Peo in Interest of J-TM

25CA1281 Peo in Interest of J-TM 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1281
Weld County District Court No. 22JV29
Honorable Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J-T.M., a Child,

and Concerning E.P.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, E.P. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with J-T.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services (Department)

initiated an action in dependency or neglect based on concerns

related to mother’s financial and housing instability, mental health,

and medical neglect of the child. The juvenile court adjudicated the

child dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for

mother.

¶3 Mother appealed, and a division of this court reversed the

adjudication judgment based on the juvenile court’s failure to

properly determine whether it had jurisdiction over the matter.

People in Interest of J-T.M., (Colo. App. No. 22CA2242, Sep. 7, 2023)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). After a remand, the

juvenile court determined it had jurisdiction, reinstated the

adjudication, and readopted mother’s treatment plan. Mother

appealed the reinstated adjudication, which was upheld on appeal

by another division of this court in People in Interest of J-T.M., (Colo.

1
App. No. 24CA150, Sep. 12, 2024) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted

the termination motion.

II. Criteria for Termination and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

hasn’t been successful in rendering the parent fit; (3) the parent

remains unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely

to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a

petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must

place the child in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see People

in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25.

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

2
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual

findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions,

including whether the department satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10;

People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The credibility of

the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the

evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom

are within the discretion of the juvenile court. People in Interest of

A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department fulfilled its duty to provide reasonable efforts.

Specifically, she asserts that (1) her in-person family time was

erroneously suspended; (2) the length of the suspension was

unreasonable; and (3) in-person family time should have been held

in Colorado. We consider, and reject, each contention below.

A. Preservation

¶9 The guardian ad litem argues that, although mother preserved

a reasonable efforts argument generally, she did not preserve the

3
specific arguments she now asserts on appeal. We need not decide

this issue because, even if we assume mother preserved her claim,

we discern no reversible error.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Reasonable efforts

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is in out-

of-home placement, and the reasonable efforts standard is satisfied

if appropriate services are provided to a parent in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.

Under that statute, family time is among the services that “must be

available and provided” as determined necessary and appropriate

by individual case plans. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest

of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 11 In determining whether family time services are necessary and

appropriate, the health and safety of the child are paramount. See

B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. Family time services should further the

4
purposes of the Children’s Code, including the preservation of

familial ties whenever possible. § 19-1-102(1)(b). However, family

time services may be denied or limited if the court finds “that

visitation with the parent would be detrimental to the health and

safety of the child.” People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23.

¶ 12 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the juvenile court should consider whether the services provided

were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. S.N-V.,

300 P.3d at 915. The parent is ultimately responsible for using the

services provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with

the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). The court may therefore consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in services when determining

whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

C. Additional Background

¶ 13 Following the child’s removal from the home, the juvenile court

ordered regular weekly supervised family time. To that end, the

Department set up in-person supervised visits, and mother

attended regularly.

5
¶ 14 During family time, mother routinely inspected the child’s

body (including the child’s genitals) and would show pictures of the

child’s face and body to professionals involved in the case, asserting

there were visible injuries on the child. The professionals did not

see the injuries mother purported to see.

¶ 15 Roughly four months after supervised family time began,

mother again alleged there were injuries on the child and that he

was being sexually abused. None of the professionals were able to

see the injuries she reported.

¶ 16 Mother then called law enforcement and paramedics and

requested the child be taken to the hospital. At the hospital,

mother asked that a sexual assault nurse examiner conduct an

exam of the child. Over the Department’s objections, the hospital

performed the exam. Medical professionals determined there were

no concerns about physical or sexual abuse. Mother did not accept

this determination and stated that she would seek a second

opinion.

¶ 17 Following the incident, the Department requested and was

granted a protection order suspending in-person family time. The

court paused all family time for two weeks before allowing it to

6
resume with therapeutically supervised virtual visits. After a brief

delay, during which the family time provider waited for mother to

sign necessary paperwork, virtual visits began and remained

available for almost two years.

