Peo in Interest of SKF

25CA0206 Peo in Interest of SKF 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0206
El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30179
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.K.F., Y.Y.F., and A.N.F., Children,

and Concerning R.F.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 5, 2026

Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney,
Melanie Douglas, Contract Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem for S.K.F.

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for Y.Y.F. and A.N.F.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.F. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationships with A.N.F., Y.Y.F., and S.K.F. (the children). We

reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

children, who were eight, ten, and fourteen years old at the time.

Prior to the filing, father had been arrested based on allegations of

sexual abuse made by the children’s older sister, who was originally

named in the petition, but who has since turned eighteen and is

therefore no longer a party. The Department also alleged that

father had physically and verbally abused the children and that

their mother, who did not live in father’s home, failed to protect

them from the alleged abuse.

¶3 The juvenile court initially granted temporary custody of the

children to mother under the Department’s supervision. The court

ordered that father’s contact with the children be supervised.

Approximately two weeks later, father’s criminal case was

1
dismissed, and he was released from custody. However, the

children remained with mother.

¶4 About a month later, the Department filed an amended

petition alleging that mother’s boyfriend had physically abused the

youngest child. Consequently, the juvenile court removed the

children from mother’s custody and granted temporary custody of

the children to the Department. They were later placed in foster

care.

¶5 On multiple occasions father requested family time with his

children. Before any supervised family time occurred, the two

younger children’s guardian ad litem (GAL), who also served as the

older child’s counsel for youth (CFY), moved the court to require

that all family time be therapeutic instead of supervised.1 Although

the court did not take any evidence on the issue, it ordered

therapeutic family time over father’s objection.

1 When the case first opened, the juvenile court appointed the same

attorney to serve as the younger two children’s GAL and the older
child’s CFY. Fifteen months into the case, the middle child turned
twelve, and the GAL transitioned to serving as her CFY. For the
remainder of the case, the same attorney served as the youngest
child’s GAL and the older two children’s CFY.

2
¶6 Around the same time, mother admitted the allegations in the

petition, and the juvenile court adopted a treatment plan for her.

Three months later, father’s counsel appeared in court and, on

father’s behalf, entered a no-fault admission to the allegations in

the petition. Although father was not present in court and did not

sign a written document stating that he had been advised of his

rights and the consequences of stipulating to the entry of an

adjudication, the court accepted the admission and adjudicated the

children dependent or neglected. Father agreed to the

Department’s proposed treatment plan except for its objectives

requiring him to complete a psychosexual evaluation and a mental

health evaluation. After the parties agreed to remove the

requirement for a psychosexual evaluation but keep the

requirement for a mental health evaluation, the court adopted the

treatment plan.

¶7 In the following months, father participated in life skills

training and individual therapy. He also continued to request

family time or at least some contact with the children. However, by

July 2023, no family time had occurred, and father moved the

juvenile court to find that the Department was not meeting its

3
obligation to make reasonable efforts based on its failure to provide

him family time.

¶8 Approximately five and a half months later, after two

continuances, the juvenile court held a two-day evidentiary hearing

on father’s reasonable efforts motion. At that hearing, the

caseworker testified that the referral for therapeutic family time was

open, but the children’s therapists did not believe that the children

were ready for family time with father. She also testified that the

older two children consistently told her that they did not want to

see father. At the end of the hearing, the court found that the

Department had been making reasonable efforts but family time

“can only be done when the children are ready.” The court also

found that forcing the children to participate in family time before

they were ready would be emotionally detrimental to them.

¶9 About three months later, the Department filed a motion to

terminate both parents’ rights. Mother confessed the motion, but

father contested it, and the juvenile court held a four-day

termination hearing over the course of five months. Approximately

two and a half years after the case opened, the court granted the

Department’s termination motion. Father had not received any

4
family time with the children between the start of the case and

entry of the termination order.

II. Therapeutic Family Time and Reasonable Efforts

¶ 10 Father argues that the Department deprived him of any

opportunity to have contact with the children despite its failure to

establish that such contact posed a risk to the children’s health or

welfare. More specifically, he argues that the court erred by

increasing the level of family time supervision without first holding

a hearing, as required by section 19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred by concluding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with

his children.

