Estate of Baker

25CA0057 Estate of Baker 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0057
Jefferson County District Court No. 18PR32
Honorable Todd L. Vriesman, Judge

In re the Estate of Lucille A. Baker, deceased.

George H. Frantz III,

Appellant,

v.

Lisa Blattner, Esq., Successor Personal Representative, Estate of Lucille Baker,

Appellee,

and

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.,

Intervenor-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Solem, Woodward & McKinley, P.C., Peter Harris, Andrew J. Gwirtsman,
Englewood, Colorado, for Appellant

Coan, Payton & Payne, LLC, Scott H. Challinor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
David N. Sutton, Aurora, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellee
¶1 George H. Frantz III, the former personal representative of

Lucille Baker’s estate, appeals the district court’s judgment in favor

of Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.

(Watchtower),1 and against him for breach of fiduciary duty and

fraud during the performance of his duties as personal

representative.2 We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 Baker had no children. When she died in January 2018, her

husband, parents, and siblings were also deceased. Susan Frantz

was Baker’s cousin and lived in Ohio. A few weeks after Baker’s

death, Susan filed an application to appoint her son, George H.

1 The district court’s orders refer to Watchtower as “Watch Tower.”

But the parties’ briefs and the record refer to the organization as
“Watchtower,” which we will also do.
2 We remind Frantz’s counsel that they must comply with the

appellate rules, including C.A.R. 28. The opening brief doesn’t
provide the record location preserving each claim and at times fails
to cite the record when required. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7); O’Quinn v.
Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631-32 (Colo. App. 2010) (we are under no
obligation to search the record, and parties should not “expect the
court to peruse the record without the help of pinpoint citations”
(quoting L.S.F. Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 282 F.3d 972, 975 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2002))). Counsel also failed to provide authority supporting the
purported standard of review as required by C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A).

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Frantz III, as the estate’s personal representative.3 The Frantzes

drove from Ohio to Colorado to tend to Baker’s affairs.

¶3 A few years before her death, Baker had shown her friend,

June Justice, whom she had met through church and had known

for years, the location of a steel box in her home, which was hidden

in a workshop closet and contained Baker’s will and other

important papers. Baker also gave Justice a key to her residence.

Shortly after Baker’s death, Justice and Brian West, an elder in

Baker’s congregation, used the key to enter Baker’s home.4 They

found the steel box, but it was locked and they couldn’t find the

key. The next day, West used a drill to open the box. The box

contained Baker’s will, important documents, and about $25,000 in

cash. Justice and West didn’t inventory the box’s contents, but

Justice made copies of the will and returned the original to West.

3 Because the Frantzes share the same surname, we will refer to

George H. Frantz III as “Frantz” and to his mother as “Susan” to
avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect by the informality.
4 Justice and West had known Baker for decades and were

members of the same church congregation. West served as a
church elder and, as detailed below, as Frantz’s point of contact for
some of the communications he had with Watchtower.

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¶4 The will was executed on August 8, 1975. The will’s named

devisees (Baker’s husband and her parents) and Baker’s nominees

for personal representatives had all died. Watchtower was the only

remaining beneficiary. West sent Watchtower a copy of the will.

¶5 The court appointed Frantz as the estate’s personal

representative. Frantz called Laura Frazier, a legal secretary for

Watchtower, in February 2018 to inform Watchtower of his

appointment and to discuss Baker’s estate. The conversation was

memorialized in a letter that Watchtower’s general counsel sent

Frantz on February 23, 2018, which confirmed that Watchtower

was a beneficiary of and had received a copy of the will.5 The letter

also asked Frantz for the estate’s accounting and inventory and

provided Frantz with Watchtower’s tax information. The letter was

addressed to Frantz’s home, but he testified that he didn’t receive it.

Frantz didn’t send Watchtower the estate’s accounting or inventory.

¶6 Frantz began administering the estate as if Baker had died

intestate. He filed a notice in a local newspaper to put estate

creditors on notice and listed Baker’s home for sale. He informed

5 During his testimony, Frantz denied discussing the will.

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Watchtower of the sale. After he sold Baker’s home and liquidated

her estate, Frantz distributed the proceeds to Baker’s intestate

heirs — Susan and James Tipton (another of Baker’s cousins).