¶ 18 While family time was virtual, mother left Colorado and gave

birth to another child. Mother first moved to Missouri, then

Florida, before settling in Michigan for the remainder of the case.

¶ 19 The child was also moved to New Mexico where he was placed

with his maternal great grandmother. Virtual family time continued

in the interim.

¶ 20 Later, mother requested and was granted the reinstatement of

supervised in-person family time. Virtual family time remained in

place for the balance of the case.

¶ 21 The Department scheduled in-person family time for mother in

New Mexico, where the child resided. Initially, a caseworker from

the Department of Human Services in New Mexico supervised the

visits. The Department covered the cost of mother’s and her

younger child’s travel to and from Michigan.

¶ 22 When the New Mexico caseworker was no longer able to

supervise visits, family time was transitioned to another provider in

7
New Mexico. That provider later reported that mother could not

bring the younger sibling to family time following an incident in

which the sibling was reportedly injured. The provider was willing

to continue supervising family time between mother and the child,

but mother refused to work with the provider if the sibling was not

allowed to attend.

¶ 23 The caseworker investigated additional family time providers

in New Mexico and nearby in Texas but was unable to coordinate

another provider who could provide adequate supervision levels

while allowing the child’s sibling to attend. Given mother’s refusal

to work with the original supervisor, and the lack of an available

provider who could accommodate the younger sibling, family time

returned to a virtual setting.

¶ 24 In between the days of the termination hearing, one in-person

family time session was held in Colorado.

D. Analysis

1. Suspension of In-Person Family Time

¶ 25 First, mother appears to contend that the court erroneously

suspended in-person family time, not due to legitimate safety

8
concerns but because “the Department felt that [m]other was too

assertive” in examining the child during family time visits.

¶ 26 The court found that the child’s health and safety required

suspension of family time. See § 19-3-217(1.5)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (a

court may “restrict or deny family time if it is necessary to protect

the child’s or youth’s safety or mental, emotional, or physical

health”). Specifically, the court believed that in-person family time

allowed mother “access to the child in a way that is unsafe,” while

virtual family time would “keep the connection between mother and

[the] child going” in a way that limited safety concerns.

¶ 27 The record supports the court’s findings:

• The visit supervisor reported mother had previously

taken pictures of the child’s genitals looking for evidence

of sexual abuse. She noted that mother indicated she

would continue to undress and search the child at every

visit if she continued to have concerns.

• The caseworker expressed that there had been ongoing

concerns about mother’s escalated behavior leading to

the incident that ended with the child being examined for

sexual abuse. The caseworker described the child as

9
being distraught after the exam and that it was difficult

to calm him down.

• The caseworker’s supervisor explained that mother did

not understand how traumatizing invasive medical exams

could be for the child. He further believed continuing in-

person family time could be “emotionally or

psychologically endangering” to the child and that the

continuation of in-person visits could expose the child to

additional trauma.

• Mother testified that if she continued to have safety

concerns about the child, she would report her concerns

to law enforcement “the same way” that she did during

the incident.

¶ 28 Given this evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court

suspended family time based on legitimate concerns for the child’s

emotional health and safety.

2. Reinstatement of In-Person Family Time

¶ 29 Mother also argues that even if the suspension of in-person

family time was necessary, the length of the suspension — about

twenty months — was unreasonable.

10
¶ 30 We acknowledge that mother’s in-person family time was

suspended by the court for nearly two years. And the record shows

that, for six months of that time, mother was engaged in her

treatment plan and received positive reports on her progress.

¶ 31 However, some concerns remained. The virtual family time

provider testified that, while mother attended consistently, virtual

family time was “very unpredictable,” and mother struggled with her

emotions, boundaries, and inappropriate conversations with the

child. Because of this, the virtual family time provider opined that

she would not recommend a less restrictive family time setting. The

caseworker also noted that mother’s mental health needed to be

further addressed to alleviate concerns over in-person family time.

Regardless, because mother’s in-person family time was ultimately

reinstated well before termination, we need not determine whether

the length of the suspension was reasonable.

