Peo v. Stidham

25CA0363 Peo v Stidham 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0363
El Paso County District Court No. 08CR1501
Honorable Samuel Evig, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Afrow Spade Stidham,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Afrow Spade Stidham, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Afrow Spade Stidham, appeals the postconviction

court’s denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion asserting that the trial

court didn’t have jurisdiction over his criminal case. We affirm.

I. Procedural History

¶2 In 2009, Stidham was convicted of child sexual assault,

adjudicated a habitual criminal, and sentenced to forty-eight years

to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Stidham

directly appealed his convictions and sentence, and after two

remands, a division of this court ultimately affirmed. People v.

Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 15CA0618, Feb. 8, 2018) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham I). The final mandate from

Stidham’s direct appeals was issued in 2018. Other divisions of

this court affirmed the denials of two postconviction motions in

2020 and 2022. See People v. Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1407,

June 11, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham

II); People v. Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0780, Nov. 30, 2023)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham III).

¶3 In 2024, Stidham filed his third postconviction motion, the

denial of which underlies this appeal. In the motion, Stidham

argued that his convictions are void and his sentence is illegal

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because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the

prosecutor’s failure to file an oath of office and bond with the

Colorado Secretary of State prior to filing the complaints.

¶4 Stidham had raised the oath-of-office issue in his first

postconviction motion. A division of this court affirmed the

postconviction court’s denial and held, as relevant here, that

Stidham’s argument (1) didn’t implicate the trial court’s subject

matter jurisdiction and (2) was successive because it could have

been raised on direct appeal. Stidham II, slip op. at ¶ 30. Then, in

Stidham’s second postconviction motion, he reraised the issue of

noncompliance with the oath and bond filing requirements by

arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to raise it. See Stidham III, slip op. at ¶ 49. On appeal, a

division of this court declined to address the oath-of-office issue

because it was argued in a conclusory fashion. Id. at ¶ 50.

¶5 In the order underlying this appeal, the postconviction court

denied Stidham’s motion for the following reasons:

• The oath-of-office claim was successive because it was

previously raised and resolved in his first postconviction

proceeding.

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• The motion was time barred because Stidham filed it

more than three years after the statutory deadline in

section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025.

• The motion failed on the merits because sections 20-1-

101 and 24-12-101, C.R.S. 2025, required only an

elected district attorney to file an oath and bond.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 We review a postconviction court’s summary denial of a

motion for postconviction relief de novo. People v. Nozolino, 2023

COA 39, ¶ 7. A postconviction motion may be denied without an

evidentiary hearing when the motion, files, and record clearly

establish that the defendant’s allegations are without merit and

don’t warrant postconviction relief. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73,

77 (Colo. 2003).

¶7 Subject to exceptions not relevant here, “claims for

postconviction relief are subject to a three-year time limitation,

which runs from the date a conviction is final. A conviction is final

on the date the defendant’s direct appeal has been exhausted if an

appeal is pursued . . . .” People v. Shepard, 151 P.3d 580, 582

(Colo. App. 2006) (citations omitted); see § 16-5-402(1).

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¶8 Additionally, a court must deny any postconviction claim that

was “raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction

proceeding on behalf of the same defendant” unless the claim is

based on newly discovered evidence or on a new rule of

constitutional law. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI).

III. Oath of Office

¶9 Stidham argues that his motion isn’t successive under Crim.

P. 35(c) and isn’t time barred under section 16-5-402 because it

raises subject matter jurisdiction, which, he asserts, excepts him

from these procedural barriers. We disagree.

¶ 10 Stidham filed his postconviction motion in 2024 —

approximately three years late. See Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO

83, ¶ 36. It’s true that a postconviction claim asserting that the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be raised outside

the three-year time limit. § 16-5-402(2)(a). However, Stidham’s

argument that the prosecutor hadn’t appropriately filed his oath of

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office doesn’t implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

See People v. Scott, 116 P.3d 1231, 1232-33 (Colo. App. 2004).1

¶ 11 Furthermore, even if Stidham’s claim did implicate the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, the claim was previously raised and

resolved in Stidham’s first postconviction proceeding. Thus, the

only way the court could address his claim is if it was based on

newly discovered evidence or on a new rule of constitutional law.

See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI). Stidham doesn’t raise any argument that

his claim falls under either of those exceptions.2

IV. Habitual Criminal Convictions

¶ 12 Stidham also challenges his designation as a habitual criminal

as unconstitutional under Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821

(2024). However, we decline to address this issue because it isn’t

1 To the extent that Stidham argues that the three-year deadline to

challenge a conviction does not apply to him because the
postconviction court lacked personal jurisdiction, see § 16-5-
402(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025, we decline to address the argument. See
People v. Gingles, 2014 COA 163, ¶ 29 (appellate courts will decline
to address issues presented in a “cursory[] and undeveloped
manner”).
2 To the extent Stidham contends that his motion is cognizable

under Crim. P. 35(a), we disagree. See Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d
1263, 1265 n.5 (Colo. 1993) (“An allegation that a trial court was
without . . . subject-matter jurisdiction is properly raised in a Crim.
P. 35(c)” motion.).

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preserved.3 See DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo.

1996) (“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for

postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of

that motion.”); People v. Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 18 (noting that

the preservation rule “applies to both constitutional and

nonconstitutional arguments presented for the first time in an

appeal of a ruling on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion”).

V. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

3 We note that Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), was

decided on June 21, 2024 — approximately two weeks before
Stidham filed the postconviction motion at issue in this appeal.

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