¶ 12 After setting forth the applicable law, we address father’s

contentions in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

5
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 14 “One of the goals of the Children’s Code is to preserve the

parent-child relationship whenever possible.” People in Interest of

A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 5. Thus, before terminating a parent’s rights

under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider

whether the department of human services made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See §§ 19-3-

100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of S.N-V.,

300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts” means

the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-

home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Appropriate

services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025,

satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 15 As relevant here, a department must provide family time

services for parents with children or youth in out-of-home

placement if those services are determined to be necessary and

appropriate by the individual case plan. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV);

People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 14. The children’s health

and safety are the paramount concerns in determining whether,

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and what type of, family time services are necessary and

appropriate. See A.A., ¶ 17. Family time services shall be designed

to promote the children’s health, safety, and well-being; facilitate

the speedy reunification of a parent and their children; and promote

the children’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-208(2)(a).

¶ 16 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination that a department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id.

B. Therapeutic Family Time

¶ 17 First, we agree with father that the juvenile court erred by

ordering therapeutic family time, which constituted an increase in

the level of family time supervision, without first holding a hearing

on the issue. Section 19-3-217(3) states the following:

Absent the issuance of an emergency order, a
parent granted family time is entitled to a
hearing prior to an ongoing reduction in,
suspension of, or increase in the level of
supervision, including a change from in-person
family time to virtual family time. If the court
issues an emergency order suspending,

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reducing, or restricting family time, a parent is
entitled to a hearing within seventy-two hours
after the order is issued, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and court holidays.

¶ 18 Recall that at the beginning of the case, the juvenile court

ordered supervised family time for father. Father did not object to

that order, and in September 2022, he requested that the

Department make a referral so his supervised family time could

begin. The Department made the referral, and the first family time

session was scheduled for December 2022.

¶ 19 However, the day before that family time session was set to

occur, the GAL-CFY moved the court to order that a therapist

supervise all family time. The family time session scheduled for the

following day did not occur. Three weeks later, the parties

appeared in court, and father expressly objected to increasing the

level of family time supervision to therapeutic. Father’s counsel

also stated that father’s life skills worker was willing and able to

supervise family time.

¶ 20 Without taking any evidence, the court ordered therapeutic

family time and directed the Department to make a referral so that

therapeutic family time could “start right away.” The court went on

8
to state that it would schedule a “contested visitation hearing” for

father because he was “objecting to the therapeutic visits.”

However, the record does not indicate that the court held a hearing

to determine if the increase in supervision was necessary and

appropriate. See A.A., ¶ 17 (when determining the level of family

time supervision, the children’s health and safety are paramount,

but, if possible, the family time services should also facilitate the

speedy reunification of parents and children).2

¶ 21 To the extent that the Department or the GAL-CFY argues that

the hearing in December 2023 satisfied the requirements of section

19-3-217(3), we disagree.3 True, the court held a hearing on

father’s reasonable efforts motion and request for contact with the

2 Although not in effect when the juvenile court ordered therapeutic

family time, section 19-3-217(1.5)(d), C.R.S. 2025, recognizes the
longstanding concept that while the children’s health and safety are
paramount in setting parameters around family time, courts must
ensure that it occurs in the least restrictive manner possible.
Specifically, subsection (1.5)(d) states that “[t]he court may only
restrict or deny family time if it is necessary to protect the child’s or
youth’s safety or mental, emotional, or physical health,” and “shall
order family time in the least restrictive . . . supervision . . . to
satisfy the child’s or youth’s safety or mental, emotional, or physical
health.”
3 While the briefing was not clear on this point, at oral argument

counsel for the GAL-CFY conceded that the failure to hold a timely
hearing under section 19-3-217(3) was error.

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children in December 2023 — approximately eleven months after it

ordered that supervision be increased to a therapeutic level. But

absent an emergency, section 19-3-217(3) required the court to

hold a hearing “prior to an . . . increase in the level of supervision.”

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 22 And even assuming that the court entered its order on an

emergency basis to protect the children’s health or safety, the

statute required the court to hold a hearing within seventy-two

hours after it issued the order. See § 19-3-217(3). Thus, we are not

persuaded that the court complied with section 19-3-217(3) by

holding a hearing eleven months after it ordered that supervision be

increased to a therapeutic level.

¶ 23 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

erred by ordering that supervision be increased to a therapeutic

level without first holding a hearing, as required under section 19-

3-217(3). And that error not only violated the statute, but it also

unfortunately permeated and tainted the court’s subsequent

reasonable efforts and termination analysis.

