Marriage of Strickland

24CA1908 Marriage of Strickland 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1908
La Plata County District Court No. 17DR30040
Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Bryson Tylor Strickland,

Appellee,

and

Lacy Joe Strickland,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD*
Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

The Law Firm of Lisa Ward, LLC, Lisa Ward, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Bryson Tylor Strickland, who we shall call “father,” filed a

motion to restrict the parenting time of Lacy Joe Strickland, whom

we shall call “mother.” In granting the motion, the trial court

ordered that the children of mother and father would change their

primary residence from mother’s home to father’s home. Mother

appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Since their divorce in 2018, mother and father have shared

custody of their two children. Under their separation agreement,

the children lived primarily with mother in Colorado, where they

attended school. Father, who lived in Texas, had monthly parenting

time plus more time with the children during the summer and

holidays.

¶3 In July 2024, father filed an emergency motion to restrict

mother’s parenting time. He alleged there was domestic violence in

mother’s home endangering the children. After a hearing, the trial

court found, in an August 2024 order, that mother had been the

victim of domestic violence involving her fiance; that it was

concerning mother was unable to acknowledge she had been the

victim of violence; and that video evidence presented during the

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hearing disturbingly showed the intensity of the violence and the

children’s reactions to witnessing it.

¶4 These findings led the court to decide the children were at risk

of emotional, physical, and psychological harm in mother’s

residence and that their well-being was endangered when mother

had unrestricted parenting time with them. The court entered a

written order restricting mother’s parenting time, ordering that the

children were to remain in Texas with father, and requiring the

children to begin school there.

¶5 Mother filed a C.R.C.P. 59 motion and a motion to remove the

restrictions the court had imposed when granting father’s

emergency motion. The court denied both motions.

II. The Court’s Findings

¶6 Mother contends the court did not consider the children’s best

interests, the harm a change of residence might cause them, or the

least detrimental alternative between allowing the children to

remain in mother’s home while prohibiting the fiance from having

any contact with them and transferring their primary residence to

father’s home. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Legal Standards

¶7 A court “may make or modify an order granting or denying

parenting time rights whenever such order or modification would

serve the best interests of the child.” § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2025. The best interest of the child “is the controlling factor for a

trial court when entering any order relating to parenting time.” In

re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010). A court

has “broad discretion when modifying an existing parenting time

order, taking into consideration the child’s best interests.” Id.

While “some detriment to a child is present in every child placement

decision, a court’s task is to make the placement choice ‘least

detrimental’ to the child.” In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 78

(Colo. App. 2002)(citation omitted). This analysis is “subsumed

within the concept of best interests of the child” standard. Id.

¶8 We review an order modifying parenting time for an abuse of

discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion if “its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; is based on an

erroneous understanding or application of the law; or misconstrues

or misapplies the law.” In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4,

¶ 9.

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B. Additional Facts

¶9 During the hearing on father’s motion, the court heard

testimony from witnesses relating to the alleged domestic violence

that mother’s fiance had inflicted on her. The fiance’s daughter, a

minor child, testified she took videos of mother and the fiance

fighting and of mother’s children fighting. She also said the fiance

had forced her to drink alcoholic beverages. After this testimony,

the court watched the videos. (We note that the video of mother

and the fiance fighting is very dark, and one cannot clearly see what

anyone is doing. But one can hear screams and yelling.)

¶ 10 The daughter’s mother testified she checked her daughter’s

phone after the daughter had returned from parenting time with the

fiance, discovering disturbing and demeaning messages the fiance

had sent to the daughter. She added that her daughter was not

doing well emotionally since returning from seeing the fiance and

that her daughter would frequently call her distraught from being

with him.

¶ 11 A caseworker with the La Plata Department of Human Services

testified about her investigation and eventual determination that

the presence of the alleged domestic violence in mother’s home was

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a safety concern for the children. The caseworker added she knew

of twenty reports over a four-year period relating to alleged domestic

violence in mother’s home. Mother objected to these reports being

admitted into evidence at the hearing, stating they were

inadmissible because they contained hearsay and because they

were irrelevant. The court admitted the reports into evidence.

¶ 12 Mother testified. She characterized the incident depicted in

the video recorded by the fiance’s daughter as a “communication

issue.” She said a 2022 investigation into an incident in which the

fiance allegedly assaulted her was a “misunderstanding,” and she

claimed he had not assaulted her.

¶ 13 Father testified. He was concerned “something irreversible”

would happen to the children during mother’s parenting time. He

said the children were more withdrawn after they returned from

parenting time at mother’s home when the incident shown in the

video took place.

