in

1
violation of section 24-50.5-103, C.R.S. 2025, of the State Employee

Protection Act (Whistleblower Act).

¶5 Anderl also requested that the Colorado Civil Rights Division

(CCRD) investigate her discrimination claim. The CCRD did so and

issued a report finding no probable cause to support Anderl’s

discrimination allegations. The Board gave notice to Anderl that if

she wanted to appeal the CCRD’s no-probable-cause finding, she

was required to file an objection within ten days of receiving the

notice. See § 24-50-125.3, C.R.S. 2025; Dep’t of Pers. & Admin.

Rule 8-20(B)(3), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. Anderl did not timely

appeal, and her discrimination claim was dismissed with prejudice.1

¶6 Anderl’s appeal to the Board proceeded through the

preliminary review process on her claim of retaliation in violation of

the Whistleblower Act.

¶7 In her information sheet (a required filing under the Board

Rules), Anderl asserted:

1 Anderl filed a motion for an extension of time to appeal.The
Board denied the motion pursuant to Board Rule 8-20(B)(5), Dep’t
of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-20(B)(3), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. On
appeal to this court, Anderl does not argue that the denial of the
motion for extension of time was erroneous.

2
I have been involved in an extremely conflicted
[Dependency and Neglect] case (Child Abuse
and Neglect) since March of 2023. After
obtaining employment with the [Department’s
WRRC,] . . . I chose not to disclose my
employer to [the Jefferson County Department
of Human Services caseworkers] as I didn’t
want them sabotaging anything else for me like
they have previously [by] selectively omitt[ing]
important details in their reports.

I became frustrated with the fact that I was
good enough and able to take care of the
state[’]s duel diagnosed disabled individuals
with special needs, yet Jefferson County
Department of Human Services Child
protection continued to aggressively keep my
children from me (unlawfully) unless I was
supervised.

On December 19, 2023, I informed case worker
[S.M.] as well as [guardian ad litem] [K.M.]
where I was employed. The fact that I was
completely blindsided with a termination for
an omissive medication error that happened
more than a month prior to termination,
without any corrective action [and] was
allowed to continue administering medication
without any increased expectations made me
feel robbed of my job. It had been less than a
month since I informed the Jefferson County
Department of Human Services Child
Protection of my employment with the
[Department’s WRRC]. It isn’t just
coincidence.

I was not fired for unsatisfactory job
performance . . . . I was fired due to
governmental power having the recent

3
knowledge of my employer and since they are
both affiliated together, they appeared to
portray as though I made massive errors that
didn’t get corrected.

¶8 The Department argued that Anderl failed to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation in violation of the Whistleblower Act.

¶9 An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that

Anderl’s request for a hearing be denied. In support of that

recommendation, the ALJ found that Anderl failed to state a prima

facie case of a violation of the Whistleblower Act.

¶ 10 Specifically, the ALJ found:

[Anderl’s] comment clearly expresses a
personal grievance that does not address a
broader public concern. As such, [Anderl’s]
comment is not the kind of disclosure that
warrants protection under the Whistleblower
Act.

....

Even if [Anderl’s] comment warranted
Whistleblower Act protection, [Anderl] did not
provide her comment/disclosure to an
appropriate person as required by the
Whistleblower statute.

¶ 11 Further, the ALJ found:

Even if [Anderl] had established that protected
disclosures occurred, [Anderl] failed to
demonstrate that the termination of her
probationary employment was taken “on

4
account of the employee’s disclosure of
information.” [§ 24-50-103(1), C.R.S. 2025].

....

Here, [Anderl] relies on the temporal proximity
between her comments concerning her
Dependency and Neglect situation on
December 19, 2023, and [Department]’s
termination of her probationary employment
on January 14, 2024[,] as evidence of a casual
connection. However, [Anderl] has provided no
information that anyone at the Department
. . ., and more specifically, anyone who was
involved in supervising [Anderl] or making the
decision to terminate her probationary
employment, knew of [Anderl’s] comments. If
they did not know of those comments, those
comments could not have been a substantial
motivating factor in the imposition of
discipline. In addition, the information the
parties have offered in their Information Sheets
indicates that [the Department] was justified in
terminating [Anderl]’s probationary
employment because of [Anderl]’s medication
errors and multiple instances of tardiness.

¶ 12 The Board adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and denied

Anderl’s petition for a hearing.

¶ 13 On appeal, Anderl contends that (1) the Board abused its

discretion in determining that she failed to meet her burden to

prove that her termination was retaliatory in violation of the

Whistleblower Act; (2) the Department deprived Anderl of her due

5
process rights; and (3) the Attorney General’s legal representation of

the Board constituted a conflict of interest. We address and reject

each of these contentions.

II. Whistleblower Claim

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 The standards set forth in section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2025,

govern judicial review of the Board’s decision. That statute provides

that an appellate court may reverse an administrative agency’s

order if it finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously,

made a decision that is unsupported by the record, erroneously

interpreted the law, or exceeded its authority. Id. If the court

concludes that sufficient evidence supports the Board’s finding,

then the Board’s action is not an abuse of discretion, and we must

defer to it. See Lawley v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1252

(Colo. 2001).