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C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 24 Although the juvenile court entered its order for therapeutic

family time in violation of section 19-3-217(3), the record indicates

that the parties proceeded under that order as if it were proper,

thereby precipitating additional errors as discussed below.

1. Confusion About the Order for Therapeutic Family Time Prior
to the Reasonable Efforts Hearing

¶ 25 Throughout the juvenile court proceedings, there appears to

have been some confusion about what “therapeutic family time”

meant. Initially, the GAL-CFY requested that family time take place

in “the presence of a therapist.” The court granted that motion and

ordered that therapeutic family time “start right away.” Thus, the

court’s order for therapeutic family time required the Department to

arrange family time supervised by a therapist.

¶ 26 However, by the time of the reasonable efforts hearing, the

Department had not scheduled any family time sessions, and father

had not had any contact with the children in approximately a year

and a half. The caseworker’s testimony indicates that, by that

point, she appeared to think that providing therapeutic family time

meant waiting until the children were “therapeutically ready” to

11
have contact with father. Essentially, she believed that the court’s

order was for the Department to wait to schedule any family time

until father wrote accountability letters to the children and the

children and their therapists agreed that the children were ready for

family time.4

¶ 27 Nothing in the record indicates that, prior to the reasonable

efforts hearing, the juvenile court had ordered that father have no

family time until the children’s therapists recommended it, until the

children agreed to it, or until father had written accountability

letters to the children. Nonetheless, at the end of the reasonable

efforts hearing, the juvenile court found that the Department had

been making reasonable efforts to provide family time services in

the eleven months leading up to the hearing. In other words, it

implicitly approved of the Department’s decision, made without a

court order, to withhold therapeutic family time until the children

said they wanted to see father, their therapists recommended that

4 At the reasonable efforts hearing, the caseworker also noted that

father had not completed a mental health evaluation, but she did
not state that father’s failure to do so was preventing the
Department from providing family time or that the Department
believed father needed to complete the mental health evaluation
before family time could begin.

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family time begin, and father wrote accountability letters.5 As a

consequence of these misunderstandings in the eleven months

leading up to the reasonable efforts hearing, not only were the

parties operating under an order that had been entered without the

required timely hearing under section 19-3-217(3), but the

Department was also withholding therapeutic family time sessions

without a court order to do so. Based on those circumstances, we

cannot agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that, in the eleven

months between its order for therapeutic family time and the

reasonable efforts hearing, the Department “made reasonable

efforts in an attempt to try [to] establish family time” for father. See

A.S.L., ¶ 8.

5 By doing so, the court effectively delegated the decision about

when to start family time to the Department, the GAL-CFY, the
children, and the children’s therapists. But whether to suspend
family time or require a parent to complete certain tasks before
family time can begin are not decisions that a juvenile court may
delegate to third parties. People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299,
302 (Colo. App. 2006); see also People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d
1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005) (stating that recommendations as to
family time are subject to the continuing supervision and review of
the juvenile court, which retains ultimate decision-making
responsibility).

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2. Finding that Family Time with Father Would Be Detrimental to
the Children’s Mental Health

¶ 28 At the end of the reasonable efforts hearing, the juvenile court

stated that it was “not going to modify any family time orders” and

that “anything above what the current orders are would be

detrimental to the kids.” At that time, the “current” family time

orders, albeit entered in violation of section 19-3-217(3), required

the Department to provide therapeutic family time, meaning family

time that was supervised by a therapist. However, the court went

on to find that “any additional family time with . . . father would be

detrimental to the kids emotionally.”

¶ 29 At the time of this finding, father had not received any family

time with the children. Thus, while the court stated that it was not

modifying its family time orders, it implicitly modified those orders

by allowing the Department to continue to withhold family time

until the children were deemed ready and father completed certain

requirements. We conclude that the order was based on a clearly

erroneous finding (that family time with father would be detrimental

to the children’s mental health).

14
¶ 30 True, there was some support for the juvenile court’s finding

in the record. The caseworker testified that, at the time of the

reasonable efforts hearing, the two older children did not want to

see father. She also testified that the children were working

through trauma in individual therapy, and consequently, their

therapists did not believe that they were ready for family time with

father. Thus, she opined as an expert in child protection and child

welfare that family time with father was not in the children’s best

interests because it would be detrimental to their mental health.