¶ 32 Still, mother argues that a second discontinuation of in-person

visits amounted to a “de facto suspension” that was caused by the

Department’s lack of reasonable efforts.

¶ 33 To be clear, the record indicates there was only one court-

ordered suspension of in-person family time, as described above,

11
and the second disruption of in-person family time occurred only

after mother refused to attend when the provider would not allow

the child’s younger sibling to attend the sessions. The family time

provider was willing to continue supervising in person family time;

but mother declined to attend the sessions. The caseworker

attempted to problem-solve with mother to arrange for alternative

childcare for the younger child while she was in family time, but

mother refused to consider any alternatives. Thus, it was mother’s

choice to stop attending in-person family time, and not the

Department’s lack of efforts or a court order, that prevented in-

person family time from continuing. See A.V., ¶ 12.

3. Location of In-Person Family Time

¶ 34 Next, we reject mother’s argument that the Department should

have held in-person family time in Colorado, even though neither

she nor the child resided there.

¶ 35 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to provide mother with in-person family time in

New Mexico. The court found that “it was not in the child’s best

interest” to be regularly transported to Colorado for family time, and

12
it “was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances.”

The court’s conclusion is supported by the record.

¶ 36 The caseworker reported that the child missed some of his

weekly therapy appointments and a few days of school due to the

difficulties in coordinating schedules for flights to and from

Colorado. The caseworker also testified that a family time visit in

Colorado cost the department over $4,000, and that expense was

not something the Department could provide on an ongoing basis.

¶ 37 Accordingly, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings and conclusion that the Department made reasonable

efforts with respect to family time, we discern no error.

IV. Fitness Determination and Substantial Compliance

¶ 38 Mother next argues that the court erred by finding that she

was unfit because she made substantial progress during the case.

In the alternative, mother contends that, based on her progress, the

court erred by finding she could not become fit within a reasonable

period of time. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 39 A parent is unfit if she is unable or unwilling to provide her

child reasonable care due to her conduct or condition. S.Z.S., ¶ 23.

13
“Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.”

Id.

¶ 40 In determining whether a parent’s fitness is likely to change

within a reasonable period of time, the court may consider “whether

any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition.” Id. at ¶ 24. A “reasonable time” must be determined

by “considering the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs” and is a fact-specific inquiry varying from

case to case. Id. at ¶ 25 (citing People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d

1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006)).

B. Analysis

¶ 41 Mother’s treatment plan required her to, among other things,

address her mental health, develop additional parenting skills to

meet the child’s needs, attend all family time, and obtain and

maintain suitable stable housing and employment.

¶ 42 The court found that mother “complied partially” with her

treatment plan, but that “there has not been substantial

14
compliance and [the treatment plan] clearly has not been successful

in returning the child home.” Specifically, it found that her

unaddressed mental health concerns were “of such duration or

nature as to render her unlikely, within a reasonable period of time,

to care for” the child’s needs and that she was unfit. This finding is

supported by the record.

¶ 43 The caseworker testified that mother was “partially” compliant

with the mental health component of her treatment plan. The

caseworker noted that mother had completed a psychological

evaluation and had engaged in mental health services for roughly

six months. She further reported that mother received “really

positive” reports and worked well with the Department.

¶ 44 However, after mother was discharged from mental health

services at her own request, the caseworker saw a notable increase

in mother’s paranoia, including allegations that the child was being

abused, and accusations that professionals and family members

were working against her. The caseworker repeatedly attempted to

reengage mother in services, but mother believed she had

completed the mental health component of her treatment plan and

would not reengage or discuss her mental health further.

15
¶ 45 An expert in the field of psychology opined that mother “had

very significant mental health needs” and met the criteria for a

delusional disorder and a paranoid personality disorder. He

believed that mother’s “mistrust of and lack of other social

supports” makes parenting a child “very difficult” and “leaves her

very vulnerable and puts her and her son at risk.” He testified that

mother would need to be in counseling for “many, many months, if

not years,” to adequately address her mental health needs. The

court found this testimony credible.

