Marriage of Chartier

24CA1734 Marriage of Chartier 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1734
Larimer County District Court No. 23DR30046
Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Mara Louise Chartier,

Appellee,

and

Scott Leonard Chartier,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Reilly, Vandenberg & Biggers, LLC, Lindsay W. Reilly, David P. Vandenberg,
Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee

Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Scott Leonard

Chartier (husband) and Mara Louise Chartier (wife), husband

appeals those portions of the permanent orders concerning

maintenance and child support. We affirm the judgment and

remand the case for further proceedings on wife’s request for

appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

I. Background

¶2 Husband works in the technology industry and has

historically received salary and performance-based bonuses. He

has also received income from two premarital businesses — Scream

& Zizz Fireworks, Inc., a retail fireworks company, and Edison

Properties LLC, a company that owns a building and rents space to

Scream & Zizz and a residential tenant. Wife was primarily a

homemaker during the marriage but, in 2020, began working as an

administrative assistant at the parties’ children’s private school.

¶3 In 2024, the district court dissolved the parties’ marriage and

entered permanent orders, dividing the marital estate relatively

equally. In considering wife’s request for maintenance, the court

found that wife’s gross income was $3,100 per month, rejecting

husband’s argument that she was voluntarily underemployed as an

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administrative assistant. It found that husband’s annual gross

income from his base salary and separate businesses was

approximately $271,900 ($22,650 per month), consisting of

$250,000 from his salary, $19,300 from Scream & Zizz, and $2,600

from Edison Properties. The court also found that husband had the

potential to receive an additional $105,000 annually in bonuses.

¶4 The court then ordered a “two step approach” to maintenance.

First, it directed husband to pay wife monthly maintenance in the

amount of $5,500 for ten years. The court credited husband for the

year he paid temporary maintenance, leaving nine years remaining.

Second, the court directed husband to pay wife a percentage of his

future after-tax bonuses each year for the next nine years — forty

percent in 2024 and 2025, and thirty percent from 2026 to 2032.

¶5 The court allocated parenting time for the parties’ minor

children equally and ordered husband to pay wife child support of

$353 per month in accordance with the child support guidelines.

II. Maintenance

¶6 Husband appeals the district court’s award of maintenance on

several grounds. He argues that the district court erred by

(1) failing to address the threshold question of whether wife lacked

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sufficient property and income to support herself and provide for

her reasonable needs; (2) miscalculating wife’s income; (3) including

husband’s business income in his gross income; (4) improperly

relying on the maintenance guidelines; (5) ordering maintenance for

ten years; and (6) requiring husband to pay wife a portion of his

future annual bonuses. We address and reject each contention.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 When a party requests maintenance, the court must first

make initial findings concerning the parties’ incomes, the division of

the marital property, the parties’ financial resources, the parties’

reasonable financial need, and the deductibility and taxability of the

maintenance award. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A)-(E), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 The court must then determine the amount and term of

maintenance, if any, that is fair and equitable to both parties.

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II). In making this determination, the court

considers the advisory guideline term of maintenance and, if the

parties’ combined annual gross income does not exceed $240,000,

an advisory guideline amount. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(b), (3.5).

It must also consider the statutory factors in section

14-10-114(3)(c). § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(B). And finally, the court

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must consider whether the party requesting maintenance lacks

sufficient property to provide for their reasonable needs and is

unable to support themselves through appropriate employment.

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d). The court may award maintenance

only if this threshold requirement is satisfied. § 14-10-114(3)(d).

¶9 We review a maintenance award for an abuse of discretion. In

re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12. A court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Herold,

2021 COA 16, ¶ 5. We defer to the district court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous, meaning they have no support in

the record. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶¶ 30-31.

B. Threshold Requirement

¶ 10 We first reject husband’s contention that the district court

failed to address the threshold question of whether wife lacked

sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and was

unable to support herself through appropriate employment.

¶ 11 After making initial findings under section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)

and considering the factors in section 14-10-114(3)(a)(II) and (3)(c),

the district court expressly found that wife “lacks sufficient property

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to provide for her reasonable needs and is currently unable to

support herself through appropriate employment absent an award

of maintenance.” See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d). Its findings

sufficiently explained the basis for that determination.