¶ 31 However, the caseworker specified that her opinion was based

on what the children’s therapists recommended. In other words,

the caseworker’s opinion was based on other professionals’

opinions. And those other professionals — the individual therapists

— did not testify, leaving the record devoid of any details about the

trauma the children were working through in therapy, father’s role

in that trauma, or how contact with father would negatively impact

the children’s therapeutic progress. And the caseworker’s limited

endorsement as an expert in child protection and child welfare was

not sufficient to provide the court with a means of evaluating the

hearsay opinions of the absent experts. See CRE 703; People in

15
Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 11 (a court may not base its

decision on evidence admitted for a limited purpose); People v.

Bornman, 953 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. App. 1997) (“Under CRE 703,

. . . an expert may rely upon statements or reports of other persons,

and he or she may describe those materials. However, such

description is not submitted for the truth of the materials’

assertion; they are offered only to explain the witness’ opinion.”).

¶ 32 Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the

caseworker’s blanket adoption of the therapists’ recommendations,

without further explanation or detail, was sufficient to support the

court’s finding that therapeutic family time with father would have

been detrimental to the children’s mental health. Thus, that finding

was clearly erroneous. See Indian Mountain Corp. v. Indian

Mountain Metro. Dist., 2016 COA 118M, ¶ 31 (a finding is clearly

erroneous if, although it is supported by the record, we are

nonetheless left, after a review of the entire evidence, with the firm

and definite conviction that a mistake has been made). Because

there was no other evidence presented that justified the failure to

provide father with any form of family time for the duration of the

16
case, the juvenile court erred by implicitly ordering the Department

to continue to withhold father’s family time.

3. Reasonable Efforts to Provide Family Time Services

¶ 33 We also disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion made at

the termination hearing that the Department made reasonable

efforts throughout the proceedings to rehabilitate father and reunite

the family. Although the record shows that the Department

provided some referrals and services for father, this evidence was

not sufficient to support the court’s reasonable efforts conclusion

because the Department’s efforts to provide family time were

lacking.

¶ 34 As noted above, family time is a required service, if deemed

appropriate by an individual case plan, for parents of children in

out-of-home placement. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Here, father’s second

treatment plan objective was to “participate in regular visitation

sessions” when “deemed therapeutically appropriate.” But, by the

time of termination, the Department had not facilitated any family

time — therapeutic or otherwise — despite the court’s ongoing order

for family time to occur. Thus, by the time of termination, father

17
had not seen or talked to the children for nearly two and a half

years.

¶ 35 We acknowledge that, throughout the case, the Department

and the GAL-CFY continually opined that family time was not

appropriate because the children did not want to see father and

because their therapists did not believe family time was in their

best interests. Indeed, at the termination hearing, the caseworker

testified that the “paramount reason for not having [family time]”

was because the children had been “very vocal about not wanting to

participate in any family time.”6 She also testified that none of the

children’s therapists recommended family time with father.

6 During the course of this case, it appears that the Department

and the juvenile court gave the children de facto veto power over
whether any family time with father would occur. We are not aware
of any authority that permits children to unilaterally decide if or
when family time is appropriate. While certainly the children’s
desires should be considered, juvenile courts and the professionals
involved with the family are tasked with creating an environment
that facilitates safe and meaningful family time in the least
restrictive manner possible. See D.G., 140 P.3d at 302 (the
Children’s Code requires the juvenile court, itself, to make decisions
regarding family time, and it may not delegate this function to third
parties); People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17; § 19-3-
217(1.5)(d).

18
¶ 36 Nonetheless, even assuming that the children did not want to

attend family time and that their therapists did not recommend it,

the Department had an ongoing obligation to provide appropriate

family time services. See E.D., ¶ 40. The record does not indicate

that the Department met that obligation.

¶ 37 True, the caseworker testified that she made a referral for

therapeutic family time, which remained open throughout the case

so that family time sessions could begin once the children were

ready. She also testified that, throughout the case, she contacted

the children’s therapists to get updates on their therapeutic

progress, asked father’s life skills worker if any additional services

might help father understand the needs of the children, and

discussed the case with father and his legal team. And the juvenile

court credited the caseworker’s testimony in concluding that the

Department made reasonable efforts.

¶ 38 We appreciate that some of the Department’s errors were

driven by the erroneous rulings discussed above. Nonetheless, we

do not agree that the Department’s efforts — making a family time

referral and communicating with the children’s therapists, father’s

providers, and the professional team — were enough to meet its

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obligation under section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Importantly, providing

family time services uniquely impacts the ability of parents and

children to successfully reunify. See § 19-1-103(64.5) (defining

“[f]amily time” as “any form of contact or engagement between

parents . . . and children or youth for the purposes of preserving

and strengthening family ties”); § 19-3-208(2)(a)(IV) (family time

services shall be designed to facilitate the “speedy reunification” of

parents and children). Thus, given the importance of family time,

the Department was required to do more to facilitate it for father.

