St. George v. Office of the State Public Defender Government

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
April 9, 2026

2026COA28

No. 25CA0380, St. George v. Office of the State Public Defender
Government — Public Records — Criminal Justice Records Act
— Criminal Justice Agency; Office of the State Public Defender

A division of the court of appeals concludes that the Office of

the State Public Defender is not a “criminal justice agency” within

the meaning of the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act,

§§ 24-72-301 to -309, C.R.S. 2025.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA28

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0380
Jefferson County District Court No. 23CV193
Honorable Todd L. Vriesman, Judge

Eric St. George,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Office of the State Public Defender,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

Announced April 9, 2026

Killmer Lane, LLP, Thomas B. Kelley, Reid Allison, Madison Schaefer, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Scott A. Schultz, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Sarah Quigley, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, the Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD),

appeals the district court’s grant of statutory penalties to plaintiff,

Eric St. George, under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act

(CCJRA), §§ 24-72-301 to -309, C.R.S. 2025. OSPD argues that

(1) the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it due to

improper service of process; (2) it isn’t subject to the CCJRA

because it isn’t a “criminal justice agency”; (3) the records St.

George sought aren’t “criminal justice records” within the meaning

of the CCJRA; and (4) the district court clearly erred, even if OSPD

is subject to the CCJRA, by concluding that OSPD improperly

denied St. George the records he sought.

¶2 We conclude that OSPD waived its personal jurisdiction

argument, but we reverse the district court’s judgment because we

agree with OSPD that it isn’t a criminal justice agency within the

meaning of the CCJRA. Accordingly, we need not address OSPD’s

remaining arguments.

I. Framework: The CCJRA

¶3 The CCJRA governs the public’s access to criminal justice

records. See Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 196 P.3d 892, 899 (Colo. 2008). As we discuss in greater

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detail below, criminal justice records are made, maintained, or kept

by a “criminal justice agency.” § 24-72-302(4), C.R.S. 2025.

¶4 “Any person denied access to . . . a[] criminal justice record

. . . may apply to the district court of the district wherein the record

is found for an order directing the custodian of such record to show

cause why said custodian should not permit the inspection of such

record.” § 24-72-305(7), C.R.S. 2025. If the court finds that the

denial was improper, it must order the custodian to permit

inspection of the record. Id. And if the district court finds that the

denial was arbitrary or capricious, it may order the custodian to

pay the applicant’s reasonable costs and attorney fees. Id. In

addition, the court may order the custodian to pay the applicant a

penalty of up to twenty-five dollars for each day that record access

was improperly denied. Id.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

¶5 On March 7, April 7, and May 8, 2023, St. George sent letters

to OSPD, each requesting that OSPD produce “the office’s official

policy under which the employees of th[at] office deny discovery files

to those they represent who[] are held in [Jefferson County] pre-trial

detention [jail]” (the discovery policy). On May 20, 2023, St. George

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received a response from Mitch Ahnstedt, an OSPD employee at the

Golden regional office. Ahnstedt explained that he was unable to

determine which documents St. George had requested. St. George

sent a letter providing clarification but received no further

response.1

¶6 St. George then filed an application with the district court for

an order to show cause why OSPD should not permit him to access

the discovery policy under the CCJRA. The application also

requested statutory penalties for improper denial of the record. The

district court entered the order to show cause and ordered OSPD to

appear at a hearing scheduled for April 11, 2024. OSPD didn’t

appear at the April 11 hearing. After hearing testimony from a

process server, the district court concluded that OSPD had been

properly served and ordered it to produce the discovery policy.

OSPD subsequently failed to meet the production deadline set by

the court and did not respond to motions filed by St. George.

¶7 On August 28, 2024, OSPD filed a response to the court’s

original show cause order. OSPD explained that it had no “record

1 The facts in this paragraph are taken from St. George’s

application.

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of service and/or refusal of service, nor receipt of [St. George’s]

application” and stated that it had only become aware of the

litigation proceedings on August 8. OSPD’s response included a

typed excerpt of its discovery policy, prohibiting employees from

providing copies of discovery to in-custody clients under any

circumstances. OSPD further requested that the court discharge

the order to show cause and vacate a second hearing that had been

set for September 12.

¶8 The court denied OSPD’s request, and the hearing went ahead

as scheduled. At the hearing, OSPD argued that the CCJRA doesn’t

apply to it because it isn’t a “criminal justice agency,” but counsel

also read the discovery policy into the record “as a courtesy.” The

day after the hearing, OSPD also filed a document in which it

reproduced the entire text of the discovery policy.

¶9 After additional briefing, the district court entered a written

order concluding that OSPD is a criminal justice agency and that

the discovery policy is a criminal justice record. The court also

found that OSPD’s letter to St. George denying “the existence or

understanding” of the requested documents was “not proper” and

noted, “At no time during this proceeding has [OSPD] contradicted

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with particularity the fact allegations contained in the [a]pplication

. . . , for example, receipt of [St. George’s] letters to [OSPD] prior to

suit.” Based on its findings, the court concluded that OSPD’s

failure to provide the discovery policy was arbitrary and capricious.