Frantz also retained some funds as compensation for estate

administration.6 He did not distribute any proceeds to Watchtower.

¶7 On March 25, 2019, Frantz filed a “Statement of Personal

Representative Closing Administration,” verifying that he had

distributed the estate’s assets to those entitled to receive

distributions (Susan and Tipton) in the appropriate amounts. The

statement didn’t mention Watchtower.

¶8 Between September 2018 and May 2019, Watchtower sent

Frantz at least four letters asking about the estate’s probate status.

Watchtower never received a response. Frantz testified that he

never received any of these letters even though they were all

addressed to his home. Watchtower also called Frantz multiple

times and left messages, but Frantz denied receiving any phone

calls.

6 The accounting prepared during litigation showed that Susan

received $770,619.75 and Tipton received $263,282.96 from the
estate’s proceeds. Frantz paid himself $26,282.96 in compensation.

4
¶9 In April 2020, Watchtower conducted its own investigation and

realized that Baker’s house had been sold in April 2018.

Watchtower sent another letter to Frantz on April 14, 2020,

requesting a copy of the closing statement for the sale of Baker’s

residence and an estate accounting.

¶ 10 After years of no response from Frantz, Watchtower contacted

the probate court and received the case file for the estate on April 7,

2022. Watchtower discovered that Frantz had not complied with

Baker’s will and had instead administered the estate as if Baker

had died intestate. In August 2022, Watchtower filed a motion to

intervene and reopen the estate. Frantz didn’t respond. The court

granted the motion to intervene but didn’t enter any findings

regarding the validity of the will or whether the estate should be

reopened for redistribution.

¶ 11 On January 24, 2023, Watchtower moved to appoint a

successor personal representative and to probate the will. Frantz

didn’t respond, and the court granted the motion, appointing the

current successor personal representative in March 2023.

¶ 12 In September 2023, the successor personal representative filed

the underlying petition and asserted claims against Frantz for

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(1) breach of fiduciary duty under the Colorado Probate Code;

(2) conversion; (3) civil theft; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) fraud (false

representation); (6) fraud (nondisclosure or concealment); (7) fraud

(nondisclosure – duty to disclose); and (8) fraudulent transfer.

Frantz moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim and

for being untimely. The district court denied the motion to dismiss

after concluding that the claims were alleged with sufficient

particularity and that the applicable statute of limitations was five

years under section 15-10-106, C.R.S. 2025. After a one-day

evidentiary hearing on the petition, the court dismissed the claims

for conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, fraud (false

representation), and fraudulent transfer. The court entered

judgment in Watchtower’s favor on the remaining two fraud claims

and the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Frantz appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 13 Frantz contends that the district court erred by finding that

(1) West and Frazier were not Watchtower’s agents; (2) Watchtower

wasn’t on notice that Baker’s estate was being administered

contrary to her will until Watchtower received the probate court’s

case file on or about April 7, 2022; and (3) Frantz breached his

6
fiduciary duty. We address and reject each of these contentions in

turn.

A. Agency

¶ 14 Frantz first argues that the district court erroneously found

that there was no agency connection between individual church

members that would bind Watchtower or otherwise impair its legal

rights. In support, Frantz asserts that West was Watchtower’s

agent based on the following: West sent Watchtower a copy of the

will, he was a church elder, and he put Frantz in contact with

Watchtower. Similarly, he contends that Frazier was an agent

because she worked for Watchtower, communicated with Frantz

about the estate, and tracked whether Watchtower had received

estate proceeds. Frantz contends that, because they were agents

and were aware in February 2018 that Frantz was administering

Baker’s estate, Watchtower was also aware, and any claims against

Frantz started accruing at that time. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 15 The question of agency is, when the facts are disputed, a

question of fact, Villalpando v. Denv. Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d

357, 363 (Colo. App. 2007); we will only set aside the court’s finding

on that question if it is clearly erroneous, Citywide Banks v. Armijo,

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313 P.3d 647, 651 (Colo. App. 2011). A factual finding is clearly

erroneous only if there is no support for the finding in the record.

Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12. We will not

“reweigh [the] evidence” or substitute our own judgment for that of

the district court. In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22

(citation omitted).