¶ 15 Under the Whistleblower Act, an employer may not discipline

or terminate an employee based on the employee’s disclosure of

protected information. § 24-50.5-103(1). Colorado courts analyze

whistleblower claims using the three-step framework announced by

the United States Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District

6
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See, e.g., Ward v.

Indus. Comm’n, 699 P.2d 960, 967-68 (Colo. 1985); Taylor v.

Regents of Univ. of Colo., 179 P.3d 246, 248 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 16 Under this framework, claimants must demonstrate that

(1) they made a protected disclosure, and (2) the disclosure was a

“substantial or motivating factor” for the disciplinary action. Ward,

699 P.2d at 968. To be protected under the statute, the disclosure

at issue must be a matter of public concern. Ferrel v. Colo. Dep’t of

Corr., 179 P.3d 178, 186 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 17 Under the second step, relevant factors to determine whether

the protected disclosure was a substantial or motivating factor for a

termination include (1) the historical background of the employer’s

decision to terminate; (2) the causal nexus between the protected

activity and the employer’s decision to terminate; (3) the extent to

which the employer departed from normal procedures or policies in

reaching its decision; (4) the pretextual character of the reasons

advanced for termination; and (5) the evidentiary support for the

employer’s asserted reasons for termination. Johnson v. Jefferson

Cnty. Bd. of Health, 662 P.2d 463, 476 (Colo. 1983).

7
A probationary employee lacks a legally
protected interest in continued employment
sufficient to create an entitlement to a due
process hearing prior to discharge . . . in the
absence of a showing that the dismissal has
been exacted as a penalty for the exercise of
the employee’s constitutionally protected rights
of speech or association, or that the charges
are such as to seriously damage the
employee’s standing and association in the
community . . . that abridges the freedom to
take advantage of other employment
opportunities.

Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 249 (Colo. 1984).

B. Analysis

¶ 18 The ALJ’s findings of fact and the Board’s reliance on those

findings are supported by the record. Anderl’s statements were

made to individuals involved in her dependency and neglect case

and related only to her personal situation. Therefore, Anderl’s

statements were not a matter of public concern and do not qualify

as protected disclosures of information under the Whistleblower

Act. See Ferrel, 179 P.3d at 186. Moreover, Anderl did not provide

any evidence that her statements to the Jefferson County agency

were known to her supervisors or appointing authority. While

Anderl contends that she submitted multiple complaints to

oversight agencies including the Ombudsman, the Attorney

8
General’s Office, and the Department’s complaint division,

addressing management issues, abuse of authority, and misuse of

public funds by the Department, our review of the record does not

support her contention.

¶ 19 Therefore, there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s

findings that Anderl’s statements had no bearing on and were not a

substantial or motivating factor in the Department’s decision to

terminate her employment.

¶ 20 Anderl argues that the ALJ’s findings are unsupported by

competent evidence, specifically that his decision is “based on

factual inaccuracies and disregards key evidence that [she] fulfilled

her responsibilities, received no warnings about her performance,

and was terminated soon after making protected disclosures.” We

disagree. The record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s

conclusion that the termination was motivated, not by Anderl’s

statements, but by her failure to meet performance standards. We

may not reweigh the evidence to reach a contrary decision. See In

re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22.

9
III. Due Process

¶ 21 Next, Anderl contends the Department violated her due

process rights because it did not provide her with notice and an

opportunity to respond prior to her termination. We disagree.

As outlined above, our review is governed by section 24-4-106(7).

¶ 22 At the time of her termination, Anderl was a probationary

employee, and therefore, she was not entitled, as a matter of due

process, to a predisciplinary meeting or hearing prior to her

termination. See Donahue, 690 P.2d at 249. Accordingly, the

Department did not violate Anderl’s due process rights.

IV. Conflict of Interest

¶ 23 Finally, Anderl argues that “[t]he dual role of the Attorney

General’s Office creates an appearance of bias, undermining the

integrity of the proceedings.” Specifically, Anderl contends it is

improper that “[t]he Attorney General’s office represents [the

Department] while also having received previous complaints from

[her] on related issues, raising concerns about impartiality.” We

disagree.

¶ 24 The law requires the Colorado Attorney General to provide

legal services for each state agency, including the Board and the

10
Department. See §§ 24-31-101(1)(a); -111(1), C.R.S. 2025. State

agencies are not permitted to obtain outside legal representation

except in limited circumstances not applicable in this case. See

§ 24-31-111(1)-(2), (5).

¶ 25 Thus, there was nothing improper regarding the Attorney

General’s representation of the Board and the Department in this

case. Moreover, Anderl has not alleged any facts or provided any

legal authority to support her argument that the specific

circumstances of the Attorney General’s representation of the Board

or the Department prejudiced her.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

11