Accordingly, the court awarded St. George statutory penalties in the

amount of twenty-five dollars per day, extending from March 17,

2023 (ten days after St. George sent his first letter), until September

13, 2024 (when OSPD filed the text of the discovery policy with the

court) (the penalties order). The penalties totaled $13,650.

¶ 10 OSPD appeals.

III. Personal Jurisdiction

¶ 11 OSPD first contends that the district court lacked personal

jurisdiction over it because it wasn’t properly served with St.

George’s application for the order to show cause. We conclude that

OSPD waived this issue.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 12 In general, a judgment is void if the court lacked personal

jurisdiction over the defendant due to invalid service of process.

Burton v. Colo. Access, 2018 CO 11, ¶ 35. However, a party may

waive a challenge to personal jurisdiction, and such waiver may be

5
implied. Garcia v. Puerto Vallarta Sports Bar, LLC, 2022 COA 17,

¶ 26. A defendant waives a personal jurisdiction defense by failing

to assert it in the first responsive pleading. Id. And even if a

defendant initially asserts a lack of personal jurisdiction, “the active

defense of a case will subject a defendant to the personal

jurisdiction of the court where that defense is maintained.” Giduck

v. Niblett, 2014 COA 86, ¶ 27.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 OSPD’s first filing in the case was its August 28 response to

the order to show cause. In that response, OSPD said only that it

had no “record of service and/or refusal of service, nor receipt of

[St. George’s] application.” OSPD didn’t ask the court to dismiss

the case or for any other relief related to the purportedly defective

service; it simply requested that the district court vacate the show

cause hearing because it had reproduced the text of the discovery

policy in its response.

¶ 14 Even if this were sufficient to initially assert a personal

jurisdiction defense, OSPD waived its argument by then defending

the case on the merits without reasserting the issue or asking for

any relief related to it. See Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th

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Cir. 1990) (concluding that, although the defendants raised a

personal jurisdiction defense in their answer, they waived it by

proceeding with the litigation without reasserting the issue), cited

with approval in Giduck, ¶ 27. And while OSPD raised personal

jurisdiction in a motion requesting that the court reconsider the

penalties order under C.R.C.P. 60(b), arguments made for the first

time in post-trial motions are too late and are deemed waived for

purposes of appeal. See Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners

Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA 78M, ¶ 66.

IV. “Criminal Justice Agency”

¶ 15 OSPD contends that the district court erred by concluding

that it is a “criminal justice agency” within the meaning of the

CCJRA. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 16 We review a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.

Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 21. We construe statutes to give

effect to the legislature’s intent. Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78,

¶ 12. In doing so, we look first to the statute’s text, giving words

and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. at ¶ 13. And

we consider “the statute as a whole, construing each provision

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consistently and in harmony with the overall statutory design.” Id.

(quoting Whitaker v. People, 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2002)). In

addition, we “avoid interpretations that would render any words or

phrases superfluous.” People v. Rodriguez-Morelos, 2025 CO 2, ¶ 8.

¶ 17 When the statutory language is clear, we apply it as written

and look no further. Coffman v. Williamson, 2015 CO 35, ¶ 23.

However, when a statute is ambiguous, we turn to other tools of

statutory construction, including legislative history. Id.; see

§ 2-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2025. A statute is ambiguous when it is

“reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations.” Coffman, ¶ 23

(quoting Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo. 2006)).

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Under the CCJRA, a criminal justice agency is

any court with criminal jurisdiction and any
agency of the state . . . that performs any
activity directly relating to the detection or
investigation of crime; the apprehension,
pretrial release, posttrial release, prosecution,
correctional supervision, rehabilitation,
evaluation, or treatment of accused persons or
criminal offenders; or criminal identification
activities or the collection, storage, or
dissemination of arrest and criminal records
information.

§ 24-72-302(3).

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¶ 19 The parties agree, as do we, that OSPD is an “agency of the

state.” Id. The question is whether any of OSPD’s activities

“directly relat[e] to” the enumerated activities in the definition of

criminal justice agency. Id. The parties argue that the plain

language of the statutory definition unambiguously supports their

respective interpretations. The mere fact that parties offer differing

possible interpretations of statutory language does not alone

establish ambiguity. People v. Scott, 2019 COA 174, ¶ 16. But

because both parties’ interpretations are reasonable, we conclude

that the definition is ambiguous. See Coffman, ¶ 23.

¶ 20 St. George argues that OSPD performs an activity “directly

relating to the detection or investigation of crime” because it

investigates the crimes that its clients are accused of committing as

part of its duty to defend its clients against the charges.

§ 24-72-302(3). And St. George contends that OSPD collects and

stores “arrest and criminal records information” because, while

providing a defense, OSPD receives such information from the

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prosecution and other law enforcement agencies.2 Id. Given the

broad language of the definition, St. George’s literal interpretation is

a reasonable one.