¶ 16 An agent is generally one who acts for, or in place of, another

or who is entrusted with the business of another, and an agency

relationship carries legal consequences. Armijo, 313 P.3d at 651.

“An agent can make his principal responsible for his actions if he is

acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority.” First

Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d

166, 177 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260,

1264 (Colo. 1994)). An agent acts with actual authority when “the

agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s

manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so

to act.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 21

(citation omitted).

¶ 17 Ample evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that

West and Frazier were not agents because neither participated in

8
Watchtower’s financial, business, or legal matters. Similarly,

although Frantz points to evidence that West and Frazier were

aware that he was selling Baker’s residence and disposing of her

assets, he fails to demonstrate how that awareness established

either actual or apparent authority. Mere status as an elder or

secretary of Watchtower, standing alone, doesn’t confer authority to

bind Watchtower in any capacity. We therefore perceive no error

with the court’s finding that West and Frazier weren’t agents.

¶ 18 Even if West and Frazier had been Watchtower’s agents,

however, any error would have been harmless because there is no

evidence supporting Frantz’s argument that the statute of

limitations for Watchtower’s claims began running in February

2018. As discussed below, nothing would have put West and

Frazier or Watchtower on notice that Frantz was administering the

estate as if Baker had died intestate.

B. Statute of Limitations

¶ 19 Frantz next argues that the district court incorrectly

determined that the claims accrued on April 7, 2022, for purposes

of applying the statute of limitations. We disagree.

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1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 Because the accrual date is factually disputed, we review the

district court’s order for clear error. See Jackson v. Am. Fam. Mut.

Ins. Co., 258 P.3d 328, 332 (Colo. App. 2011) (when the material

facts are disputed, the question of when a claim accrued is one of

fact).

¶ 21 Section 15-10-106 states that

[w]henever fraud has been perpetrated in
connection with any proceeding or in any
statement filed under this code or if fraud is
used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or
purposes of this code, any person injured
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against
the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from
any person (other than a bona fide purchaser)
benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or
not. Any proceeding must be commenced
within five years after the discovery of the
fraud.

“Integral to any statute of limitations is the time of accrual: the time

when the proverbial clock starts ticking and the statute of

limitations begins to run.” City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 2024 CO 5, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). A cause of action for

fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit accrues on the

date that the fraud “is discovered or should have been discovered by

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the exercise of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(3), C.R.S. 2025.

Likewise, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty accrues

when the plaintiff has knowledge of facts that would put a

reasonable person on notice that the defendant engaged in wrongful

conduct causing some damages. Prospect Dev. Co. v. Holland &

Knight, LLP, 2018 COA 107, ¶ 26; see also § 13-80-108(8) (The

cause of action accrues “when the injury, loss, damage, or conduct

giving rise to the cause of action is discovered or should have been

discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”).

¶ 22 To establish a claim for fraud by nondisclosure, a plaintiff

must prove that (1) the concealment of a material existing fact that

in equity and good conscience the defendant should have disclosed;

(2) knowledge on the defendant’s part that such a fact was being

concealed; (3) ignorance of that fact on the plaintiff’s part; (4) the

intention that the concealment be acted upon; and (5) action on the

concealment resulting in damages. Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v.

Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, 2018 CO 54, ¶ 56. To establish a

claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the

defendant was acting as a fiduciary of the plaintiff; (2) the

defendant breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) the

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plaintiff incurred damages; and (4) the defendant’s breach of

fiduciary duty was a cause of the damages. In re Estate of Chavez,

2022 COA 89M, ¶ 36.

¶ 23 Watchtower’s fraud claims could not have accrued until

Watchtower knew, or should have known, that Frantz concealed or

failed to disclose a material fact. Likewise, Watchtower’s breach of

fiduciary duty claims could not have accrued until Watchtower had,

or should have had, knowledge that Frantz breached his personal

representative duty.

2. Analysis

¶ 24 The record supports the court’s conclusion that Watchtower

didn’t have notice — and couldn’t have reasonably discovered — the

alleged fraud or breach of fiduciary duty until April 7, 2022, when it

received the case file from the probate court. Before then, there was

no indication to Watchtower, West, or Frazier that Frantz was

administering the estate contrary to Baker’s will. Instead, they

reasonably relied on Frantz’s repeated representations that he was

administering the estate and that distribution of the estate’s assets

would be forthcoming, as required by the will.