¶ 12 In particular, the court found that:

• wife had not worked outside the home for nearly fifteen

years as a result of the parties’ joint economic decision,

see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(VI), (VII), (X);

• wife had significantly fewer financial resources than

husband, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I);

• wife presently earned $3,100 per month, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A);

• wife’s after-tax income would not cover her housing

expenses, let alone her other necessary costs, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D), (3)(c)(I);

• husband was the family’s sole source of income for most

of the marriage, and his income (at least $22,650 per

month) was approximately five times wife’s, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (3)(c)(II), (3)(c)(X);

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• wife’s actual income and potential earning ability had

always been lower than husband’s income and earning

ability, and “likely [would] always be lower,” see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I), (3)(c)(V), (3)(c)(VI);

• wife was relying on financial support from others to meet

her needs, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I);

• the marital estate was divided about equally, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(B), (3)(c)(IV);

• the “parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during the

marriage” but likely could not sustain the exact same

lifestyle they had enjoyed after the divorce, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D), (3)(c)(III); and

• husband was paying wife temporary maintenance, which

was initially set at $8,500 per month and later reduced to

$3,000 per month, see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(VIII).

¶ 13 The record supports these findings and the court’s

determination that wife met the threshold requirement for

maintenance. See In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699, 701

(Colo. App. 1998) (“The determination of the threshold need

entitling a spouse to an award of maintenance is a question of

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fact. . . . [W]hen the order is supported by competent evidence, it

should not be disturbed on review.”). Specifically, wife testified that

she had been a homemaker during most of the marriage and relied

on husband’s income to meet her needs — a point that husband

also acknowledged. She explained that she only recently returned

to work as an administrative assistant, making $3,100 per month,

and that she could not afford her reasonable expenses based on her

income alone. Instead, she relied on temporary maintenance,

withdrawals from the parties’ home equity line of credit, and

financial support from her father to meet her needs. She also

described the parties’ comfortable standard of living during the

marriage, explaining that their children attended a private school,

they lived in a million-dollar home, and they took many vacations.

¶ 14 Husband contends that the court’s determination concerning

wife’s need for maintenance is inconsistent with its finding that

some of her reported expenses were unsustainable, unreasonable,

or unlikely to continue. But while the court questioned some of

wife’s monthly expenses, its findings suggested that at least $6,000

of her reported monthly expenses — well in excess of her $3,100

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monthly income — were reasonable and that, in addition to those

expenses, she would also incur necessary housing expenses.

¶ 15 Reasonable needs must be liberally construed based on the

parties’ particular facts and circumstances. In re Marriage of Yates,

148 P.3d 304, 313 (Colo. App. 2006). A court does not need to limit

maintenance to an amount that merely satisfies the party’s basic

needs. See id. Instead, the court may consider the parties’

standard of living during the marriage as a “starting point” for its

determination of a party’s reasonable needs. In re Marriage of

Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782, 789 (Colo. 2010). Thus, we are not

persuaded that the court’s rejection of some of wife’s reported

expenses undermines its determination that she still could not

independently meet her reasonable needs without maintenance.

¶ 16 Husband also asserts that wife’s receipt of substantial liquid

assets from the marital estate allowed her to meet her reasonable

needs. But a party is not required to deplete their share of the

marital estate to qualify for maintenance. See In re Marriage of

Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 26. And it is for the district court, not us, to

evaluate conflicting evidence and weigh the relevant circumstances

when reaching its decision. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA

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141, ¶ 45 (“We are not at liberty to re-evaluate the conflicting

evidence and set aside findings supported by the record.”).

C. Wife’s Income

¶ 17 Husband next contends that the district court erred in

determining wife’s income by (1) failing to impute income to her

based on her voluntary underemployment; (2) finding that the

difference between her actual income and her potential income was

not significant; (3) excluding the discount on the children’s tuition

that she receives as a benefit of her employment; and (4) excluding

gifts she receives from her family. We see no reversible error.

1. Voluntary Underemployment

¶ 18 A court generally determines maintenance based on the

parties’ actual gross incomes. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(a)(II). But

if a party is voluntarily underemployed, the court considers their

potential income instead. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); In re Marriage of

Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 29. A party is voluntarily

underemployed when they shirk their support obligation by

unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment. Collins, ¶ 29. A

party is not voluntarily underemployed when their employment

represents a good faith career choice. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B).

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¶ 19 Whether a party is underemployed for purposes of imputing

income is predominantly a question of fact, and we may not disturb

the district court’s finding if the record supports it. Collins, ¶ 30.