¶ 39 We recognize that a human services department can still

satisfy its reasonable efforts obligation under section 19-3-

208(2)(b)(IV) “by making available and providing appropriate

therapeutic family time services . . . even if those services don’t

successfully result in face-to-face contact because of continuing

risks to the child[ren]’s . . . health and safety from such contact.”

E.D., ¶ 55. But to do so, the record must show that the department

made ongoing efforts to move toward face-to-face contact; this

necessarily involves an ongoing evaluation of whether the services

being provided are progressing the goal of face-to-face contact, and

20
if not, providing additional services and referrals to improve the

likelihood of such contact.

¶ 40 For example, in E.D., the juvenile court ordered therapeutic

family time after the child attended a supervised family time session

with the mother, which ended early because both the child and the

supervisor felt unsafe in the mother’s presence. See id. at ¶ 15.

Thereafter, the court held review hearings every thirty to sixty days

to monitor the progress of the therapeutic family time. Id. at ¶ 22.

Initially, it ordered that the child and the mother continue to work

with their individual therapists and that those therapists

communicate with each other. Id. at ¶ 21. But in addition to

individual therapy, the human services department also referred

the family to a reintegration specialist who met with the child and

the mother separately. Id. at ¶ 23. When the reintegration

specialist determined that the child was not ready for contact with

the mother, the specialist worked with her individual therapist to

help her write a clarification letter to the child. Id. When that did

not result in the child being ready for contact with the mother, the

department referred her to a different specialist who was tasked

21
with creating a plan for contact between the mother and the child.

Id. at ¶ 25.

¶ 41 Based on those recommendations, the department referred the

mother to Trust Based Relational Intervention training, referred the

child to a different individual therapist, and referred the family to a

second reintegration therapist. Id. at ¶ 26. Although the second

reintegration therapist made progress with the family, the child

experienced a flashback while meeting with the therapist, which led

to a recommendation that the child work through his trauma before

continuing reintegration therapy. Id. at ¶ 27. Thus, although no

face-to-face contact occurred, the juvenile court found, and a

division of this court agreed, that the department made reasonable

efforts to reunify the mother with her child. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 42 By contrast, in this case, within a month of the juvenile

court’s order for therapeutic family time, the Department made

referrals for individual therapy, and the children and father began

seeing their therapists. Around the same time, the Department

made a referral for therapeutic family time. For the following two

years, however, the Department did not provide any additional

family time services or referrals, even though it was clear that

22
nothing was changing in terms of the children’s progress toward

family time. Indeed, at the reasonable efforts hearing, the

caseworker testified that the family time services and referrals

provided by the Department had been the same for nearly a year

even though no meaningful progress occurred. When asked at the

termination hearing about the Department’s efforts to facilitate

family time, the caseworker had nothing new to share; she stated

only that the Department had made a referral for therapeutic family

time and had ensured that the children and father were in

individual therapy.

¶ 43 We reject the Department and the GAL-CFY’s argument that

father’s unwillingness to write accountability letters to the children

or complete a mental health evaluation excused its obligation to

provide family time. True, at the termination hearing, the

caseworker testified that for family time to begin, father was

23
required to write letters showing “some sort of acknowledgement”7

and complete a mental health evaluation. But as noted, the record

does not indicate that the juvenile court ever ordered father to write

accountability letters or complete a mental health evaluation as

prerequisites for therapeutic family time to begin. And neither the

Department nor the GAL-CFY had the authority to unilaterally

implement prerequisites to family time. See People in Interest of

D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 44 Even if we were to assume that, at some unidentified point in

the proceedings, the court implicitly adopted the Department and

GAL-CFY’s recommendation that father be required to write

accountability letters and complete a mental health evaluation

before family time could begin, that implicit order constituted yet

7 Although the caseworker testified that father needed to write

letters to the children to move toward face-to-face contact with the
them, it is unclear from the record whether the Department and
GAL-CFY believed father needed to admit that he had abused or
neglected the children despite the fact that he entered a no-fault
admission and adamantly denied the allegations of abuse or
neglect. At one point, the caseworker testified that he needed to
“take accountability for what had happened” to the children and his
“role in the trauma that the kids have endured.” She also testified
that father needed to acknowledge “the concerns that caused this
case to open where he was part of it.”

