Peo v. Siegel

24CA1568 Peo v Siegel 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1568
El Paso County District Court No. 02CR1938
Honorable Marcus S. Henson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Steven Tod Siegel,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Richard Bednarski, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Steven Tod Siegel appeals the district court’s order denying his

petition to discontinue sex offender registration and for his removal

from the sex offender registry pursuant to section 16-22-113,

C.R.S. 2025. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2001, Siegel began electronically communicating with an

undercover detective who posed as an individual able to facilitate

adults’ sexual fantasies with children. The detective coordinated

with Siegel to meet underage girls in exchange for payment and

arranged a meet-up at a hotel in Colorado Springs. Siegel arrived at

the specified hotel one evening and confirmed his identity with the

undercover detective. The detective then arrested him, searched his

car, and found a video camera, condoms, and a sex toy. Siegel was

initially charged with three crimes: soliciting for child prostitution,

criminal attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a child, and

criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a child.

¶3 Siegel pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit sexual

exploitation of a child and to an added count of sexual exploitation

of a child (possession of sexually exploitative material) in exchange

for dismissal of the remaining charges. The district court sentenced

1
Siegel to ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision

probation, which required that he complete sex offender treatment.

The district court register of actions also reflects a note that Siegel

was required to “register as [a] sex offender for 10 yrs after

prob[ation].”

¶4 Siegel successfully completed his probationary term in 2014

and registered as a sex offender for ten years thereafter. In 2024,

he filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration with the

district court, arguing that he had completed his ten-year

registration term. After a hearing, the district court denied Siegel’s

petition, reasoning that, under section 16-22-113(3)(c), Siegel’s two

convictions rendered him ineligible for deregistration.

¶5 Siegel appeals. First, he argues that section 16-22-113(3)(c) is

intended for “habitual abusers” and not for offenders whose

convictions arise from a single offense. Second, Siegel contends

that the district court erred by concluding that he doesn’t qualify

for the statutory exception offered in section 18-6-403(5.7), C.R.S.

2025, as an alternative avenue for deregistration. Third, Siegel

argues that even if the statutes preclude deregistration, he is

entitled to deregister from the sex offender registry because the

2
sentencing court advised him that he would be eligible to deregister

ten years after his successful termination from probation, which

was material to his plea bargain. We address each argument in

turn.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 We review a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.

People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 17. In construing a statute, we aim

to give effect to the legislative intent. Id. To discern intent, we look

first to the plain language of the statute and give “its words and

phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Weeks, 2021

CO 75, ¶ 25 (quoting McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10). We

must construe a statute “as a whole” with an eye toward “giving

consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts” while

avoiding “constructions that would render any words or phrases

superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” McCoy v. People,

2019 CO 44, ¶ 38.

¶7 When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we

give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning “and look no further.”

Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12.

3
III. Applicable Law

¶8 Sex offenders in Colorado are required to register as such

pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA).

§ 16-22-103, C.R.S. 2025. A person who is required to register may

petition the court to discontinue registration under certain

circumstances. § 16-22-113. However, section 16-22-113(3)(c)

states in relevant part that “[a]ny adult who has more than one

conviction as an adult for unlawful sexual behavior or any other

offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual

behavior,” is not eligible to petition for deregistration.

¶9 Section 18-6-403(5.7) provides an exception to this

ineligibility: An “adult who has more than one conviction” for sexual

exploitation of a child (accessing, viewing, possessing, or controlling

sexually exploitative material) “in a single criminal case is eligible to

petition for removal from the registry pursuant to section

16-22-113.” See § 16-22-113(3)(c); § 18-6-403(3)(b.5), (5.7).

¶ 10 A division of this court interpreted the deregistration eligibility

criteria in People v. Atencio, 219 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2009). In

Atencio, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempt to

commit sexual assault on a child with each count naming a

4
separate victim. Id. at 1081. Upon completing his probationary

sentence, the defendant petitioned the court to discontinue his

statutorily required sex offender registration. Id. The People

opposed the petition, arguing that he was ineligible under section

16-22-113 because he had been convicted of two counts of unlawful

sexual behavior. Id. The defendant argued that because he

pleaded guilty to two counts in the same case, section

16-22-113(3)(c) was inapplicable to him. Id. The division disagreed

and concluded that a person who is convicted of more than one

charge of unlawful sexual behavior is ineligible for deregistration

under section 16-22-113, regardless of whether the convictions

occurred in the same case or in separate cases. Id.