12
¶ 25 The record further reflects that Frantz’s conduct, at least

outwardly, was consistent with proper estate administration.

Frantz acted as the personal representative, sold Baker’s residence,

and informed Watchtower that he planned to distribute the

proceeds of the sale to Watchtower. Watchtower later confirmed

this discussion. Although Watchtower became aware around April

2020 that Baker’s house had been sold,7 based on the record,

Watchtower had no reason to believe that it wouldn’t receive the

proceeds from the sale. Further, nothing in the record indicated

that Watchtower knew or was told that Frantz didn’t open the will

for probate, that he failed to identify Watchtower as a beneficiary in

court filings, or that he had administratively closed the estate after

disbursing the sale proceeds to Susan and Tipton.

¶ 26 Likewise, Frantz didn’t serve Watchtower with the information

of appointment, didn’t provide a copy of the home’s closing

statement or accounting from the home sale, and testified that he

never informed Watchtower that he was administering the estate as

7 Even assuming the accrual date was April 2020, when

Watchtower learned the house had been sold, the claims are timely
because they fall within the five-year statute of limitations.

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intestate. On this record, there were no circumstances that would

have placed Watchtower on notice that Frantz breached a fiduciary

duty or engaged in fraud until Watchtower received the estate’s

court file on April 7, 2022. Accordingly, the district court did not

err by concluding that the accrual date was April 7, 2022.

¶ 27 To the extent Frantz’s testimony conflicted with the district

court’s findings, the court found that his testimony wasn’t credible.

We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and factual

findings. Owens, ¶ 22 (we may not reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment for the trial court’s). Given the absence of

notice and Watchtower’s reasonable reliance on Frantz’s

representations, we discern no clear error with the court’s

determination that the claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty

accrued on April 7, 2022.

C. Other Issues

¶ 28 Frantz also contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to

support a fraud finding, and (2) the district court erroneously held

him to a professional standard of care by concluding that he

breached his fiduciary duty. However, these arguments are

presented in a conclusory manner and are unsupported by citation

14
to relevant legal authority. We won’t consider them further because

we do not consider undeveloped arguments on appeal. See Am.

Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2015 COA 135,

¶ 42.

D. Attorney Fees

¶ 29 Although Frantz requests an award of attorney fees on appeal,

we decline to award any for his failure to comply with C.A.R. 39.1,

which requires parties claiming attorney fees to “explain the legal

and factual basis” for such an award. See also Sos v. Roaring Fork

Transp. Auth., 2017 COA 142, ¶ 59 (declining to consider an

“undeveloped request” for attorney fees when the requesting party

failed to state any legal or factual basis for an award). Also, Frantz

didn’t prevail on appeal.

¶ 30 The Estate and Watchtower also request an award of attorney

fees and costs on appeal. “When a party is awarded attorney fees

for a prior stage of the proceedings, it may recover reasonable

attorney fees and costs for successfully defending the appeal.”

Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 75 (quoting

Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 390 (Colo. App. 2006)).

The Estate and Watchtower sought attorney fees for their successful

15
defense of the action in the district court, and the court granted

their request.8 In requesting fees on appeal, the Estate and

Watchtower argue that Frantz’s appeal is frivolous. We disagree;

Frantz raised a genuine issue regarding the accrual date.

¶ 31 Because the Estate and Watchtower successfully defended the

district court’s judgment on appeal, were awarded attorney fees by

the district court, and cited a legal and factual basis supporting the

award under C.A.R. 39.1, we grant their request. We remand the

case to the district court to determine and award the amount of

reasonable attorney fees and costs that the Estate and Watchtower

incurred on appeal.

8 Though not included as part of the record, we take judicial notice

of the district court’s “Order re Attorney Fees and Costs by
WatchTower” and “Order: Granting Motion for Personal
Representative’s Fees and Costs,” issued on May 21, 2025, which
finalized the specific amount of attorney fees and costs payable to
the Estate and Watchtower. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016
COA 43, ¶ 64 (appellate courts can take judicial notice of the
contents of court records in a related proceeding whether requested
to do so or not).

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III. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed. We remand the case to the district

court to determine appropriate appellate attorney fees for the Estate

and Watchtower.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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