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another restriction on father’s family time. Thus, a hearing would

have been required before that restriction could enter. See § 19-3-

217(3).

D. Conclusion

¶ 45 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

erred by (1) failing to hold a hearing as required by section 19-3-

217(3) before increasing the level of family time supervision; (2)

denying father any family time during the course of this case; and

(3) ultimately concluding that the Department made reasonable

efforts to reunify father with the children.

¶ 46 The court’s failure to ensure, and the Department’s failure to

provide, adequate family time services at any time during the two

and a half years prior to termination substantially restricted

father’s statutory right to family time and prevented meaningful

progress toward reunification of father with his children. Thus, the

error was not harmless, and reversal of the termination judgment is

required. See People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 66

(explaining that an error is not harmless if “it can be said with fair

assurance that [the error] substantially influenced the outcome of

the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself”), overruled

25
on other grounds by, People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO

42.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 47 Father also contends that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance at both the adjudicatory and termination phases of the

proceedings. We need not address father’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on his counsel’s performance at the

termination hearing because, as explained above, we reverse the

termination judgment on other grounds. However, we conclude

that father did not have a full and fair opportunity, until this

appeal, to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based

on counsel’s performance at the adjudicatory hearing. And, based

on father’s assertions,8 we conclude that it is appropriate to remand

the case to the juvenile court to hold a hearing to determine

whether father received effective assistance of counsel at the

adjudicatory hearing.

8 In assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the

criminal context, we have the benefit of a motion under Crim. P. 35.
But because we do not have an analogous rule in the dependency
and neglect context, we rely upon counsel’s allegations in the
appellate briefs to assess the claim.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 48 A parent has a statutory right to effective counsel in

dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1),

C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent can raise a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and

neglect proceeding for the first time on appeal. People in Interest of

C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 49 However, in an appeal from a judgment terminating parental

rights, an appellate court may consider a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s performance at the prior

adjudicatory hearing “only when the party asserting the claimed

ineffective assistance did not have a full and fair opportunity to

bring such a claim immediately after his or her child was

adjudicated dependent and neglected (as, for example, by way of a

direct appeal of the adjudication order).” A.R., ¶ 85; see also § 19-

1-109(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (stating that an order adjudicating a child

dependent or neglected is final and appealable upon entry of the

initial dispositional order). Thus, a parent’s assertion of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s performance at the

adjudicatory hearing is untimely if raised following the termination

27
of parental rights if (1) the parent was aware (or reasonably should

have been aware) of the facts giving rise to any claim of ineffective

assistance at the adjudicatory hearing at or shortly after that

hearing; (2) the parent made no effort to file a timely appeal from

the adjudication order; and (3) the record does not disclose any

factual or legal impediments to the parent’s ability to pursue a

timely appeal. See A.R., ¶ 43.

¶ 50 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient

because it fell outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance; and (2) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A.R., ¶¶ 48-

51, 60; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

“If the parent fails to establish either prong of this test, the claim

fails.” People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

¶ 51 Under this approach, we must remand for an evidentiary

hearing if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and

compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel. A.R., ¶ 63. However, if the parent’s

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allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may summarily deny the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 52 As a threshold matter, we conclude that father’s assertion of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s performance

at the adjudicatory hearing is properly before us because he did not

have a full and fair opportunity to bring the claim immediately after

the children were adjudicated dependent or neglected. True, father

did not try to timely appeal the adjudication judgment. But we

cannot say, on the record before us, that he was aware (or

reasonably should have been aware) of the facts giving rise to his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim at or shortly after the

adjudicatory hearing. See A.R., ¶ 43.

¶ 53 Recall that father did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing

when his counsel entered the admission on his behalf. If father had

appeared, then the court could have advised him about the

consequences of the admission and his right to appeal and ensured

that father knew that the children had been adjudicated dependent

or neglected. Or, if counsel had filed an appropriate written

advisement signed by father, then we could conclude that father

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reasonably should have known that his counsel entered an

admission on his behalf and that the children had been adjudicated

dependent or neglected. However, the record confirms that (1) the

court did not advise father about the admission, adjudication, or

right to appeal; and (2) father never signed a written advisement.