¶ 20 Husband argues that wife was voluntarily underemployed as

an administrative assistant because she previously worked as an

elementary school teacher, had a master’s degree in teaching, and

could earn a higher income as a teacher. But wife testified that she

stopped working in 2004 to stay home and care for the parties’

children. She explained that she returned to the workforce as an

administrative assistant in 2020 because the schedule allowed her

to continue to support the family needs and the job gave the parties

a discount on their children’s private school tuition. She also said

she could not return to teaching because her license was inactive.

¶ 21 The district court credited this testimony and found that wife’s

employment as an administrative assistant was a good faith career

choice. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B). It explained that wife had

stopped teaching almost twenty years ago to support the family, did

not have an active teaching license, and had been out of the

workforce for at least fifteen years before she took the job as an

administrative assistant. It further noted that because wife began

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this job a few years before the dissolution case, it was not

persuaded that she did so to avoid her support obligation.

¶ 22 Husband argues that the court’s finding was unsound because

it improperly focused on wife’s decision to take the job in 2020,

rather than her present circumstances. But nothing in the court’s

order suggests that its analysis was confined to the circumstances

in 2020. Wife testified not only about her reasons for taking the job

as an administrative assistant, but also her reasons for remaining

in the position. The court found her testimony credible and, based

on the totality of circumstances, determined that her decision to

continue to work as an administrative assistant was a good faith

career choice. Because the record supports the district court’s

findings, we will not disturb its decision. See Collins, ¶ 30.

2. Difference Between Actual and Potential Income

¶ 23 Husband also argues that the district court erred by finding

that the difference between wife’s actual income as an

administrative assistant ($37,250 per year) and her potential

income as a teacher ($52,200 per year) was not significant.

¶ 24 But the district court made this observation merely as “further

support[]” for its finding that wife was not underemployed. As we

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have explained above, the court also found, with record support,

that wife’s employment as an administrative assistant was a good

faith career choice. That finding alone was sufficient to sustain the

court’s finding that wife was not underemployed. See

§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(V)(B). Thus, even assuming the court understated

the difference between wife’s actual and putative potential income,

husband does not explain how that error affected the maintenance

award. It therefore does not provide a basis for disturbing the

award. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any

error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”).

3. Tuition Discount

¶ 25 Husband next contends that the district court erred by

excluding from wife’s gross income the discount her employer gave

her on the children’s private school tuition. We again disagree.

¶ 26 A party’s gross income includes “[e]xpense reimbursements or

in-kind payments received by a party in the course of employment

. . . if they are significant and reduce personal living expenses.”

§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(X). But to be included as gross income, benefits

received by a party must be “available for the individual’s

discretionary use or to reduce daily living expenses.” Tooker, ¶ 18.

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¶ 27 Wife testified that, as a benefit of her employment at the

children’s school, the children’s tuition was discounted by fifty

percent — $6,000 annually at the time of permanent orders. But

nothing in the record indicated that this discount was a “payment

received by [wife]” or that it was available to “reduce [her] personal

living expenses.” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(X); see also Tooker, ¶¶ 18-20

(holding that tuition assistance was properly excluded from income

where it was paid directly to the college and could not be used for

“general living or other discretionary expenses”). To the contrary, it

could be used only to reduce the children’s tuition — a benefit that,

notably, inured to both parties, who shared the cost of the tuition.

¶ 28 The district court therefore did not err by excluding the tuition

discount from wife’s gross income.

4. Financial Gifts from Wife’s Family

¶ 29 Husband testified that wife received substantial financial gifts

from her family. He argued in the district court, and argues on

appeal, that these gifts should have been included in wife’s income.

¶ 30 Gross income includes “monetary gifts,” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(U),

if they are “regularly received from a dependable source,” In re

Marriage of Nimmo, 891 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Colo. 1995).

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¶ 31 Wife acknowledged that, during the dissolution proceedings,

her father loaned her money and paid her monthly car payments.

But she testified that this financial support was only intended to

“bridge the gap” until the marriage was dissolved and her financial

situation was resolved. She also said the support was not typical,

and she did not expect it to continue after the dissolution.

Husband disagrees, highlighting that wife’s father had been

consistently paying her car payments since she purchased the car.

