Peo v. Spector

24CA0105 Peo v Spector 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0105
Douglas County District Court No. 22CR1185
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joseph Michael Spector,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Joseph Michael Spector, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered in Douglas County District Court pursuant to a

plea agreement resolving cases against him in three separate

counties. Spector raises one issue on appeal: Did the district court

err by denying a motion to continue his sentencing hearing so that

recently appointed counsel could have additional time to investigate

the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea based on ineffective

assistance of counsel? We conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In a global disposition of three cases in which he was charged

with sexual offenses against several children, Spector agreed to the

following:

• In Douglas County case number 22CR1185 — the case

appealed here — Spector pleaded guilty to (1) one count

of sexual exploitation of a child with a stipulated

determinate ten-year prison sentence and (2) one count

of sexual assault on a child with a stipulated sentence of

ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision

probation (SOISP).

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• In Denver case number 22CR5083, Spector pleaded

guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child with a

stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.

• In Arapahoe County case number 22CR2122, Spector

pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child

with a stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.

¶3 Each agreement stipulated that the three SOISP sentences

were to be served consecutive to the prison sentence and

concurrent with each other.

¶4 After the district courts in all three counties accepted

Spector’s guilty pleas but before any sentencing hearings, Spector’s

private attorney, Colin Bresee, withdrew due to irreconcilable

differences. Public defender Lauren Sposa was appointed to

represent Spector in Douglas County.

¶5 Three weeks later and one day before the scheduled

sentencing hearing in this case, Sposa moved to continue so she

could investigate “whether or not Mr. Spector has a claim to

withdraw his plea” under Crim. P. 32(d) due to “potential ineffective

assistance of counsel claims.” The People objected, argued that

Spector was “playing games,” and said the victims wanted closure.

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The Douglas County district court denied the motion, finding,

among other things, that (1) the victims objected to a continuance;

(2) any ineffective assistance claims could be raised in a

postconviction motion; (3) the case had been pending for over a

year; and (4) Spector had been “playing games” as a tactic to delay

proceedings. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court

sentenced Spector to ten years in prison plus a consecutive ten

years to life on SOISP.

II. Discussion

¶6 On appeal, Spector contends that the district court erred by

denying his motion to continue so that Sposa could adequately

advise him about whether to move to withdraw his guilty plea. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to continue for

abuse of discretion. People v. Ahuero, 2017 CO 90, ¶ 11. “There

are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a [district] court

abuses its discretion by denying a continuance.” People v. Brown,

2014 CO 25, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1353

(Colo. 1988)).

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¶8 On review, we consider (1) the prejudice to the moving party if

the continuance was denied versus the prejudice to the opposing

party if a continuance was granted, see People v. Smith, 275 P.3d

715, 721-22 (Colo. App. 2011); (2) the circumstances confronting

the district court when the motion was made, see Ahuero, ¶ 11; and

(3) the reasons presented for the continuance, see id. Because a

request for a continuance requires the court to balance many

factors, “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates

the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Morris v.

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).

¶9 Crim. P. 32(d) permits a defendant to move to withdraw his

guilty plea before a sentence is imposed. See Crumb v. People, 230

P.3d 726, 730 (Colo. 2010). The rule “provides a vehicle” for a

defendant to present “a fair and just reason for discretionarily

permitting withdrawal” of the plea, People v. Figueroa-Lemus, 2020

CO 59, ¶ 12, but the defendant has the burden of demonstrating

that fair and just reason, People v. Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609

(Colo. 1988), and whether the defendant met that burden is an

assessment within the sound discretion of the trial court, People v.

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Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871 (Colo. App. 2000). One fair and just

reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d) is the

ineffective assistance of counsel. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871.

B. Application

¶ 10 The record shows that the district court appropriately

considered the balance of prejudice to the parties before denying

Spector’s continuance. The prosecutor objected to a continuance

on behalf of the “more than four victims” in this global plea, who

wanted closure. The court weighed the victims’ interest in closure

against Spector’s interest in a potential ineffective assistance claim,

noting that (1) the case had been pending for over a year; and (2) if

there was a basis for an ineffective assistance claim, Spector could

pursue relief in a postconviction motion.

¶ 11 These circumstances, in addition to those revealed at the

providency hearing, support the district court’s finding that Spector

was simply “playing games” to delay sentencing. At the hearing, the

court engaged in a robust discussion with Spector about whether

he was satisfied with Bresee’s representation. When the court

made clear it would not accept a plea that day unless Spector was

fully satisfied, Spector insisted that he wanted to keep Bresee as his

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attorney and to accept the plea deal. He “absolutely” did not want

to go to trial. This discussion, suggesting that Spector had no

interest in going to trial, reasonably informed the district court’s

finding that Spector’s continuance motion was a delay tactic.

¶ 12 As to the reasons presented for a continuance, Spector

expressed only one specific concern about Bresee’s representation

— that Bresee could have sent more emails to the district attorney.

In response, the district attorney argued that she had “never

received so many emails on one case . . . . [She had] never had to

spend so much time responding to emails of the defendant’s

questions, explaining to him why my offer will never change.”

Spector conceded that sending more emails would not have resulted

in a better plea offer. Counsel’s written motion to continue asserted

only a vague and speculative claim of ineffective assistance — she

did not allege a specific fair and just reason for withdrawing

Spector’s plea that could be developed with further investigation.

Cf. id. at 871 (concluding that a Crim. P. 32(d) motion may be

denied if a claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory or

contradicted by the record).

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¶ 13 For these reasons, we perceive nothing arbitrary or

unreasonable about the district court’s decision to deny Spector’s

motion to continue. We conclude that the court acted well within

its discretion.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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