¶ 54 Father argues that because he was never advised about the

admission and his counsel did not tell him that an adjudicatory

judgment had been entered, he had no way of knowing that he

needed to file an appeal. To that end, father contends that, up until

termination, he believed “that he was being afforded a treatment

plan and a chance to be reunited with his children without

admitting that the children were dependent and neglected, and

without conceding that he was less than a fully fit parent in any

way.”

¶ 55 We recognize that before the juvenile court accepted the

admission and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected,

father’s counsel stated that he had spoken to father about making

an admission “multiple times” in the months leading up to the

adjudicatory hearing. Counsel also stated, “I do think [father]

understands what he’s entering into, as well as he does understand

30
that the next phase of this case will be the treatment plan that he’s

hoping to work relatively quickly to get his kids back with him.”

But even if we assume that father’s counsel advised him about

entering an admission before the adjudicatory hearing, nothing in

the record indicates that his counsel informed him after the

adjudicatory hearing that the adjudicatory judgment had entered.

And if father did not know that his counsel entered an admission

on his behalf or that the children had been adjudicated dependent

or neglected, then it is unclear how he would have known the facts

giving rise to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim or that he

needed to file a timely appeal of the adjudicatory judgment.

¶ 56 The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts of A.R.

Like in this case, the parent’s counsel in A.R. entered an admission

to the allegations in the petition in the parent’s absence and

without obtaining a signed advisement. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12. However,

on appeal from the judgment terminating her rights, that parent

claimed that she had been unable to timely appeal the adjudication

because the court did not enter a written, appealable order. See id.

at ¶ 44. The supreme court rejected her claim as untimely because

the parent “was aware (or reasonably should have been aware)”

31
shortly after the adjudicatory hearing of the facts underlying her

ineffective assistance of counsel claim but failed to request a final,

written order and never attempted to appeal the adjudication. See

id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Importantly, the parent in A.R. did not claim, as

father does in this case, that her counsel never told her that an

admission and adjudication had been entered in her absence.

¶ 57 Accordingly, because we cannot say that father knew or

reasonably should have known that he needed to appeal the

adjudicatory judgment, we may properly consider his claim of

ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s performance at the

adjudicatory hearing. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 43-44, 85.

¶ 58 Father claims that his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel entered an admission without his knowledge or

permission and then failed to inform him that the adjudication had

entered. He also alleges that he did not want to enter an admission

and that if he had known that counsel was planning to admit the

petition on his behalf, he would have demanded an adjudicatory

hearing because he believed he was a fit parent. He also asserts

that an evidentiary hearing or jury trial would have resulted in

dismissal of the petition because the Department never presented

32
any direct evidence, at any stage of the proceedings, that father had

abused or neglected the children.

¶ 59 Father’s allegations are sufficiently specific and compelling to

constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

But we cannot resolve the claim on appeal because it involves

questions of fact that have not been resolved by the juvenile court

— namely, whether father’s counsel advised him of the

consequences of entering an admission; whether counsel informed

him, after the adjudicatory hearing, that counsel had entered an

admission on his behalf and that the juvenile court had adjudicated

the children dependent or neglected; and whether there was a

reasonable likelihood that he would have prevailed at the

adjudicatory hearing if no admission had been entered on his

behalf. Thus, we must remand the case to the juvenile court to

hold a hearing on whether father received effective assistance of

counsel at the adjudicatory hearing. See id. at ¶ 63.

IV. Disposition

¶ 60 The termination judgment is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings as follows:

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• The court shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether and what type of family time services are

necessary and appropriate for father and the children.

See § 19-3-217(3). Thereafter, the Department shall

make reasonable efforts to provide family time services in

compliance with section 19-3-208(2)(a)(IV), (2)(b)(IV).

• Contemporaneously, the court shall hold an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether father received ineffective

assistance of counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.

• If the court determines that father received ineffective

assistance of counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, then

the court shall vacate the judgment adjudicating the

children dependent or neglected and hold a new

adjudicatory hearing. See § 19-3-505(1), C.R.S. 2025.

Any party may appeal that decision. See § 19-1-

109(2)(c).

• If the juvenile court determines that father received

effective assistance of counsel at the adjudicatory

hearing, then the adjudicatory judgment stands affirmed.

34
Any party may thereafter appeal the order resolving the

ineffective assistance of counsel contention. See id.

• The court and the parties must give priority to holding

both evidentiary hearings on family time and father’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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