¶ 32 The district court acknowledged the gifts (including the

monthly car payments), heard the conflicting testimony, and found

that the money was not “regularly received.” See Nimmo, 891 P.2d

at 1008. Because that finding has record support, we may not

disturb it. See Capparelli, ¶ 30; Evans, ¶ 45. The district court

therefore did not err by excluding these gifts from wife’s income.

D. Husband’s Business Income

¶ 33 Husband asserts that the district court erred by including his

income from Scream & Zizz in his gross income. We disagree.

¶ 34 A party’s gross income does not include income from

additional jobs that result in employment of more than forty hours

per week or more than what would otherwise be considered full-

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time employment. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C). But it does include a

party’s income from closely held corporations beyond their salary

from primary employment. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(W); In re Marriage of

Upson, 991 P.2d 341, 343 (Colo. App. 1999), disapproved of on other

grounds by, In re Marriage of Boettcher, 2019 CO 81.

¶ 35 In addition to his full-time employment at Zimperium,

husband was the sole owner of Scream & Zizz — a fireworks

business that husband testified operated only two to three weeks

each summer. Husband explained that he typically hired family

members or other community members to sell the fireworks and

that the business supplied him with additional income each year.

¶ 36 These circumstances support the district court’s finding that

husband’s income from Scream & Zizz was “business income” from

a closely held corporation, not income from secondary employment.

See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(W), (8)(c)(II)(C); Upson, 991 P.2d at 343. The

district court thus properly included it in husband’s gross income.

E. Extrapolation from Maintenance Guidelines

¶ 37 Husband next contends that the district court improperly

relied on an extrapolation from the advisory statutory guidelines in

calculating the amount of maintenance. We are not persuaded.

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¶ 38 When, as here, the parties’ combined annual adjusted gross

income exceeds $240,000, the statutory calculation of a guideline

amount of maintenance does not apply. § 14-10-114(3.5). Instead,

the court must consider the factors in section 14-10-114(3)(c) in

determining the maintenance amount. § 14-10-114(3.5).

¶ 39 The district court in this case did exactly that. It first noted

correctly that, because the parties’ adjusted gross income is “above

the maintenance guidelines . . . there is no maintenance guideline

calculation.” It continued by correctly recognizing that, “[b]ecause

the maintenance guidelines do not apply,” it would consider the

factors in section 14-10-114(3)(c). And then it did so. After

separately addressing each statutory factor, it determined that a

fair and equitable amount of maintenance was $5,500 per month,

plus a percentage of husband’s after-tax bonuses each year.

¶ 40 Although the maintenance award was close to the statutory

calculation in section 14-10-114(3)(b), the district court gave no

indication that it was applying, or “extrapolating from,” that

calculation. Instead, it thoroughly addressed each of the section

14-10-114(3)(c) factors and made clear that its award was based on

those factors. See § 14-10-114(3.5). The court’s findings — which

16
are supported by the record — sufficiently explained the basis for

its decision. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 20.

¶ 41 Thus, the district court adhered to the statutory process for

determining the maintenance amount and awarded an amount of

maintenance based on the relevant facts and circumstances. We

perceive no abuse of discretion in that decision. See Tooker, ¶ 12.

F. Maintenance Term

¶ 42 Husband challenges the maintenance term only on the ground

that the district court’s findings were insufficient. We disagree.

¶ 43 In determining the appropriate term of maintenance, the court

considers the guideline term based upon the duration of the

marriage. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(b)(II)(A), (3.5). Unlike the

amount of maintenance, the guideline term of maintenance may

apply regardless of the parties’ income. § 14-10-114(3.5). And

when the marriage exceeds twenty years, the court may not award

maintenance for less than ten years unless it makes specific

findings to support a reduced term. § 14-10-114(3)(b)(II)(A). The

court’s findings must be “sufficiently explicit . . . to give the

reviewing court a clear understanding of the basis of its order.” In

re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 32 (citation omitted).

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¶ 44 The parties were married for more than twenty years. In

determining the term (and amount) of maintenance, the court

explicitly considered each of the factors in section 14-10-114(3)(c),

including the duration of the marriage. The court also noted that

the parties’ joint economic decision years earlier had taken wife out

of the workforce for nearly fifteen years. Based on these

considerations, the court found that ten years — the presumptive

guideline term — with a credit for the one year of temporary

maintenance husband had paid, was fair and equitable.