¶ 21 OSPD’s interpretation, while less literal, is also reasonable

because it accounts for the common understandings of the

enumerated activities. And we agree with OSPD that, when the

enumerated activities are read together, the common understanding

of the focus of such activities is the prosecution of crime and the

punishment and rehabilitation of defendants. First, as OSPD

points out, the definition includes activities directly relating to

“prosecution” of criminal offenders, but not to their “defense.” Id.

Second, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “detection or

investigation of crime” conjures images of police or police-like

officials conducting typical police functions to determine whether a

2 The district court’s ruling rested on a different rationale. The
court ruled that OSPD is a criminal justice agency because it
performs activities “directly relating” to “pretrial release, posttrial
release,” and “prosecution” of criminal offenders — namely, it
provides a defense to its clients in those circumstances.
§ 24-72-302(3), C.R.S. 2025. St. George doesn’t defend the district
court’s ruling on these grounds. For purposes of this opinion, we
assume (without deciding) that the district court’s interpretation is
also reasonable.

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crime has been committed and, if so, to refer the crime to the

district attorney for prosecution. Id.; cf. Ma v. People, 121 P.3d 205,

210-11 (Colo. 2005) (Although a broad reading of the phrase “law

enforcement” means “the enforcement of both civil and criminal

laws,” the common understanding (and appropriate interpretation)

is “the enforcement of criminal laws by the police or other

police-like agencies.”); Gazette v. Bourgerie, 2024 CO 78, ¶ 37

(holding that the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)

Board is a “criminal justice agency” under section 24-72-302(3)

because one of its functions is to conduct criminal investigations

into officers and applicants suspected of committing criminal

offenses, even though “prosecutions arising out of POST referrals

may occur infrequently” (emphasis added)).

¶ 22 Further, OSPD’s interpretation is supported by other CCJRA

provisions. See Allman, ¶ 13 (we must construe statutory

provisions in harmony with the overall statutory scheme). Section

24-72-304, C.R.S. 2025, pertains to the inspection of criminal

justice records. It provides that custodians must delete the names

and identifying information of certain child victims and child

witnesses from criminal justice records before releasing the records

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to “any individual or agency other than a criminal justice agency,

the office of the state public defender,” or other designated

recipients. § 24-72-304(4.5)(a)(I) (emphasis added). If OSPD is a

criminal justice agency, separately naming it serves no purpose.

See Wolford v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 947, 951 (Colo. 2005)

(“[W]e must interpret a statute to give effect to all its parts and

avoid interpretations that render statutory provisions redundant or

superfluous.”); Rodriguez-Morelos, ¶ 8.

¶ 23 Because both interpretations are reasonable, we look beyond

the plain language of the statute to uncover the legislative intent.

See Coffman, ¶ 23. And we need not look far. The statutory history

of the definition — meaning the evolution of the definition as

amended over time, Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v.

Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2 — reveals a clear intent.

¶ 24 The CCJRA previously defined “[c]riminal justice agency” as

any court with criminal jurisdiction and any
agency of the state . . . which performs any
activity directly relating to the detection or
investigation of crime; the apprehension,
pretrial release, post trial release, prosecution,
defense, correctional supervision,
rehabilitation, evaluation, or treatment of
accused persons or criminal offenders; or
criminal identification activities or the

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collection, storage, or dissemination of
criminal justice information.

§ 24-72-302(3), C.R.S. 1980 (emphasis added). However, in 1981,

the legislature amended the definition to remove the word “defense.”

Ch. 311, sec. 1, § 24-72-302(3), 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1238. And

in doing so, it didn’t remove the word “prosecution” or make any

other changes to the list of enumerated activities.3 See id. This

revision clearly evinces an intent to exclude agencies — like OSPD

— whose function is to defend criminal defendants.4

¶ 25 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by

ruling that OSPD is a criminal justice agency under the CCJRA and

imposing statutory penalties. We therefore reverse the portion of

3 The legislature made other minor changes that aren’t relevant to

our analysis.
4 Some opinions from the Colorado Supreme Court and divisions of

this court suggest that statutory history (the evolution of a statute
as it is amended over time) may be used to aid interpretation even if
the statute is unambiguous, see, e.g., Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm’n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2 (collecting cases); People
v. Lockett, 2025 COA 1, ¶ 20, while some suggest otherwise, see,
e.g., Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18; People v. Dominguez,
2021 COA 76, ¶ 14. But see § 2-4-203(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (We “may
consider . . . former statutory provisions” only “[i]f a statute is
ambiguous.”). Because we conclude the statute is ambiguous, we
need not address this apparent inconsistency.

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the judgment pertaining to OSPD.5 Because of our disposition, we

need not address the remainder of OSPD’s contentions.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is reversed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

5 In the district court, St. George sued other defendants who aren’t

parties to this appeal. The portions of the judgment pertaining to
those defendants remain undisturbed.

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