IV. Section 16-22-113(3)(c) Ineligibility

¶ 11 Siegel first argues that the ineligibility criteria in section

16-22-113(3)(c) don’t apply to individuals whose multiple

convictions (1) arise out of the same criminal act and (2) don’t

involve multiple victims. For this reason, he also argues that the

district court erred by relying on Atencio to conclude that he is

ineligible for deregistration because that case involved multiple

victims, whereas his case doesn’t. We are unpersuaded.

5
¶ 12 The term “conviction” may vary in meaning depending on the

language and context of the statute. Atencio, 219 P.3d at 1082;

People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Colo. 1994). For

purposes of CSORA, a “conviction” means “having received a verdict

of guilty” or “having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.”

§ 16-22-102(3), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 13 Siegel pleaded guilty to two charges: criminal attempt to

commit sexual exploitation of a child and sexual exploitation of a

child (possession of sexually exploitative material). Under the plain

language of the statute, Siegel has more than one “conviction” and

is therefore ineligible for deregistration.1 Siegel’s argument that

ineligibility doesn’t apply to individuals who are not “habitual

abusers” (i.e., individuals whose convictions arise from a single

offense and don’t involve multiple victims) requires us to read words

into the statute, which we can’t do. See People v. Shores, 2016 COA

129, ¶ 17 (We cannot “read into a statute an exception, limitation,

or qualifier that its plain language does not suggest, warrant, or

1 Siegel does not dispute that his convictions are for “unlawful

sexual behavior” or “any other offense, the underlying factual basis
of which is unlawful sexual behavior” as those terms are used in
section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

6
mandate.” (quoting People v. Sorrendino, 37 P.3d 501, 504 (Colo.

App. 2001))).

¶ 14 Furthermore, the Atencio division’s holding wasn’t premised on

the fact that the convictions involved separate victims. Rather, it

was based solely on the statutory definition of “conviction” and the

lack of any statutory language requiring that the convictions occur

in separate cases. Atencio, 219 P.3d at 1082-83.

¶ 15 For these reasons, the district court didn’t err in interpreting

section 16-22-113(3)(c) or by relying on Atencio to rule that Siegel is

ineligible for deregistration.

V. Section 18-6-403(5.7) Exception to Ineligibility

¶ 16 Siegel next contends that the district court erred by

concluding that he isn’t eligible to deregister under the statutory

exception to ineligibility in section 18-6-403(5.7). We again

disagree.

¶ 17 By its plain language, the exception in section 18-6-403(5.7)

applies only to individuals who have more than one conviction for

sexual exploitation of a child relating to accessing, viewing,

possessing, or controlling sexually exploitative material.

§ 18-6-403(3)(b.5), (5.7). While Siegel has one conviction that fits

7
this exception, his second conviction (criminal attempt to commit

sexual exploitation of a child) doesn’t qualify. Thus, the district

court didn’t err by concluding that the exception doesn’t apply to

Siegel.

VI. The Sentencing Court’s Advisement

¶ 18 Siegel’s last contention is that he is entitled to deregister

because the sentencing court advised him that he would be eligible

to petition for deregistration ten years after termination from

probation, and the ability to deregister was material to his

agreement to plead guilty.

¶ 19 The sentencing court included the following language in the

minute order entered on September 30, 2002: “AFTER 10 YRS

DEFT MAY PETITION COURT UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION

OFFENSE SPECIFIC TREATMENT AND PROVIDER STATES HE IS

NO LONGER THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY; MUST REGISTER AS

SEX OFFENDER FOR 10 YRS AFTER PROB.” The record doesn’t

contain the sentencing transcript or the plea agreement.

¶ 20 Based on this limited record, it’s unclear whether the minute

order reflects the court’s statements to Siegel before his plea or

afterward (or indeed whether the court said anything at all to Siegel

8
regarding his sex offender registration obligation), nor is it clear

whether the statement induced Siegel’s plea. But even if we

assume (without deciding) that the sentencing court misadvised

Siegel regarding his sex offender registration requirements, we

discern no error by the district court on the issue before us. Given

the statutory language described above, the court lacked discretion

to grant Siegel’s petition to deregister.

VII. Disposition

¶ 21 The district court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

9