¶ 46 While the record shows mother consistently attended family

time, the caseworker reported concerns that she was not willing to

follow the recommendations provided by family time supervisors.

And the family time supervisor testified that she would not

recommend lowering the visit supervision level because she believed

mother would engage in inappropriate conversations with the child

or be unable to regulate her emotions.

¶ 47 Additionally, despite mother testifying that she had stable

housing and employment, the Department was never able to verify

her claims. While mother provided several home addresses

throughout the case, she was not always willing to provide

16
information about where she was living and at times gave

contradictory information. Similarly, while mother reported she

was consistently employed, financially successful, and later

provided a bank statement as proof, the caseworker was unable to

verify her income because the report was heavily redacted.

¶ 48 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that mother was not fit and

that she was not willing to work on the concerns that led to the

filing of the case. The caseworker did not believe mother would be

able to make the necessary changes to become a fit parent in a

reasonable amount of time.

¶ 49 Mother points us to aspects of her treatment plan compliance

and an approved Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

home study as proof she could become fit within a reasonable

period of time. Although the record supports aspects of mother’s

assertions, the court considered that evidence, weighed it against

the contrary evidence described above, and concluded that mother

is unfit. Additionally, the case had been open for over three years,

and mother had significant treatment areas that she needed to

address to become fit. Under these circumstances, mother’s

compliance with the treatment plan was not sufficient to render her

17
fit, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App.

2005), nor was the juvenile court required to give her more time to

become fit, see S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶ 50 For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not

err when it found mother was unfit or unable to become fit within a

reasonable period of time.

V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 51 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 52 In analyzing less drastic alternatives, the juvenile court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 29. Long-term or permanent placement with a family

member, short of termination, may not be in a child’s best interests

if it does not meet the child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012

COA 195M, ¶ 41. When a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds that termination is in a child’s best interests,

we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the record

supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

18
B. Analysis

¶ 53 The juvenile court found that termination of parental rights

was in the child’s best interests and there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. The court recognized the existing bond

between mother and the child and that there would be a negative

impact on the child if that bond was severed through termination.

Nevertheless, the court did not believe an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) would “meet the child’s best interests on a

long term basis.”

¶ 54 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

opined that termination was appropriate because she did not

believe mother was able to give the child the stability and

permanency he needs. True, the caseworker agreed that mother

and the child were bonded and severing that bond would be

traumatic for the child. But the caseworker also noted that

maternal great grandmother and mother did not have a good

relationship. Maternal great grandmother agreed her relationship

with mother was “severed” after mother allegedly made false reports

of abuse against her. And she testified that she would not support

19
any contact between mother and the child unless mother addressed

her mental health needs.

¶ 55 The caseworker believed termination was in the child’s best

interest. She further opined that continuing the case would have a

greater negative impact on the child than the severed bond.

¶ 56 Mother’s arguments do not convince us that the juvenile

court’s less drastic findings were clearly erroneous. Mother asserts

that an APR to the kinship provider was in the child’s best interest

because (1) an APR would preserve the child’s bond with his

siblings; (2) maternal great grandmother testified that she would

accept an APR if the court ordered one; and (3) as noted, maternal

great grandmother reported if mother’s rights were terminated she

would not support contact between mother and the child unless

and until mother addressed her mental health.

¶ 57 A juvenile court can consider these and other factors when

deciding if there is a viable less drastic alternative to termination.

See People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009)

(considering similar factors); see also A.R., ¶ 38 (noting that the

court “may consider various factors” in its analysis of less drastic

alternatives). In this case, the court considered, and rejected, an

20
APR based on mother’s unfitness, mother’s volatile relationship

with maternal great grandmother, and the child’s need for

permanency. It is not our place to reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment to reach a different conclusion. See S.Z.S.,

¶ 29. And because the record supports the court’s less drastic

alternatives finding, we are bound to affirm it. See B.H., ¶ 80.

VI. Disposition

¶ 58 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

21