¶ 14 In its written order restricting mother’s parenting time, the

court stated that section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) allows courts to modify

parenting time rights whenever such a modification would “serve

the best interests of the child.” It then found “the children’s

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emotional, physical, and psychological wellbeing is endangered due

to unrestricted parenting time with [m]other,” and “[m]other’s denial

of the presence of domestic violence in the home, as well as the

children’s repeated exposure to the domestic violence, puts the

children at risk of emotional, physical, and psychological harm.” It

also found mother “failed to protect the children from this harm,”

and she posed an “emotional and psychological safety risk to the

children.” Finally, it found there was “credible testimony [mother’s]

prior partner had both engaged in domestic violence and excessive

discipline of the children.”

¶ 15 In an oral ruling from the bench, the court found, due to the

children being endangered in mother’s home, it would restrict her

parenting time until the threatening conditions no longer existed or

until the court adopted a different parenting time plan that was in

the children’s best interests.

C. Analysis

¶ 16 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the court, when

entering its order, considered the children’s best interests, the harm

that a change of residence might cause them, and the least

detrimental alternative between allowing the children to remain in

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mother’s home while prohibiting her fiance from having any contact

with them and transferring their primary residence to father’s

home. We further conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion when entering its order because its decision (1) was not

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; (2) was not based on an

erroneous understanding or application of the law; and (3) did not

misconstrue or misapply the law. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.

¶ 17 First, in its written order, the court stated the best-interests-

of-the-child standard governed its analysis of whether a restriction

of mother’s parenting time was appropriate and proper.

¶ 18 Second, the court’s oral and written orders prioritized the

children’s best interests.

¶ 19 Third, the court found that, “when [it] consider[ed] what [was]

in the children’s best interest after it ma[de] the endangerment

analysis, it could not “put these children back in [mother’s] home”

and that it “ha[d] limited options available to it and [it thought the

restriction was] what’s in the best interest of the children.”

¶ 20 Fourth, contrary to mother’s assertion, the court considered

mother’s proposed least detrimental alternative of prohibiting

contact between mother’s fiance and the children. The record

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shows the court considered this alternative insufficient to protect

the children because the court was concerned mother had

demonstrated a “willingness to lie to protect her relationship with

[the fiance]” to the point that the court could not take her word “at

face value.”

¶ 21 Fifth, the “least detrimental alternative” analysis is “subsumed

within the concept” of the analysis of what arrangement is in the

best interests of the child. See Martin, 42 P.3d at 78. So, even if

the court had not expressly addressed the inadequacy of mother’s

proposed least detrimental alternative, it implicitly addressed that

alternative by deciding that the best interests of the children

required a transfer of their primary residence to father.

¶ 22 Sixth, the court considered the potential harm of changing the

children’s primary residence. The court said, “I absolutely

understand how disruptive this is moving the children from one

state to the next. The court’s hands are a little tied because of the

geographic distance.”

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III. Endangerment Finding

¶ 23 Mother asserts the court erred by restricting her parenting

time and changing the children’s primary residence without finding

that she had endangered them. We disagree.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

¶ 24 A court “shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights

unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child’s

physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional

development.” § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). In addition to such a finding, a

court “shall enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the

restriction.” Id. Finally, a court must determine that the restriction

would serve the best interests of the child. See § 14-10-129(2.5)(a).

B. Analysis

¶ 25 Contrary to mother’s assertion, the court found that living

with mother endangered the children. In its written order, the court

found that mother had not protected the children from the harm

resulting from witnessing the fiance subject mother to domestic

violence; that mother posed an “emotional and psychological safety

risk to the children”; and that, in part due to her denying that the

domestic violence had occurred, it was “difficult to ascertain when,

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or if, the children would be safe in her care.” In its oral ruling, the

court also specified that it found “that there was sufficient evidence

to remove the children due to emotional, mental, and physical

endangerment to them in [mother and the fiance’s] home.”

¶ 26 The court also laid out the specific factual underpinnings of its

order, including the video, the testimony about the children’s

emotional well-being, and its “great concern regarding the impact

[of the presence of domestic violence] on the children’s

development.”

¶ 27 In her C.R.C.P. 59 motion, mother asked for relief because her

fiance’s daughter supposedly admitted her testimony had been

false. But, in its ruling on the motion, the court stated that this

putative admission would not have made a difference in its ruling.

Based on the other evidence upon which the court relied, we see no

reason to question this ruling.

¶ 28 Mother last asserts the court’s finding of endangerment was

undermined by its willingness to allow the children to stay with

mother during her parenting time without supervision as long as

her fiance remained out of the house. But the court’s order was

also based on concerns about the harm mother’s conduct had

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caused the children and about mother’s credibility. As we noted

above, the court found (1) unrestricted parenting time with mother

endangered the children’s “emotional, physical, and psychological

wellbeing”; (2) mother’s denial of domestic violence in the home

along with the children’s repeated exposure to it “put[] the children

at risk of emotional, physical, and psychological harm”; (3) mother

failed to protect the children from this risk, so she also posed a

safety risk to the children; (4) it was hard for the court “to ascertain

when, or if, the children would be safe in [mother’s] care”; and

(5) mother was willing “to lie to protect her relationship with [the

fiance],” so the court could not take her word “at face value.”