¶ 45 Given the guideline term of maintenance for an over-twenty-

year marriage and the record support for the court’s findings on the

statutory factors, we conclude that those findings were sufficient to

give us a clear understanding of the basis of the order.

G. Husband’s Bonuses

¶ 46 Husband finally argues that the district court erred by

ordering him to pay a percentage of his future annual bonuses to

wife as maintenance. He characterizes this ruling as an improper

allocation of his separate property to wife. We disagree with this

characterization. The district court took the bonuses into account

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as income for purposes of determining maintenance. It did not

allocate those post-divorce earnings to wife as marital property.

¶ 47 A party’s post-divorce earnings are separate property and are

“immunized from” the property division. In re Marriage of Hunt, 909

P.2d 525, 532 (Colo. 1995). Thus, a court may not divide a future

bonus as marital property when the necessary conditions for the

bonus have not yet been achieved. See In re Marriage of Turner,

2022 COA 39, ¶¶ 17-19. But a party’s gross income for purposes of

determining maintenance includes bonuses. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(E).

And when the court finds that a party’s income will fluctuate, the

court may order the party to pay as maintenance a percentage of

their fluctuating income. See Reap v. Reap, 350 P.2d 1063,

1065-66 (Colo. 1960); see also In re Marriage of Ostler, 272 Cal.

Rptr. 560, 567-71 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming maintenance award

consisting of fixed amount and percentage of future bonuses).

¶ 48 That is what happened in this case. Husband testified that, in

addition to his regular salary, he had consistently received annual

performance-based bonuses ranging from $36,000 to $142,000. He

had recently started a new job that offered an annual bonus of up

to $105,000, but he did not yet know the bonus structure or how

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much of that amount, if any, he was likely to receive. Based on this

testimony, the district court found that husband was likely to

receive some bonus, but it could not fairly determine how much.

¶ 49 That left the court with a dilemma in calculating husband’s

gross income. If the court based husband’s gross income on the

maximum bonus amount, as wife requested, it risked substantially

overstating husband’s income. If it based husband’s gross income

solely on his base salary with no bonus, as husband requested, it

risked substantially understating husband’s income and giving

husband a windfall. Rather than opting for one of these extremes,

either of which might have been inconsistent with the facts, the

court opted for what it called a “two step approach,” ordering a set

amount of maintenance tied to the base salary and an additional

amount of maintenance tied to the bonuses. This approach

ensured that the maintenance award was based on husband’s

actual gross income rather than the parties’ competing speculation

about what his income might be. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A).

¶ 50 In adopting this approach, the court did not give wife an

interest in husband’s post-divorce earnings. See Hunt, 909 P.2d at

532. It determined a fair and equitable maintenance amount that

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took into account the full scope of husband’s gross income. Given

the uncertainty and fluctuation of the bonuses, the district court

did not abuse its discretion by awarding maintenance equal to a

percentage of that income. See Reap, 350 P.2d at 1065-66.

III. Child Support

¶ 51 Husband’s appeal of the child support order is based entirely

on his argument that wife was voluntarily underemployed and,

thus, should have had income imputed to her. But we have

concluded above that the district court did not clearly err by finding

that wife was not voluntarily underemployed.1 We reject husband’s

challenge to the child support order for the same reasons. See

Wright, ¶ 21 n.3 (“[T]he analysis of voluntary underemployment [in

a child support case] is the same [as] in a maintenance case.”).

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 52 Wife requests an award of her appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025, on the ground that husband’s

appeal lacks substantial justification. We deny this request.

1 The district court made the same finding in calculating child

support, finding that wife’s career choice is not “intended to deprive
the children of support or unreasonably reduce the support
available to the children.” See § 14-10-115(5)(b)(III)(B), C.R.S. 2025.

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Although husband has not prevailed, his appeal was not so lacking

in rational argument as to warrant an award of fees. See Glover v.

Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that awards of

attorney fees for frivolous appeals should be reserved for “clear and

unequivocal” cases involving “egregious conduct” (citation omitted)).

¶ 53 Wife also requests an award of her appellate attorney fees

under section 14-10-119 based on the purported financial disparity

between the parties. Because the district court is better equipped

to resolve the factual issues associated with this request, we

remand the case to the district court to address wife’s request. See

C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30.

V. Disposition

¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings on wife’s request for appellate

attorney fees under section 14-10-119.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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