¶ 29 Relatedly, it is important to keep in mind what the court’s

order was and what it was not.

¶ 30 The order addressed an emergency motion, and it imposed a

temporary remedy. The order did not address a motion to modify

parenting time on a more long-term basis, which would ask the

court to adjudicate whether the children should relocate to Texas to

live with father. The court anticipated father would file such a

motion, which he did September 2024. That motion is pending.

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IV. Evidentiary Claims

¶ 31 Mother submits the court erred because it admitted hearsay

and irrelevant evidence and because it relied on evidence outside

the record. We disagree.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

¶ 32 Evidence is relevant, and presumptively admissible, if it has

“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401;

accord Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 3.

¶ 33 Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Hearsay statements

are generally inadmissible except as provided in CRE 803. People v.

Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 25. One such exception, the business

records exception, renders hearsay evidence admissible when the

evidence was “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to

make [the record].” CRE 803(6).

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¶ 34 To satisfy the business records exception, the proponent of the

evidence must establish five things. First, the document must have

been made at or near the time of the matters recorded in it. People

v. Flores-Lozano, 2016 COA 149, ¶ 13. Second, the record must

have been prepared by, or from information transmitted by, a

person with knowledge of the matters recorded. Id. Third, the

person who recorded the document must have done so as part of a

regularly conducted business activity. Id. Fourth, it must have

been the regular practice of that business activity to make such

documents. Id. Finally, the document must have been created and

kept during a regularly conducted business activity. Id.

¶ 35 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Russell, 2014 COA 21M, ¶ 22, aff’d, 2017 CO

3. We have described what amounts to an abuse of discretion

previously in this opinion. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.

¶ 36 A trial court’s decision about “whether a statement constitutes

hearsay is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo.” People v.

Hamilton, 2019 COA 101, ¶ 12.

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B. Analysis

¶ 37 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the court did not

improperly admit hearsay or irrelevant evidence and that it did not

improperly rely on evidence outside of the record. As a result, the

court did not abuse its discretion when it made the evidentiary

rulings mother contests. See Marriage of Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.

¶ 38 Mother submits that the court improperly admitted the reports

from the La Plata Department of Human Services because they were

irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

¶ 39 The reports were highly relevant to a material issue: whether

the historical presence of domestic violence in mother’s home

endangered the children. See CRE 401; Rojas, ¶ 3. Mother

contends that some of the reports concerned people who are no

longer present in her life. But the reports were still relevant for the

court to understand the historical pattern of domestic violence in

mother’s relationships and its effect on the children. The reports

helped the court to decide whether mother’s parenting time

endangered the children and what would be in their best interests.

As such, the reports were relevant and presumptively admissible.

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¶ 40 Next, the reports were not inadmissible hearsay. The court

properly concluded that they were admissible under the business

records exception to the hearsay rule. It found that the reports

were generated in the regular course of the Department of Human

Service’s business and that the caseworker’s testimony satisfied the

other four elements of the business records exception. And mother

does not develop any other hearsay arguments in her opening brief.

¶ 41 Last, the court did not improperly rely on information that had

not been introduced into evidence. Rather, it relied on its

experience to make an individualized determination that the

children’s physical, emotional, and psychological health was

endangered by unrestricted parenting time with mother. Although

mother contends the court’s recitation of harm to children from

witnessing domestic violence was not based on the evidence in the

record, the record contains evidence that the children were harmed

while living with mother. For example, father testified the children

were more withdrawn after the domestic violence incident depicted

on the video. For another example, our review of the video indicates

the children were exposed to a traumatizing event.

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V. Father’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 42 Father asks us to award him appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025; C.A.R. 38(b); and C.A.R. 39.1

because, he submits, mother’s appeal lacked substantial

justification and was frivolous. We deny this request. See Mission

Denv. Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984)(“Standards for

determining whether an appeal is frivolous should be directed

toward penalizing egregious conduct without deterring a lawyer

from vigorously asserting his client’s rights.”); Glover v. Serratoga

Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that attorney fees awards for

frivolous appeals should be reserved for “clear and unequivocal”

cases involving “egregious conduct” (citation omitted)). While we

are affirming the trial court’s order, it was not “so plainly correct

and the legal authority so clearly against [mother’s] position that

there [was] really no appealable issue.” Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d

857, 862 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 43 But, because we affirm the order, father is entitled to his

appellate costs under C.A.R. 39(a)(2), which states, “[I]f a judgment

is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant.” Father may

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pursue those costs in the trial court by following the procedure

described in C.A.R. 39(c)(2).

¶ 44 The trial court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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